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Introduction 
 
 
This work aims to present a new understanding of Greek manumission, with specific 
attention both to the nature of the act through which masters conferred freedom upon 
their slaves and to the main features characterising the condition of freed individuals in 
the ancient Greek world. Much has been written about the concepts of slavery and 
freedom in ancient Greece; surprisingly, however, little attention has been paid by 
modern scholars to the various aspects of manumission, which ideally ‘bridges’ the gap 
between the two opposite poles of slavery and freedom. 
This study does not intend to discuss all the multiple aspects of manumission in 
ancient Greece, but, rather, to highlight the importance of adopting a legal approach to 
the study of this institution. My analysis will focus on the most relevant sources dealing 
with slaves’ liberation in Greece, and show that they convey detailed information about 
how the Greeks themselves conceptualised the grant of freedom to slaves. More 
specifically, this work will look at the ancient Greek sources on manumission from a 
legal perspective, with the aim of unearthing the legal concepts and definitions which 
shaped the liberation of slaves in ancient Greece. Most importantly, this kind of 
approach will be typically ‘emic’, in the sense that it will deal with the ancient categories 
as they were understood ‘by the subjects under consideration’.1 In other words, this 
study will unveil the sophisticated way in which the Greeks themselves understood 
manumission (as a legal institution) and the condition of freedmen (as one pertaining to 
legally free individuals), by exploring the Greeks’ own legal categories, rather than 
importing modern views and constructions in the analysis (an approach that would be 
informed, by contrast, by so-called ‘etic categories’, that are, ‘those of the examiner and 
not of the subject’).2 
                                                          
1 Lewis (forthcoming a). 
2 Lewis (forthcoming a). For a detailed discussion on the ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ categories, see Lloyd 
(1990): 7-20. 
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The fundamental reason for adopting a (‘emic’) legal approach lies in the very nature 
of the extant evidence. Our information on manumission is provided by inscriptions and 
forensic speeches, that are legal sources themselves. It follows that looking at the Greek 
legal concepts for our understanding of manumission is the only way to access the ‘emic’ 
dimension of the ancient sources: if we fail to investigate manumission – first of all – 
from a legal perspective and in light of the specific legal concepts and procedures used 
by the Greeks, we run the risk of misconstruing the nature of the extant evidence, and of 
turning the study of Greek manumission into an exercise in fitting the ancient institution 
into the straightjacket of our preconceptions. In order to define the Greeks’ own (‘emic’) 
legal understanding of manumission, my analysis will pay careful attention to the 
specific language and procedures presented by the sources, as this is the only way we 
can understand how the ancient social and legal actors viewed and conceptualised the 
liberation of slaves. 
This approach has not so far been typical of scholarship on Greek manumission. As I 
will discuss in further detail, most works which deal with slaves’ liberation can be 
challenged from a methodological point of view, but one aspect is – I believe – the main 
reason for the unsatisfactory results achieved in the study of manumission, namely, the 
general rejection of legal data and definitions. Zelnick-Abramovitz, for example, has 
expressly refused to look at the ancient sources for manumission by (also) using a legal 
perspective, arguing that ‘the attempts made by scholars to unearth juristic concepts, 
supposedly underlying these modes of manumission, induced long discussions on 
minute legal details that are often based on modern legal thinking and contribute little 
to our understanding of the ancient Greek concepts’.3 
As I will show, this assessment, and the approach to the ancient sources that it 
engenders, is highly misleading, as it ultimately implies that the legal dimension played 
only a secondary role among the Greeks, or that they did not develop specific legal 
concepts and definitions. It is true that many ‘legal’ assessments of Greek manumission 
in the past have effectively over-imposed modern and Roman legal categories on the 
                                                          
3 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 5. 
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ancient material, turning the study of Greek manumission into an exercise in taxonomy.4 
But it is misleading to imply that the uncritical adoption by scholars in the past of ‘etic’ 
legal categories is in itself evidence that a more nuanced and critically aware legal 
perspective is impossible and undesirable. And the alternative approach proposed by 
Zelnick-Abramovitz, while it denies that imposing extraneous legal categories on the 
material is a valid analytical tool, ends up replacing them with extraneous sociological 
categories, namely Patterson’s definition of slavery, which is imposed uncritically on 
source material that is quite explicitly resistant to it. 5  This refusal of analysing 
manumission as a legal institution has given rise to many mistaken interpretations 
which have for a long time prevented a complete understanding of Greek manumission. 
By contrast, a consideration of the legal aspects and an accurate interpretation of the 
legal institutions as they were understood by the Greeks themselves constitute a 
necessary starting-point for the study of the multiple implications of manumission in 
Greece, such as, for example, the economic and social ones. These aspects are also central 
for our understanding of slaves’ liberation in all its nuances; yet, they must rely on a 
solid knowledge of how the liberation of slaves was conceptualised as a legal institution 
by the social actors involved, and what specific effects it implied in the legal condition 
of slaves. Once these fundamental aspects are clear, and once we are able to discern – 
within the legal sources – which ones attest manumissions and which ones do not, it 
becomes possible to further our understanding of manumission by considering the 
economic and social dimensions of this phenomenon. 
Yet, before entering into the details of the Greek understanding of manumission, it is 
important to point out, first of all, the basic legal meanings of slavery and freedom. More 
specifically, at the heart of this research is the idea that slavery and freedom need to be 
understood, first of all, as legal statuses conveying specific and fundamental (legal) 
implications. Recent works have challenged those scholarly interpretations which 
rejected the ‘traditional’ view of slaves as property, and highlighted the necessity of a 
newly orientated approach to the ancient sources which should be based, first of all, on 
                                                          
4 See below for a discussion of Calderini’s work, which suffers from these very problems. 
5 See below n. 28. 
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the understanding of slavery as a legal condition based on the right of ownership.6 What 
is important to stress here is that, although the ancient sources often use the vocabulary 
of slavery and freedom according to multiple shades of meaning which pertain to the 
specific contexts (slavery and freedom may be used, for example, in a political sense7, or 
in their social dimension8, or, again, in the context of philosophical argumentations9), we 
need to keep in mind that the various ways in which these concepts might be addressed 
originate from a basic legal significance, and are extended metaphorically to other 
spheres. 
Slavery is in fact, first and above all, a legal condition characterised by a relationship 
between masters and slaves based on the right of ownership. This means, in other words, 
that slaves are included among their masters’ property like any other object, and that 
masters can exercise on slaves all the rights and powers descending from ownership. 
Two points need to be made clear from the outset. The first pertains to the right of 
ownership itself. The common misconception, that because the Greeks did not have a 
class of jurists who theorised an abstract concept parallel to that of the Roman dominium, 
they lacked the legal idea and definition of ownership, needs to be challenged. This view 
ignores that the ancient sources are unequivocal in showing that Greek owners clearly 
knew what ownership implied, as they exercised on their property all the rights and 
powers that typically descend from the entitlement to the right of ownership. In other 
                                                          
6 Most recently, cf. Lewis (forthcoming a). 
7 The most notorious example is perhaps provided by Herodotus in the seventh Book of the 
Histories, in which the Spartan king Demaratus addresses Xerxes by stressing that the Greeks are 
free and yet subject only to νόμος as their δεσπότης, as opposed to the Persians who are to be 
considered ‘enslaved’ because of their subjection to Xerxes as their δεσπότης: cf. Hdt. 7.104.4. 
8 Some examples for the use of the vocabulary of slavery and freedom in their social meanings 
will be offered in chapters 2, 3 and 4. However, it might be worth to point out, as noted below, 
that a typical example in this regard is offered by those inscriptions in which the obligations of 
freedmen towards their former masters are described with the vocabulary of slavery: this practice 
clearly reflects a metaphorical use of the vocabulary of slavery, which points to its ‘social’ 
dimension, by which working for other people was conceived of as slavish. On this point, see 
Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 101; Lewis (forthcoming a). 
9 Lewis (forthcoming a) stresses that, in this context, the language of slavery ‘is often related 
to dispositional vices. In a philosophical context a man can be said to be enslaved to one of his 
passions or appetites that exercises despotic power over him’. For a detailed discussion on the 
multiple registers which could inform the use of the vocabulary of slavery and freedom in the 
ancient sources, yet all originating from a basic legal meaning, see Lewis (forthcoming a). 
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words, it is certainly possible to say that, at least in Athens, there was ‘a sophisticated 
practical understanding of property law’.10 This consideration brings us to the second 
point which is important to keep in mind when addressing the issue of slavery as a legal 
institution: the masters’ entitlement to exercise over their slaves all the rights and powers 
descending from ownership is abundantly attested in the ancient Greek sources. 
In an important essay published in 1961, Honoré has shown that ownership (which 
he defines as ‘the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law 
recognizes’), far from being a Roman invention, is a transculturally recognised concept 
which is shared by all mature systems, from the primitive to the modern: ‘Ownership, 
dominium, propriété, Eigentum and similar words stand not merely for the greatest interest 
in things in particular systems, but for a type of interest with common features 
transcending particular systems’, as ‘everywhere the “owner” can, in the simple 
uncomplicated case in which no other person has interest in the thing, use it, stop others 
using it, lend it, sell it or leave it by will’.11 
Moreover, Honoré singled out ten ‘incidents of ownership’, which he defines as 
‘conditions for the person of inherence to be designated “owner” of a particular thing in 
a given system’12 and which ‘have a tendency to remain constant from place to place and 
age to age’.13 These common features descending from ownership have been identified 
as follows: 1) right to possess (‘the right … to have exclusive physical control of a thing’); 
2) right to use (which implies that ‘the owner’s liberty to make use of his property is 
more extensive than any other form of legal interest’)14; 3) right to manage (‘the right to 
decide how and by whom the thing owned shall be used’); 4) right to the income (‘the 
right to harvest and either consume or sell anything grown on his land; if he rented his 
land to anyone, he had the right to collect the payment of rent … in the case of slaves, 
masters in Greece had the right to anything they produced [including the children of 
                                                          
10 Lewis (2016): 38. 
11 Honoré (1961): 108. 
12 Honoré (1961): 113. 
13 Honoré (1961): 109, 112-113, where he specifies that ‘the listed incidents are not individually 
necessary’, since ‘the use of “owner” will extend to cases in which not all the listed incidents are 
present’. 
14 Lewis (2016): 35. 
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slave-women]’)15; 5) right to the capital (‘the power to alienate the thing and the liberty 
to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it’); 6) right to security (‘an immunity 
from expropriation, based on rules which provide that … the transmission of ownership 
is consensual’); 7) transmissibility (‘the permanence of this interest is so strong that it 
outlasts the lifespan of the owner: the property thus passes to his heir after the owner’s 
death’) and 8) absence of term (‘an owner’s rights over his property are essentially 
permanent: unless he chooses to alienate his property, or unless the property is seized 
by the state or a third party for legally legitimate reasons …, his interest in the item is 
permanent’)16; 9) prohibition of harmful use (which implies that ‘an owner cannot use 
his property to illegal ends’)17; 10) liability to execution (‘liability of the owner’s interest 
to be taken away from him for debt, either by execution of a judgment debt or on 
insolvency’). 
Those works that have looked at Greek slavery with a legal approach have shown 
that, from the Homeric poems through to the Classical age and beyond, masters did 
exercise on their slaves all the rights and powers descending from ownership, as this is 
largely attested in the ancient sources.18 
On the other hand, the general failure to acknowledge the basic legal implications of 
slavery and freedom has often led scholars not to take into consideration the distinction, 
which recurs in the ancient sources, between legal and factual aspects and implications 
of manumission in the condition of freedmen. This is another key-point that it is 
fundamental to keep in mind in analysing the Greek evidence for manumission. The 
following example will make the point clearer. The Greek sources sometimes refer to 
freedmen as ‘slaves’, or describe the services they need to perform in favour of their 
manumittors with verbs that typically identify slavish tasks (such as δουλεύειν). This 
has created much confusion among scholars, who have failed altogether to acknowledge 
that such usages do not refer to the legal condition of freedmen after manumission 
                                                          
15 Harris (2015b): 119. 
16 Lewis (2016): 36. 
17 Lewis (2016): 36. 
18 This has been made clear, for example, in several works by Harris: cf., most importantly, 
Harris (2002): 416-417, (2012), (2015b): 118-120. See also Lewis (2016); (forthcoming a). 
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(which is clearly one of freedom) but, rather, to the de facto condition of those 
manumitted slaves who were required to perform further services after their liberation. 
Working for another person was considered to be somehow slavish; yet, as I will show 
(especially in chapters 2 and 4), such an obligation does not undermine the legal 
condition of freedom which characterised these manumitted slaves: this means, in other 
words, that their manumittors could not exercise on them any of the powers and rights 
descending from ownership. 
The same considerations can be made for the meaning and implications of freedom, 
as the idea of freedom is closely connected to that of slavery. 19  The original legal 
significance conveyed by the concept of ‘slavery’ characterises also the primeval concept 
of freedom. Like slavery, the term ἐλευθερία and the adjective ἐλεύθερος are often used 
in the Greek sources with different nuances and meanings. Yet, these multiple registers 
originate from a basic legal meaning which, as opposed to slavery, identifies the legal 
condition of an individual who does not belong to anyone and, at the same time, is a 
legal person who – as such – is entitled to rights and duties. 
Although scholars have often rejected a legal approach to the concept of freedom, 
arguing that such an idea was unknown to the Greeks, clarifying the basic legal 
implications of slavery and freedom is key for a proper understanding of Greek 
manumission. Returning to the example previously considered, we notice that the 
ancient sources often suggest that, at the end of their παραμονή period, freedmen 
become (completely) free.20  This element has been interpreted as an indication that, 
while under παραμονή, manumitted slaves were still slaves or ‘half-slaves’, whilst they 
would become legally free only at the end of παραμονή. 21  Such an interpretation, 
however, fails to recognise that many legal clauses mentioned in the inscriptions state 
explicitly that, from a legal perspective, manumitted slaves under παραμονή were 
already free individuals. Such an expression in extra-legal contexts reflects a 
                                                          
19 Vlassopoulos (2011): 117. 
20 Cf. Harp. s.v. ἀποστασίου; see also FD III 1:303 (from 1st century B.C. Delphi). 
21 For the first view (manumitted slaves under παραμονή were in a legal condition of slavery), 
see, most recently, Sosin (2015); for the second view (ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή were half-
slaves), cf., for example, Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 244-246. 
8 
 
metaphorical usage of the vocabulary of freedom or, more specifically, refers to their de 
facto situation, which was no longer characterised by the existence of any further 
obligation bounding them to the beneficiaries of their services. This shows, in other 
words, that the Greeks were very aware of the various possible usages of the language 
of freedom, and were capable of discriminating between them.22 
It is in light of these considerations that we must understand manumission: given the 
legal nature of slavery (a legal condition characterising those individuals who belong as 
property to another person) and of freedom (in the opposite sense of legal condition 
typical of those persons who do not belong to anyone) as they are conceptualised in 
Greek legal documents, and given the language of the Greek evidence for manumission 
itself, we can define manumission as the legal act through which masters extinguished 
their right of ownership over their slaves and conferred freedom upon them (often in 
exchange for money). More specifically, the legal nature of manumission is clear from 
its very first attestations, which can be found in the Homeric poems: as I will show in 
chapter 1, both the Iliad and the Odyssey describe episodes of manumission as taking 
specific forms according to the different contexts they represent; in both cases, however, 
manumission is described as a purely legal act that marks the transition from a legal 
condition of slavery to a legal condition of freedom. This further confirms that in 
Homeric society the contrast between slavery and freedom pertains exclusively to legal 
statuses, from which all the other possible meanings of those concepts originated and 
developed.23 
Manumission, on the other hand, is closely connected to the right of ownership, as it 
can be understood as a typical expression of the owners’ right to dispose of their 
property by extinguishing their right of ownership (a point that will be further explained 
in chapter 5). Unlike alienation, in which the right of ownership is transferred to another 
person (for example, via sale or gift), manumission marks the complete extinction of the 
right of ownership over slaves: in other words, since the latter become legally free 
individuals, no one can exercise over them any of the rights and powers descending 
                                                          
22 On this point, see Lewis (forthcoming a). 
23 Cf. Lewis (forthcoming a). 
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from ownership, as they are now in turn transformed into legal subjects. At the same 
time, because manumission is a typical expression of the masters’ right to dispose of 
their property, the Greek sources describe manumission as the result of a decision which 
pertains exclusively to individual slave owners: except for specific exceptions to this 
general rule (which will be analysed in chapter 5), masters’ exclusive entitlement to 
manumission reflects the nature of the right of ownership in Greece, the exercise of 
which did not admit any kind of interference by third parties.24 
As mentioned above, however, modern scholars have failed to adopt a productive 
legal approach based on an ‘emic’ understanding of the Greek legal institutions. They 
tend, by contrast, to over-impose modern categories both on the evidence for 
manumission and on the institution of slaves’ liberation itself. 
Calderini’s outdated La manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia and Zelnick-
Abramovitz’s Not Wholly Free: the Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted 
Slaves in the Ancient Greek World are the only monographs entirely dedicated to the study 
of manumission in Greece. Both these works constitute useful starting-points for the 
study of the liberation of slaves in Greece, as they offer a wide-ranging survey of 
manumission in the entire Greek world, a detailed exposition on the previous 
scholarship, as well as a valuable collection of the relevant sources (both literary and 
epigraphical). Their respective approaches, however, present some important 
methodological flaws that do not allow for a complete understanding of the mechanisms 
surrounding the liberation of slaves in Greece.  
Calderini’s analysis of Greek manumission, for example, is characterised by a strict 
taxonomic methodology, by which the ancient sources are grouped within specific 
‘modes’ of manumission, within which precise ‘forms’ of slaves’ liberation are listed.25 
                                                          
24 Jones (1956): 198. 
25 Calderini (1965): 93: ‘… io distinguo anzitutto le manomissioni in due grandi categorie: 
ordinarie e straordinarie; le prime cioè, che avvengono nelle condizioni normali della vita greca, 
sollecitate da cause complesse e non sempre direttamente avvertibili, le seconde che avvengono 
in condizioni speciali, provocate da circostanze politiche d’importanza e in ogni modo sanzionate 
da una deliberazione del popolo con un decreto speciale’. His classification of the Greek modes 
of manumission is the following: ‘I. Manomissione ordinaria. A) Tipo Greco. 1° Religiosa. α) 
consacrazione ad una divinità; β) vendita ad una divinità; γ) protezione da parte di una divinità; 
a) invocazione della protezione di un dio sul liberto; b) modo civile-religioso. 2° Civile. α) per 
10 
 
This approach is useful for a modern reader, who can thus have easier access to the 
complex variety of Greek sources dealing with manumission; yet, the rigid 
classifications and definitions he proposes seem to reflect modern ideas rather than 
Greek conceptualisations. For example, one of the fundamental distinctions suggested 
by Calderini is that between ‘sacral’ and ‘secular’ modes of manumission: the first – 
sacral – is characterised by the active role played by the gods in the manumission 
procedure, whereas the second – secular – includes all those forms of manumission 
which do not require the intervention of the divine element, but of civic bodies only.26 
Within the first group, he lists the Delphic manumissions through ‘sale’ of a slave to the 
god, the Chaironeian inscriptions which (according to the traditional interpretation) 
record manumissions through ‘consecrations’ of slaves and, finally, a few sources which 
are believed to represent manumissions through invocation of the god’s protection. In 
the second group are included, for instance, some sources concerning manumissions 
carried out in Athens as mentioned in the forensic speeches, in which only ‘civic’ bodies 
are involved in the slaves’ liberation. This classificatory approach underpins the entire 
work by Calderini, and a reader gets the impression that the Greeks conceived of 
manumission as an act which was firmly organised into specific classifications. A closer 
look at the ancient sources, however, shows that it was neither the intervention or not of 
the god which shaped manumissions, nor the external form (either sale, consecration, or 
‘conditional sale’) given to this act. Rather, the rationale behind all the possible ‘modes’ 
and ‘forms’ of manumission was that, given that slaves lacked legal personality, 
whenever masters required money in return for manumission the intervention of a third 
party was needed in order to make a legally valid and effective payment. Whether the 
third party was a god or not, and independently or not of the external form given to this 
                                                          
mezzo di atti individuali; β) per mezzo di liste di manomissione civili; γ) διά κήρυκος; δ) per 
testamento, B) Tipo greco-romano 1° Atti pubblici. 2° Atti privati: α) inter amicos. II. 
Manomissione straordinaria. A) in guerra; B) altre manomissioni straordinarie per decreto’ (cf. 
Calderini [1965]: 94-95, where he specifies that ‘il tipo più specialmente greco’ is labelled as such 
‘anche se per avventura fosse nato altrove’, whereas ‘il tipo greco-romano’ emerged ‘quando il 
diritto romano nei paesi di conquista si sovrappose e si mescolò al diritto greco anche in questa 
parte della legislazione antica’). 
26 Calderini (1965): 96-107, 125-135. 
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act, this study will show that although modern definitions, such as of ‘religious’ forms 
of manumission versus ‘civic’ ones, might be useful for pure taxonomic reasons and for 
an easier access to the ancient material, they fail altogether to make justice of the 
sophisticated legal reasoning on which Greek manumissions were ultimately based. 
The monograph by Zelnick-Abramovitz, on the other hand, relies for her 
interpretation of Greek manumission and its implications on a complete rejection of the 
legal data, which she describes as ‘futile’.27 Instead, her study looks at the ancient sources 
using a sociological approach which is expressly informed by Patterson’s view on the 
concept of slavery, based in its turn on the denial of the definition of slavery as a 
relationship based on ownership.28 It follows that her definitions both of slavery (in 
which she includes ‘any kind of dependence’) and of freedom (which would refer to a 
condition of ‘complete independence’) entirely ignore the basic legal meanings of these 
concepts in the ancient sources.29 Such an approach runs into multiple problems, and her 
understanding both of the nature of manumission (which she describes in terms of 
φιλία)30 and of the condition of manumitted slaves is difficult to accept – often her 
conclusions are incompatible with an analysis of the relevant texts, and her categories 
are superimposed on the evidence yet fail to make full sense of it. One example of the 
shortcomings of her approach will clarify its weaknesses. When discussing the nature of 
manumission with παραμονή, for instance, Zelnick-Abramovitz argues that its nature 
is that of a ‘delayed’ or ‘deferred’ manumission resulting in a ‘conditional freedom’ for 
                                                          
27 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 38. 
28  Cf. Patterson (1982): 13, 21, who notably defines slavery as ‘the permanent, violent 
domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons’. His denial of an 
understanding of slavery as based on ownership relies on two main arguments. First, he argues 
that relationships based on ownership are not typical of slavery only (‘to define slavery only as 
the treatment of human beings as property fails as a definition, since it does not really specify any 
distinct category of persons. Proprietary claims and powers are made with respect to many 
persons who are clearly not slaves. Indeed, any person, beggar or king, can be the object of a 
property relation. Slaves are no different in this respect’). Second, he maintains that property is 
not cross-culturally recognised, and that some societies even lacked the idea of ownership: it 
follows, in his view, that property – being different from one society to another – cannot be taken 
as the common denominator for slavery. For a detailed criticism of Patterson’s approach, see, 
most recently, Lewis (2016). 
29 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 9. 
30 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 50-60. 
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manumitted slaves31; moreover, she argues that manumitted slaves under παραμονή 
were in a condition of ‘semi-freedom or semi-slavery’.32 Yet the concept of ‘conditional’ 
or ‘deferred’ freedom and the interpretation of the condition of manumitted slaves under 
παραμονή as half-way between slavery and freedom not only are not supported by the 
ancient sources, but also constitute modern categories, which do not reflect the meanings 
of the Greek sources. These sources are uncontroversially underpinned by the basic legal 
meanings of slavery and freedom and, therefore, of manumission as a legal institution. 
This short discussion isolates some of the methodological flaws of these modern 
analyses of the ancient Greek sources: more specifically, both works are typically ‘etic’, 
although in a very different way from each other. On the one hand, Calderini’ work is 
clearly informed by a legal approach, yet he builds a rigid taxonomy on the (exclusive) 
basis of modern categories. On the other hand, the analysis by Zelnick-Abramovitz not 
only underplays the legal dimension and nature of the ancient sources themselves, but 
also over-imposes modern sociological concepts and definitions to this evidence. An 
approach which combines legal data and definitions with ‘emic’ categories derived from 
the conceptualisations present in the source material itself promises to avoid these 
pitfalls and provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate understanding of Greek 
manumission. 
Apart from these works, which are entirely dedicated to the study of slaves’ liberation 
in ancient Greece, manumission – as mentioned before – has been relatively ignored by 
modern scholars. In most cases, it is referred to through brief remarks, mainly at the 
conclusion of general discussions on Greek slavery or society. In this sense, 
manumission is simply seen as the act which brings slavery to an end, thus ignoring or 
underestimating the complex problematics that naturally arise from the transformation 
of slaves into free persons (such as, for example, the ways slaves were made free; the 
possible connection they may maintain with their former owners and the effects on their 
legal condition; or, again, the implications of their inclusion among the free population). 
Of the other existing works on manumission, most confine their analysis to single aspects 
                                                          
31 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 239-248. 
32 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 339. 
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of the procedure through which slaves were granted freedom, or limit their attention to 
specific geographical or chronological contexts. Some studies, for example, deal with the 
nature of παραμονή only 33 ; or with the religious dimension of particular evidence 
dealing with manumission 34 ; or with the social position of freedmen and their 
relationship with other members of Greek society.35 Other works, on the other hand, 
analyse manumission and the condition enjoyed by manumitted slaves in specific 
geographical contexts 36 , or in given periods of Greek history. 37  As a result, our 
knowledge of manumission in Greece is often restricted to specific aspects concerning 
the act of manumission itself or the condition of manumitted slaves, and we lack an 
overall view of this phenomenon. 
Our understanding of manumission in Greece is therefore incomplete, and relies 
largely on interpretations of the ancient material that are, in most cases, inaccurate. This 
is certainly due, in the first place, to the status of the extant evidence, which constitutes 
a major problem for scholars of Greek manumission. On the one hand, the ancient Greek 
literary and epigraphic sources are on the whole fragmentary and leave many gaps, and 
this often hampers a correct interpretation of the information they provide. On the other 
hand, the geographical and chronological distribution of the Greek sources is far from 
uniform. For example, the most important source of information for manumission is the 
epigraphic material from Central Greece (mainly Boeotia), dating from the 2nd century 
B.C. up to the end of the 1st century A.D. The case of Athens, on the other hand, is 
somewhat peculiar: while this πόλις provides the bulk of the evidence for our 
understanding of many aspects of Greek laws and institutions, it lacks a consistent body 
of sources for manumission. For a long time scholars held that the so-called φιάλαι 
ἐξελευθερικαί constituted a uniform corpus of inscriptions referring to Athenian 
manumissions and argued that they provide the major source of information for the 
                                                          
33 Cf., for example, Samuel (1965): 221-311; Waldstein (1986); Westermann (1948b): 9-50. 
34 For example, Sokolowski (1954): 173-181; Bömer (1960). 
35 Bearzot (2005): 77-92; Dimopoulou (2008): 27-50; Finley (1964): 233-249; Gärtner, 2008: 453-
466. 
36 Babacos (1964): 494–503; Cabanes (1974): 105-209; Lewis (1959): 208-238; Martini (1995): 11-
18, (2005): 46-47; Mulliez (1992): 31-44; Tod (1901/1902): 197-230; Westermann (1946): 92-104. 
37 See, for instance, Lencman (1966); Nieto (1982): 21-29. 
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practice of liberating slaves in Classical Athens. Recent interpretations, however, have 
shown that these sources can no longer be considered as evidence for manumission. It 
follows that our understanding of manumission in Athens can only rely on the analysis 
of a few forensic speeches from the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.; these sources, however, 
refer to manumission and manumitted slaves through sporadic references, thus leaving 
the modern reader with a piecemeal picture of the multiple aspects which informed the 
liberation of slaves in Classical Athens. Therefore, together with the methodological 
shortcomings which characterise modern approaches to the ancient sources for 
manumission, the difficulty of disentangling the ancient material also explains the 
unsatisfactory results of the modern attempts to understand Greek manumission. 
The Greek language referred to manumitted slaves with the word ἀπελεύθεροι. The 
term ἀπελεύθερος has a strong implication, as it clearly conveys the idea of ‘separation’ 
or, to better say, of ‘provenance’ from a previous legal condition of non-freedom, that is, 
of slavery. This is clear from the very etymology of ἀπελεύθερος: the term is composed 
by the prefix ἀπό-, which stresses the aspect of ‘origin’ or ‘provenance from’38, followed 
by the adjective ἐλεύθερος. The ultimate meaning of ἀπελεύθερος is then twofold: on 
the one hand, it functions as a constant reminder of the fact that, although legally 
included among the free population, manumitted slaves are not ab origine free 
individuals, as their actual condition of freedom originates from a previous condition of 
non-freedom (that is, of slavery). On the other hand, it implies that even though 
manumitted slaves were legally free (in the sense that they did not belong to anyone), 
they were nonetheless excluded from citizenship (πολιτεία) – they were rather enrolled 
among the population of the free non-citizens. One of the main features of the condition 
enjoyed by ἀπελεύθεροι is that they usually did not acquire, together with freedom, 
citizenship rights: this aspect is often said to mark the fundamental distinction between 
ἀπελεύθεροι and liberti in Roman law, who would usually acquire, together with 
freedom, the status of cives as an effect of manumission (with the important exception of 
                                                          
38  For a detailed discussion on the meaning of the prefix ἀπό- in ancient Greek, see 
Papanastassiou (2011): 98, who stresses that ‘the main meanings of the preposition ἀπό are “from, 
away from” (of motion, position, etc.), “from after” (of time), “from” (of origin, cause, material, 
instrument, etc.)’. 
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the so-called ‘informal manumissions’).39 Exclusion from citizenship bears significant 
implications in the de facto condition of manumitted slaves: as non-citizens, they were 
excluded, most notably, from political rights, duties and activity; their procedural 
capacity was limited; and non-political ‘privileges’ did not apply to them (for example, 
they were excluded from ownership of real estate, unless the ἔγκτησις γῆς καὶ οἰκίας 
was specifically granted to them). 40  On the other hand, the grant of citizenship to 
manumitted slaves was conceived of as an exceptional reward, which was only assigned 
in rare occasions and did not depend on their masters’ will, but exclusively on a decision 
taken by the πόλις through the enactment of a ψήφισμα ad hoc. The best known case of 
a public grant of citizenship rights to an ἀπελεύθερος comes from Classical Athens and 
refers to Pasion, an ex-slave of two bankers (Antisthenes and Archestratos) who was first 
manumitted by his owners towards the end of the 4th century B.C. and put in charge of 
the bank41, and later given Athenian citizenship by the πόλις, which enacted a ψήφισμα 
ad hoc, because of the contributions that Pasion rendered to the state.42 Apart from these 
exceptional cases, once freed, ἀπελεύθεροι joined the population of the free non-citizens: 
as I will illustrate in chapter 4, however, their condition cannot be properly assimilated 
to that of the metics, as the differences existing between the two groups suggests that we 
should look at them as two separate categories of free non-citizens. 
This work will look at the Greek evidence for manumission with particular attention, 
on the one hand, to the legal nature of manumission and, on the other hand, to the legal 
condition enjoyed by ἀπελεύθεροι after their liberation. Moreover, it will show that 
both these aspects of manumission share the same basic features in different 
                                                          
39 Cf. Sirks (1981), (1983). 
40 On Greek citizenship in general (and Athenian πολιτεία in particular), as well as on its 
nature and implications, see, most recently, Brock (2015); Rhodes (2015). 
41 Cf., for instance, Dem. 36.48. 
42 Cf. [Dem.] 59.2: ψηφισαμένου γὰρ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι Πασίωνα 
καὶ ἐκγόνους τοὺς ἐκείνου διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας τὰς εἰς τὴν πόλιν … (‘when the people of Athens 
passed a decree granting the right of citizenship to Pasion and his descendants on account of 
services to the state …’). According to Davies (1971): 428, followed by Osborne (1983): 48, Pasion 
was manumitted in early 390s and then granted citizenship by the πόλις ten years later, in early 
380s. 
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geographical and chronological contexts of the Greek world, thus pointing to a 
substantial unity of the Greek law pertaining to manumission and manumitted slaves. 
Chapter one will focus on the historical origins of Greek manumission, an issue that 
has received very little attention by modern scholars. This is due to two main reasons: 
first, the fact that ἀπελεύθεροι are only mentioned in Greek sources from the Classical 
age onwards; second, the widely-accepted idea that slavery as an institution did not 
develop before the 6th century B.C., that is, as an effect of the economic and social reforms 
carried out by Solon. After embracing the most recent interpretations which, through the 
analysis of the legal data, have shown that the institution of slavery was already in 
existence in Homeric society, this chapter will examine the evidence from the Iliad and 
the Odyssey, and will show that both poems attest to episodes of manumission, which is 
presented as a (purely) legal act determining the transition from a legal condition of 
slavery to a legal condition of freedom. On the one hand, this conclusion will show that 
specific forms of manumission were practiced long before the 6th century B.C.; on the 
other hand, it will further confirm that slavery at the time of the Solonian reforms, far 
from being a new institution, had an important and fundamental antecedent in Homeric 
slavery. 
Chapter 2 will look at the most extensive source of information for Greek 
manumission, namely, the corpus of the Delphic inscriptions from the 2nd and 1st century 
B.C. Traditionally included among the so-called ‘sacral’ manumissions, these 
inscriptions have always puzzled scholars, as in these sources manumission takes the 
form of a sale of the slaves to the god Apollo. After addressing the relationship between 
sale and manumission, their (opposite) legal effects and the different interpretations 
suggested by scholars on this point, the chapter will question the nature of these 
manumissions and show that they do not record actual sales but, rather, bilateral legal 
transactions by which slaves ‘acquired’ their own freedom through the intervention of 
the god, to whom they had previously entrusted their money. Secondly, the chapter will 
investigate the legal condition of those manumitted slaves who, after their liberation, 
were required to παραμένειν with their manumittors, an issue which still divides 
scholars and which is still far from being definitely clarified. Through an analysis of the 
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legal nature of παραμονή and of the individual clauses that could follow such an 
agreement (most importantly, the concept and implication of ἀπόλυσις), the chapter will 
highlight the distinction between the legal condition of these manumitted slaves, which 
is clearly one of freedom, and their de facto situation, which required them to perform 
further services in favour of their manumittors. 
Chapter 3 will consider another important corpus of inscriptions which has been 
traditionally included among the ‘sacral’ manumissions, namely, the epigraphic 
material from Hellenistic Chaeronea, which will be discussed as a case-study. The 
traditional view holds that, in these inscriptions, manumission takes the form of a 
consecration and, consequently, that slaves become free (ἱεροί) as an effect of their 
consecration to the god by their masters. This chapter will argue that there are several 
reasons to abandon this view, which is problematic because it implies that the ultimate 
effects of manumission and of consecration are the same. After highlighting that 
manumission and consecration have opposite legal effects (extinction of any right of 
ownership versus transfer of ownership to a new owner), the chapter will focus on the 
individual clauses which are mentioned in these inscriptions (most significantly, the fact 
that also ἀπελεύθεροι were dedicated as sacred to the god proves that manumission 
and consecration were conceived of as two separate legal transactions), and argue that 
the condition of ἱεροί was a very peculiar one, in which the contrast between the legal 
and the factual dimension is perhaps mostly evident. 
Chapter 4 will turn to the evidence dealing with Classical Athens, for which we know 
very little about manumission: the only information we have is provided by a few 
forensic speeches (the most relevant ones are [Dem.] 59 and Hyp. 3), which deal however 
only indirectly with manumission itself. A close look at their text will show that in 
Athens (as well as in other πόλεις from the Classical age) manumission shares the same 
basic features of slaves’ liberation as is attested in the inscriptions from Delphi: on the 
one hand, payment in return for manumission implies that this act is described as a 
bilateral transaction between slaves’ masers and a third party; on the other hand, the 
Athenian evidence further suggests the existence of two categories of manumitted slaves, 
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depending on the imposition or not of παραμονή obligations upon them: both, however, 
enjoyed a legal condition of freedom and differed only as for their de facto situation. 
Finally, chapter 5 will address a specific issue, namely, the possibility for the πόλις to 
interfere with the individual masters’ right of ownership by ‘forcedly’ manumitting 
privately-owned slaves. After questioning the consistency of this ‘mode’ of 
manumission with the nature of Greek ownership, and after remarking that such a kind 
of public intervention corresponds to a form of expropriation which, as such, was 
expressly limited to specific cases and circumstances (in accordance with what we call 
‘right to security’), the chapter will investigate the specific conditions in which ‘public 
manumissions’ have been allowed in Classical Greece. After analysing the evidence from 
Classical Athens, Rhodes and Chios, the chapter will look at the evidence referring to 
Classical Sparta, as this πόλις (which is generally ignored in modern studies on 
manumission) seems to be described in the ancient sources as representing the most 
intrusive form of intervention by the state in masters’ right to dispose of their ownership 
by extinguishing it. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The origins of manumission in Greece: the evidence from the Homeric poems 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
One aspect of Greek manumission that has received very little attention is that of its 
historical origins. This is primarily due to two main reasons. The first one is that – as is 
commonly acknowledged by scholars – the the first references to ἀπελεύθεροι can only 
be found in Greek sources dating from the 5th century B.C. onwards43: for this reason, 
modern discussions on manumission in Greece tend to focus on the evidence from the 
Classical and the Hellenistic ages. The second one is that the very existence of slavery 
before the 6th century B.C. has been the object of many debates among scholars: as for 
Athens, for example, it has commonly been held that the institution of slavery emerged 
in close connection with the reforms carried out by Solon.44 It follows that the nature (or 
even the very existence) of manumission in earlier sources has largely been ignored by 
modern scholarship: if manumission, in legal terms, is a datio libertatis, that is, the 
liberation of a slave from his master’s ownership and potestas45 , it follows that this 
institution is strictly connected to slavery, as it could only exist in those societies in which 
slavery was known and practiced. However, given the widely accepted assumption by 
which slavery only developed in the 6th century B.C., there has been very little space for 
any discussion on manumission in previous times, such as, for example, in the Homeric 
poems.46  In fact, very few works have questioned the existence of manumission in 
                                                          
43 See Calderini (1965): 299; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 101. 
44 Meyer (1910); Finley (1954), (1980). 
45 This definition can be found in the Digest and constitutes a quotation from Ulpian who, after 
including manumission among the institutions belonging to ius gentium (‘manumissiones quoque 
iuris gentium sunt’), thus describes manumissio: ‘est autem manumissio de manu missio, id est datio 
libertatis: nam quamdiu quis in servitute est, manui et potestati suppositus est, manumissus liberatur 
potestate’ (Ulp. Inst. D. 1.1.4). 
46 For a discussion about the expression ‘Homeric society’, see, most recently, Harris (2012): 
351-354; Pelloso (2012): 77-80. 
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Homeric society 47 , yet their contributions are often unsatisfactory: when facing the 
problem concerning the origins of Greek manumission, some scholars simply take for 
granted that Homeric society did not know the social and legal distinction between free 
individuals and slaves48, as this would only be a much later development.49 Some other 
scholars, although acknowledging the existence of slavery in the poems, underestimate 
its importance and its features to the point of describing Homeric slavery as ‘mild’ and 
‘paternalistic’ and, therefore, as having nothing in common with the so-called ‘chattel-
slavery’ of Classical age50, being Homeric slavery closer to the institution of serfdom.51 
Recent studies, however, have challenged these traditional views: for example Harris, 
                                                          
47 The only works specifically dealing with Homeric manumission are the esseys by Nieto 
(1982); N’doye (2008); Bouvier (2008); however, as this chapter will show, their contributions are 
not entirely persuasive, and much work still has to be done for a complete understanding of 
manumission in the Homeric poems. 
48 One of the main supporters of this idea is Garlan, who argued that the condition of Homeric 
slaves was not clear at all if compared to that of other individuals who were legally free, such as 
the θήτες and the θεράποντες. One of the main points made in traditional scholarship is that 
while in the 5th century B.C. there was a specific term designating Greek slaves (δοῦλος), in the 
Homeric poems, together with δμῶες and δμωαί which exclusively refer to slaves, there were 
many other words which could be used both for free individuals and for slaves and which 
reflected their role in the οἶκος, such as οἰκεύς and δρηστήρ (contra, see Beringer [1982]: 28, who 
argues that δμώς ‘denotes the dependent man within an estate-household’, as opposed to δοῦλος 
which, in its turn, identifies ‘the not-belongin foreigner or alien who is subject to [Greek] royal-
aristocratic power’). This usage of some terms as referring to slaves and to free individuals led 
scholars to a general confusion about the boundaries between freedom and slavery in the 
Homeric poems: Garlan, for instance, maintains that the main distinction within the Homeric 
society was that between nobles and non-nobles, and that there was no divide between slaves 
and free individuals (it follows that, according to this interpretation, no forms of manumissions 
can be found in the poems: Garlan [1988]: 31). This idea is shared by Todd (1993): 171, who 
believes that ‘in the Homeric poems … the distinction between slaves and citizens means little’. 
49 Cf Meyer (1910); Finley (1954): 34; for a detailed criticism of their opinions, see Harris (2012). 
50 Todd (1993): 184: ‘Slavery in classical Athens meant chattel-slavery: in this respect, any 
slaves found in Homer are wholly different from their classical successors’. This view is 
commonly based on the fact that the Odyssey seems to refer to some slaves as particularly 
privileged ones, such as Eumaeus and Euricleia; this has taken to the idea that ‘the treatment of 
slaves by their owners was notably mild and kindly ... the Homeric poems represent the slaves, 
on the whole, as loyal and devoted, often to the point that relations of marked affection existed 
between them and members of the households of which they were a part’ (Westermann [1955]: 3; 
the same view is shared by Garlan [1988]: 35. See also Thalmann [1998], who points out the 
ideological purposes behind such a description of slavery in the Homeric poems). For a criticism 
of these opinions and for an accurate list of evidence showing that slavery in Homer shared the 
same basic features of that of Classical Athens, see, once again, Harris (2012). 
51 Beringer (1982); Morris (1987): 178. 
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by combining social and legal data, has conclusively shown that slavery did exist and 
was commonly practiced in the Iliad and in the Odyssey, and that Homeric slavery did 
not differ fundamentally from the so-called ‘chattel-slavery’ of Classical age.52 
In this chapter, I will move from these recent results in order to show, on the one hand, 
that manumission – as well as slavery – was known and practiced in the societies 
represented in the two poems and, on the other hand, that their different contexts (the 
Iliad is characterised by a war-context, whereas the Odyssey’s one is more domestic) 
reflect different and specific forms of manumissions. 
This chapter will therefore be divided into two parts. The first one will examine the 
evidence from the Iliad, and will show that several passages from the poem clearly show, 
on the one hand, that the defeated enemies were made slaves (as war-captives) of the 
victors and, on the other hand, that their liberation (i.e. manumission, which is typically 
expressed by the verbs λύειν or ἀπολύειν) took the form of the payment of a ransom 
(ἄποινα) by a member of their families, usually the father. The second part will focus on 
the Odyssey, and will show that there is only one passage in the whole poem which 
directly refers to manumission (Hom. Od. 21.212-216): in this case, manumission is 
described as depending on domestic dynamics, by which two slaves are integrated in 
their master’s οἶκος (no longer as slaves, but) as equal and free individuals through the 
establishment of a relationship based on reciprocity and kinship between the former and 
the latter. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to show that, despite the fact that the first 
evidence referring to ἀπελεύθεροι dates to the 5th century B.C., specific forms of 
manumission (in its legal meaning of a transition from a legal condition of slavery to a 
legal condition of freedom) can already be found in the Homeric poems. Moreover, this 
conclusion will ultimately reinforce the idea that slavery was not a new reality at the 
time of Solon’s reforms but, rather, that this institution had an important and 
fundamental antecedent in Homeric society. 
 
                                                          
52  Harris (2012). See also Van Wees (1992): 49-53, who showed that slavery was the 
fundamental labour source of the Homeric society; Fisher (1995): 49; Lewis (2015). 
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2. Forms of reduction into slavery and manumission in the ‘Iliad’. 
Consistently with the war-context which constitutes the background of the Iliad53, one 
of the main forms of reduction into slavery (together with kidnapping) is defeat in battle 
and the subsequent reduction into captivity. Several passages from the poem show that 
as a rule descending from the defeat in battle, warriors became captives of the victor, 
and the relationship thus established between the two is clearly based on ownership.54 
This is further suggested by the specific vocabulary used in the poem to describe the 
reduction of the defeated enemies into captivity. The seizure of men as captives is 
usually expressed by the verbs ζογρέω, λαμβάνω and αἱρέω 55 , whereas ληίζομαι 
generally identifies the seizure of women56: the use of these verbs is highly significant, 
as each of them conveys a specific meaning. 
Although the meanings of those verbs which are typically used in the poem to 
describe the seizure of men have a slightly different nuance, they all ultimately suggest 
that captives are made the object of an immediate and individual right of ownership by 
their captor: this means, in other words, that they become property of the latter, and 
therefore their slaves: ζογρέω (which means ‘to save alive’, ‘to take captive’ instead of 
killing) 57 ; λαμβάνω (which means ‘to take’, ‘to seize’, is sometimes used as a 
synonymous of ζογρέω)58; and αἱρέω (the fundamental meaning of which is ‘to grasp’, 
‘to take’, but which is sometimes followed by the term ζωός, this underlying that the 
                                                          
53 On warfare and conflict within the Homeric societies, see Van Wees (1992). 
54 On this point, see Harris (2002): 425, who stresses that ‘since the Homeric period … anything 
captured in war belonged to the victor’ and that ‘the person who was captured in war therefore 
became the slave of his captor’. 
55 For ζογρέω see, for instance, Hom. Il. 10.378, 11.131, 6.46; for λαμβάνω, see Hom. Il. 11.106, 
20.464, 21.36; for αἱρέω, see Hom. Il. 6.38, 16.331, 21.102. 
56 See, for instance, Hom. Il. 18.28 (δμῳαὶ δ’ἅς Ἀχιλεὺς ληίσσατο Πάτροκλός τε). The verb 
ληίζομαι has the same root of λεία (booty) and it means ‘emmener comme butin’: cf. Chantraine 
(1977) s.v. λεία. 
57 This verb is used three times in the Iliad by the defeated enemy (Hom. Il. 6.46, 10.378, 11.131) 
who supplicates the victor to take him alive (the verb is always used in the imperative form 
ζωγρεῖτ’: cf. Ducrey (1968): 29-30; Chantraine (1977) s.v. ζωάγρια. 
58 The verb λαμβάνω is used three times in the Iliad in the aorist participle λαβών (Hom. Il. 
11.106, 20.464, 21.36). For its use a synonymous of ζωγρέω with the specific meaning of ‘to take 
alive’, see Hom. Il. 20.464, in which Troos thus pleads Achilles: ‘λαβὼν καὶ ζωὸν ἀφείη’. 
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verb αἱρέω, in all these cases, can be considered as a synonymous of ζογρέω).59 The verb 
ληίζομαι, on the other hand, typically describes the seizure of women: its fundamental 
meaning, which is ‘to seize as a booty’60, suggests that the acquisition of ownership over 
women goes through two different stages. Once captured, women were included among 
the booty together with the other plundered goods: the booty was considered to be a 
common property of the whole army (as the Greek term for ‘booty’, ξυνήϊα, suggests)61 
and all the goods that were part of the booty were gathered at the center of the assembly 
of the warriors. The ἀγορή then divided the booty and assigned the goods to each fighter, 
who thus became the owner of the goods he was given. It was only through this second 
step that the plundered goods – which were initially part of the booty and common 
property of the whole army – became the object of an individual right of ownership that 
could not be challenged by anyone.62 
That captives were considered property of the victors is further proved by other 
elements, which show that the former’s fate exclusively depended on the latters’s will. 
As pointed out by Garlan63, the victor could dispose of the defeated enemies and of the 
latter’s properties as he liked: several passages from the Iliad show that the victors, when 
they decided not to kill their enemies, had the complete power to sell them abroad or to 
liberate them by the payment of a ransom.64 For example, in the twenty-first Book of the 
Iliad, Achilles maintains that, before Patroclus’ death, he had saved many of his enemies’ 
lives by selling them abroad instead of killing them65; similarly, in the twenty-second 
Book, Priam reminds Hector that many of his sons had been killed or sold abroad by 
Achilles.66 The verbs used in these two passages are πέρνημι (in the first case) and 
περάω (in the second case) and they both refer to the act of exporting captives to foreign 
                                                          
59 Cf. Hom. Il. 6.38, 16.331, 21.102 (ζωὸν ἑλεῖν). 
60 Liddell, Scott (1996) s.v. ληίζομαι 
61 The main meaning of ξυνήϊα is indeed ‘common property’: cf. Liddell, Scott (1996) s.v. 
ξυνήϊα. 
62 Cantarella (1979): 117-121; Van Wees (1992): 299-310. 
63 Garlan (1987): 4. 
64 Van Wees (1992): 253. 
65 Hom. Il. 21.102: πολλοὺς ζωοὺς ἕλον ἠδὲ πέρασσα. 
66 Hom. Il. 22.46: ὅς μ’υἱῶν πολλῶν … κτείνων καὶ περνὰς νήσων ὲπι τηλεδαπάων. 
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lands for selling them as slaves.67 The same verbs, on the other hand, are used with this 
meaning in many other episodes in which the objects sold abroad are slaves or, in one 
case, the entirety of the κτήματα that once belonged to Troy.68 
The use of verbs connected with the seizure of captives and with the practice of selling 
them abroad implies that, in all these case, the relationship between the two parties is 
based on ownership and therefore has to be identified with slavery. If we read this 
evidence from the Iliad in the light of the ‘incidents of ownership’ as singled out by 
Honoré, it follows that the power of selling captives abroad and the right to kill them 
can be included among the so-called right to the capital, which can be defined as ‘the 
power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or 
part of it’.69 Once it is clear that war-captivity is one of the main forms of reduction into 
slavery attested in the Iliad, it is also possible to question whether the poem refers to 
episodes which mention the possible liberation of these captives from their actual 
condition of slavery. 
Several episodes from the Iliad describe defeated enemies in the act of supplicating 
the victor (i.e. their owner) to not kill them, but to release them as an effect of the 
payment of a ransom (ἄποινα).70 Although this kind of request is frequently attested in 
the poem, we should not infer that captives had the right of paying the ἄποινα to the 
victor and therefore of being liberated: the acceptance of the ἄποινα was rather 
conceived of as a power that the victor could exercise or not according to his 
unquestionable will.71 The episode mentioned in the sixth Book of the Iliad at lines 37-65 
                                                          
67 Liddell, Scott (1996) s.v. πέρνημι. As it has been pointed out by Mele in his work on society 
and labour in the Homeric world, the etymology of the verb πέρνημι conveys the idea of a 
movement towards a place, and it should be best interpreted as ‘to export for sale’: Mele (1968): 
24. 
68 Hom. Il. 23.292. 
69 Honoré (1961): 118. 
70  See, for example, Adrastus’ supplication to Menelaus (Hom. Il. 6.46-50); Dolon’s 
supplication to Odysseus and Diomedes (Hom. Il. 10.378-381); Peisander and Hippolochus’ 
supplications to Agamemnon (Hom. Il. 11.131-135). 
71 Bielman (1994): 288, correctly maintains that ‘la rançon n’est pas un privilège concédé de 
droit au prisonnier; c’est une faveur accordée aux captifs, par leur détenteur, au gré de son bon 
vouloir et de ses intérêts’. See also Naiden (2006). Most recently, see Harris (2015a): 30: 
‘Supplication is well attested in the Homeric poems … It consists of four basic steps: 1) the 
approach of the suppliant (either to an individual or a shrine), 2) a supplicatory gesture (holding 
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provides a typical example in this regard. When, at the end of the battle, Adrastus 
realises that Menelaus has overwhelmed him, and after Menelaus had taken him alive 
as a captive72, he supplicates him not to kill him and to accept the payment of a ransom, 
ensuring Menelaus that his father would have paid ἀπερείσι’ἄποινα (‘a countless 
ransom’) for his liberation.73 Menelaus is about to accept Adrastus’ supplication, but 
Agamemnon suddenly intervenes and persuades his brother to kill Adrastus: in doing 
so, Homer describes Agamemnon as αἴσιμα παρειπών, which means ‘the one who says 
just things’.74 In other words, this episode shows that the refusal to release captives by 
accepting the payment of a ransom was considered αἴσιμον, which means ‘just’. 
The episode which is attested in the first Book of the Iliad at lines 10-52, however, at 
first sight seems to suggest an opposite view, in the sense that it seems to represent the 
acceptance of the ransom and the liberation of a captive-slave as a due act. In these lines, 
Chryses implores the assembly of the Achaeans to release his daughter – who had 
previously been assigned as a γέρας to Agamemnon – by the payment of 
ἀπερείσι’ἄποινα. It has to be noted, however, that in this specific case the acceptance of 
the ἄποινα and the liberation of Chryses’ daughter are necessary not because Chryses 
per se or his daughter enjoyed such a right, but because of the peculiar qualification of 
Chryses as Apollo’s priest. As Achilles tells his mother Thetis, after the Achaeans had 
destroyed and plundered Thebes, they captured Chryses’ daughter, who was initially 
included among the booty and then assigned as a γέρας to Agammenon, but they 
decided not to kill nor to capture Chryses.75 A similar episode is described in the ninth 
Book of the Odyssey, when Odysseus tells that after the destruction of the city of Ismarus, 
he and his companions killed all the men and captured all the women, but saved Maron’s 
life, who was Apollo’s priest, and did not capture his wife and his son because the 
                                                          
a bough, touching the knees, sitting at an altar), 3) a request for something from the person 
supplicated (supplicandus), and 4) a decision by the supplicandus either to accept or reject the 
suppliant … The evaluation of the suppliant’s request was made following standard moral and 
religious views that are in accordance with the unwritten laws of the gods’. 
72 Hom. Il. 6.37-38: Ἄδρηστον … Μενέλαος ζωὸν ἕλ’. 
73 Hom. Il. 6.45-50. 
74 Cf. Liddell, Scott (1996) s.v. ἄισιμος. 
75 Hom. Il. 1.366-369. 
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Achaeans were respectful of the god Apollo (ἁζόμενοι). 76  The episode of Chryses’ 
supplication shows that an offence to a priest leads to a deprivation of his τιμή (the verb 
constantly employed in the first book of the Iliad to describe the offense caused to 
Chryses is in fact ἀτιμάζειν) and indirectly causes, as a result, an offence to the god 
himself. It is because of this peculiar relationship between the priest and the god that the 
release of Chryses’ daughter by the payment of the ἄποινα can be seen, in this case, as 
a due act: from the very outset, Homer underlines that Chryses addresses the Achaeans 
as Apollo’s priest, and this is made clear both for the golden scepter he is carrying with 
him77 and because he says that, by accepting his request, the whole army will honor the 
god Apollo himself.78 But if Chryses’ qualification as a priest gives rise to a sense of 
αἰδώς between the whole Achaean army, which agrees on the opportunity of accepting 
the ἄποινα79, the same cannot be said about Agamemnon, who brutally refuses Chryses’ 
supplication. This refusal deprives Chryses of his τιμή80, and the priest thus prays the 
god Apollo to punish the Achaeans for this offence: from this moment, an epidemic of 
plague struck the Achaean army for ten days until Agamemnon decided to release 
Chryses’ daughter and to accept the ἄποινα he had been offered.81 
These two episodes show that in the Iliad, the liberation of a war-captive reduced into 
slavery is not a due requirement, but a choice which rests with the owner of the slave. It 
is no coincidence that, notwithstanding the many supplications of being released by the 
payment of ἄποινα attested in the poem, only one of them is accepted: the episode deals 
with the liberation of Andromache’s mother, who survived the destruction of Thebes 
(while her father and seven brothers were all killed by Achilles) and, after having been 
captured by Peleus’ son, was then released by the latter after the payment of ἀπερείσι’ 
                                                          
76 Hom. Od. 9.197-200. The Greeks ensured immunity not only to the goods that belonged to 
gods or that were under their protection, but also – and above all – to priests: cf. Garlan (1985): 
55-58. 
77 Hom. Il. 1.14-15. 
78 Hom. Il. 1.20-21: παῖδα δ’ἐμοὶ λύσατε φίλην, τὰ δ’ἄποινα δέχεσθαι / ἁζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν 
ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα. 
79 Hom. Il. 1.22-23, 376-377. 
80 The verb used by Homer is ἀτιμάζειν (ἠτίμησ’): cf. Hom. Il. 1.94. 
81 Hom. Il. 1.34-54. 
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ἄποινα.82 In all the other cases, however, the victor refuses his enemy’s request and kills 
him.83 
The liberation of Andromache’s mother, on the other hand, shows that also female-
captives could be released by the payment of ἄποινα; however, it might be possible to 
suggest that women had one further possibility of obtaining their freedom, namely, 
legitimate marriage to their masters. This seems to be implied, for example, by Hom. Il. 
19.295-299, where Briseis reminds that Patroclus had promised to take her to Phthia, 
where she would have become Achilles’ κουριδίη ἄλοχος (which is best interpreted as 
‘legitimate wife’)84 as the effect of the celebration of their γάμος among the Myrmidons.85 
If this is true, in this latter case manumission would descend from marriage, which 
ultimately implies the entrance of a female-slave into her master’s οἶκος no longer as a 
property but, rather, as an effect of the creation ex novo of a kinship tie. This possibility, 
on the other hand, seems plausible also in the light of the evidence from the Odyssey, in 
which the formal entrance of a slave into his master’s household as an equal (ἑταῖρος) 
and at the same time as a kin (κασίγνητος) is the only attested form of manumission. 
 
3. Slavery and manumission in the ‘Odyssey’. 
Further information about slavery and manumission can be found in the Odyssey, 
which is characterised by a more domestic context than the one of the Iliad. Most of the 
                                                          
82 Hom. Il. 6.414-428. 
83 Cf. Wilson (2002): 31. 
84 Although Patterson underlines the ‘looseness of the Homeric vocabulary denoting the wife’ 
and maintains that ‘the tendency to read into kouridie the idea of “legitimate” or “lawful” is not 
supported by etymology or usage’ (Patterson [1990]: 49 and n. 36), in the Homeric poems the term 
ἄλοχος, when preceded by the adjective κουριδίη, is often used in relation to legitimate 
marriages: it is the case, for example, of Hom. Il. 1.114, where Agamemnon describes 
Clytemnestra as his κουριδίη ἄλοχος. Thus, the condition of a freed slave becoming the 
legitimate wife of her master differs from that of a slave concubine bearing children to her owner, 
since the former has to be considered free, whereas the latter is a slave: see Lewis (forthcoming 
b). 
85 Hom. Il. 19.295-299: οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδέ μ᾽ ἔασκες, ὅτ᾽ ἄνδρ᾽ ἐμὸν ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεὺς / ἔκτεινεν, 
πέρσεν δὲ πόλιν θείοιο Μύνητος, / κλαίειν, ἀλλά μ᾽ ἔφασκες Ἀχιλλῆος θείοιο / κουριδίην 
ἄλοχον θήσειν, ἄξειν τ᾽ ἐνὶ νηυσὶν / ἐς Φθίην, δαίσειν δὲ γάμον μετὰ Μυρμιδόνεσσι (‘but you, 
Patroklos, even when Achilles slew my husband and sacked the city of noble Mynes, told me that I was not 
to weep, for you said you would make Achilles marry me, and take me back with him to Phthia, where we 
would celebrate our marriage among the Myrmidons’). 
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events take place in Odysseus’ palace86, thus providing significant information for our 
understanding of the various aspects of the slaves’ lives, their conditions and their tasks 
in the οἶκος, as well of the relationship between masters and slaves: for this reason, the 
poem has constituted the traditional starting-point from which scholars have usually 
developed their considerations about Homeric slavery. For example, the overall 
description of the condition of Eumaeus and Eurycleia as ‘privileged’ slaves has led 
some scholars to generalise the main features of Homeric slavery by describing it, as a 
whole, as mild and paternalistic.87 As some recent works have pointed out, however, the 
‘privileged’ condition of these two slaves cannot be considered as a paradigm for the 
understanding of Homeric slavery per se.88 Many episodes mentioned in the Odyssey 
suggest that masters did exercise all the powers inherent to their right of ownership over 
their slaves: they could sell them; control their private lives (for example, slaves could 
                                                          
86 Harris (2012). 
87  Westermann (1955): 3; Beringer (1982); Morris (1987): 178. For the ideological and 
pedagogical purposes of the poem, aiming at ‘partially at flattering slaveholders and partially at 
providing didactic exempla of how to be a good slave and a good master’, see Lewis (forthcoming 
b); Thalmann (1998). 
88 This issue has been thoroughly analysed by Harris (2012), who provides a comprehensive 
list of episodes from the poems showing that Homeric slavery was not fundamentally different 
from the slavery of the Classical period. Similarly, N’doye (2008), after mentioning several 
passages from the Odyssey that seem to show the existence of a mild and affectionate relationship 
between masters and slaves (due to the use of terms relating to a familiar context or to kinship 
ties, such as τέκος, μαῖα, ἄττα οr παῖς), advises that ‘bien que le maître soit présenté comme le 
parent de l’esclave, il faut se garder de tout idéalisme. Cette parenté, illusoire en réalité, masque 
la relation de subordination qui caractérise l’esclave, éternel exploité, dépourvu de tout droit et 
de tout lien outre celui qui l’unit à son maître’ (N’doye [2008]: 18). Some other scholars (such as 
Canfora [2001]: 16; Todd [1993]: 179; Mossé [1984]: 148) also maintained that the condition of 
Homeric slaves did not identify the lowest social status, as their condition was better than that of 
the θήτες. This opinion is basically founded on the reading of Hom. Od. 11.488-491, in which 
Achilles says to Odysseus that he would rather be a θής than the lord over the dead (μὴ δή μοι 
θάνατόν γε παραύδα, φαίδιμ᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ. / βουλοίμην κ᾽ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, / 
ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη, / ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν), 
and this statement has been interpreted as signifying that the θήτες embodied the lowest possible 
condition. I think that this idea is ultimately wrong, as the θήτες, although living in poor and 
humble conditions, where nonetheless free individuals. Moreover, in several occasions Homeric 
heroes and women expressly say that they would die rather than being reduced into slavery (an 
idea which is generally described with the expression ‘δούλιον ἦμαρ’), thus showing that 
freedom was the supreme good, which was considered to be even more precious than life. 
Therefore, Achilles’ words in Hom. Od. 11.488-491 probably just mean that any life, however 
miserable yet free, would certainly be better than his actual condition as the lord of the shades in 
the Underworld (Hom. Od. 11.485): cf. Garlan (1988): 35; Harris (2012): 357-358. 
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not get married without their master’s consent); force them to perform hard jobs 89 ; 
mistreat them90; punish them harshly in case of disobedience91 (which are all expressions 
of the right to possess). 
Yet, although a master could be cruel towards those slaves who did not perform their 
duties, he could also be affectionate and grateful towards those slaves who had proved 
to be devoted and loyal. This is the case of Eurycleia, whom Laertes bought when she 
was very young92 and who is always described in the poem as wise and faithful and held 
in high consideration in Odysseus’ οἶκος; and of Eumaeus, who is mentioned in two 
significant passages which is important to analyse in detail in order to understand the 
main features of manumission in the Odyssey. 
The first passage is Hom. Od. 14.61-66, in which Eumaeus talks about his master with 
these affectionate words: 
 
ἦ γὰρ τοῦ γε θεοὶ κατὰ νόστον ἔδησαν, 
ὅς κεν ἔμ᾽ ἐνδυκέως ἐφίλει καὶ κτῆσιν ὄπασσεν, 
οἶκόν τε κλῆρόν τε πολυμνήστην τε γυναῖκα, 
οἷά τε ᾧ οἰκῆϊ ἄναξ εὔθυμος ἔδωκεν, 
ὅς οἱ πολλὰ κάμῃσι, θεὸς δ᾽ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἀέξῃ, 
ὡς καὶ ἐμοὶ τόδε ἔργον ἀέξεται, ᾧ ἐπιμίμνω. 
 
The gods have stopped the homeward voyage of that one  
who cared greatly for me, and granted me such possessions 
as a good-natured lord grants to the slave of his house; a home 
of his own, and a plot of land, and a wife much sought after, 
when the man accomplishes much work and god speeds the labor 
as he has sped for me this labor to which I am given. (Tr. Lattimore) 
 
These words are reproduced in a very similar fashion in another passage, Hom. Od. 
21.212-216, in which Odysseus thus speaks to his two slaves Eumaeus and Philoitius: 
 
 
                                                          
89 Hom. Od. 20.105-119. 
90 Hom. Od. 4.244-245. 
91 Hom. Od. 22.430-473. See Harris (2012). 
92 Hom. Od. 1.430-431. 
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σφῶϊν δ᾽, ὡς ἔσεταί περ, ἀληθείην καταλέξω. 
εἴ χ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοί γε θεὸς δαμάσῃ μνηστῆρας ἀγαυούς, 
ἄξομαι ἀμφοτέροις ἀλόχους καὶ κτήματ᾽ ὀπάσσω 
οἰκία τ᾽ ἐγγὺς ἐμεῖο τετυγμένα: καί μοι ἔπειτα 
Τηλεμάχου ἑτάρω τε κασιγνήτω τε ἔσεσθον. 
 
Therefore I will tell you the truth, and so it shall be; 
if by my hand the god overmasters the lordly suitors, 
then I shall get wives for you both, and grant you possessions 
and houses built next to mine, and think of you in the future 
always as companions of Telemachos, and his brothers. (Tr. Lattimore) 
 
At first sight, these two passages seem to have very similar contents: both refer to a 
master who promises his slave(s) specific rewards. In the first case (Hom. Od. 14.61-65) 
Homer is referring to some rewards which a master shall give to one of his slaves for 
proving to be diligent in performing his duties and loyal towards him. This is what 
Eumaeus implies when he says that if his master returned, he would be rewarded for his 
hard work and loyalty not only with kindness, but also by being assigned a set of goods 
which he defines with the comprehensive term κτῆσις, in which he includes a house 
(οἶκος), a piece of land (κλῆρος) and a woman (πολυμνήστη γυνή). 
Some scholars believe that these lines refer to manumission93; yet, I believe that this 
passage should be best interpreted as showing something completely different, namely, 
a master attributing his slave single and specific privileges, which does not itself imply 
Eumaeus’ ultimate release from slavery. In other words, these lines suggest that, once 
returned to Ithaca, Odysseus would have granted his slave both the capacity to get 
married and to have a wife and, at the same time, the possession of an οἶκος and a 
κλῆρος. The implication of this reward is significant for a slave since, legally speaking, 
slaves were considered objects rather than individuals and, for this reason, they had no 
recognised family ties nor could be entitled to any right: it follows that anything they 
had belonged to their masters, and that families of slaves were not recognised unless 
they were granted these specific boons as a privilege.94 Yet, granting slaves individual 
                                                          
93 Calderini (1965): 5. 
94 Jones (1956): 282-283. See also Lewis (2013), who – although in direct reference to Gortynian 
slavery – clearly shows that granting slaves certain privileges, such as that of possessing some 
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and specific privileges does not imply that they were automatically granted freedom. A 
closer look at the vocabulary of Hom. Od. 14.61-65 shows that the attribution to Eumaeus 
of the capacity to get married is not suggested by the use of the term γυνή itself at line 
64, since γυνή (as it is for ἄλοχος) has a general meaning and does not necessarily 
identify a legitimate wife.95 The acquisition of the capacity to marry by Eumaeus is rather 
implied by the adjective πολυμνήστη which precedes the term γυνή. The adjective 
πολυμνήστη is composed of the prefix πολύ- followed by the verb μνάομαι: Chantreine 
pointed out that in the Homeric poems the verb μνάομαι often has the technical 
meaning of ‘rechercher une femme en marriage’ 96 , while μνηστή ‘dans l’emploi 
particulier relatif au mariage … désigne une femme qui a été régulièrement demandée 
en mariage, une femme légitime’. 97  Penelope herself is sometimes defined as 
πολυμνήστη βασίλεια, since the one hundred and eight suitors that occupied 
Odysseus’ οἶκος wanted her to marry one of them (and, in doing so, they are described 
as μνηστῆρες).98 
                                                          
goods or of marrying another slave, far from resulting in the attribution of legal rights to slaves, 
was ultimatetly meant to reinforce masters’ control over their slaves (Lewis [2013]: 415: ‘These 
rules did not grant or acknowledge rights for slaves, but were chiefly aimed at clarifying the 
property rights of free citizens in complex scenarios where disputes over “who owns what” might 
have led to conflict and litigation’). On this point see, more extensively, chapter 4. 
95 In both poems ἄλοχος can be used for designating both the ‘bedfellow’ and the legitimate 
wife: see, for instance, Hom. Od. 4.623, or Hom. Il. 9.336. Yet, it is also worth considering that in 
the poems a legitimate wife is referred to as κουρίδια ἄλοχος (cf., for example, Hom. Il. 1.114, 
19.298). Moreover, the analysis of the vocabulary describing the only slave couple mentioned in 
the poem, Dolios (Penelope’s δμώς: Hom. Od. 4.736) and the Sicilian slave woman, is not helpful 
for the understanding of marital relations between slaves, as they are only described as the πατήρ 
(Hom. Od. 24.411) and the μήτηρ (Hom. Od. 24.389) of their υἱεῖς, but no mention is made of the 
kind of relationship between these two slaves (Harris [2012]: 358). For the use of the vocabulary 
of ‘legitimate marriage’ in Gortyn, see Lewis (2013): 396-402, who argues that ‘there is no a priori 
reason … to suppose that the identical use of vocabulary for free and slave marriages in Gortyn 
need imply legal equivalency’; furthermore, this idea has some parallels both from the ancient 
world (Rome, Israel and Babylonia) and from 19th century America (Lewis [2013]: 402). 
96 Chantraine (1977) s.v. μνάομαι. The same verb is used in Hom. Od. 6.34, when Athena, 
speaking in Nausicaa’s dream, reminds her that the noblest of all the Phaeacians had asked for 
her in marriage (ἤδη γάρ σε μνῶνται ἀριστῆες κατὰ δῆμον / πάντων Φαιήκων). 
97 Chantraine (1977) s.v. μιμνήσκω. 
98 Vernant explained such a conduct by the suitors as an effect of the ‘identification of the wife 
with the power of her husband and the privilege which her conjugal status confers upon her of 
perpetuating and transmitting the sovereign power’. It follows that ‘to take the king’s place at the 
heart of his house, in his bed, by becoming united with his wife, is to acquire a claim to reign after 
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Conversely, the episode mentioned at Hom. Od. 21.212-216 seems to describe a real 
manumission. Notwithstanding the parallelism between the οἶκος, the κλῆρος and the 
πολυμνήστη γυνή mentioned in Hom. Od. 14.61-65 and the terms οἰκία, κτήματα and 
ἄλοχος mentioned in Hom. Od. 21.212-216, it is important to stress that in this last 
passage Odysseus also promises his slaves that, if they will help in his fight against the 
suitors, he will make them ἑταῖροι and κασίγνητοι of Telemachus. 
The interpretations offered by scholars about the meaning and implication of these 
lines are very different. Some of them believe that the meaning of this passage is not 
different from the meaning of Hom. Od. 14.61-65, as they would both represent nothing 
more than a reward to two loyal slaves without implying any change in their legal 
condition: even after these grants, in other words, Eumaeus and Philoitius remain slaves 
of Odysseus.99 This opinion is based on two general considerations: first, these scholars 
believe that manumission cannot be attested in the Homeric poems as this phenomenon 
was supposed to have developed with the rise of the classical πόλις and written law100; 
second, the practice of manumitting slaves could not be practiced in the Homeric 
societies as the contrast between free individuals and slaves was not known yet.101 Other 
                                                          
him over the land which his wife, in a way, symbolises’ (Vernant [1980]: 62-63). This consideration, 
on the other hand, may prove to be useful for the understanding of Hom. Od. 14.64, in which a 
specific relationship between the terms οἶκος, κλῆρος and γυνή can be envisaged. Vernant has 
singled out a peculiar characteristic of the Greek wife, namely, that she was ‘intimately linked to 
her husband’s house, soil and hearth – at least for as long as she lives with him and shares the 
master’s bed’ (Vernant [1980]: 62). Moreover, Ferrucci (2006): 135-141, stressed the connection 
between οἶκος and marital relations by underlining the different meanings of the terms οἰκία and 
οἶκος: while the first one identifies ‘la casa, che per sineddoche può indicare anche la famiglia che 
vi abita e, più raramente, le proprietà familiari’, the second one refers to ‘un insieme che 
comprende casa, beni di proprietà e persone’. The οἶκος could be then conceived of as an 
‘organismo’ (as it has been defined by Paoli [1961]: 36) based on a legitimate marriage: ‘la 
centralità del matrimonio nella costituzione di un oikos è motivata, anzitutto, con la necessità di 
garantire la sopravvivenza della struttura attraverso la creazione di un erede titolato a 
subentrarvi alla morte del padre’. Thus, if the οἶκος generally comprises a house, some properties 
and the people living in there, the specific words used in Hom. Od. 14.64 (‘οἶκόν τε κλῆρόν τε 
πολυμνήστην τε γυναῖκα’) could possibly be interpreted as representing Eumaeus’ intimate 
wish of marrying a woman and, consequently, entering an οἶκος and a κλῆρος. 
99 Rädle (1969): 7; Westermann (1955): 2, who maintains that in the poems ‘no case of formal 
manumission appears, nor any example of limited bond service, paramone’; Andreau, Descat 
(2006): 30. 
100 Bouvier (2008): 16; Nieto (1982). 
101 Garlan (1988). 
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scholars, on the other hand, maintain that the episode mentioned in the twenty-first 
Book of the Odyssey describes a manumission. Calderini, for instance, argues that as an 
effect of these grants Eumaeus and Philoitius become Odysseus’ freedmen and he 
justifies this assumption by considering that manumissions can be envisaged in all those 
cases in which masters granted their slaves a certain autonomy which allows them to be 
more independent and to enjoy specific rights, such as – typically – the right to have a 
wife or to own property.102 This argument alone, however, is not enough for interpreting 
this passage as referring to manumission. On the one hand, Calderini does not consider 
that before Odysseus’ return to Ithaca, Eumaeus already enjoyed some privileges: he had 
been granted the possession of the hut in which he gives hospitality to the disguised 
Odysseus, and the slave Mesaulius, whom he bought with his own goods by the 
Taphians without needing any authorization by Laertes or Penelopes.103 On the other 
hand, he does not consider the meaning and the implications of the terms ἑταῖροι and 
κασίγνητοι (Hom. Od. 216), which are central in suggesting that the change in the legal 
condition of these two slaves went through two different stages. 
The term ἑταῖρος generally means ‘comrade’, ‘companion’104 and, according to the 
general interpretation, implies the existence, between two or more individuals, of a 
relationship characterized by equality and reciprocity. As Cantarella has pointed out, 
ἑταῖρος designates an individual who belongs to a group of friends or companions 
which is completely independent of any kinship tie.105 The same considerations about 
the meaning of ἑταῖρος have been suggested by Konstan who, in his study on the 
concept of friendship in the Classical world, pointed out the different implications of the 
terms φίλος and ἑταῖρος. Although ἑταῖρος has often been translated as ‘friend’, it 
merely denotes – if not preceded or followed by φίλος – a wide range of companionable 
relations often grouped around a leader; a group of comrades which is not characterised 
per se by a sense of personal affection, but among which some ἑταῖροι could be 
considered as particularly dear by some other companions (as it is for the relationship 
                                                          
102 Calderini (1965): 6. 
103 Hom. Od. 14.449-452. 
104 Chantraine (1977) s.v. ἑταῖρος. 
105 Cantarella (1979): 226; similarly, see Stagakis (1968): 397. 
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between Patroclus and Achilles, in which Patroclus is not simply described as Achilles’ 
ἑταῖρος, but as Achilles’ πολύ φίλτατος ἑταῖρος’, thus stressing the contrast and the 
different meanings of the terms φίλος and ἑταῖρος).106 Konstan also emphasises that 
ἑταῖρος has nothing to do with kinship, whether by blood or marriage; but it is also 
worth considering, at the same time, that a group of ἑταῖροι was also characterized by 
the absence of any hierarchical relationship between its members.107 Moreover, together 
with the idea of equality or, in a wider sense, the lack of any hierarchical relationship 
between the members of such a group, the term ἑταῖρος also conveys the idea of 
reciprocity, which means ‘that one gives of one’s own accord, with the expectation that 
a suitable return will follow’.108 The connection between the term ἑταῖρος and the idea 
of reciprocity has been analysed by Donlan, who identified ‘the occurrence in Homer 
of … three degrees of reciprocity: the altruistic giving of “generalized reciprocity”, 
giving without obligation to return; “balanced reciprocity”, or quid pro quo; and 
“negative reciprocity”, taking without returning’.109 Donlan focuses on what he calls 
political reciprocity, which he defines as ‘the relationship between the leaders and the 
people’110  and, in particular, on the relationship between Odysseus and his ἑταῖροι 
during the νόστος and at their arrival in Ithaca, and suggests that their ‘political’ 
relationship ‘is one of balanced reciprocity’. 111  In examining the many events that 
Odysseus and his ἑταῖροι had do face during the νόστος, Donlan shows that their 
                                                          
106 Konstan (1997): 31. Konstan further specifies that ‘the category of hetairos differs from that 
of philos in designating a relationship between associates, often age-mates, in a common 
enterprise, without necessarily conveying the sense of special intimacy and harmony of views 
that is characteristic of true friends or philoi’ (Konstan [1996]: 78). 
107 N’doye (2008): 26. 
108 Donlan (1998): 51. After mentioning Benveniste’s interpretation about the implications of 
the term φίλος, which ‘has not merely a sentimental meaning in Homer, but describes all who 
are united by certain reciprocal obligations’ (Donlan [1985]: 300), Donlan specifies that ‘a similar 
kind of relationship is reflected in the words etes and hetairos in Homer’ (Donlan [1985]: 300). 
Similarly, in his study on the relationship between θεράποντες and ἑταῖροι in the Iliad, Stagakis 
understands reciprocity ‘as the universal rule applicable to all hetairos relationships’ (Stagakis 
[1966]: 415. For a further analysis of the meaning of ἑταῖρος and its relations to ἔτης, see Stagakis 
[1971]). 
109 Donlan (1998): 51. 
110 Donlan (1998): 51. 
111 Donlan (1998): 52. 
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relationship was always characterized by equal sharing112, redistribution113 and equal 
allocation of danger.114 These considerations allow him to conclude that this kind of 
reciprocity within a group of ἑταῖροι (which was not only confined to the Odyssey, as 
similar features can clearly be seen in the ἑταῖροι-relations described in the Iliad) 
‘presents a set of actions that maintain or restore the normative distribution of rights, 
dues and responsibilities among the leader and sub-leaders and between leader and 
community’.115 
I believe that Donlan’s analysis of the rule of the so-called ‘political reciprocity’ in the 
Odyssey is helpful for our understanding of Odysseus’ words in Hom. Od. 21.216 since, 
by making Eumaeus and Philoitius ἑταῖροι of Telemachus, Odysseus raises his two 
slaves’ condition in the social ladder, by the application of the rule of reciprocity between 
them and Telemachus and, consequently, by the creation of reciprocal rights, duties and 
responsibilities among them. Moreover, since the existence of a ἑταῖροι-relation also 
implies the lack of any hierarchy among its members, I think that it can be safely 
assumed that, as an effect of this specific grant, Eumaeus and Philoitius exit their servile 
status and become free individuals. 
But, what is more, Odysseus also promises his slaves that he will make them 
κασίγνητοι of Telemachus. The term κασίγνητος is often used in the Homeric poems to 
identify a ‘brother’, especially of those born from the same father116, but sometimes it 
                                                          
112 Donlan (1998): 58. 
113 Donlan (1998): 60-61, specifies that ‘collection and redistribution by and among a group is 
the most sociable of reciprocities, similar to the generalized reciprocity within a family. The 
inherent social intent of sharing-out is to reaffirm and strengthen the basic equality within the 
group. Among the hetairoi, pooling and distribution by lot was a fixed custom; no other method 
of distribution was thinkable’. Moreover, in focusing on the story of the Cyclops’ cave, Donlan 
stresses that ‘Odysseus does not keep the ten goats but shares them with his companions … both 
the getting and the giving, which balance out perfectly, increase his honour and prestige (time, 
kleos)’ (Donlan [1998]: 61). 
114 Donlan (1998): 62: ‘in perfect parallel with the apportionment of booty, danger is also 
apportioned in an egalitarian manner’. 
115 Donlan (1998): 68 and n. 17. For a detailed discussion on the rule of reciprocity in the 
economy of Homeric society, see Donlan (1982). 
116  Miller (1953): 46-47; see also Donlan (1985): 306. For a discussion on the relationship 
between ἀδελφός and κασίγνητος, see Gainsford (2012). 
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also designates a ‘cousin’117: in both cases, however, κασίγνητος typically designates the 
existence of a kinship relation.118 This consideration has taken some scholars to believe 
that the episode of Eumaeus and Philoitius should be read as a case of adoption119; but 
what is important to stress is that the creation of a kinship relation between two slaves 
and their master’s son ultimately means that the former join their master’s οἶκος as kin120 
and, therefore, that they can no longer be considered as his slaves. 
In the light of these considerations, I think that Odysseus’ promise to Eumaeus and 
Philoitius in Hom. Od. 21.216 points to a major change in these slaves’ legal condition, 
and this change goes through two different stages: the term ἑταῖρος alludes to a 
condition of equality and to the establishment of reciprocity of rights and duties, 
whereas κασίγνητος implies the creation, ex novo in this case, of a kinship relationship 
between Eumaeus and Philoitius on the one hand, and Telemachus, on the other hand. 
It follows that both these grants necessarily imply that Eumaeus and Philoitius are no 
longer slaves, but free individuals: and this ultimately constitutes, legally speaking, a 
typical case of manumission. 
                                                          
117 Glotz (1904): 86; Stagakis (1968): 397; Chantraine (1977) s.v. κασίγνητος. 
118 The use of ἑταῖρος in connection with κασίγνητος is not infrequent in the poems: see, for 
instance, Hom. Od. 8.585-586 (ἐπεὶ οὐ μέν τι κασιγνήτοιο χερείων / γίγνεται, ὅς κεν ἑταῖρος 
ἐὼν πεπνυμένα εἰδῇ). Stagakis (1968): 397, provides a list of passages from the Iliad in which 
κασίγνητος is used together with ἔτης, which is assumed to be a synonymous of ἑταῖρος. This 
has led some scholars to question the relationship between these two terms. After analysing 
several passages from the Iliad in which κασίγνητοι and ἑταῖροι seem to be somehow connected, 
Stagakis maintains that ‘the basic fact about them [κασίγνητοι] is that they are ἑταῖροι’, and that 
‘each of them is involved in ἑταῖρος relations … the evidence concerning the Trojan κασίγνητοι 
is highly suggestive of the possibility that in the Iliad a Trojan κασίγνητος is to be regarded also 
as an ἑταῖρος’ (Stagakis [1968]: 398). Yet, the terms ἑταῖροι and κασίγνητοι convey different 
meanings that have to be kept in mind: as Donlan has pointed out, κασίγνητος has a relevance 
in the context of the οἶκος, whereas ἑταῖροι-relations operated even outside the household 
(‘bonds of kinship operated at the level of the family and its extensions, the oikos; beyond that 
level, they were attenuated … the oikos was the center of economic and political power, from 
which radiated the wider non-kin associations of hetairoi and xeinoi’: Donlan [1982]: 155). 
Moreover, the difference between κασίγνητος and ἑταῖρος seems to be stressed also in Hesiod. 
op. 707 (μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον: on this line, see Konstan [1997]: 43). 
119 Beringer (1964): 19; Lencman (1966): 300. 
120 As slaves, they were already part of the οἶκος as property: see Donlan (1982): 155, who 
describes the οἶκος as the ‘basic Homeric social unit … which was a residential group … whose 
human membership also embraced non-kin, such as dependents and slaves’. 
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It is important to highlight, however, that in Hom. Od. 21.216 the new kinship 
relationship and social reciprocity are established only between the two former slaves 
and Telemachus, not between the former and Odysseus (Odysseus indeed says that ‘καί 
μοι ἔπειτα / Τηλεμάχου ἑτάρω τε κασιγνήτω τε ἔσεσθον’). This can probably be 
understood by considering Odysseus’ role as the ἄναξ of his οἶκος and, therefore, by 
the necessity to respect precise hierarchies within the family-group. By making Eumaeus 
and Philoitius equals to Telemachus only, and not to himself, Odysseus aims not only to 
include his two former slaves within his household, but also and at the same time, to 
confirm and reinforce his role as the undisputed lord of the οἶκος. 
 
4. Final considerations. 
To sum up, it is important to stress, first of all, that the Homeric poems make it clear 
that both the concept and implication of slavery and the distinction between slave and 
free individuals were already evident in Homeric society. Although most scholars 
believe that the meaning of freedom was blurry in this period and that there was not a 
clear-cut distinction between free individuals and slaves121, both the Iliad and the Odyssey 
show, by contrast, a sharp free-slave distinction among the members of their societies. 
At the same time, the two poems mention the possibility for a slave to gain freedom 
through specific forms of manumission which are differently described in the Iliad and 
in the Odyssey. In the Iliad, war-captives became slaves of the victor and their release 
from slavery (i.e. manumission) takes the form of a liberation as an effect of the payment 
of a ransom by a relative, usually the father, of the enslaved individual: this act is 
generally expressed with the verb λύειν (or the composite form ἀπολύειν) followed by 
ἄποινα. As I have shown, the liberation of captives as an effect of the payment of ransom 
was not conceived as mandatory for the master but, rather, as a power that the latter 
could decide to exercise or not: the episode of Adrastus’ supplication is particularly 
significant in suggesting that the refusal to release a captive and to receive the ἄποινα 
offered for his liberation was considered αἴσιμον, that is ‘just’, because it was in 
                                                          
121 Raaflaub (2004): 26. 
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accordance with the will of the gods. If this is certainly the most frequently attested form 
of manumission in the Iliad, it should also be considered that women had perhaps 
another option for gaining their freedom: as is suggested in Hom. Il. 19.295-299, Briseis, 
who had become Achilles’ slave, recalls what Patroclus had promised to her, that she 
would have become Achilles’ legitimate wife (κουριδίη ἄλοχος). If this γάμος had been 
celebrated, it would have originated, on the one hand, a marital relationship and, on the 
other hand, the formal entrance of a young slave into her master’s οἶκος as a wife, and 
this would have implied Briseis’ ultimate release from her servile condition. 
This twofold mechanism is implied also in the Odyssey, in which manumission is 
described as a reward for those slaves who proved to be devoted and loyal to their 
master. The only significant passage in the Odyssey for the study of manumission is the 
episode mentioned in Hom. Od. 21.216, in which Odysseus promises his slaves Eumaeus 
and Philoitius that he will make them ἑταῖροι and κασίγνητοι of Telemachus. By 
alluding, with ἑταῖροι, to the ideal of equality and the rule of reciprocity and, with 
κασίγνητοι, to the creation ex novo of a kinship relationship between the two (former) 
slaves and Telemachus (and, consequently, to their entrance in Odysseus’ οἶκος as kin), 
Homer is clearly referring to manumission, which is thus represented, in this context, as 
an event exclusively depending on domestic dynamics. 
Once all these elements are considered, it is clear that even though the term 
ἀπελεύθερος does not seem to be attested before the 5th century B.C., the institution of 
manumission had evident roots already in the Homeric period. It is important to keep 
in mind, however, that one of the later shades of meaning that the terminology of 
freedom might carry (that is, freedom as implying civic duties) had not yet developed 
by the early period described in the Homeric poems. We notice in fact that in the 
Homeric poems, ‘freedom’ only conveys the ‘basic’ legal meaning which identifies the 
legal condition of someone who is not the property of someone else.122 It is in the light of 
these considerations that we must read the episodes of release from slavery which are 
attested in the Iliad and in the Odyssey: it is no coincidence that in both poems 
                                                          
122 For the development of freedom terminology over time, see Lewis (forthcoming a). 
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manumission conveys only the legal meaning of a transition from being the object of 
someone else’s ownership to a condition of non-belonging to anyone. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Manumission and sale in the Delphic inscriptions 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
The corpus of the Delphic inscriptions is one of the most important sources for the 
study of manumission in ancient Greece: more than one thousand inscriptions have been 
found in Delphi recording the liberation of more than one thousand and two hundred 
slaves, dating from the 2nd century B.C. down to the end of the 1st century A.D. 
The god plays a key role in the form of manumission recorded in these inscriptions, 
and for this reason scholars have usually included it among the so-called ‘sacral 
manumissions’.123 This label is due to the main feature of ‘sacral manumissions’, that is, 
the intervention of the gods (in different ways) in the process leading to the slaves’ 
liberation. For this reason, ‘sacral’ manumissions are usually opposed to the so-called 
‘secular’ manumissions, which – by contrast – do not involve the intervention of the 
divine element, but of the civic bodies only. 
Scholars have identified specific forms of ‘sacral’ manumission. The majority of them 
(which is best attested in the inscriptions from Delphi) represents manumission as taking 
the form of a sale (πρᾶσις ὠνή), involving the slave’s owner as the vendor124, the god – 
generally Apollo – as the purchaser, and the slave as the object sold.125 Other inscriptions, 
                                                          
123 See, for instance: Calderini (1965): 125; Jones (1956): 284; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 69; 
Kamen (2014): 284. 
124 I have found only one inscription in which the vendor, i.e. the manumittor, is the πόλις 
itself – SGDI II 1706 (Delphi, 2nd century B.C.): ἄρχοντος Εὐδώρου μηνὸς Δαιδαφορίου, ἀπέδοτο 
ἁ πόλις / τῶν Δελφῶν τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι σῶμα ἀνδρεῖον ὧι ὄνο/μα Εὐτυχίδας 
ἐνδογενῆ, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν τεσσάρων, / καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Εὐτυχίδας τὰν ὠνὰν τῶι θεῶι, 
ἐφ’ ὅτωι / ἐλεύθερον εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα / βίον, καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἔχει 
πᾶσαν. βεβαιωτὴρ κατὰ τοὺς νό/μους τᾶς πόλιος· … (Under the archonship of Eudoros, in the 
month of Dadaphorios, the city of the Delphians sold to Pythian Apollo a home-born male-slave named 
Eutuchidas, at the price of four silver mnas, since Eutuchidas entrusted the purchase money to the god, on 
the condition that he is free and not claimable by anyone for the rest of his life, and [the city] received the 
whole money. Guarantor in accordance with the laws of the city: …) For a discussion on ‘public’ 
manumissions of privately-owned slaves, see chapter 5. 
125 Some scholars believe that this particular form of manumission originated in Delphi (Bömer 
[1960]: 27-27; Kamen [2014]: 285), but this opinion is far from universal. Other scholars suggest 
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on the other hand, are believed to record manumissions through the consecration of a 
slave to the god (the verb of dedication-consecration is usually ἀνατιθέναι). This form 
of manumission is mostly attested in Hellenistic Chaeronea and will be discussed in 
chapter 3, whilst we have very little evidence for ‘manumission-consecrations’ from 
Delphi. 126  Finally, some scholars have identified, within the Delphic corpus of 
inscriptions, one single ‘testamentary’ manumission by a foreigner (SGDI II 2101).127 
This chapter will analyse the evidence concerning the so-called ‘manumission 
through sale’ of slaves to the god (as this form of manumission is attested in the bulk of 
the inscriptions from Delphi) and is divided in two parts. 
In the first part, I will isolate the main features characterising this specific form of 
manumission. Although the symbolic or fictitious nature of the ‘sale’, as is recorded in 
these inscriptions, seems to be acknowledged by most scholars, the legal nature of these 
acts has been the object of many discussions and different interpretations, which have 
for a long time prevented a complete understanding of the legal mechanisms 
surrounding slaves’ liberation as is represented in the inscriptions from Delphi. 
There are many fundamental problems and issues emerging from the reading of this 
epigraphic material. Most importantly, it is necessary to question the reason why these 
manumissions take the form of a sale. From a legal point of view, manumission and sale 
have two opposite effects: while manumission implies the liberation of a slave who, as 
an effect of manumission, becomes a free person and therefore can no longer belong to 
anyone, sale has the opposite effect of transferring ownership over a slave from one 
                                                          
that it was first employed somewhere else, and then it became commonly practiced in Delphi 
because of the religious warranty offered to the act by the god Apollo. Mulliez (1992): 33, for 
example, argues that ‘ce n’est en tout cas pas à Delphes que la procedure par vente fictive aurait 
été inaugurée, mais en Locride: de là, elle serait passée à Delphes, où elle n’est d’ailleurs utilisée 
dans les premières années que par des Locriens; il faut attendre la cinquième année pour voir des 
Delphiens y recouir’. Hopkins (1978): 138, on the other hand, maintains that ‘the surviving 
inscriptions were merely the last part, the by-product of a religious ritual, in which the master set 
the slave free solemnly and publicly before the god Apollo, his priests and civil witnesses and 
guarantors’; yet, the surviving inscriptions make no mention of this primitive ceremony (Mulliez 
[1992]: 34). 
126  Jones (1956): 284; Calderini (1965): 96; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 86. For some brief 
remarks on the Delphic evidence for ‘manumission through consecration’, cf. chapter 3, n. 236. 
127 Cf. Tucker (1974): 225; Hopkins (1984): 154; Mulliez (1992): 31-32. 
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owner to another. How, then, is manumission consistent with sale? My aim is to show 
that in these inscriptions there was no actual sale taking place (and therefore no transfer 
of ownership over the slaves resulted from the procedure thus attested), since, as an 
effect of the payment, slaves became immediately free individuals. More specifically, I 
will argue that Delphic manumissions were bilateral legal transactions between the 
slaves’ masters and the god. In showing this, I will emphasise the relationship, based on 
trust, between the slaves and the god: this relationship is crucial in showing that the 
complex mechanism of manumitting slaves in Delphi was ultimately meant to overcome 
the legal problem consisting in the slaves’ lack of the capacity to negotiate their 
manumission with their masters and to pay for their liberation. In order to address these 
problems and to shed light on these controversial issues, I will analyse in detail the single 
acts and clauses that are mentioned in the inscriptions, as the vocabulary specifically 
used and the precise sequence of legal acts they represent are central for a correct 
understanding of the nature of the Delphic manumissions. 
In the second part of the chapter, I will address the problem concerning the legal 
condition of those ἀπελεύθεροι who, after their manumission, were bound to perform 
παραμονή duties towards their former masters. The fact that ἀπελεύθεροι could be 
required to ‘remain with’ their manumittors for a certain period of time and perform 
services in the latter’s favour (or, less frequently, for other members of the latter’s 
families) has often puzzled scholars, who have defined the legal condition of these 
freedmen as one of slavery, one of freedom, or as a half-way one between slavery and 
freedom. In this section I will investigate, on the one hand, the legal nature of παραμονή, 
in order to show that it was the object of a legally binding agreement between 
manumittors and manumitted slaves. On the other hand, I will investigate the institution 
of ἀπόλυσις, which allowed manumitted slaves obliged to παραμένειν with their 
manumittors to obtain early release from παραμονή in exchange for money. Both 
παραμονή and ἀπόλυσις are in fact key-elements for the understanding of the legal 
condition of freedmen under παραμονή as one of freedom. Through a legal analysis of 
the main features of παραμονή and ἀπόλυσις in the wider context of the manumission-
inscriptions from Delphi, I will show that this corpus of inscriptions points to the 
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existence of two categories of manumitted slaves (those who were under παραμονή 
obligations towards their manumittors, and those who were not under such obligations); 
as I will show in chapter 4, this is also confirmed by the evidence for manumission 
referring to Classical Athens. Moreover, I will show that – despite the uncertainties and 
doubts that have for a long time characterised the scholarly debates about the condition 
of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή obligations – both these categories of manumitted 
slaves enjoyed a legal condition of freedom, and differed ‘only’ as for their de facto 
situation. 
 
2. Sale and manumission in modern interpretations. 
Scholarly interpretations about the nature and implications of the Delphic 
manumissions through ‘sale’ are very different and contradictory, and – as mentioned 
above – this has constituted a major obstacle to our understanding of the legal features 
of this form of manumission. 
Pringsheim, for example, analyses the Delphic manumissions through ‘sale’ in the 
light of the institution of ‘trust’, and argues that the ultimate result of this complex 
mechanism is a contrast between legal ownership (of the god over the slaves) and 
beneficial ownership (of the slaves over themselves).128 His interpretation, however, is 
not supported by the contents of the inscriptions: a closer look at their individual clauses 
will show that there was no distinction between legal and beneficial ownership, and that 
the god had no title over manumitted slaves. As the chapter will show, slaves acquired 
their own freedom by ‘entrusting’ the purchase money to the god, for the purpose of 
validly finalising the transaction with their masters. 
Calderini, on the other hand, maintains that the sales attested in Delphic inscriptions 
are only symbolic, since it is the slaves who, through the medium of the god, give the 
purchase money to their masters. Yet, he further argues that, as an effect of the sale, the 
god becomes the slaves’ new master, and is then required to liberate them.129 Calderini’s 
interpretation can be challenged on two main grounds. First, the god does not become 
                                                          
128 Pringsheim (1950): 185-186. 
129 Calderini (1965): 102-103. 
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the slaves’ new master, since as an effect of payment, slaves became immediately free 
and therefore any right of ownership over them ceased to exist. Second, his opinion is 
self-contradictory: he maintains, on the one hand, that the purchase-money was 
provided by slaves and, on the other, that slaves became property of the god, thus 
ignoring a key-element in the context of Greek sales, namely, the provenance of the 
purchase-money (which is described in the inscriptions as being provided by the slaves 
themselves). 
Again, Westermann maintains that the fundamental feature of these inscriptions is 
that the slaves ‘entrusted their savings to the god, with the confident reliance that Apollo 
would carry out, in its civil aspects, the trust of which had been placed in him’.130 He 
therefore concludes that these inscriptions record a ‘self-purchase of their liberation by 
the slaves themselves through the medium of the entrustment sale to Apollo’. 131 
Westermann’s opinion is certainly the most persuasive, although he does not seem to 
take into adequate consideration the importance of the verb πιστεύειν and the specific 
kind of relationship it establishes between the slaves and the god, which is key for 
properly assessing the nature of these sources. 
Finally, Sokolowski suggests that this specific form of ‘sacral’ manumission 
progressively developed from the so-called right of asylum (ἀσυλία), by which slaves 
could escape to temples and ask for the gods’ protection against their masters. The 
refugee thus became a ἱερός (this implying, earlier in time, that he was considered as a 
temple-slave)132  and, given this condition, ‘the sale to the divinity is the result of a 
decision of the court of priests’.133 Sokolowski’s interpretation is undermined by two 
                                                          
130 Westermann (1948b): 9. 
131  Westermann (1948b): 9, 35. Slightly different, but similar in the final outcome, is the 
interpretation offered by Kamen (2014): 285-286, who maintains that, although the overall idea is 
that ‘masters freed their slaves by “selling” them to a god, generally Apollo, for a specified price’, 
‘it was not actually the god who paid but the slaves themselves, under the guise of “entrusting 
the sale” to the god. These slaves then became the nominal property of the god, with the 
understanding that Apollo would make no use of his right of ownership. As a result, the right of 
ownership was transferred, by default, to the slaves themselves, who were then in possession of 
themselves – that is, free’. 
132 For a discussion on the meaning of ἱερός and of its legal implications (with specific regard 
to the corpus of inscriptions from Hellenistic Chaeronea), cf. chapter 3. 
133 Sokolowski (1954): 176-178. 
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fundamental problems. First, nothing in the inscriptions suggests that manumission is 
the reault of a decision taken by the temple which had previously become the slave’s 
new master: on the contrary, the epigraphic evidence suggests that slaves were still 
privately owned by their masters at the time of manumission. Second, his reconstruction 
does not distinguish between manumission through ‘sale’ and consecration, which 
inscriptions present as two completely different acts. 
This brief overview has highlighted the shortcomings of only some of the various 
ways in which scholarship has addressed the issues emerging from the text of the 
inscriptions; this makes it clear, however, that the nature of these sources is still far from 
being properly understood. In order to overcome these difficulties, it is important to 
focus on the vocabulary of the inscriptions and to analyse in detail their contents and the 
precise sequence of acts they describe. 
 
3. The vocabulary of manumission through πρᾶσις ὠνή. 
The formulas of the inscriptions are typical, as they are used in a very similar fashion 
in all the epigraphic material from Delphi recording manumissions through ‘sale’. 
As a typical example of Delphic inscription recording manumission through ‘sale’, I 
will consider SGDI II 1685 (from the 2nd century B.C.), whose formula describing the acts 
leading to the slave’s liberation through ‘sale’ can be found almost verbatim in many 
other manumission inscriptions: 
 
1 ἄρχοντος Θρασυκλέος μηνὸς Ἡρακλήου, ἀπέδοτο Ἄθαμβος Ἀθανίωνος τῶι 
Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι 
σῶμα γυναικεῖον ἇι ὄνομα Ἁρμοδίκα τὸ γένος ἐξ Ἐλατείας, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου 
μνᾶν ἕξ, καὶ τὰν τιμὰν 
ἔχει πᾶσαν, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Ἁρμοδίκα τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ὧιτε 
ἐλευθέρα εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος 
4 ἀπὸ πάντων τὸμ πάντα χρόνον ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέλη καὶ ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα 
θέλη. βεβαιωτῆρες κατὰ τὸν 
5 νόμον τᾶς πόλιος· Ἀντιχάρης Ἀζαράτου, Φιλόδαμος Χάρητος. εἰ δέ τις 
ἅπτοιτο ἐπὶ καταδουλισσμῶι Ἁρ- 
μοδίκας, βέβαιον παρεχόντων τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν ὅ [τ]ε ἀποδόμενος Ἄθαμβος 
καὶ οἱ βεβαιωτῆρες Ἀντιχά- 
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ρης, Φιλόδαμος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ παρατυγχάνοντε[ς] κύριοι ἐόντων συλέοντες 
Ἁρμοδίκαν ὡς ἐλευθέραν ἐοῦ- 
σαν ἀζάμιοι ἐόντες καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι πάσας δίκας κα[ὶ] ζαμίας. μάρτυροι· … 
 
Under the archonship of Thrasikleos, in the month of Herakleios, Athambos son of Athanionis 
sold to Pythian Apollo a female slave named Armodika from Elateia, at the price of six silver mnas, 
and (Athambos) received the whole money, since Armodika entrusted the purchase money to the 
god, on the condition that she is free and not claimable by anyone forever, and she can to do 
whatever she wants and she can go wherever she wants. Guarantors in accordance with the law 
of the city: Antikares, son of Azaratos, Filodamos, son of Charetos. If someone seizes Armodika 
for enslavement, the vendor Athambos and the guarantors Antikares and Filodamos shall warrant 
the sale to the god. Likewise, anyone is entitled to counter-seize Armodika on the grounds that 
she is free, being (anyone) not liable to penalty nor to any judgment. Witnesses: … 
 
The inscription starts by mentioning the archon (Thrasikleos) and the month 
(Herakleos) at the time of manumission: this is clearly meant to provide specific 
chronological information about the time of manumission. 
The vocabulary of sale results from the very first line of the inscription: the verb 
ἀποδίδωμι indicates that the contract thus carried out is a πρᾶσις ὠνή. More specifically, 
the inscription records a man, Athambos, as the vendor; the god Apollo as the purchaser; 
a female slave whose name is Armodika as the object sold; finally, it is also specified that 
the sale-price consists of six silver minae. 
Several inscriptions also mention the presence of one or more individuals together 
with the vendor, and their intervention is described with the verbs συνευδοκεῖν134, 
συνευαρεστεῖν135  or συνεπαινεῖν136 , especially – but not always – when the sale is 
carried out by a woman. This has led some scholars to argue that these verbs refer to the 
institution of legal representation; recent studies, however, have concluded that they 
rather allude to something different, namely, assistance or consent to the contract. On 
the one hand, it is true that some inscriptions record that women were assisted by their 
husbands or sons, which suggests that the verbs συνευδοκεῖν, συνευαρεστεῖν or 
συνεπαινεῖν could potentially refer to legal representation. But, on the other hand, there 
                                                          
134 Cf., for example, SGDI II 1688 (2nd century B.C.). 
135 See, for example, SGDI II 2168 (2nd century B.C.); SGDI II 2185 (undated). 
136 Cf., e.g., SGDI II 1708, 1717, 1728, 1743, all from the 2nd century B.C. 
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are also cases of women selling their slaves without being assisted by anyone137; women 
assisting their husbands 138 ; sons assisting their fathers 139 ; daughters assisting their 
fathers 140  or their mothers 141 ; finally, the whole family group assisting one of its 
members.142 These cases, in which the role of the vendor is performed by women without 
being assisted, or by men assisted by their wives and daughters or by the entire family 
group, show that there is no reason to believe that all the actors involved lacked legal 
capacity. For this reason, I suggest that the verbs συνευδοκεῖν, συνευαρεστεῖν or 
συνεπαινεῖν should be better interpreted in terms of assistance or consent to the contract. 
Assistance and consent to the contract, however, convey different meanings: if a 
person assists another in the making of a contract, it means that he simply observes the 
making of an agreement without his consent being essential for it, and his role is thus 
akin to that of a witness; if, on the other hand, a person gives his content to the contract, 
it means that his consensus is essential for the very making of the agreement. For this 
reason, and because witnesses are specifically and separately listed in each inscription, 
it is more likely that the function of the individuals described in the act of συνευδοκεῖν, 
συνευαρεστεῖν or συνεπαινεῖν to the sale was to give their consent to manumission, 
perhaps in order to avoid any future claim by the remaining members of the family 
group to the slave thus ‘sold’.143 
The inscription then states that the sale is complete, as the expression ‘καὶ τὰν τιμὰν 
ἔχοντι’ reveals that the vendors have received the whole purchase money: a 
                                                          
137 Cf., for example, FD III 2: 229 and 3:3, both dated to the 2nd century B.C. 
138 Cf., e.g., SGDI II 1732, 2277 (2nd century B.C.). 
139 SGDI II 1699, 1704. 
140 SGDI II 1711 (2nd century B.C.). 
141 Cf., e.g., FD III 1:138 (1st century B.C.); FD III 1:566 (2nd century B.C.); FD III 4:479,B (2nd 
century B.C.). 
142 See, for instance, SGDI II 1698 (2nd century B.C.), where the manumission carried out by a 
woman is made in the presence of her husband, her daughters and her son. Cf. also SGDI II 1686 
(2nd century B.C.). 
143 This opinion is shared by Beasley (1906): 251; Calderini (1965): 184; Bielman (2001): 234; 
Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 135; Kamen (2014): 288. 
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fundamental feature of Greek sale is that a πρᾶσις ὠνή can be considered complete and 
effective only once the entire purchase money has been paid.144 
The next expression that we find in the inscription is ‘καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Ἁρμοδίκα 
τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν’. This sentence needs to be examined with particular attention, as a 
proper understanding of the specific meanings that the verb ‘ἐπίστευσε’ and the term 
‘τὰν ὠνάν’ convey in this context is crucial for our analysis. On the one hand, the 
importance of the verb πιστεύειν has been often underestimated by scholars; on the 
other hand, scholarly interpretations of the term ὠνή are usually misleading. 
As for the verb πιστεύειν, it is important to point out that it indicates that the 
relationship between the two parties (in this case, the slave and the god) is a fiduciary 
                                                          
144 As Pringsheim stressed in his study of Greek sale, ‘in Greek law the payment of the price is 
the key-stone of the sale’ (Pringsheim [1950]: 190), since it has three fundamental effects. First, it 
is the payment of price that makes the sale complete (see also Jones [1956]: 228; Martini [2005]: 
85): in other words, the agreement between the vendor and the purchaser, albeit necessary, was 
not sufficient, because it had to be followed by the payment in order to complete the contract. In 
this respect, πρᾶσις ὠνή differs from the Roman emptio-venditio, in which the agreement itself 
made the sale complete (this contract was indeed included by Gaius among those concluded 
consensu together with locatio-conductio, societas and mandatum. Cf. Gai 3.135-136: Consensu fiunt 
obligationes in emptionibus et venditionibus, locationibus conductionibus, societatibus, mandatis. Ideo 
autem istis modis consensu dicimus obligationes contrahi, quod neque verborum neque scripturae ulla 
proprietas desideratur, sed sufficit eos, qui negotium gerunt, consensisse. Unde inter absentes quoque talia 
negotia contrahuntur, veluti per epistulam aut per internuntium, cum alioquin verborum obligatio inter 
absentes fieri non possit. Similarly, see Iust. I. 3.22.1: Consensu fiunt obligationes in emptionibus 
venditionibus, locationibus conductionibus, societatibus, mandatis. Ideo autem istis modis consensu dicitur 
obligatio contrahi, quia neque scriptura neque praesentia omnimodo opus est, ac ne dari quidquam necesse 
est, ut substantiam capiat obligatio, sed sufficit eos qui negotium gerunt consentire. Unde inter absentes 
quoque talia negotia contrahuntur, veluti per epistulam aut per nuntium. Item in his contractibus alter 
alteri obligatur in id quod alterum alteri ex bono et aequo praestare oportet, cum alioquin in verborum 
obligationibus alius stipuletur, alius promittat). That sale is completed by the payment of the full 
price is also confirmed by a passage from Hyperides’ third speech Against Athenogenes, when 
Epicrates says: τὰς δὲ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς ἐγὼ καταβαλὼν τὴν ὠνὴν ἐποιησάμην (Hyp. 3.9). 
Second, payment of price determined the transfer of ownership over the good from the vendor 
to the purchaser: in this respect, ‘delivery was irrelevant in the matter of passing the title, and 
payment decisive’ (Jones [1956]: 228; see also Pringsheim [1950]: 204, 219-220; Biscardi [1982]: 151; 
Harris [1988]: 360, who stresses the prevalence – at least in the Athenian legal system – of the 
‘principle of the cash sale’). Finally, payment of the price – and not παράδοσις – proves the 
acquisition of ownership: as Pringsheim has pointed out, ‘proof of acquisition by purchase is 
regularly offered as evidence of ownership’ (Pringsheim [1950]: 183) and, consequently, 
‘ownership can be proved by proving the payment’ (Pringsheim [1950]: 204). 
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one, i.e. is based on πίστις (trust).145 This use of πίστις and of the verb πιστεύειν within 
personal relationships is clear in Plato’s Laws146, where the philosopher – while giving 
rules for contracts and, more specifically, for πρᾶσις ὠνή – speaks of πιστεύειν in 
connection with ἐπὶ ἀναβολῇ, an expression which means ‘with delay’. Within this 
context, the entire formulation refers to a delayed performance by one of the parties to 
the contract, whereas the creditor – who first performed his obligation relying on trust – 
does not have any legal protection to his claim. Therefore, the verb πιστεύειν, which 
means ‘to trust the other,… is always at the risk of the trusting party. The parties may 
defer performance, on one side, but if one of them breaks the promise to pay or to deliver, 
it is too late (οὐκέτι δίκης οὔσης). There are no legal actions for such contracts’.147 
The same principles can be found in Aristotle. Interpersonal relationships based on 
trust and their features are described in a very similar fashion in the eight and ninth 
Books of the Nicomachean Ethics (E.N. 1162 b 16-25), in which Aristotle discusses the 
concept of φιλία. In the context of his discussion on ethics, the term φιλία does not have 
to be interpreted in the narrow sense of ‘friendship’, as it rather designates any 
interpersonal relationship which is not characterised by any kind of hostility.148 After 
distinguishing three kinds of φιλία (‘διά τήν ἀρετήν’, based on merit/what is good; ‘διά 
τὸ χρήσιμον’, based on what is useful; ‘διά τήν ἡδονήν’, based on pleasure), he 
discusses the concept of φιλία διά τὸ χρήσιμον (based on what is useful). Within this 
                                                          
145  For the meaning and implications of πίστις, cf. Faraguna (2012a): 355-373. Faraguna 
maintains that it is possible to envisage two different kinds of πίστις: an ‘aristocratic’ one, that 
‘was based on oath and originally belonged to characteristically archaic social contexts such as 
hetaireia and xenia-relations’, and a ‘democratic’ πίστις, which developed in the 5th century 
Athenian social and legal practices and ‘was based on “contract” and the protection contract was 
accorded by the laws and by the court system’ (Faraguna [2012a]: 371). See also Johnstone (2011), 
who analysed the economic and social role of trust in ancient Greece: he maintains, on the one 
hand, that even instant payment for goods required trust between the two parties, because of the 
general lack of approximation in weights and measures; on the other hand, he assumes that trust 
was the mean by which citizens on official boards tried to obtain consensus. 
146 Plat. Leg. 9.2.915d. 
147 Pringsheim (1950): 127-128. Plato gives a reason for this: ‘ὁ δὲ προέμενος ὡς πιστεύων, 
ἐάντε κομίσηται καὶ ἂν μή, στεργέτω’ (Plat. Leg 8.849e); ‘πιστεύων πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἀλλάττηται, 
ποιείτω ταῦτα’ (Plat. Leg 11.915e). According to Plato, ‘the trusting party has to take the risk, he 
must attribute his disappointment if the promise is not fulfilled to himself only’ (Pringsheim 
[1950]: 131). 
148 Natali (1999): 528 n. 834; Pelloso (2007): 45. 
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last category, he distinguishes between φιλία νομική, which is based on predetermined 
written agreements (ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς), and φιλία ἠθική, which is based on trust and is 
characterised by vagueness of the second performance (as for the an, quantum and 
quando).149 Aristotle then maintains that there is one kind of φιλία νομική that is akin to 
φιλία ἠθική, as it relies on trust. Φιλία νομική is in fact divided by Aristotle into two 
main categories: on the one hand, we find a φιλία which is typical of commerce and is 
characterised by an immediate exchange between the two parties from hand to hand (ἐκ 
χειρός εἰς χεῖρα); on the other hand, there is another kind of φιλία νομική which still 
relies on an agreement (κατ᾽ὁμολογίαν) but is ‘more liberal with a view to the time of 
repayment (ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον) … requiring one thing in return for another’.150 
This latter kind of relationships is characterised by an ἀναβολή (that is, a postponement, 
a chronological gap) between two performances: one party, after having performed his 
duty, defers to a future date the other party’s performance, thus generating a debt 
(ὀφείλημα) upon the latter. Aristotle qualifies ἀναβολή as φιλικόν, to signify that 
although ‘it is clear and unambiguous what is owed … there is an element of friendliness 
in the postponement allowed’151, and this makes this particular kind of φιλία νομική 
very much akin to φιλία ἠθική.152 Furthermore, Aristotle makes it clear (similarly to 
Plato in Laws) that these relationships based on πίστις do not have any legal protection. 
More specifically, ‘in all contracts a party trusting another must take the risk of loss’.153 
To sum up, we notice that the fundamental point descending from both Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s use of πίστις and πιστεύειν is the following: those relationships based on 
πίστις imply that one party performs his obligations before the counterparty fulfils his 
own; and that, as a consequence, the counterparty has a debt (ὀφείλημα) towards the 
party that had first fulfilled his obligations. Therefore, the term πίστις should be best 
interpreted as legal expectation; more specifically, it identifies the legal expectation of 
                                                          
149 Pelloso (2007): 48. 
150 Faraguna (2012a): 369. 
151 Faraguna (2012a): 369. 
152 Pelloso (2007): 48. 
153 Pringsheim (1950): 132. Cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1162b.25-30: διόπερ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων 
δίκαι, ἀλλ᾽ οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. See also Faraguna (2012a): 
369; Pelloso (2007): 49; Martini (2003): 443. 
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the party who has first performed his obligation to the future performance of his own 
obligation by the counterparty.154 
If this is correct, I suggest that the expression ‘καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Ἁρμοδίκα τῶι θεῶι 
τὰν ὠνάν’ should be read in the light of the previous considerations about the meaning 
and implications of the verb πιστεύειν. In other words, it is possible to infer that the 
slave has carried out his performance consisting, in this case, in ‘entrusting’ the ὠνή to 
the god; as an effect, it follows that the slave has an expectation towards the god’s 
performance of his own duty in a later time, having become the latter’s creditor. 
Yet, in order to understand the performance that binds the god towards the slave, it 
is necessary to find out what the meaning of ὠνή is in this context. This term has been 
interpreted in three different ways by scholars, who suggest that it means ‘ownership’155, 
‘sale’156, or ‘purchase money’.157 
Pringsheim, for example, argues that, within the specific context of these inscriptions, 
ὠνή means ‘ownership’. More specifically, he points out that in Greek sale ‘ὠνή is the 
name not only for the sale, but also for the agreement to sell and buy and for the 
document recording the sale’; in any case, ‘it is not … a name for the purchase money’.158 
Later claims in his reconstruction end up undermining his interpretation of ὠνή. On the 
one hand, he claims that the purchase money was provided by the slaves themselves; on 
the other hand, he observes that ‘ownership is acquired by payment of the price; 
                                                          
154 Maffi (1979): 181 (‘in Aristot. EN 1162 b 21 ss. un rapporto di filia può nascere da un contratto 
a prestazione differita, cioè stipulato kata pistin. Qui si è raggiunto il massimo livello di astrazione: 
filia designa semplicemente il legame fra il creditore e debitore e pistis l’aspettativa del creditore 
nel futuro adempimento del debitore’); Pelloso (2007): 49. 
155 Pringsheim (1950): 185. 
156 Samuel (1965): 258. 
157 Westermann (1948b): 9. 
158 Pringsheim (1950): 119. This is due, according to Pringsheim, to the very nature of Greek 
sale and can be understood only once the relationship between the terms ὠνή and πρᾶσις is made 
clear. He points out that several Greek authors generally referred to the concept of ‘ὠνή καἰ 
πρᾶσις’, thus implying not two different legal transactions (a buying and a selling) but, rather, a 
two-sided act. In other words, Greek sale is conceived as ‘a unity of two transactions, the buying 
and the selling, which are the two sides of one and the same purchase-sale’ (Pringsheim [1950]: 
114). Pringsheim then focuses on the meanings of ὠνή and πρᾶσις when used independently 
from one another: while πρᾶσις is a late term (it is Hellenistic and mainly appears in papyri) and 
is used only exceptionally to emphasize the vendor’s side, ὠνή refers to the purchaser’s side and, 
consequently, to the acquisition of ownership by the payment of price (Pringsheim [1950]: 117). 
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consequently the acquirer is the person from whom the money came, in these 
manumissions the slave’. As a logical corollary of these assumptions, he suggests that 
‘ὠνά in our clause is neither the document of sale, nor the price, nor yet the task 
committed to the god nor the sale, but the ownership acquired by the purchase for the 
slave’.159 From this interpretation, it follows that ‘the ownership he [i.e. the slave] gives 
to the god in trust so that the god becomes the legal, the slave the beneficial owner’ and 
that ‘the slave’s beneficial ownership, which results from the trust, is of course identical 
with his freedom’. 160  This, however, is problematic: on the one hand, Pringsheim 
(correctly) bases his whole intepretation on the assumption that the money is provided 
by the slaves; on the other, since he translates ὠνή with ownership, the idea that the 
purchase money was provided by slaves does not descend from the text of the 
inscriptions. Given his translation, in other words, there is nothing in the text suggesting 
that the money was provided by slaves. 
A different interpretation has been offered by Samuel, who maintains that ὠνή refers 
to the sale itself161; yet, although his interpretation of ὠνή is different from Pringsheim’s, 
it is undermined by the same kind of problems. After remarking that ‘in early documents, 
the term πιστεύειν has significance in the identification of the payor’, he assumes that 
‘where the term appears with the name of the slave as subject, the slave makes the 
payment and … since in most cases the slave is the subject, in most cases the slave makes 
the payment’.162 This is further confirmed, according to Samuel, by the content of those 
inscriptions in which ‘manumissions have provisions for the release from obligations 
upon the death of the manumittor’.163 The problem with Samuel’s interpretation is that, 
given his identification of ὠνή with sale, there is nothing in the text of the inscriptions 
to suggest that the purchase money was provided by the slaves. Samuel himself seems 
to find this reconstruction quite problematic, as he assumes that the provenance of the 
                                                          
159 Pringsheim (1950): 185. 
160 Pringsheim (1950): 185-186. 
161 Samuel (1965): 258: ‘the majority of the documents state that the slave entrusts the sale to 
the god; the typical formula is: καθὼς ἐπίστευσε ὁ δεῖνα τῶ Ἀπόλλωνι τὰν ὠνὰν’. 
162 Samuel (1965): 259. 
163 Samuel (1965): 259. 
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money is somehow inconsistent with what the inscriptions record (‘although this 
formula is used, the money used for the sale-manumission comes from the slave’).164 
To sum up, both Pringsheim’s and Samuel’s interpretations are weakened by the 
same kind of problem: they agree that the purchase money was provided by slaves, but 
their interpretations of the meaning of ὠνή are inconsistent with this assumption. But 
their interpretations are problematic also in another respect. If, following Pringsheim, 
we intend ὠνή as ownership, the expression ‘καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Ἁρμοδίκα τῶι θεῶι τὰν 
ὠνάν’ would mean that ‘Armodika entrusted the ownership to the god’. The problem 
with this interpretation, however, is that a slave cannot entrust to the god (or to anyone 
else) his own ownership, which he or she does not hold. If, on the other hand, we accept 
Samuel’s identification of ὠνή with sale, the expression would indicate that ‘Armodika 
entrusted the sale to the god’: but, as is evident, a slave cannot entrust to the god (or to 
anyone else) the sale of himself, for the fundamental reason that, within this framework, 
he is the object sold and not one of the parties to the contract. 
According to these interpretations, there is nothing in the inscriptions that justifies 
these scholars’ basic assumptions that the purchase money is provided by slaves. And 
yet, that the purchase money was provided by the slaves themselves results, I believe, 
from the very meaning of the expression ‘καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Ἁρμοδίκα τῶι θεῶι τὰν 
ὠνάν’. As is suggested by the verb ἐπίστευσε, the delivery is based on trust. But the 
slave cannot entrust to the god an ownership that he does not hold, or a sale to which he 
is not entitled. The only plausible interpretation of the meaning of ὠνή vis-à-vis 
ἐπίστευσε is that ὠνή refers to the purchase money, which is entrusted by the slave to 
the god. After having entrusted their money to the god, the slave becomes his creditor, 
and he can thus expect the god’s performance, consisting in the payment of the purchase 
money to the slave’s master which would result in the final ‘sale’ of the slave. 
This conclusion was first suggested by Westermann, who identifies ὠνή with the 
purchase money. Westermann maintains that the slave ‘had entrusted his savings to the 
god’ and that ‘when he received the slave’s money, Apollo perfected the act of civil 
                                                          
164 Samuel (1965): 258. 
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emancipation by turning over through his priests the redemption money to the former 
owner of the slave’.165 For this reason, he concludes that the Delphic inscriptions attest a 
‘self-purchase of their liberation by the slaves themselves through the medium of the 
entrustment sale to Apollo’.166 A correct identification of the person who provided the 
purchase money is thus a key-element, because – as mentioned before – in Greek sale 
the provenance of the purchase money determined the acquisition of ownership.167 
Finally, we find the expression ‘ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέρα εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ 
πάντων τὸμ πάντα χρόνον’. This clause also needs to be correctly understood: scholars 
have sometimes ignored it in their studies on Delphic manumissions, 168  or failed 
altogether to connect it to the context of πρᾶσις ὠνή.169 This provision was used in a very 
similar fashion in the Athenian maritime loan (ναυτικός τόκος): it soon became a 
common practice for the borrower to insert in the συγγραφή (together with the 
prohibition of ἐπιδανείζειν) a warranty clause in which the latter bound himself to give 
as a security goods that were ‘ἐλεύθερα καί ἀνέπαφα’ (which means free from any 
claim and legal interference). If the borrower breached this clause by giving the same 
goods as security to another creditor, he would have been considered as having 
committed an intentional offense towards both the former and the latter creditor.170 
The fact that Delphic manumissions mention the clause ‘ἐφ’ ὅτωι ἐλεύθερος εἶμεν 
καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πάντων’ is significant, because within the context of a πρᾶσις ὠνή 
the adjective ἀνέφαπτος (sometimes used interchangeably with ἀνέπαφος) identifies 
the warranty against eviction, that is, the warranty that the vendor is selling a good 
which is not owned by anyone else who, after the sale, could claim it as his property.171 
                                                          
165 Westermann (1948b): 9-10. 
166 Westermann (1955): 35. 
167 Pringsheim (1950): 205-206: ‘the provenance of the money used for the payment of the price 
is decisive for the acquisition. The person from whom the money comes … has a title to the goods 
acquired with it’; it follows that ‘if … the money belonged not to the purchaser, but to somebody 
else, some title, if not ownership, must be acquired by him’. See also Jones (1956): 229. 
168 Westermann (1946): 1955; Pringsheim (1950); Calderini (1965); Hopkins (1984); Mulliez 
(1992). 
169 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 79; Dimopoulou-Piliouni (2008): 42. 
170 Pelloso (2008a): 71, 103. On real security in Classical Athens and, more specifically, on the 
relationship between πρᾶσις ἐπί λύσει and ὑποθήκη, see Harris (1988). 
171 Pringsheim (1950): 465. 
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For this reason, this clause must be interpreted in the sense that, in order for the ‘sale’ to 
be legally valid and effective, the object of the sale (the slave) had to be free from any 
legal interference and from someone else’s claim of a superior title to the slave thus ‘sold’. 
The warranty against eviction implies that ‘if the vendor is not the owner of the goods 
sold and therefore cannot transfer ownership by receiving the price, he is liable. But this 
liability is, in Greece as elsewhere, based not on contract, but on the vendor’s failure to 
defend the right of his transferee against interference’.172 The implication is therefore that, 
through the eviction clause, the master (i.e. the vendor) gave the slave (i.e. the purchaser) 
guarantee that the ownership thus transferred (i.e. the slave’s freedom) was complete, 
and that it could not be challenged by anyone claiming a superior title to the good thus 
sold (i.e. the slave himself).173 
Once the language of the inscriptions is carefully examined, it is clear that their typical 
formulas suggest a precise sequence of legal acts; at the same time, each of these legal 
acts has a specific significance in the context of a sale, and is strictly connected to the 
other parts of the formula. 
To conclude, the analysis of the individual clauses and elements of the inscriptions 
suggests that they do not simply describe a sale with the slave as the object sold, and the 
master and the god as subjects (respectively, as vendor and purchaser). The fundamental 
aspect which is often ignored but results clearly from the text of the inscriptions is that 
the purchase money was not provided by the god (or the temple) but, rather, by the 
slaves themselves, who entrust them to the god to transact on their behalf. This implies 
that once the sale is complete, the god does not acquire any (fictitious or formal) 
                                                          
172 Pringsheim (1950): 429. 
173  Within the context of πρᾶσις ὠνή the term ἀνέφαπτος is technical and refers to the 
warranty of undisturbed possession (eviction). This term identifies ‘the rightful claim of the 
owner’ and ‘everywhere it means free from legal interference’ (Pringsheim [1950]: 466). If 
someone claimed to have a superior title over the goods sold to the purchaser, the latter had to 
summon the vendor (through an act called ἀνάγειν εἰς πρατῆρα) who, in his turn, had to warrant 
the sale by defending the goods against the claimant: if the vendor failed to defend the good he 
had sold, the purchaser could bring a δίκη βεβαιώσεως against him, and he would have been 
subject to a money penalty (Pringsheim [1950]: 430; Biscardi [1982]: 152; Harris [1988]: 373). 
Scholars maintain that the sale of goods not belonging to vendors was not very common, since 
the Greek rules for publicity of contracts and the presence of witnesses to sales allowed the owner 
to intervene before the sale was completed (Pringsheim [1950]: 431; Biscardi [1982]: 153). 
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ownership over the slaves, but it is the slaves who, having provided the purchase money, 
acquire ownership over themselves: in other words, by entrusting the money to the god 
who then delivers it to the slaves’ masters as payment of the price, the slaves become 
ἀπελεύθεροι. 
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the inscriptions never represent 
slaves who, having (at least de facto) the money required for the ‘sale’, personally give it 
to their masters. This is due to the fact that slaves lacked the capacity to contract and, 
consequently, they were not capable of entering into valid and effective manumission 
agreements with their masters. It follows that the intervention of a third party (who, in 
the case of the Delphic inscriptions, is represented by the god) in the manumission 
procedure was necessary for the legal validity of the ‘sale’ itself, given the slave’s lack of 
capacity to contract. This does not mean, however, that the god, because of its 
intervention in the procedure (more specifically, because of the payment of the purchase 
money), acquired any right over the slaves, or that the slaves would later have any kind 
of obligation towards the god: in fact, the sale produced its effects directly on the slave, 
and not on the god.174 
 
4. The legal protection of ἀπελεύθεροι in the Delphic inscriptions. 
After recording manumissions through πρᾶσις ὠνή, many inscriptions mention the 
means by which the legal freedom of ἀπελεύθεροι was granted. 
We shall consider, as a typical example, SGDI II 1686 (from the 2nd century B.C.). After 
describing the manumission of a female slave named Katastalia through πρᾶσις ὠνή by 
her mistress Laiada to the god Apollo (with the use of the same formulas analysed 
above), the text continues with the following words (ll. 8-12): 
 
εἰ δέ τις ἐφάπτοιτο Κασταλίας ἐπὶ καταδουλισσμῶι, βέβαιον παρεχόν- 
των τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν οἵ τε ἀποδόμενοι καὶ ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ Ἀστόξενος· εἰ δὲ μὴ 
παρέχο[ι]ν βέβαιον τῶι θε- 
                                                          
174 For a detailed discussion about the variations of prices for manumission in the Delphic 
inscriptions, see Hopkins (1978): 162 (who notices that during the 2nd and 1st century B.C., price 
for manumission increased whilst the number of manumitted slaves diminished); see also 
Duncan-Jones (1984). 
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10 ῶι τὰν ὠνάν, πράκτιμοι ἐόντων κατὰ τὸν νόμον τᾶς πόλιος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ 
παρατυγχάνοντες κύριοι ἐόν- 
των συλέοντες Κασταλίαν ἐλευθέραν ἐοῦσαν ἀζάμιοι ἐόντες καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι 
πάσας δίκας καὶ ζαμίας. μάρ- 
τυροι· … 
 
If someone seizes Katastalias for enslavement, the vendors and the guarantor Astoxenos shall 
warrant the sale to the god; if they do not do so, they will be liable to a money penalty in accordance 
with the law of the city. Likewise, anyone is entitled to counter-seize Katastalia on the grounds 
that she is free, being (anyone) not liable to penalty nor to any judgment. Witnesses: … 
 
Although the formula ‘ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέρα εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν 
πάντα χρόν[ο]ν’, which is used in line 6 of the inscription, implies that the slave ‘sold’ 
must be free from someone else’s claim and from any kind of legal interference 
(warranty against eviction), the possibility that, after manumission is completed, 
someone may seize the ἀπελευθέρα is expressly mentioned; this ultimately results in a 
challenge to the legal title of the seller over the slave thus ‘sold’. This is described as the 
act of ἐφάπτειν the ex-slave ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῷ, but sometimes the verbs ἅπτεσθαι175 
or καταδουλίζασθαι176 are also used, which convey the same idea of ‘enslavement’177 or, 
more precisely, ‘the formal act of seizing the thing’.178 When this happens, we learn from 
the inscriptions that the protection granted to ἀπελεύθεροι was twofold. On the one 
hand, it is stated that ‘βέβαιον παρεχόντων τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν οἵ τε ἀποδόμενοι καὶ 
ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ’: this means that the vendors (i.e. the former masters) and the guarantor to 
the ‘sale’ must intervene in the context of the warranty against eviction as an effect of 
the buyer’s summon, and thus ‘warrant’ that the ‘sale’ is valid and effective.179 If the 
                                                          
175 See, e.g., SGDI II 1685 (2nd century B.C.). 
176 See, for example, SGDI II 1701 (2nd century B.C.). 
177 Cf. Liddle, Scott (1996) s.v. καταδουλισμός, who point out that the verbs ἅπτεσθαι and 
ἐφάπτεσθαί τινος ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῷ have the same meaning and that they refer to enslavement. 
178 Harrison (1968): 210. 
179 Cf. Pringsheim (1950): 431, who argues that the clause ‘βεβαιοῦν τὴν ὠνήν’ ‘means that the 
defence is undertaken by a vendor, to whom the purchaser has referred the claimant: ἀνάγειν 
εἰς πρατῆρα’. See also Harris (1988): 373: ‘the only way an Athenian could prove that he was the 
rightful owner of a piece of property was to provide evidence to show that he had acquired it in 
a legitimate fashion. If the property had been acquired by sale, the buyer, when challenged to 
prove title, would have to summon the man who sold him the property and have him testify 
about the sale. The seller (πρατήρ) who did respond to the summons and testified was said to 
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vendors and the guarantors fail to intervene, the inscriptions state that they are both 
liable to a monetary fine (‘πράκτιμοι ἐόντων’). This part of the inscription, in other 
words, must be read in the light of the warranty against eviction, according to which – 
as noted above – the sale is valid and produces its effects only if the ‘vendor’ has the 
right to alienate his slave, which is questioned whenever someone claims a title over the 
slave thus ‘sold’. When this occurs, the ‘vendors’ and the guarantors must ‘warrant’ the 
sale; if they do not do so, they will be subject to a money penalty, whereas no 
consequence is said to be descending upon the manumitted slaves’ legal condition 
(which therefore remains one of freedom). 
On the other hand, many inscriptions also state that in the event of a formal seizure 
by a third party, anyone (οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες) was entitled to exercise an act of 
counter-seizure over the slave. In other words, against the first seizure by someone 
claiming to have a title over the manumitted slave, anyone else could reply by an act of 
counter-seizure in order to take the ἀπελεύθερος back to freedom (‘ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ 
παρατυγχάνοντες κύριοι ἐόντων συλέοντες Κασταλίαν ἐλευθέραν ἐοῦσαν’). The 
contrast between an initial ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῷ and the subsequent συλᾶν 
clearly resembles the connection between the two opposite acts of ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν 
and ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν which characterised the Athenian procedure relating to 
slaves’ status. In Athens, if someone claimed to be entitled to the right of ownership over 
a person who, on the contrary, claimed to be free, the former was legally entitled to seize 
the letter. This act constituted an institutionalised form of self-help and was technically 
labelled as ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν, which was approved and recognised by the laws of the 
πόλις. It followed that the claimant acquired possession over the individual whose legal 
condition was disputed (the ἀπαχθείς). This de facto situation was effective until the 
                                                          
“warrant” the sale (βεβαιοῦν) and to become a co-defendant in the case (συνίστασθαι τήν 
δίκην)’. Cf. also SGDI II 1687 (2nd century B.C.), where the formula is slightly different, as it states 
that ‘εἰ δέ τις ἐφάπτοιτο ἐπὶ καταδ[ο]υ[λισμῶι] Ἀνθρακίου, ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ ἀσφαλῆ παρεχέτ[ω 
τὰν ὠ]νὰν τῶι θεῶι. μάρτυρες·(…)’. This formula presents three main differences from the 
standard formulas: first, the individual that has to ‘warrant’ the sale is only the guarantor, 
whereas no mention is made of the vendor; second, the ὠνή is not said to be βέβαιος, but 
ἀσφαλής, which means ‘not liable to fall, immovable, steadfast’ (Liddle, Scott [1996] s.v. 
ἀσφαλής), which alludes to the effectiveness of the sale; third, there is no mention of the money 
penalty that has to be suffered by the guarantor in the event that he does not fulfil his obligation. 
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intervention of a third party who, through a formal request called ἀφαίρεσις εἰς 
ἐλευθερίαν (which resulted in ‘the symbolic act of taking the alleged slave away into 
liberty’)180, forced the claimant to stop his ἀγωγή and thus to release the seized person: 
if the claimant did not give up the ἀγωγή, he was liable to a δίκη βιαίων. After the 
ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν and the subsequent release of the ἀπαχθείς, the alleged 
master – in order to pursue his claim – had to bring a δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως against the 
‘adsertor in libertatem’. During the period between the release from seizure and the end 
of the δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως, the ἀπαχθείς was temporarily granted the possession of 
himself.181  The δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως was a delictual action through which the plaintiff 
aimed to obtain the condemnation of the defendant to the payment of a monetary fine 
to the state.182 In fact, the decision directly ascertained which one of the two parties was 
right and only indirectly determined the legal condition of the seized individual.183 
Although with some differences, the same features can be found in the procedure 
described in the Delphic manumission inscriptions, which state that if someone seized 
the former slave and claimed to have rights over him (ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐπὶ καταδουλισμῷ), 
anyone (οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες) – and, in some cases, the freed slaves themselves184 – 
could in their turn counter-seize the ἀπαχθείς. As an effect of the counter-seizure by οἱ 
παρατυγχάνοντες, the claimant would have thus lost possession over the ἀπαχθείς. 
The only difference between the Athenian and the Delphic procedure (which, however, 
does not mark a fundamental distinction between the two models of litigation 
concerning the legal condition of individuals) is that while in Athens the ‘adsertor in 
libertatem’ could force the claimant to release the ἀπαχθείς only by means of a formal 
declaration, in Delphi he could obtain the same result by actually taking away the 
ἀπαχθείς from the claimant’s possession by means of a self-help procedure (this act was 
                                                          
180 Harrison (1968): 178. 
181 Paoli (1976): 452-453. 
182 Maffi (1995): 21-22: ‘la multa era pari al doppio del valore dello schiavo, di cui la metà 
andava alla polis’; Harrison (1968): 179, on the other hand, maintains that ‘a convicted defendant 
had to pay a fine of the value of the slave to the state’. 
183 Paoli (1976): 452-453. 
184  A typical example in this regard is provided by SGDI II 1701 (ll. 7-8): ‘εἰ δέ τις 
κατ[α]δουλίζοιτο Δορκίδα, κυρία ἔστω αὐσαυτὰν συλέουσα’. Similarly, cf. SGDI II 1713, 1729, 
1971, 2213, 2252, all from the 2nd century B.C. 
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technically called συλᾶν185, which therefore identifies an act of ‘prendre de force pour 
mettre en liberté’).186 Apart from this, the two procedures shared the same basic features, 
and it is also important to stress that in both πόλεις they are conceived of as lawful and 
expressly authorised. More specifically, the Delphic inscriptions state that οἱ 
παρατυγχάνοντες who start a συλᾶν over the ἀπαχθείς must be considered 
‘unpunishable’, ‘not liable to penalty’ (ἀζάμιοι) 187 and, as a corollary, they could not be 
convicted in any action (ἀνυπόδικοι πάσας δίκας καὶ ζαμίας).188 
 
5. The legal nature of manumission through ‘sale’: final considerations. 
An analysis of the inscriptions recording manumissions through πρᾶσις ὠνή allows 
us to conclude that sale is only the external form given to the act of manumission: there 
is no sale taking place between the slaves’ masters and the god, nor we can envisage the 
fundamental legal effect of sale, that is, the transfer of ownership over the slaves from 
                                                          
185 The term συλᾶν technically identified the right of seizure between citizens of different 
πολεῖς: more specifically, it designates ‘il diritto di rappresaglia che un cittadino esercita sui beni 
e sulla persona del cittadino di una città straniera, quando non possa far valere i suoi diritti 
davanti agli organi della città’ (Biscardi [1982]: 87-88, who also points out that ἀσυλία was a 
privilege that the Athenians could grant to ξένοι, and consisted in their exclusion from σῦλαι). 
Συλᾶν was the object of many treaties stipulated between πολεῖς, such as the one between 
Oianthea and Chaleion in the 5th century B.C., that expressly authorized their respective citizens 
to seize the goods belonging to the other πόλις, ‘except on the territories or in the harbours of the 
two cities’ (Harrison [1968]: 245 n. 4). This system was usually meant ‘non seulement à opérer des 
saisies en réparation d’un préjudice, en riposte à quelque chose (acte d’hostilité, refus d’acquitter 
une dette, violation de la loi)’, mais à les pratiquer sur les biens ou la personne de n’importe quel 
compatriote du coupable – ou présumé tel’ (Van Effenterre, Ruzé [1994]: 218). The legitimacy of 
συλᾶν as a ‘seizure in pursuit of a remedy for a wrong’ is generally accepted by scholars (cf. 
Lintott [2004]: 340-344, who says that σῦλαι ‘are permitted as counter-measure to an illegal 
seizure’; Van Effenterre, Ruzé [1994]: 74; Liddle, Scott, [1996] s.v. συλάω, who identify it with the 
right of reprisals; Dareste, Haussoullier, Reinach [1898]: 403), and it has only been challenged by 
Bravo, who – in commenting on a law from the first column of the Great Law Code of Gortyn – 
maintains that συλᾶν does not refer to the right of seizure, as it is used to describe the act of 
taking away things or slaves, but never free individuals; on the other hand, he states that the term 
is ‘neutral’ and does not necessarily imply the legitimacy of the action (Bravo [1980]). His opinion, 
however, is not shared by other scholars, who generally stress the legitimacy of συλᾶν and its 
connection with the right of seizure. 
186 Dareste, Haussoullier, Reinach (1898): 403. 
187  Liddle, Scott (1996) s.v. ἀζήμιος. Ζαμία is indeed the doric equivalent of ζημία. On 
immunity from prosecution, see Rubinstein (2010): 200-203. 
188 See Liddle, Scott (1996) s.v. ἀνυπόδικος, where it is stated that the entire formula ‘ἀ. πάσας 
δίκας καὶ ζαμίας’ means ‘not liable to action’. 
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the masters to the god. Although the Delphic inscriptions clearly refer to the terminology 
of πρᾶσις ὠνή, their formulas make it clear that the purchase money is provided by the 
slaves themselves, and that the god’s only task is to deliver it to the slaves’ masters: this 
constitutes the god’s only duty arising from the fiduciary relationship established 
between the slave and the god, which is expressed by the verb πιστεύειν. The simple 
fact that the god’s action is limited to the delivery of the slaves’ money to their masters 
does not imply that he acquires any right or duty from the ‘sale’ thus concluded. From 
a more general point of view, this also allows us to conclude that Delphic manumissions 
through πρᾶσις ὠνή were not unilateral acts of the masters but, rather, bilateral legal 
transactions by which masters liberated their slaves in return for money: once payment 
is made, manumission has to be considered complete and the slaves automatically 
became legally free individuals. 
It is therefore clear that this complex set of acts is ultimately meant to overcome the 
legal difficulties arising from the slaves’ lack of capacity to contract: how could slaves 
validly and effectively pay their masters in order to obtain freedom, if they were not 
legal subjects and, consequently, could not enter into legally binding agreements with 
their δεσπόται? This is the fundamental reason lying behind the god’s intervention in 
the manumission procedure, and this is also the reason why the liberation of a slave is 
described as a πρᾶσις ὠνή. Once this mechanism is understood, it becomes clear that, 
in this context, the role of the ‘purchaser’ is played by the slaves themselves, who thus 
‘buy’ themselves and, consequently, their own freedom. 
At the same time, the inscriptions provide slaves with two mechanisms for protecting 
their legal freedom: on the one hand, the ex-master and the guarantor to the contract 
must guarantee the validity of the πρᾶσις ὠνή under monetary penalty; on the other 
hand, if someone seizes the freed individual, anyone – and also the ἀπελεύθερος 
himself – can legally counter-seize him and thus take him back to freedom. 
 
6. The role and nature of παραμονή in the Delphic inscriptions. 
The majority of the Delphic inscriptions states that, after their liberation, manumitted 
slaves are free to go wherever they want and do whatever they wish. This is the case, for 
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example, of SGDI II 1685 (2nd century B.C.): after describing the act through which the 
female slave named Armodika was liberated and before mentioning the means by which 
her freedom was protected against other people’s claims, the first part of the inscription 
ends with the following statement (ll. 3-5): 
 
… ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέρα εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος 
ἀπὸ πάντων τὸμ πάντα χρόνον ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέλη καὶ ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα 
θέλη. βεβαιωτῆρες κατὰ τὸν 
5 νόμον τᾶς πόλιος· … 
 
… on the condition that she is free and not claimable by anyone forever, and she can do 
whatever she wants and she can go wherever she wants. Guarantors in accordance with the law 
of the city: … 
 
This inscription shows that, as an effect of manumission, the freedwoman is granted 
complete freedom of movement and action.189 This formula (‘ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέλη καὶ 
ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα θέλη’) is mentioned in about three quarters of Delphic inscriptions 
recording manumission through πρᾶσις ὠνή: there is no doubt that, in all these cases, 
the legal condition of manumitted slaves was one of freedom, both de iure and de facto.190 
The remaining inscriptions (about one fourth of the total), on the other hand, after 
describing manumissions through ‘sale’ of slaves to the god by their masters, mention a 
different clause, which requires manumitted slaves to perform further services towards 
their manumittors or other members of the latter’s families. Most inscriptions refer to 
this clause by using the aorist imperative of the verb παραμένειν (παραμεινάτω; the 
meaning of παραμένειν is ‘to remain, stay’)191: for this reason, scholars traditionally refer 
                                                          
189 Westermann (1955): 35; Meyer (2009): 84, observes (correctly) that such a ‘freedom to go 
where they want’ is largely attested in Delphi, but is not mentioned at all in the dedication-
inscriptions from Chaeronea. For a discussion on the relationship between manumission and 
consecration, see chapter 3. 
190 Westermann (1948b): 10: ‘the slave, by virtue of the sale to the god, became immediately 
and unequivocally a free man, being unencumbered in his new status by any kind of restrictive 
commitment to his former owner’. 
191 Liddle, Scott (1996) s.v. παραμένω. 
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to this duty by using, in a general fashion, the term παραμονή192, which can therefore be 
defined as the duty compelling freedmen to ‘remain’, in a general sense, with their 
former masters to perform certain services for them (or, less frequently, for other 
members of the latter’s families) for a period that can range from several years to the rest 
of the manumittors’ life. More specifically, Westermann first pointed out that the 
grammatical structure of the inscriptions reflects the ‘autonomy’ of παραμονή 
provisions from the act of manumission itself.193 He noticed that the first part of those 
manumission-inscriptions in which παραμονή provisions are mentioned (that is, the 
part which describes the very act of manumission) is characterised by the use of the 
indicative ἀπέδοτο; whereas the second part of these inscriptions (which usually deals 
with παραμονή provisions) is in most cases characterised by the use of the verb 
παραμένειν, conjugated in the imperative tense (παραμεινάτω or παραμεινάντων). 
According to Westermann, ‘the abrupt shift in the modal structure of the two parts of 
the Delphic reports of paramone manumissions has the only significance that it 
differentiates the continuing service agreement of the freedman, the paramone portion, 
from the statement of the sale of the same person, while he was still enslaved, to the 
god’. 194  This grammatical structure shows, in other words, that manumission and 
παραμονή provisions (when attested in the inscriptions) were conceived of as two 
distinct and separate parts of the complex mechanism of liberating slaves in Delphi. 
                                                          
192 Although most inscriptions use the aorist imperative of the verb παραμένειν, very few of 
them use the aorist participle (παραμείνασαν, παραμείναντες). In a recent work on the legal 
condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή, Sosin has relied heavily on this latter use of the verb 
παραμένειν and suggested that, because the aorist imperative might also convey the idea of 
anteriority, the Delphic inscriptions mentioning παραμονή clauses ultimately signify that ‘the 
slaves were sold on condition that they be free “after they have remained”’ (Sosin [2015]: 101). In 
other words, according to Sosin’s interpretation, ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή were property 
of the god (that is, slaves), and would become legally free only at the end of the παραμονή period. 
Sosin’s argument, however, can be challenged both from a philological point of view (the aorist 
participle is only used in very rare cases, whereas in most cases the inscriptions express the duty 
to παραμένειν with the aorist imperative, which has no temporal meaning but only an aspectual 
value), and from a legal perspective (for a detailed discussion of the single legal clauses which 
indicate that ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή were legally free individuals, see infra). 
193 Westermann (1948b): 9-11. 
194 Westermann (1948b): 10-11. 
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Although in some inscriptions παραμονή had to be performed towards other 
members of the manumittor’s family, in most cases the beneficiary of παραμονή was 
the manumittor himself: for this reason (and in order to make the exposition more fluid), 
in the following part of my discussion I will refer to the beneficiary of παραμονή by 
using, in a wider sense, the term manumittor. 
As a typical example of inscription mentioning παραμονή provisions I will consider 
the content of SGDI II 1721 (2nd century B.C.). After describing the ‘sale’ to Apollo of a 
young house-born slave named Sosikrates by his master Kratos at the price of two silver 
minae, the inscription states (ll. 5-6): 
 
5 παραμεινάτω δὲ Σωσικράτης παρὰ Κρατὼ ποιῶν τὸ ποιτασσόμενον πᾶν, 
ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη Κρατώ· 
 
Sosikrates must remain by Kratos and do whatever he is ordered to do, for the rest of Kratos’ 
life … 
 
From the inscription we infer that, after his liberation, Sosikrates is required to 
παραμένειν with his former master and do all the things that the latter orders him to 
do. In this specific case, the content of the παραμονή duty is only generic: this is a 
common feature of those inscriptions mentioning παραμονή clauses, as the majority of 
them simply states that the ἀπελεύθερος must do whatever the manumittor orders him 
to do, with no mention of the specific services that the freed slave must perform.195 
Some other inscriptions, on the other hand, after mentioning the παραμονή duty 
binding the ἀπελεύθερος towards the manumittor, describe the specific services that 
the manumitted slave must perform in favour of his former master. This is the case, for 
example, of SGDI II 1708 (2nd century B.C.), which, after describing the liberation through 
‘sale’ of a young female slave named Meda by her mistress Timo at the price of two silver 
minae with the usual formulas, refers to a very peculiar παραμονή duty. Meda, once 
freed, is in fact required to look after (τρέφειν) and behave well (εὐσχημονεῖν) towards 
her father Sosibios and her mother Soso until they both reach their old age, whether in 
                                                          
195 Westermann (1948b): 12. 
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the meantime they had been freed or had remained slaves. If she does not do so, her 
parents or anyone else on their behalf can punish her as they wish (ll. 12-22): 
 
τρε- 
φέτω δὲ Μήδα Σωσίβιον τὸν ἴδιον πατέ- 
[ρ]α καὶ τὰμ ματέρα Σωσὼ καὶ εὐσχημο- 
15 νιζέτω, ἐπεί κα ἐν ἁλικίαν ἔλθη, εἰ χρείαν ἔ- 
χοισαν Σωσίβιος ἢ Σωσὼ τροφᾶς ἢ εὐσχημονι- 
σμοῦ, εἴτε δουλεύοντες εἶεν εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι 
γεγονότες· εἰ δὲ μὴ τρέφοι ἢ μὴ εὐσχημονίζοι Μήδα 
Σωσίβιον ἢ Σωσὼ χρείαν ἔχοντας, ἐξουσία ἔστω 
20 Σωσιβίωι καὶ Σωσοῖ κολάζειν Μήδαν ὧ[ι] θέλοιν 
τρόπωι, καὶ ἄ[λλ]ωι ὑπὲρ Σωσίβιον ἢ Σωσὼ ὅγ κα κε- 
λεύη Σωσίβιος ἢ Σωσώ … 
 
The peculiarity of this inscription is that the freedwoman does not have to perform 
any duty towards her former mistress since, after her liberation, she is only required to 
look after her own parents. 
Another inscription which mentions very peculiar provisions is SGDI II 2171 (also 
from the 2nd century B.C.), which describes the liberation of a house-born female slave 
named Diokleia by her master Philagros at the price of three silver minae according to 
the usual formulas. The inscription states that after her liberation Diokleia must remain 
with her former master’s mother, Kleopatra, who can punish and put her in fetters, but 
is expressly prohibited to sell her. Finally, it is also specified that if during her παραμονή 
Diokleia bears a child, she can decide whether to grow him – in which case, the child 
would be free – or to kill him, but, in any case, she cannot sell him: 
 
παραμεινατω δὲ Διόκλεια 
[παρ]ὰ Κλεοπάτραι τῆι ματρὶ Φιλάγρου ποιοῦσα 
[τὸ ἐ]πιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν, ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἐχέ- 
10 τω ἐπιτιμέουσα καὶ διδέουσα τρόπωι ὧι κα θέληι 
πλὰν μὴ πωλέουσα … 
 … 
εἰ δέ τι γένοιτο ἐγ Διοκλέας 
τέκνον ἐν τῶι τᾶς παραμονᾶς χρόνωι, εἴ κα μὲν θέ- 
ληι ἀποπνεῖξαι Διόκλεα ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω, εἰ δὲ θέλοι 
τρέφειν, ἔστω τὸ τρεφόμενον ἐλεύθερον· εἴ κα μὴ 
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20 αὐτὸ θέληι, πωλῆσαι δὲ τὸ γενηθέν μὴ ἐχέτω ἐξουσίαν 
Διόκλεα μηδὲ ἄλλος μηθείς. μάρτυροι· 
 
This inscription is unique, as it explicitly authorises the ἀπελευθέρα to kill her own 
offspring. Some scholars have suggested that this specific authorization of infanticide 
should be connected with the institution of ἀπόλυσις (which, as I will show later, 
allowed an ἀπελεύθερος under παραμονή to pay a specific sum of money to the 
manumittor in order to obtain early release from παραμονή). Dioklea’s manumittor 
seems in fact not to care at all about the former’s determinations about her own children, 
as she is in fact entitled both to raise them or to kill them. The manumittor’s sole concern 
(together with Dioklea’s caring after his mother) is that she will not sell her own 
offspring: this prohibition was probably meant to make sure that Dioklea would not get 
the money she needed to pay for her early release from παραμονή.196 
Apart from these cases, the majority of the inscriptions refers to the duty of 
παραμένειν only in general terms, without mentioning the specific services that 
manumitted slaves had to perform.197 Moreover, while some inscriptions simply record 
this duty without mentioning its duration 198 , many others expressly state that the 
ἀπελεύθερος is required to παραμένειν with his former master for the rest of the latter’s 
life (or for the rest of the life of whatever person is indicated as the beneficiary of 
παραμονή)199, or for several years.200 After the παραμονή period has come to an end, 
the inscriptions often prescribe that the ἀπελεύθερος should become free.201 Finally, 
besides those inscriptions that do not mention the non-fulfilment of παραμονή duties 
                                                          
196 Tucker (1974): 235-236. 
197 Westermann (1948b): 12. 
198 Cf., e.g., FD III 3:140 (2nd century B.C.), which, after recording the liberation of a female slave 
named Afrodisia by her mistress Sosia through πρᾶσις ὠνή to the god Apollo, states: … 
παραμεινάτ[ω δ]ὲ Ἀφροδισία π[αρ]ὰ / Στρατ[ὼ] ποιο[ῦ]σα τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον …. 
199 This is the case of SGDI II 1721 above mentioned, in which it is stated that the freed slave 
Sosikrates has to remain with his former master Kratos for the rest of Krato’s life. See also, for 
example, SGDI II 1694, 1714, 1729 (all from the 2nd century B.C). 
200 See, for instance, SGDI II 1696, 1702, 1916. 
201 For example, SGDI II 1694 (2nd century B.C.): … παραμεινάτ[ω δ]ὲ Θρᾶισσα παρὰ Βόηθον 
/ [ποιέου]σα π[ᾶν τὸ] δυνατόν, ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη Βόηθος· ἐπεὶ δέ κα [μ]ε- / [ταλλ]άξηι τὸ[ν βίο]ν 
Βόηθος, ἐλευθέρα ἔστω Θρᾶισσα καὶ ὁ βεβ[α]ιω- / τὴρ [μη]κέτι βε[βαι]ούτω … 
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by the ἀπελεύθερος, many others expressly mention the consequences that would 
descend upon those freedmen who did not παραμένειν with their manumittors. The 
remedies attested in the inscriptions can be divided into two main categories. 
On the one hand, we find inscriptions recording that, if the ἀπελεύθερος does not 
παραμένειν, the manumittor can punish him as he wishes. As a typical inscription in 
this regard, one could consider SGDI II 1726 (2nd century B.C.): 
 
παραμεινάτω δὲ Λυσὼ παρὰ Μικκύλον ἕως κα ζῆ ποέου- 
σα τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν. εἰ δέ κα ἢ μὴ παραμένη ἢ μὴ ποῆ τὸ 
ποτιτασσόμενον Λυσὼ Μικκύλοι, κύριος ἔ- 
5 στω κολάζων ὥς κα θέλη. … 
 
Lyso must remain by Mykkolos for the rest of her life, doing everything she is ordered to do as 
far as possible. If Luso does not remain (by Mykkolos) or she does not do what she is ordered to 
do, (Mykkolos) has the power to punish her as he wants. 
 
In this case, as in many others, the only direct consequence descending upon 
freedmen is physical punishment202: this does not affect manumission, nor it constitutes 
a threat for the freedom that the ἀπελεύθερος had previously acquired through 
manumission. A similar institution, after all, was also existing in early Roman Law: we 
know for example that the so-called nexi (that is, debtors who had pledged their own 
persons to their creditors) were legally free, although the creditor could exercise physical 
coercition over them and sometimes beat them in order for them to pay their debts off. 
Although their de facto condition towards their creditors could be somewhat similar to 
that of slaves in relation to their masters, they were nonetheless legally free and 
maintained their citizenship rights. 
On the other hand, some other inscriptions state that if the ἀπελεύθερος does not 
perform his παραμονή duty, the ‘sale’ (that is, manumission) must be considered invalid 
                                                          
202 Cf., example, SGDI II 1703 and 1717. It is also worth mentioning the case of SGDI II 1714 
(2nd century B.C.), as it states that if the ἀπελευθέρα does not perform her obligation of 
παραμένειν, the manumittor can punish her ‘as a free person’ (… παραμεινάτω δὲ Σωφρόνα 
πα- / ρὰ Δρόμωνα ἕως οὗ κα ζώη Δρόμων ποιέουσα τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον καὶ δυ- / νατὸν πᾶν· 
εἰ δὲ μὴ πειθαρχέοι Σωφρόνα, κύριος ἔστω Δρόμων ἐπι- / τιμέων Σωφρόνα τρόπωι ὧι θέλοι 
ὡς ἐλευθέρα. βεβαιωτὴρ κα- / τὰ τὸν νόμον). 
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(ἄκυρος)203 and with no effects (ἀτελής). This is the case, for instance, of SGDI II 1721 (ll. 
5-7): 
 
5 παραμεινάτω δὲ Σωσικράτης παρὰ Κρατὼ ποιῶν τὸ ποιτασσόμενον πᾶν, 
ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη Κρατώ· εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμείναι καθὼς γέγραπται, ἄκυρος καὶ 
ἀτελὴς ἁ 
ὠνὰ ἔστω. μάρτυροι· … 
 
Sosikrates must remain by Krato doing everything he is ordered to do, for the rest of Krato’s 
life; if he (Sosikrates) does not remain (by Krato) as it has been established, the sale shall be invalid 
and with no effects. Witnesses: … 
 
In all those cases in which, as a direct consequence of the non-fulfilment of παραμονή 
duties by the ἀπελεύθερος, the remedy is said to be the invalidity and the inefficacy of 
the πρᾶσις ὠνή204 , the act of manumission itself has to be considered invalid and, 
consequently, the ἀπελεύθερος loses his freedom and reverts into slavery.205 When this 
happens, the non-fulfilment of παραμονή duties directly affects manumission and, as a 
result, the freedman’s new legal condition. 
To sum up, I think it is important to point out, first of all, that παραμονή was not a 
constant feature characterising the legal condition of all manumitted slaves, at least in 
Delphi: it is indeed significant that only a smaller number of inscriptions mentions the 
imposition of παραμονή duties binding manumitted slaves to their manumittors. For 
this reason, we can easily infer that παραμονή was the object of a contractual clause that 
could be part of the agreement to liberate the slave, but it was not a necessary element 
of it. In other words, in Delphic manumissions παραμονή did not characterise ex lege the 
condition of freedmen, as their legal condition was not always marked by the imposition 
of παραμονή duties.206 Moreover, as I will show in further detail, the fact that, after 
                                                          
203 For the implications of the formula ‘ἄκυρος ἔστω’ as designating, in Greek legal texts, the 
institution of legal invalidity, see Dimopoulou (2013): 249-276. 
204 Some further examples can be found, for example, in SGDI II 1702 and 1689, both from the 
2nd century B.C. 
205  Hopkins (1984): 158; Dareste, Hassoullier, Reinach (1898): 275; Gernet (1955): 170; 
Dimopoulou (2013): 262. 
206  Samuel (1965): 294: ‘this obligation may be imposed upon the freedman, but it is not 
imposed by the law or act of manumission, and a man may be manumitted without it’. According 
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manumission, some ἀπελεύθεροι were bound to παραμονή duties whereas some other 
ones were not, strongly suggests the existence of two categories of manumitted slaves. 
 
7. The legal implications of prohibition to sell and ‘arbitration’ clauses on the legal condition 
of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή. 
Παραμονή provisions, however, could often be followed by other clauses. For 
example, the provision which entitled the beneficiaries of παραμονή services to punish 
the ἀπελεύθεροι if the latter did not perform their duties207 (which, at first sight, seems 
to make the de facto condition of ἀπελεύθεροι not much different from that of slaves), 
could be sometimes followed by another clause, which expressly forbade manumittors 
from selling freedmen. 
This provision is attested, for example, in SGDI II 2140 (2nd century B.C., ll. 24-30)208, 
which records the liberation through ‘sale’ of a young home-born female slave named 
Sopatra by her mistress Kallisto: 
 
… παραμινάτω δὲ Σωπά- 
25 τρα παρὰ Καλλιστὼ ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη Καλλιστὼ ποιέ- 
ουσα τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνε[γ]- 
κλήτως. εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμένοι ἢ μὴ ποιέοι τὸ ποτιτασ- 
σόμενον Σωπάτρα, κυρία ἔστω Καλλιστὼ ἐπιτιμέ- 
ο[υ]σα Σωπάτραν τρόπωι ὧ κα αὐτὰ θέλη, πλὰν μὴ 
30 π[ω]λέουσ[α]. μάρτυροι· … 
 
Sopatra must remain by Kallistos for the rest of Kallisto’s life, doing blamelessly everything 
she is ordered to do, as far as possible. If Sopatra does not remain (by Kallistos) or she does not do 
                                                          
to Segré (1945), the contractual nature of παραμονή was common all over the Greek world with 
one important exception, that is the corpus of manumission inscriptions found in the island of 
Calymna and dated to the 1st century A.D., where παραμονή was likely descending ex lege upon 
manumitted slaves. On this point, see chapter 4, 174-176. 
207  Hopkins (1978): 153, maintains that ‘the centrality of punishment in the manumission 
records reflected not only the owners’ power, but also their fear that ex-slaves might not do what 
they were told, neither stay nor serve’. 
208 A similar clause attesting prohibition to sell (which is usually expressed with the formula 
πλὰν μὴ πωλέουσα / πωλέων / πωλέοντες) is also recorded in several other inscriptions. Cf., 
for instance: SGDI II 2158, 2159, 2163, 2171, 2186, 2190, 2225; FD III 2:223, 2:233, 2:243, 2:247, 3:27, 
3:32, 3:45, 3:174, 3:369, 3:306, 3:346, 3:364, 3:374, 3:411, 3:424, 4:71. 
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what she is ordered to do, Kallisto has the power to punish Sopatra in any way she wants, but she 
cannot sell her. Witnesses: … 
 
This provision is fundamental in showing that the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι 
under παραμονή was one of freedom. If ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή were still 
slaves, as some authors maintain209, prohibition to sell them would have constituted an 
important limitation of their (former) masters’ right of ownership. More specifically, 
prohibition to sell is not consistent with the qualification of freedmen under παραμονή 
duties as slaves, as the right to alienate their property and, therefore, to transfer 
ownership over them210 through sale is one of the most important rights descending 
from ownership.211 
Another clause which is sometimes attested in the Delphic inscriptions states that if 
manumittors and manumitted slaves disagreed on the performance of παραμονή duties 
by the latter, both the ἀπελεύθεροι and their manumittors had to be brought in front of 
three men who would decide the dispute (they were thus acting as arbitrators): their 
decision, whatever it was, had to be considered valid and binding for both parties.212 
A typical example is provided by SGDI II 1689 (2nd century B.C., ll. 6-9): 
                                                          
209  Bloch (1914): 27; Curtius (1843): 39; Rensch (1911): 107; Schönbauer (1933): 422. Most 
recently, cf. Sosin (2015). 
210  The majority of the inscriptions providing remedies in the case of non-fulfilment of 
παραμονή by freedmen expressly forbids manumittors from selling manumitted slaves. Yet, in 
a couple of cases manumittors are expressly authorised both to punish their freedmen and to sell 
them. Cf. FD III 3:337 (undated): παραμινάτωσαν δὲ αὐτᾶι τὰ προγ]εγραμμένα σώματα 
Σ[ωτη]- / [ρίχα, / Σ]ύμφορον, Τρυφέρα πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἕ[ως] κα ζῇ Μενεκράτεια, 
δουλεύοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα π[ᾶν τ]ὸ ἐπιτασσόμενο[ν πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν. εἰ δέ τι τῶν 
προγεγραμμέ]νων σωμάτων μὴ πειθαρχέ[οι] / [ἢ μὴ π]οιέοι τὸ ἐπι[τασσ]όμενον ὑπὸ 
Μενεκρατείας, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω Μενεκράτεια εἴτε κα θέλῃ / πωλεῖν τῶν προγ[εγ]ραμμένων 
τι σωμάτων [πωλέουσα εἴτε κολάζουσα καὶ πλαγαῖ]ς καὶ [δ]εσμοῖς καθώς κα θέλῃ. See also 
FD III 3:175 (1st century B.C.): this inscription makes a distinction between the case in which the 
manumitted slave does not παραμένειν (in which case he can be sold), and the case in which he 
does not do what he is ordered to do (and the consequence will be physical punishment, whilst 
sale is expressly forbidden): παραμεινάτω δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς παρὰ Ἁβρ[ό]μαχον ἕως κα ζῆ 
Ἁβρόμαχος, ποιῶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυνα- / τὸν ἀνεγκλήτως· εἰ δὲ μὴ παραμένοι, 
κύ[ριο]ς ἔστω Ἁβρόμαχος καὶ πωλέων Ἀγαθοκλῆ καὶ ὑποτιθείς· εἰ δὲ / μὴ ποιέοι τὸ 
ἐπιτασσόμενον πᾶν τὸ δυν̣[α]τόν, κύριος <ἔσ>τω Ἁβρόμαχος ἐπιτιμέων τρόπω ὧ κα θέλη, 
πλὰν μή <πωλέων>. 
211 Honoré (1961): 107. 
212 Cf. also SGDI II 1696, 1832, 1858, 1874, 1971, all from the 2nd century B.C. 
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παραμεινάτω δὲ Νικαία καὶ Ἰσθμὸς παρὰ Σωσίαν ἄχρι οὗ κα ζώη Σωσίας, 
ποιέοντες πᾶν 
τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον Σωσία τὸ δυνατὸν [ἀ]νενκλήτως· εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοιν Νικαία 
καὶ Ἰσθμός, μὴ 
ἔστω βέβαιος αὐτοῖς ἁ ὠνά, ἀλλὰ ἄκυρος ἔστω. εἰ δέ τι ἐνκαλέοι Σωσίας 
Νικαία ἢ Ἰσθμῶ, ἐπικρι- 
θέντω ἐν ἄνδροις τρίοις· ὅ τι δέ κα οὗτοι κρίνωντι, κύριον ἔστω. 
 
Nikaia and Isthmos must remain by Sosias for the rest of Sosia’s life, doing blamessly 
everything they are ordered to do, as far as possible; if Nikaia and Isthmos do not do (everything 
they are ordered to do), the sale shall not be confirmed, but it will be invalid. If Sosias accuses 
Nikaia or Isthmos, the decision must be taken by three men; whatever they decide, it will be valid. 
 
This provision ‘implicitly recognised a measure of equality between master and freed 
slave’213 and suggests the existence of rights that set freedmen under παραμονή apart 
from slaves. In other words, this provision is not consistent with the identification of 
freedmen under παραμονή as slaves (and of παραμονή as ‘delayed manumission’): if 
manumitted slaves under παραμονή were still considered to be property of their 
masters, the latter would have had complete power to decide the means through which 
punishing their slaves, and no interference would have been allowed in the concrete 
exercise of their right of ownership. 
 
8. The institution of ἀπόλυσις and its legal implications. 
After mentioning the imposition of παραμονή duties upon manumitted slaves, some 
inscriptions (around forty)214 also attest the possibility for ἀπελεύθεροι to obtain release 
from παραμονή before the term specifically established: the ‘release of the freedman 
from his paramone’215 is traditionally referred to as ἀπόλυσις, and the formula typically 
used in the inscriptions to describe this institution is ‘ἀπολύειν τᾶς παραμονᾶς’. 
                                                          
213 Hopkins (1978): 154. 
214 The inscriptions mentioning the ἀπόλυσις-clause are the following: FD III 1:316, 2:225, 3:43, 
3:272, 3:273, 3:278, 3:281, 3:292, 3:296, 3:302, 3:304, 3:319, 3:327, 3:332, 3:333, 3: 340, 3:341, 3:354, 
3:369, 3:398, 3:402, 3:418, 3:419, 3:423, 3:428, 4:507, 6:7, 6:18, 6:25, 6:30, 6:33, 6:40; SGDI II 1919, 2157, 
2167, 2200, 2327, 2199; BCH 76 (1952) 646,17; BCH 83 (1958) 480,13; BCH 110 (1986) 437,3. 
215 Westermann (1948b): 26. 
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Early release from παραμονή was generally achieved by ἀπελεύθεροι through the 
payment of a specific sum of money to the beneficiary of παραμονή; yet, some 
inscriptions record the release of ἀπελεύθεροι from παραμονή duties without 
mentioning any payment to their former masters. However, the fact that some 
inscriptions do not mention payment does not mean that no payment was actually 
made216, as FD III 3:418 (undated) clearly shows. The inscription records the liberation of 
a female slave named Soso by her mistress Ladika, the imposition on her of παραμονή 
duties, and the possibility of ἀπόλυσις by payment of three silver minae to Ladika (ll. 1-
5): 
 
[ἄρχοντος — — — —]ου, [μηνὸς Ἐ]νδυ[σπ]οιτρ[οπίου, β]ουλευ[όντων 
Ἁ]β[ρ]ομάχου, Μεγάρτα, ἀπέδ[ο]το Λαδίκα καὶ Πο- 
[— — — — — — τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι σ]ῶμα γυναικῆον ᾇ ὄνομα Σωσώ, τιμᾶς 
ἀργυρίο[υ μ]νᾶν [τ]ριῶν, καὶ τὰν τιμὰν ἔ- 
[χει πᾶσαν. βε]βαιωτ[ὴρ κ]ατὰ τοὺ[ς] ν[όμου]ς τᾶς πόλιος Μελισσίων 
Διονυσίου. παραμινάτω δὲ Σωσὼ Λαδίκᾳ ἕ- 
[ως κα ζῇ, ποιοῦσα] τ[ὸ] ἐ[πι]τασσόμενον πᾶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιέοι, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω 
Λαδίκα ἐπιτειμέουσα τρόπῳ ᾧ κα 
5 [θέλῃ. εἰ δὲ θέλοι] Σωσὼ προαπελθεῖν ἀπὸ Λαδίκας, δότω Λαδίκᾳ ἀργυρίου 
μνᾶς τρεῖς. 
 
 [Under the archonship of — — — —], in the month of Enduspoitropios, Ladika and [— 
— — — — — ] sold to Apollo a female slave named Soso, at the price of three silver mnas, and 
they received the whole money. Guarantor in accordance with the laws of the city: Melission son 
of Dionysios. Soso must remain by Ladika for the rest of her life, doing everithing she is ordered 
to do; if she does not (do everithing she is ordered to do), Ladika has the power to punish her in 
any way she wants. If Soso wants to leave (Ladika) earlier, she will give three silver mnas to 
Ladika. 
 
The following inscription FD III 3:419 (undated) records Soso’s ἀπόλυσις:  
 
[ἐπὶ δὲ ἄρχοντ]ος Εὐκλείδα, μηνὸς Ἀμαλίου, ἀπέλυσε Λαδίκα Σωσὼι τᾶς 
παραμονᾶς. [μάρτυροι] 
[․․․c.10․․․]ιος, Κλέανδρος, Φίλων, Λάδικος. 
 
                                                          
216 Scholars generally agree on this point. See, for instance, Samuel (1965): 265: ‘we cannot 
assume from the absence of mention of payment in the apolysis that no payment was made’. 
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[in the time of the archonship of Eukleida], in the month of Amalios, Ladika released Soso from 
her paramone. [Witnesses]: Kleandros, Philon, Ladikos. 
 
Although FD III 3:419 does not mention Soso’s payment to her former mistress, that 
the payment was actually made can be inferred from what we find in FD III 3:418, which 
required Soso to pay three silver minae in order to obtain early release from παραμονή. 
Finally, some other inscriptions, instead of recording the payment made by the 
ἀπελεύθερος to the manumittor in order to obtain early release from παραμονή, 
generically state – this is the typical formula – that the ἀπελεύθερος has to be considered 
released from παραμονή since the manumittor has received ‘all the goods’ (or ‘all the 
money’) that had been established in the ‘sale’-agreement (‘λαβών / λαβοῦσα τὸ ἐν τᾷ 
ὠνᾷ καταγεγραμμένον χρῆμα’).217 
One peculiar case is represented by SGDI II 1717 (2nd century B.C.): after describing 
the liberation of a female slave named Aphrodisias by her masters and after compelling 
her to παραμένειν with them for the rest of their lives, the inscription states that if she 
wants to leave them any time earlier, she has to provide them with a slave-girl of her 
age, whom she has to buy in return for her ἀπόλυσις (ll. 6-8): 
 
5 … 
ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέρα εἶμ[εν κ]αὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πάντω[ν]. εἰ δὲ πρότερον θέλοι 
Ἀφροδισία ἀπολύεσθαι ἀπὸ Καλλιστράτου 
καὶ Θα[υμί]ου ζωόντων, ἀντιπρι[άσ]θω Ἀφροδισία Καλλιστράτω[ι κ]αὶ 
Θαυμίωι σῶμα γυν[α]ικεῖον τὰν αὐτὰν ἁλικίαν 
ἔχον· … 
 
… on the condition that she is free and not claimable by anyone. If Aphrodisias wants to leave 
Kallistratos and Thaumios before they die, Aphrodisias shall buy for Kallistratos and Thaumios a 
slave-girl of her age … 
 
                                                          
217 Cf., e.g., FD III 6:18 (1st century B.C.). See also FD III 3:296 (undated) that, in the last two 
lines, after describing the liberation of a female slave and ordering her to παραμένειν with her 
manumittor, records her ἀπόλυσις: … ἀπέλυσε Σωτηρὶς τᾶς πα[ραμονᾶς Ξενοκράτεαν, 
λαβοῦσα τὸ ἐν τᾷ ὠνᾷ] / [κ]αταγεγραμμένο[ν χρῆμ]α, ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλευθέρα [— — — —]. 
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The institutions of παραμονή and ἀπόλυσις are therefore strongly connected, and 
this is reflected in the very structure of the Delphic inscriptions. More specifically, the 
reciprocal position of παραμονή and ἀπόλυσις within the inscriptions can be modelled 
in three different ways. Most inscriptions simply record the actual ἀπόλυσις of 
manumitted slaves (‘ἀπέλυσε τᾶς παραμονᾶς’) without relating their previous 
manumission, or to the imposition of παραμονή duties upon them (the content and 
duration of which are thus unknown).218 Some other inscriptions, although mentioning 
ἀπόλυσις only, are connected to the previous inscription, which records the 
manumission of that same slave and the imposition on him/her, once freed, of 
παραμονή duties.219 In some other cases manumission, παραμονή and the possibility of 
early release from παραμονή are mentioned within one single inscription 220 ; these 
inscriptions can be sometimes followed by a separate one recording the actual release of 
the ἀπελεύθερος from παραμονή.221 Finally, some other inscriptions record, at the same 
time, manumission, παραμονή and ἀπόλυσις.222  
                                                          
218  Cf., for example, FD III 3:43 (1st century B.C.): ἐπὶ δὲ ἄρχοντος Ἐράτωνος, / μηνὸς 
Ἀπελλαίου, Φιλὼ Φίλωνος / ἀπέλυσε τᾶς παραμονᾶς Σωτη- / ρίν. μάρτυροι … (Under the 
archonship of Eraton, in the month of Apellaios, Philos son of Philos released Soteris from her paramone. 
Witnesses: …). 
219 For example, SGDI II 1918 (2nd century B.C.) describes the liberation through ‘sale’ to Apollo 
of a female slave named Agathameris by her masters Ierokles and Ierokleia and requires her, once 
freed, to παραμένειν with them; the following inscription, SGDI II 1919 (2nd century B.C.) records 
the actual release of Agathameris from παραμονή, after she had paid three silver minae to her 
former masters. 
220 This is the case, for example, of FD III 3:273 (undated). 
221 Cf. e.g. SGDI II 2199 (1st century B.C.), which describes the liberation of a female slave 
named Apollonia by her mistress Theodora through ‘sale’ to Apollo and requires her, once freed, 
to παραμένειν with her former mistress until the latter’s death. It also states that, if she wants to 
be released earlier from παραμονή, she has to pay three silver minae to Theodora. The following 
inscription, SGDI II 2200 (1st century B.C.), records Apollonia’s ἀπόλυσις: ἐπὶ δὲ ἄρχοντος 
[Κλ]εομ[άν]τιος τοῦ Δ[ίων]ος, / μηνὸς Ἰλαίου, Θεοδώρα ἀπέλυσε τᾶς παρα- / μονᾶς 
Ἀπολλωνίαν, λαβοῦσα μνᾶς τρεῖς, συν- / παρούσας καὶ συναρεστεούσας καὶ τᾶς / ματρὸς 
Σωπάτρας. μάρτυροι· οἱ αὐτοί (Under the archonship of Kleomantis son of Dion, in the month of Ilaios, 
Theodora released Apollonias from her paramone, after [Apollonias] paid three mnas, with the assistance 
and the consent of her mother Sopatras. Witnesses: …). 
222 This is the case, for instance, of FD III 3:296 (undated): after describing the liberation of a 
female slave named Senokratea and the imposition on her of παραμονή duties towards her 
former mistress Soteris, this inscription records Senokratea’s ἀπόλυσις, after Soteris had received 
all that had been established in the sale agreement(lines 15-17). Similarly, see also FD III 6:33 (1st 
century B.C.). 
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The institution of ἀπόλυσις is often ignored by studies of Delphic manumissions, or 
its relevance underestimate. The analysis of its nature and implications is however 
central, not only because it further contributes to our understanding of the complex way 
of manumitting slaves through πρᾶσις ὠνή (or, more precisely, for the understanding 
of the different clauses that could be attached to their liberation), but also – and above 
all – because its basic features shed light on an issue which is still highly controversial, 
namely, the legal condition enjoyed by manumitted slaves bound to their manumittors 
by παραμονή duties. 
The main significance of ἀπόλυσις is to allow manumitted slaves under παραμονή 
to pay a specific sum of money to their manumittors in order to obtain early release from 
παραμονή. This simple fact is key, as its relevance for our understanding of 
manumission can be appreciated in two main respects. On the one hand, it implies that 
during the παραμονή period manumitted slaves could own their own money, which 
was considered to be their property not only de facto, but also de iure. This clearly implies 
a fundamental change in their legal condition since, before being manumitted, slaves 
could manage their peculium only de facto, while de iure it was considered to be property 
of their masters. On the other hand, ἀπόλυσις also implies that ἀπελεύθεροι could 
validly pay money to their former masters: in other words, they could negotiate and 
enter into legally binding agreements with their manumittors. This is another element 
which clearly differentiates the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι from that of slaves, who 
– by contrast – were not legal persons and thus needed the intervention of a third party 
(in the case of the Delphic manumissions, the god) in order to make a valid payment to 
their masters for manumission. Manumitted slaves under παραμονή, on the other hand, 
were entitled to pay money directly to the beneficiaries of their services without the 
intervention of a third person: this act was legally valid, and it implied the extinction of 
their obligations towards their manumittors. 
These basic features of ἀπόλυσις ultimately prove that slaves, as an effect of 
manumission, underwent a significant change in their legal condition,223 independently 
                                                          
223 On this point, cf. the persuasive conclusions suggested by Samuel (1964): 268. See also 
Westermann (1948b): 27 n. 55. 
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or not of the possible imposition upon them of post-manumission obligations 
(παραμονή). The inscriptions make it clear that even those ἀπελεύθεροι who were 
obliged to παραμένειν with their former masters were conceived of as legally free 
individuals, who could own their own money and enter into legally binding agreements 
with free individuals without needing the intervention of the god as a validating party 
in the transaction. 
 
9. Final considerations on παραμονή, ἀπόλυσις and the legal condition of freedmen in the 
Delphic inscriptions. 
A comprehensive examination of παραμονή provisions, of the different clauses that 
could follow slaves’ manumission, and of the institution of ἀπόλυσις is of primary 
importance for our understanding of the legal condition enjoyed by those freedmen who 
were bound to their former masters by post-manumission obligations.  
First of all, we notice that the inscriptions from Delphi point to the existence of two 
categories of manumitted slaves, both enjoying a legal condition of freedom and 
differing ‘only’ as for their de facto situation. It is in fact clear that while in the majority 
of Delphic inscriptions manumitted slaves were not required to παραμένειν with their 
manumittors (thus enjoying freedom not only de iure, but also de facto, immediately after 
and as an effect of their liberation), in a smaller number of cases ἀπελεύθεροι were 
bound to their manumittors by παραμονή duties. 
The fact that, after manumission, ἀπελεύθεροι could be under παραμονή obligation 
has often puzzled scholars, and much confusion has characterised their debates on 
‘whether persons freed under παραμονή were virtual slaves, free, half-free, half-slave, 
or both slave and free’. 224  The simple fact that ἀπελεύθεροι could be required to 
παραμένειν with their former masters has in fact taken scholars to suggest three 
different interpretations about their legal condition. Some of them believe that 
ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή were still slaves, and that they would become legally 
                                                          
224 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 239. 
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free individuals only at the end of their παραμονή period.225 This idea is mainly based 
on two considerations: the possible subjection of freedmen to physical punishment by 
their manumittors if παραμονή was not correctly or properly performed; and the fact 
that their obligation to ‘remain with’ their former masters in order to perform specific or 
unspecified duties made their condition akin to that of slaves. As I showed above, 
however, none of these considerations constitutes a decisive argument for the 
interpretation of the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή in terms of 
slavery; moreover, the clauses that could follow παραμονή provisions (most 
importantly, prohibition to sell, ἀπόλυσις and the settlement of any dispute through 
private arbitrators) are inconsistent with the interpretation of their legal condition in 
terms of slavery. 
Other scholars, on the other hand, insist on the alleged ‘ambiguity’ of παραμονή 
clauses226 and define the legal condition of manumitted slaves under παραμονή as an 
unspecified one between slavery and freedom.227 Most recently, Zelnick-Abramovitz has 
argued that the παραμονή clause justifies a definition of slaves’ liberation, in these cases, 
as ‘deferred manumissions’ (by which she intends ‘any act of manumission which did 
not make the slave free immediately’)228, and that ‘manumission inscriptions that include 
paramone clauses and other conditions reflect the ambiguous status of manumitted 
                                                          
225  This opinion is shared by Bloch (1914): 27, who also maintains that freedmen under 
παραμονή could not enjoy the right of ownership and that – at least according to some 
inscriptions – freedmen’s offspring born during παραμονή were not considered free. More 
specifically, according to Bloch, during the παραμονή period freedmen were still slaves, whereas 
they would become free only after the παραμονή period had come to an end. Cf. also Curtius 
(1843): 39; Rensch (1911): 107 (although his considerations refer to manumission documents from 
Thessaly); Schönbauer (1933): 422; most recently, cf. Sosin (2015). 
226 According to these scholars, this ambiguity is due to the fact that ‘le statut juridique de 
l’affranchi se trouve en contradiction avec la réalité de sa situation’: cf. Mulliez (1992): 39. 
227 Babacos (1964): 319 (‘zugleich vollkommen frei und vollkommen Sklave’); Hopkins (1978): 
148 (‘a compromise between slavery and freedom’); Calderini (1965): 286 (‘egli aveva ottenuto 
unprincipio di libertà, e sperava presto di raggiungerla intiera’); Pringsheim (1950): 186 n. 6 (‘the 
legal ownership of the god, the beneficial ownership of the slave, are both restricted by the 
paramone’); Koschaker (1931): 45 (‘die Paramone nicht die Formulierung einer Bedingung, 
sondern einen unmittelbar durch die Paramonefreilassung eintretenden rechtlich relevanten 
Dauerzustand, einen besonderen Status des Freigelassenen’). 
228 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 222. 
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slaves’.229 It follows that ‘conditions attached to manumission, whether or not combined 
with paramone, protracted slavery to a considerable degree’.230 Finally, only very few 
scholars understand the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή obligation in 
terms of freedom.231 
The general confusion among scholars on how to define manumitted slaves under 
παραμονή obligation is due to the fact that the legal condition of these manumitted 
slaves has too often been the object of misleading and superficial interpretations, which 
did not take into adequate consideration the legal aspects and implications of 
manumission and of its legal consequences. 
A first attempt to distinguish between de iure and de facto condition of ἀπελεύθεροι 
under παραμονή can be found in Kranzlein’s approach232, who compared the content of 
the Delphic inscriptions mentioning παραμονή provisions with three inscriptions from 
Phocis: one (IG IX, 12 3:754) is from Amphissa and is dated to the 1st century B.C., whereas 
the other two (IG IX, 1: 192 and IG IX, 1: 194) come from the 2nd century B.C. Tithorea. 
Two of them (IG IX, 12 3:754 and IG IX, 1:192) have very similar contents: after describing 
the liberation of slaves through ‘sale’ to the god (Asclepius in the first one, Serapis in the 
second one), both of them require manumitted slaves to παραμένειν with their 
manumittors. At the same time, however, both inscriptions stress that, towards anyone 
else other than the beneficiaries of their services, they had to be considered as free 
individuals (IG IX, 12 3:754, l. 10: ποτὶ δὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας ἔστω Σωτηρὶς ἐλευθέρα 
καὶ ἀνέπαφο[ς]; IG IX, 1:192, ll. 21-22: τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἐλευθέρα ἔστω καὶ 
ἀνέπαφος). 
The contrast between the condition of freedmen under παραμονή in relation to the 
beneficiary of παραμονή, on the one hand, and their condition towards all the other 
members of the society, on the other hand, is even more evident in IG IX, 1: 194 (ll. 20-
23), where the services that the two manumitted slaves under παραμονή are required 
                                                          
229 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 244. 
230 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 245. 
231  Dareste, Haussoullier, Reinach (1898): 274-275; Westermann (1948b): 12; Westermann 
(1955): 35; Samuel (1965): 294-295. 
232 Kränzlein (1983): 239-247. 
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to perform in favour of their former masters is described with the verb δουλεύειν, 
whereas they are said to be ἐλεύθεραι vis-à-vis everybody else: 
 
20 … παρμεν<ε>ῖ δὲ Νικάσιν καὶ Στοργὴ πάν- 
τα τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς {Ἀ<νασι>φορ<ου>} Ὀνασιφόρου χρόνον {Υ} 
δουλεύουσαι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐλεύθεραι ἔ- 
σ<των> … 
 
Nikasis and Storghes must remain (by Anasiphoros) for the rest of Anasiphoros’ life rendering 
services as slaves, but towards everybody else they shall be free … 
 
According to Kranzlein’s interpretation, the content of these three inscriptions 
ultimately suggests that the de facto condition of manumitted slaves under παραμονή 
can be differently understood depending on whether their status is considered in 
relation to their former masters (in which case, although legally free, their de facto 
freedom was restricted) or, on the contrary, in relation to everybody else (in which case 
their freedom was ‘complete’, both de facto and de iure). The metaphorical use of the 
language of slavery which characterises these Phocian sources, as well as their suggested 
distinction between legal and ‘factual’ levels, mirror the information that we can draw 
from the Delphic inscriptions and, at the same time, further confirm that the legal 
condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή obligation is one of freedom. 
As noted above, several provisions mentioned in the corpus of inscription from 
Delphi suggest that, from a legal point of view, ἀπελεύθεροι compelled to παραμονή 
enjoyed a condition of freedom. These provisions are: prohibition, for the beneficiaries 
of παραμονή, to sell freedmen; necessity to recur to three arbitrators in case of a dispute 
between beneficiaries of παραμονή and manumitted slaves; validity of the arbitrators’ 
decision for both parties; finally, the institution of ἀπόλυσις, which shows that freedmen 
could own money and enter into legally binding agreements with their manumittors. 
To sum up, I believe that the language of the Delphic inscriptions suggests that 
manumitted slaves went through a major change in their legal condition immediately 
after and as an effect of manumission: all manumitted slaves, whether or not under 
παραμονή obligation, were legally free, and their freedom was protected through 
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several means. Moreover, despite the great confusion which has long characterised the 
scholarly debates about the legal condition of manumitted slaves under παραμονή, the 
inscriptions clearly indicate that the relationship between the latter and their former 
masters is no longer one of ownership, as is clearly suggested by the following elements. 
First, παραμονή is described as the object of a binding agreement between 
manumittors and manumitted slaves (as legally free individuals), under which 
ἀπελεύθεροι were bound to perform specified or unspecified services in favour of their 
former masters or of other members of the latter’s family. This means, in other words, 
that manumitted slaves under παραμονή were under obligation towards their 
manumittors: this ultimately implies that, even though under παραμονή, they were 
(already) legally free, and that their legal condition of freedom resulted from the very 
‘sale’ to the god. The fact that very few inscriptions, on the other hand, state that 
manumitted slaves under παραμονή shall still perform services ‘as slaves’, or that, after 
the ἀπόλυσις, freedmen are ‘completely free’, does not contrast with this conclusion. It 
is in fact clear that, in these cases, the inscriptions are not referring to the legal 
significance of slavery and freedom, but rather use the vocabulary of slavery and 
freedom in a metaphorical sense: this suggests that the relationship between 
manumitted slaves under παραμονή and their former masters should not be described 
in terms of ownership but, rather, in terms of domination.233  
Second, the institution of ἀπόλυσις (although attested in a small number of 
inscriptions) is also fundamental for interpreting the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι 
under παραμονή in terms of freedom. On the one hand, it shows that this category of 
ἀπελεύθεροι could own, also from a legal point of view, their own money; on the other 
hand, it indicates that they could enter into legally binding agreements with their former 
owners: both these elements are clear indicators of the legal condition of freedom 
enjoyed by freedmen under παραμονή. 
                                                          
233 For the large recurrence by the Greeks to metaphorical usages of the vocabulary of slavery 
and freedom, see Lewis (forthcoming a). Cf. Canevaro, Lewis (2014), for a similar interpretation 
of the relationship between former masters and freedmen who were not χωρίς οἰκοῦντες in 
Athens as based on domination, rather than on ownership. 
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Finally, prohibition to sell those manumitted slaves who did not perform their 
obligations, or the necessity to recur to private arbitration in the event of dispute 
between the latter and the beneficiaries of their services, clearly point to the fact that the 
legal condition enjoyed by ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή was one of freedom. In this 
last regard, it is important to keep in mind that, independently or not of the possible 
imposition of παραμονή obligations upon ἀπελεύθεροι, manumitted slaves have to be 
understood as legally free individuals, who became as such as an effect of the ‘sale’ to 
Apollo. Moreover, as chapter 4 will show, the distinction between manumitted slaves 
under παραμονή obligation and ἀπελεύθεροι who were not required to perform such 
services for their manumittors is also attested in many sources referring to Classical 
Athens, thus proving that the institution of παραμονή and its implications in the legal 
condition of manumitted slaves, far from being a Delphic peculiarity, share the same 
basic features in different geographical and chronological contexts of Ancient Greece. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Manumission and consecration in Central Greece: the case of the Chaironeian inscriptions 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
Besides the so-called manumissions through ‘sale’ largely attested in the Delphic 
inscriptions, scholars identify another form of sacral manumission, which is traditionally 
labelled as ‘manumission through consecration’ of a slave to the god: the general view 
is that, as an effect of consecration, slaves became immediately free individuals.234 
The bulk of the evidence for this alleged form of manumission comes from Central 
Greece and is dated from the 2nd and the 1st century B.C., although few cases of 
manumission through consecration are already attested in other regions of the Greek 
world (mainly in the Peloponnese) from the 5th century B.C.235 The evidence for this 
specific form of manumission is provided, once again, by the epigraphic material: the 
chronological distribution of the inscriptions shows that ‘manumission through 
consecration’ was practiced simultaneously with manumission through ‘sale’, and that 
these two modes of manumission were thus coexisting in Central Greece during the 
Hellenistic period. The geographical distribution of the evidence seems to suggest 
however that ‘sale’ and ‘consecration’ were not alternative forms of manumission: if 
manumission thorough ‘sale’ was typical of Delphi, where only few inscriptions 
attesting consecrations of slaves ‘for the purpose of freedom’ have been found 236 , 
                                                          
234 See, for instance: Bloch (1914): 6; Westermann (1948a): 59; Sokolowski (1954); Bömer (1960): 
10-11; Calderini (1965): 96; Rädle (1969): 42; Schaps (1976); Darmezin (1999); Zelnick-Abramovitz 
(2005): 86-99; Meyer (2009); Grenet (2014): 395-396; Kamen (2014): 178; Caneva, Delli Pizzi (2015): 
171-172. 
235 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 86; Kamen (2005): 58-83. These inscriptions have been collected 
by Darmezin who, in the introduction of her work on ‘manumission through consecration’, points 
out that ‘la grande majorité date des 3e et 2e siècle avant J.-C., mais s’y ajoutent quelques actes du 
Péloponnèse (n˚ 1 à 9), qui représentent les documents les plus anciens de ce recueil (fin du 5e et 
4e siècle)’ (Darmezin [1999]: 10). 
236 Yet, in these cases the vocabulary of consecration presents some differences with that of the 
typical consecration-inscriptions from Central Greece. The only Delphic inscriptions recording 
dedications of slaves ‘for the purpose of freedom’ are the following: FD III 3:329 (2nd century B.C.), 
especially lines 2-3 (… ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἀν[α]τί[θ]ητι [Κλε]- / [όμαντις Δίν]ωνος̣ [ὠν]ὰν Εἰσιάδος ἐπ’ 
ἐλευθερίᾳ τειμᾶς ἀργυρίου μνᾶν δύο …); SGDI II 2071 (2nd century B.C.), especially lines 2-4 
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manumission through consecration is largely attested in other πόλεις of Central Greece 
(such as Chaironeia, Koroneia and Orchomenos) where, on the other hand, manumission 
through ‘sale’ does not seem to be attested.237 
In this chapter, I shall analyse, as a case-study, the vocabulary of the inscriptions from 
Chaironeia, since this πόλις provides the bulk of the epigraphic material concerning the 
so-called ‘manumission thorough consecration’. The corpus of the dedication 
inscriptions from Boeotia constitutes the most significant source of information for the 
study of the so-called ‘manumissions through consecrations’ 238  and comprises 172 
inscriptions, 125 of which have been found in Chaironeia239: for this reason, a careful 
investigation of its inscriptions is a useful starting-point for the correct understanding of 
the language and implications of the consecrations of slaves. 
                                                          
(Ἄσανδρος Μενάνδρου Βεροιαῖος ἀνατίθησι τῶι / Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι ἐλευθέραν ἐμ 
παραθήκηι / Εὐπορίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ παιδίσκην …); SGDI II 2101 (2nd century B.C.), especially lines 
9-11: καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ ἴδια {α} / ἀνατίθητι, εἴ τί κα πάθη, τῶι θεῶι καὶ {καὶ} το ̑ι πόλει, 
καὶ Θευτίμαν τὰν ἰδίαν / θεράπαιναν ὥστε ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν αὐτάν, εἴ τί κα πάθη …); SGDI 
II 2172 (2nd century B.C.), especially lines 5-9 (… ἀνέθηκαν / Καλλικράτης Καλλινόου, Πραξὼ 
Κλεομένεος / Ἐριναῖοι σῶμα ἀνδρεῖον ὧι ὄνομα Ἀντίοχος τῶι Ἀπόλλω- / νι τῶι Πυθίωι ἐπ’ 
ἐλευθερίαι, ἀπειλαφότες παρ’ αὐτοῦ λύ- / τρα ἐκ πολεμίων, …); SGDI II 2097 (2nd century B.C.), 
especially lines 6-10 (…ἀνέθηκε Ἀγη- / σιβούλα Φυσκίς, συνευδοκεόντων τοῦ τε πατρὸς αὐτᾶς 
/ Λύκωνος καὶ τᾶς ματρὸς Ἁρμοξένας, τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι / τῶι Πυθίωι σῶμα γυναικεῖον ἇι ὄνομα 
Μνασώ, ὥστε ἱερὰν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτον καὶ ἐλευθέραν Μνασώ …). 
237 About the practice of manumitting slaves in Delphi and in Chaironeia, as well as for the 
relationship between the two different (alleged) forms of ‘sacral’ manumission, see Meyer (2009): 
82-85. Meyer argues, on the one hand, that both cases – as traditionally included within the so-
called ‘sacral’ manumissions – reflect ‘an archaic way of freeing slaves, characteristic of 
backwaters of the Greek world before city-state involvement in the process of manumission’; on 
the other hand, she maintains that the form of manumission which is attested in Chaironeia 
ultimately represents a local ‘response’ to the importance and prestige of the Delphic sanctuary 
and its largely attested practice of manumitting slaves through ‘sale’ to Apollo. Meyer argues in 
fact that ‘Chairoineia, which could not ignore or evade the force exerted by her close neighbour 
Delphi’s immense regional prestige, was taking canny steps of her own to avoid being 
overwhelmed by that powerful sanctuary’s influence. The city and her major families worked 
together to ensure that the local sanctuaries would never lack dedicated service, and these 
sanctuaries in turn must have contributed to the prestige and prosperity of the city’. It follows 
that, in Meyer’s interpretation, ‘supporting Chaironeain sanctuaries was a way for Chaironeia to 
support herself, and to assure her own continued existence’. 
238 Darmezin (1999): 9. 
239 Of the other inscriptions from Boeotia dealing with consecrations of slaves, 16 come from 
Koroneia, 14 from Orchomenos, 7 from Thespiai, 6 from Lebadeia, 4 from Thisbe and 1 from 
Oropos. Cf. Grenet (2014): 395. 
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Scholars normally believe that, as an effect of consecration, slaves became ἱεροί, that 
is free, and that in all these cases consecrations were only fictitious. Such a conclusion, 
however, does not take into adequate consideration several and fundamental questions 
arising from the text of the inscriptions, which need to be satisfactorily answered before 
the practice can be properly assessed. On the one hand, nothing in the sources suggests 
that these consecrations were fictitious: the formulas of the inscriptions are in fact found 
all over Greece for dedications of gifts to the gods.240 On the other hand, the vocabulary 
of dedication as is used in the Chaironeain inscriptions is technical and, by alluding to 
the twofold act of dedication-consecration, seems to suggest that consecrated slaves 
became property of the god to whom they had been dedicated: their final result would 
therefore be a transfer of ownership over the dedicated slaves from human owners to 
the gods. 
In order to overcome these difficulties and to understand the implications of these 
dedications of slaves correctly, in this chapter I shall focus, first of all, on the vocabulary 
of the act of dedication-consecration in order to highlight the features and implications 
of the verb ἀνατίθημι, on the one hand, and of the adjective ἱερός, on the other, as both 
terms refer to the ownership of the gods. Second, I will analyse the individual elements 
(such as the identity of the dedicator and of the dedicated person) and clauses (such as 
the ‘μὴ προσήκοντα μηθενὶ μηθέν’ clause, and the legal protection granted to 
consecrated slaves) that are recorded in the dedication inscriptions, in order to provide 
a comprehensive overview on the features which characterised the dedication of slaves 
and the legal condition of ἱεροί: in doing so, I shall compare the Chaironeian inscriptions 
with the epigraphic material recording dedications of slaves that has been preserved in 
nearby πόλεις. Third, once all these aspects have been made clear, I shall question (first 
of all in legal terms) the supposed analogy between the condition of a ἱερός (whose 
designation identifies, technically and legally, the property of a god) and the condition 
of free individuals (who, on the contrary, were not the property of any human or divine 
individual). In order to reach a complete understanding of the condition of ἱεροί, I shall 
                                                          
240 For the formulas typical of dedication-consecration, see Rouse (1902): 335-341; Darmezin 
(1999): 180-183; Parker (2004): 274. 
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compare the information provided by the Chaironeian inscriptions with other Greek 
literary sources (mainly Euripides and Strabo) dealing with the institution of slaves-
dedication.  
Through a careful analysis of these sources, this chapter will therefore make the point 
that the traditional identification of these dedications with manumissions is not 
persuasive in several respects, as the following points clearly result from the evidence 
for slaves-consecration. First, the ancient sources (both epigraphic and literary) show 
that ἱεροί were no longer the property of their dedicators. Second, the specific 
vocabulary used in the inscriptions (as well as in other Greek sources dealing with 
consecrated slaves) is constantly and unequivocally one of slavery: a careful reading of 
the vocabulary of the inscriptions is fundamental for the understanding of the legal 
condition of ἱεροί, and yet this aspect is too often ignored by scholars.  
Once all these sources are analysed and the individual elements and clauses they 
attest are considered, this chapter will ultimately suggest the possibility of considering 
ἱεροί as a specific category of persons who enjoyed a very peculiar legal condition: if, 
from a legal point of view, they were considered to be slaves of the gods, their de facto 
condition resulted from the absence of a ‘physical’ owner who could concretely exercise 
the powers descending from the right of ownership. In other words, those features of 
these inscriptions which, at first sight, seem to suggest that ἱεροί should be better 
understood as free individuals, are more likely to reflect the peculiarities of their legal 
condition as property of the gods. 
 
2. The nature and implications of dedication-consecration in Rome and in Greece: a 
comparative perspective. 
The vocabulary of the inscriptions from Chaironeia technically refers to the twofold 
act of dedication and consecration: this is made clear by the constant use, on the one 
hand, of the verb ἀνατίθημι and, on the other hand, of the adjective ἱερός. 
Before analysing the meaning and implications of ἀνατίθημι and ἱερός, it is essential 
to isolate the relationship between dedication and consecration, also in the light of the 
distinction between dedicatio and consecratio in Roman law, and to understand the legal 
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implications of consecration through a brief overview on the condition of res sacrae in 
Rome: the technical and specific formulation provided by Roman law will help to shed 
light on the nature of dedication and on the legal condition of consecrated objects and 
persons in the Greek world. 
Roman dedicatio was a ritual act implying the ‘surrender of an object into divine 
ownership’ (the typical words were ‘do, dico, dedicoque’). 241  In order to transfer the 
ownership of the dedicated object from the humans to the gods, the intervention of civic 
bodies was required and, more specifically, the act of dedication had to be performed by 
a magistrate with imperium. If privates meant to dedicate goods without the involvement 
of a magistrate, there was no dedication taking place and the object remained 
profanum:242 this aspect of Roman dedication is probably due to the peculiar relationship 
between the gods and the State, since ‘la religione stessa, lo stesso riconoscimento e 
disconoscimento delle divinità è un affare di Stato, è di competenza di questo’.243 
The procedure was also attended by a pontifex, whose intervention – known as 
consecratio – consisted in dictating to the magistrate the formulas that the latter had to 
pronounce (his function was thus to provide technical assistance to the magistrate). It is 
then possible to suggest that consecratio and dedicatio were two aspects of the same 
procedure and that they were complementary to each other: if dedicatio ‘was the 
resignation of the dedicant from the ownership of the offering and the claim for divine 
approval of this act … accomplished by a high official or by an officially designated 
private person who represented the dedicating community or individual’, consecratio can 
be defined as ‘the lawful and permanent transfer of an object or a being from the domain 
of human law to that of divine law, their integration into the category of res sacrae’.244 
                                                          
241 Hornblower, Spawforth (1996) s.v. ‘dedicatio’. 
242 Cf. Marc. 3 inst. D. 1.8.6.3: Sacrae autem res sunt hae, quae publice consecratae sunt, non private: 
si quis ergo privatim sibi sacrum constituerit, sacrum non est, sed profanum. 
243 Grosso (2001): 20. 
244 Lambrinoudakis, Balty (2005): 304. Cf. Laffi (2001): 519: ‘la dedicatio, in senso tecnico, è l’atto 
solenne mediante il quale il dedicante, un privato o un magistrato, trasferisce l’oggetto della 
dedica in proprietà della divinità’, laddove la consecratio costituisce un atto ‘compiuto dal 
sacerdote con la partecipazione del magistrato dedicante’ che ‘concorre a rendere l’oggetto 
dedicato res sacra e a porlo, come tale, extra commercium’. As for the procedure, ‘il doppio atto 
della dedicatio-consecratio si compiva nelle forme di un solenne cerimoniale, nel corso del quale il 
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Thus, it is possible to maintain that dedicatio refers to the solemn act, whereas consecratio 
refers to the effect of dedicatio (the transfer of ownership from humans to gods). 
As an effect of the twofold act of dedicatio (by the magistrate) and consecratio (by the 
pontifex), the consecrated objects became res sacrae. The adjective sacer identifies a specific 
legal category of things, and it has both positive and negative connotations. In its 
positive aspects, res sacrae are characterised by their belonging to the god, and the 
adjective sacer actually refers to ‘l’attuale stato di “appartenenza” o “soggezione” di un 
essere animato, oppure di una qualsivoglia porzione inanimata del mondo naturale 
circostante, a una divinità’245: in other words, ‘in Roman religious law the word sacer 
indicated that the object to which it was applied was the property of a deity, taken out 
of the region of the profanum by the action of the State, and passed on into that of the 
sacrum’.246 At the same time, res sacrae were also characterised by negative connotations, 
since they are first of all nullius, in the sense that, as an effect of consecration and their 
qualification as res divini iuris, they have been taken out from and opposed to ius 
humanum. Moreover, res sacrae are included among the res extra nostrum patrimonium: this 
means that they cannot be the object of private rights and, for this reason, ‘esse … “nullius 
in bonis sunt”, cioè non sono né possono venire nel patrimonio di privati; poiché non è 
ammissibile su di esse la proprietà, così non si può costituire una servitù …; non essendo 
esse in proprietà di alcuno, non è ammissibile un’azione di rivendica …; non possono 
essere possedute né possono essere oggetto di contrattazioni’.247 This also implies that 
everything which was defined as sacer was ‘sottratto ai rapporti umani’ and ‘destinato 
                                                          
sacerdote pronunciava la formula rituale, che veniva poi ripetuta dal magistrato. Questa formula 
conteneva come parte integrante l’enunciazione delle leges, vale a dire delle condizioni in base 
alle quali la divinità acquistava la nuova proprietà’. 
245 Pelloso (2013): 64-65. 
246 Fowler (1911): 57. Rüpke (2004): 9, maintains that the adjective sacer ‘deriva dal linguaggio 
giuridico relativo alla proprietà: “sacro” è ciò che è di proprietà di un dio, di una dea’. The idea 
that res sacrae belonged to gods is also shared, among the others, by Savigny (1840): 247-264; 
Wissowa (1971): 385; Scialoja (1933): 144; Scherillo (1945): 40; Bonfante (1966): 22; Grosso (2001): 
20. On the legal meaning and implications of sacer, cf., ex plurimis, Impallomeni (1971): 23; Morani 
(1981): 30; Scheid (2003): 23; Ter Beek (2012): 28. 
247 See Grosso (2001): 20. On the other hand, pontifices were in charge of the administration and 
protection of res sacrae: Talamanca (1990): 381. 
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alla divinità’.248 Finally, because res sacrae could not be the object of private rights, any 
attempt to steal them was not considered a furtum – this qualification implying that the 
stolen item was privately owned – but, rather, a sacrilegium.249 
To sum up, the act of dedication-consecration and the legal condition of res sacrae in 
Roman law are characterised by three key features: first, the act of dedication was 
governed by specific rules and rituals that had to be followed for the validity of 
consecration; second, dedication-consecration required the involvement of the public 
sphere through the intervention of a magistratum cum imperio; third, consecrated things 
(res sacrae) were characterised as belonging to the god and therefore by the prohibition 
of use and disposition by humans, and by the subsequent qualification as sacrilegium of 
any attempt to seize them. 
The same basic features seem to be shared by the act of dedication-consecration and 
the legal condition of consecrated objects in Greece. The first issue to investigate is the 
meaning and implication of ἀνατίθημι: scholars generally agree that, from at least the 
5th century B.C., this verb and the term ἀνάθημα are technical within the religious 
sphere in designating the act of dedicating something to the gods and the dedicated 
object respectively.250 As Parker showed, ἀνατίθημι did not originally have intrinsic 
religious implications: its meaning was simply ‘to set up’. Its relation and definitive use 
                                                          
248 Santalucia (1994): 13; see also Dumezil (2001): 125; Lambrinoudakis, Balty: 304 (according 
to which the function as divine property of what has been consecrated ‘made itself directly felt in 
society through the absolute prohibition of its use, or restriction of use only for religious purposes 
or purposes extremely important for the common interest’). 
249 Grosso (2001): 20. While the legal condition of res sacrae has been made clear and analysed 
in detail by Roman jurists, the problem of identifying who or what entity was entitled to the right 
of ownership over them is still open. This issue and the different interpretations offered by 
scholars about the possibility of conceiving Roman gods as owners or, more generally, about their 
possible entitlement to legal situations, has been thoroughly analysed by Impallomeni (1971): 23-
68, who, in pointing out the weaknesses of the two traditional answers to this problem (res sacrae 
belong to the State; res sacrae belong to the gods) if compared to what is attested in the ancient 
legal sources, stresses the difficulty in reaching a safe conclusion on this point, as Roman 
jurisprudence was more concerned in defining the legal condition of res sacrae rather than in 
identifying their owners. According to Impallomeni, what is clear about dedicatio and consecratio 
is that these acts did not imply a translatio dominii over consecrated items but, rather, their transfer 
from being considered res humani iuris to their inclusion among res divini iuris. 
250 Rouse (1902): 323; Calderone (1972): 392; Burkert (1985): 93; Van Straten (2000): 191. 
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within the religious sphere began only with the Classical age.251 The same meaning is 
shared by other verbs that were sometimes used for the act of dedication (such as ἵστημι, 
‘I set up’; ἵζω, ‘I set down’; or ἱδρύω, ‘I establish, place, found’), although the use of 
ἀνατίθημι was more widespread. 252  Notwithstanding this, the original meaning of 
ἀνατίθημι is mirrored in the very nature of the act of dedication, since ‘etymologically, 
one dedicated an object simply by “setting it up” (or “setting it down” or “placing” it); 
and nothing in our … evidence proves that any more was normally involved than this: 
one simply went to the sacred place of the god and deposited there one’s gift to him’.253 
This also means that an inscription recording a dedication was not necessary for the 
validity of the act of consecration as a whole, as the evidence shows: the majority of the 
votive objects is not inscribed, although the use of writing – which was meant to 
reinforce the act of dedication and to preserve the memory of the dedicator – began to 
be common from the 7th century B.C. onwards.254 
                                                          
251 Parker (2004): 270: ‘Unlike so many of the terms that we use when speaking of Greek 
religion, “dedication” has a fairly straightforward Greek equivalent. In a great majority of the 
relevant cases, forms of ἀνατίθημι or ἀνάθημα or closely related words recur. ἀνατίθημι has 
no intrinsic religious associations, but means simply “set up”; it can be combined with καθιερόω, 
“I consecrate”, without tautology … early on, however, it became specialized in its familiar 
religious application (found already in Hesiod) and by the 5th cent. Thucydides could use 
ἀνατίθημι for the consecration of the island Rheneia by Polycrates to Apollo, which he 
accomplished by attaching it to Delos by a chain (3, 104, 2) … the old merely physical sense 
perhaps survives in the common use of ἀνάθεσις for the setting up of a decree of secular content 
(e.g. IG II/III2 780, 24), but the practice of setting up even such decrees in sanctuaries may have 
led to a blurring of divisions’. 
252 Parker (2004): 270: ‘Most of the other verbs that occur in comparable contexts have physical 
meanings. ἵστημι, “I set up”, is applied chiefly to statues. In relation to herms and altars, there 
was a tendency to use ἵζω, “I set down”, or ἱδρύω, “I establish, place, found”. In these cases the 
choice of the verb may express the idea of founding a new place where cult acts will be performed 
… but ἀνατίθημι and ἀνάθημα remain quite common even in this context’. Parker also stresses 
that ‘the most singular variation is the appearance in Arcadian dedications … of ἀνέθυσε 
(“sacrificed up”) … alongside ἀνέθηκε. This strange usage must reflect a perspective in which 
what is primary is the “taking out” of goods from human circulation for the gods; the question 
whether they are then used to finance sacrifice, or dedication, or a mixture is of secondary 
importance’. 
253 Parker (2004): 270. 
254 Rouse (1902): 322; Parker (2004): 274. See also Burkert (1985): 93: ‘from such beginnings, the 
custom of setting up things in the sanctuary (anatithenai) clearly underwent an unprecedented 
expansion from the eight century onwards, primarily in connection with the votive offering’. 
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The inscriptions that could accompany the act of dedication are characterised by the 
use of specific formulas, even though some variations can be found. The typical 
Chaironeian inscriptions recording the dedication of slaves as ἱεροί can be included 
within the first type identified by Parker as ‘ὁ δεῖνα (με) ἀνέθηκε τῷ θεῷ’255, whereas 
Rouse conceives dedications of slaves as a separate type of consecration, whose formulas 
started to be used much later than the others: according to Rouse, this seems to be 
suggested by the fact that these formulas were not known in the earlier stages of Greek 
history, as the bulk of the relevant evidence comes from the 3rd and the 2nd century B.C.256 
In order to understand the implications of the Chaironeain dedications of slaves, it is 
important to investigate the nature, the purpose and the implications of dedication qua 
talis. The very nature of  dedication is that of a gift that a person makes to the god for 
several purposes257: as a way of commemorating their achievements258; as a vote of 
thanks to the gods for life and for the good things it offers259; for fear260; but, especially, 
                                                          
255 Parker (2004): 274. Within the wider context of dedications of objects, Parker also identified 
the following formulae: 1. ὁ δεῖνα (με) ἀνέθηκε; 2. ὁ δεῖνα τῷ θεῷ; 3. ὁ δεῖνα; 4. τοῦ δεῖνος; 5. 
τῷ θεῷ; 6. ὁ θεός; 7. τοῦ θεοῦ; 8. τοῦ θεοῦ εἰμι; 9. ὦ θεός, σόν (σοῦ) εἰμι; 10. ἱερόν τοῦ θεοῦ; 11. 
ἱερόν εἰμι τοῦ θεοῦ; 12. ἱερόν τῷ θεῷ; 13. ἱερόν. Parker also stresses that ‘the choice between the 
types is determined partly by local fashion, partly by the size and character of the object 
dedicated’. 
256 Rouse (1902): 335-341. He further maintains that, as an effect of the dedication of a slave to 
a god, the dedicated slave became immediately free: ‘he was made free of human control, and 
that meant (since the deity did not enforce his claims) his own man’. Rouse also lists the earliest 
formulas for dedication of objects to the gods, and their contents can be divided as follows: 1. no 
deity is named; 2. the deity’s name without the dedicator’s; 3. both deity and devotee are named 
(Rouse [1902]: 326-327). 
257 After pointing out that ‘dedication, sacrifice and choruses were the three main ways in 
which Greeks sought to win the favour of the gods’, Parker (2004): 270, maintains that ‘dedication 
and sacrifice were both seen as forms of gift’. See also Burkert (1987): 43, who, after stressing that 
‘“gifts to the gods” may appear to be a simple and natural phenomenon: a token of respect for 
superior powers, an expression of thanks for life and all the good things we receive every day’ 
and that ‘this is a very old way of communicating and acting with regards to the god’, points out 
the main problem, that is, ‘the question of how it was, and is, possible that repeated acts of 
“giving”, for which there is no obvious return, could become customary, nay, a sacred institution 
that has persisted for thousands of years’. See also Burkert (1985): 93: ‘the object set up in this 
way, anathema, is a lasting, visible gift: a witness to one’s relationship to the deity, the principle 
form of expression for private devotion and the most representative document of official piety’. 
258 Parker (2004): 270. 
259 Burkert (1987): 43. 
260 Rouse (1902): 189. 
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as a means through which to obtain the favour of the gods in the context of an ‘if-then 
relation’ between the dedicator and the gods.261 In this last regard, it is important to stress 
the twofold implications of dedication. On the one hand, although the intimate nature 
of dedication is that of a gift, ἀνατίθημι implies an exchange and the idea of reciprocity 
between the human and the divine element. According to Burkert, the idea of reciprocity 
is ‘what constitutes a “gift” in the full sense’: if a gift implies ‘the expectation of a return 
for a gift presented, the obligation incurred by receiving a gift’, the nature of a gift is also 
determined by ‘the dimension of time: if each gift demands retribution, it is still the 
intervening time, the absence of immediate effect, that makes it a gift in the true sense’.262 
The idea of reciprocity – giving something in return for something else – is probably 
mirrored in the very etymology of ἀνατίθημι: the prefix ἀνά not only implies, with 
regard to places, the idea of a movement ‘from bottom to top’, but in composites also 
conveys ‘the notion of back, backwards’, that is, of reciprocity.263 On the other hand, 
dedication implies a renunciation by the dedicator to his/her own property: this is due 
to the very nature of dedications, since they ‘consisted in renunciation and long-term 
symbolic investment in the divine, in expectation of good things to come’, with the result 
that ‘by depositing a perceptible object in a sanctuary, one both loses it and makes it 
                                                          
261  Hornblower, Spawforth (1996) s.v. ‘votive offerings’: ‘the gift to the sanctuary both 
mediates and serves as a testimony to the occasion of the vow. “If my ship arrives safely, if I 
recover from illness, if my crops succeeds, etc. … I shall dedicate a statue, a tithe, a temple, and 
so on”’. 
262 Burkert (1987): 47, who also stressed that the above mentioned features of gifts ‘are most 
firmly enrooted in pre-capitalistic, archaic societies’ (for a detailed discussion about gift-exchange 
and the different types of gifts in the Homeric societies – implying or not the idea of reciprocity 
–, see Van Wees [1992]: 228-237). See also Burkert (1985): 93: ‘as the inscriptions state, the donor 
expects a gracious gift in return, even if only that the god may grant him occasion to set up 
another gift in the future’. In this regard, Englund (1987): 61, describes the relationship 
established between the dedicator and the god by virtue of the dedication in terms of ‘reciprocal 
giving’ responding to a ‘do ut des principle’ (‘the gifts to the gods are all made according to the do 
ut des principle … it is a question of a reciprocal giving’); whereas Maffi (1974): 53, defines a gift 
as ‘una prestazione di beni di prestigio che ha luogo nell’ambito di un rapporto di reciprocità; 
prestazione qualificata sia dalla posizione sociale delle parti, sia dalla funzione socialmente 
riconosciuta, a livello di ideologia dominante, che essa assume’. 
263 Liddell, Scott (1996) s.v. ‘ἀνά’. 
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eternal’.264 In legal terms, through the dedication of an object to a god (ἀνατίθημι), the 
dedicator deprives himself of his own property for good, this implying – technically – a 
transfer of ownership from the human sphere into the divine one. 
This fundamental feature of dedication is strictly connected with and naturally leads 
to the problem of the meaning of ἱερός, an adjective which is typically used within 
dedication-inscriptions in order to describe the condition of something which has been 
consecrated to a god: as an effect of dedication (ἀνάθεσις), slaves are said to become 
ἱεροί, which means ‘consecrated’, to a god. Scholars traditionally agree that the adjective 
ἱερός in its technical meaning started to belong to the religious sphere only from the 5th 
century B.C. onwards, whilst in earlier times – and especially in the Homeric poems – 
the semantic field of ἱερός was not exclusively religious nor its meaning unambiguous. 
This issue has been carefully discussed by Gallavotti, who points out that in the Homeric 
poems the adjective ἱερός does not have one single meaning, since ‘in Omero, sul piano 
stilistico, il valore di ἱερός si svolge fra due poli, ossia quello della potenza vitale … e 
l’altro della sacralità, cui si congiunge a volte la nozione della intangibilità, inviolabilità, 
come compete al giudizio di Zeus … e alla sua persona’.265 
                                                          
264 Hornblower, Spawforth (1996) s.v. ‘votive offerings’. In this regard, it is interesting to point 
out that ‘one of the primary functions of temples was to house expensive dedications; the temple 
itself was a communal dedication, anathēma, to the god’. 
265 Gallavotti (1963): 414-415: if, on the one hand, some usages of the adjective imply the idea 
of ‘“sacro” in senso tecnico, e sostantivato “rito sacro, sacrificio”’, on the other hand it could also 
refer to ‘farina e olivo, a località naturali, a case e mura e città’ (this implying that ‘il più delle 
volte significa soltanto “rigoglioso” o “possente”, ha insomma quel valore elativo generico a cui 
ricorrono gli antichi commentatori, traducendolo con μέγας, in quei casi in cui il significato di 
“sacro” sembra maggiormente estraneo al contesto’), but also ‘all’esercito … o all’intera 
assemblea degli anziani radunati in cerchio’, and ‘in tale accezione l’aggettivo sembra esprimere 
soltanto una nozione di energia, gagliardia, vitalità’. The connection between the two original 
and co-existing meanings of ἱερός is thus made clear by Gallavotti through the materiality of 
rituals: ‘come una voce è “efficace” se è vigorosa e si fa sentire di lontano; come una donna 
feconda e “vitalmente rigorosa” è fisiologicamente efficace perché risponde alla propria natura; 
così un’offerta votiva e un sacrificio sono ἱερά perché sono (ritualmente) vigorosi, vitalmente 
efficaci, rispondendo al loro scopo di costringere il dio ad accordare il suo favore. Il rito 
dell’offerta … è un impegno a cui l’uomo costringe il dio per mezzo del dono …è l’uomo che 
stabilisce un vincolo con il suo nume. In generale, dunque, ἱερός significa qualche cosa di 
estremamente efficace, che l’uomo indirizza ad uno scopo di vitale interesse’ (Gallavotti [1963]: 
417-418). 
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Dedicated objects became ἱερά, that is, consecrated to a god and thus sacred; but their 
qualification as such raises some fundamental questions. What was the (legal) condition 
of consecrated objects? What was their relationship with the god to whom they had been 
consecrated? And, finally, did they still have any kind of relationship with their previous 
owners? Can the latter dispose of them in some way? In order to provide an answer to 
these problems, it is necessary to take into consideration two fundamental aspects of τά 
ἱερά: first, their belonging to the god to whom they had been dedicated; second, their 
inviolability and intangibility by humans. 
As for the first aspect, it is important to stress that, in its technical connotation, ἱερός 
means ‘“things of the gods” or, more precisely, things that belong to the gods, 
manifesting their power, because they have been consecrated by humans’.266 Therefore, 
the first feature of something which is defined as ἱερός is that the relationship 
established between consecrated objects and gods by virtue of dedication is based on 
ownership. This implies that, as an effect of dedication, the dedicator gave up his/her 
rights over the consecrated object by transferring them to the god.267 
The second point which has to be stressed is that the adjective ἱερός ‘bears principally 
negative characteristics. It is surrounded by prohibitions: uncontrolled dealings, 
unrestrained use are excluded’; from these premises, it follows that the adjective ‘hieros 
                                                          
266 Blok (2014): 16. 
267 That τά ἱερά belonged to the god is commonly recognised by scholars. See, for instance, 
Chantraine (1968) s.v. ‘ἱερός’ (‘d’une manière générale, ἱερός exprime ce qui appartient aux dieux 
ou vient d’eux … avec une valeur plus technique, s’applique à ce qui appartient aux dieux, 
domaines, animaux, objets consacrés’); Clarke (1995): 300 (‘ἱερός … in its religious sense is 
applied not to gods proper, but to what is of gods’); Burkert (1985): 269 (‘hieros would … have to 
be defined as that which belongs to a god or a sanctuary in an irrevocable way. The opposite is 
bebelos, profane. Man consecrates something, some possession, in that he takes it away from his 
own disposal and surrenders it to the god’); Caneva, Delli Pizzi (2015): 167 (‘the adjective ἱερός 
… generally translated “sacred”, indicates that an object has been conceded to the gods and is 
now in relation with them [relation of belonging, protection, etc.]’). See also Lambrinoudakis, 
Balty (2005): 303, according to whom consecrated objects primarily functioned as ‘divine 
property’. 
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draws boundaries’ 268 , and that anything which is described as such is intimately 
untouchable and inviolable by humans.269 
Thus, Greek dedications (ἀναθήματα) and the legal condition of consecrated objects 
(ἱερά) seem to share the same basic features of dedicatio-consecratio and of res sacrae in 
Roman Law: first, Greek dedications also implied the involvement of civic bodies, since 
these acts had to be carried out at the συνέδριον (as the formulas of the inscriptions 
specifically state); second, their performance had to follow specific rules (κατὰ τὸν 
νόμον); third, the condition of consecrated items was characterised, on the one hand, by 
their being the property of a god and, on the other hand, by their being untouchable by 
humans, this implying that any attempt to seize something which was qualified as ἱερόν 
would have constituted ἱεροσυλία (that is, ‘theft of sacred property’) and therefore 
would have been prosecuted with a γραφή ἱεροσυλίας.270 
These elements, however, are not taken into adequate consideration by modern 
scholarship: the general interpretation of these inscriptions relies on some clauses, the 
meanings of which seem to imply that the legal condition of ἱεροί was akin to that of free 
individuals, in order to assume that ἱεροί were legally free and, therefore, that 
consecration was ultimately a form of ‘sacral’ manumission. In the following sections, I 
will analyse these clauses and show that although – at a first superficial look – they seem 
to suggest that ἱεροί were free, they are not inconsistent with slavery and with the 
general information provided by the ancient sources according to which ἱεροί were 
property of the god. 
 
3. The vocabulary of dedication in the Chaironeian inscriptions. 
As mentioned above, many inscriptions from the 2nd century B.C. have been found in 
Chaironeia recording dedications of slaves to a god, usually Serapis, by their masters.271 
                                                          
268 Burkert (1985): 269. 
269 Gallavotti (1963): 409 (‘ἱερός è il termine usuale e generico in greco per esprimere la nozione 
di “sacro”, e quindi anche inviolabile, ossia tabù – ma non “santo” o “divino”’). 
270 Todd (1993): 107. In this regard see, for instance, Darmezin, Affranchissements 100,135; 
Darmezin, Affranchissements 91,126. 
271  Generally speaking, Serapis is, together with Asklepios, the most common god in 
dedication inscriptions from Central Greece, and it is certainly the most frequently attested one 
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The act of dedicating slaves to the god is generally referred to with the verb ἀνατίθημι, 
followed by the name of the slave in the accusative and his qualification, as an effect of 
consecration, as ἱερόν. 
IG VII 3312 is a typical inscription in this regard: 
 
ἄρχοντος Ἀρχεδά- 
μου, μηνὸς Ὁμολωΐου 
πεντεκαιδεκάτ[ῃ], 
Θέων Σωμήλου Λε- 
5 βαδεύς, παρόντος 
αὐτῷ τοῦ υἱοῦ Σά- 
μωνος, ἀντίθησι τὸ- 
ν ἴδιον θρεπτόν, ᾧ ὄ- 
νομα Σωσίδαμος, ἱε- 
10 ρὸν τῷ Σεράπει, πο[ιο]- 
<ύ>μενος τὴν ἀνάθε- 
σιν διὰ τοῦ συνεδρ- 
ίου κατὰ τὸν νόμ- 
ον. 
 
Under the archonship of Archedamos, in the fifteenth day of the month of Homoloios, Theos 
Lebadeus son of Semelos, being his son Samenos with him, dedicates his own home-bred slave, 
named Sosimados, as sacred to Serapis, having performed the dedication at the council according 
to the law. 
 
                                                          
in Chaironeian inscriptions, whereas Apollo is the god generally mentioned in Delphic records 
of manumissions through ‘sale’. Scholars traditionally agree that the reason for the involvement 
of these specific gods in ‘religious’ manumissions is due to their role as assistants of persons (both 
free and slaves) under duress, this implying an idea of manumission as ‘a procedure involving a 
difficult transformation of status’ (Kamen [2012] 185; see also Calderini [1965]: 199; Bömer [1958]: 
132), whereas Darmezin (1999): 184, maintains that ‘il ne semble donc pas qu’il y ait eu des 
divinités “spécialisés” dans la protection des affranchis. En revanche, les maîtres choisissaient la 
divinité la plus importante de la cite, ou alors celle à laquelle ils rendaient un culte personnel’. 
Kamen (2012): 185-189, further interprets the constant choice of these gods in the light of their 
qualification as healers: ‘the frequent selection of these gods in sacral manumission implies that 
healing gods were thought particularly appropriate for effecting the slave’s transition to freedom. 
And if this is the case, we can posit that slavery itself was conceptualized as a sort of sickness, or 
even death, from which the slave had to be “healed” or “saved” … once the socially dead slave 
was freed, however, he regained his personhood; he was no longer a mere commodity. Moreover, 
he could now regain family and community ties, either by returning to his homeland or by 
forging social connections in Greece. Manumission then was a process of both re-personalization 
and re-socialization’. 
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The first part of the inscription provides detailed chronological information about the 
time of dedication, by mentioning the archon (Archedamos) and the day of the month 
in which the act has been performed (the fifteenth day of the month of Homoloios). Then, 
the formula mentions the name of the slave’s owner as the person who consecrates 
(ἀντίθησι) his slave as sacred (ἱερὸν) to the god Serapis with the assistance of his son, 
as suggested by the verb πάρειμι. More specifically, I believe that in the case of the 
inscriptions from Chaironeia the verb πάρειμι does not convey the same significance of 
the verbs συνευδοκεῖν, συνευαρεστεῖν or συνεπαινεῖν that are often mentioned in the 
Delphic inscriptions recording manumission through ‘sale’: if, in the case of the Delphic 
inscription, this last group of verbs suggests that a person gives his/her consent to the 
‘sale’, this being an essential element for the very making of the agreement, it seems to 
me that in the case of the consecration inscriptions from Chaironeia the verb πάρειμι 
conveys the idea of a person assisting to the act of consecration, being his function akin 
to that of a witness, as suggested by three elements. First, unlike the Delphic inscriptions, 
all mentioning the names of the people witnessing to the ‘sale’ of the slave to the god 
Apollo, the consecration-inscriptions from Chaironeia do not specifically list the 
witnesses to the act: for this reason, it is likely that this is the function of those people 
whose role in the act is described with the verb πάρειμι. Second, some inscriptions use 
together the verbs πάρειμι and συνευαρεστεῖν, this implying that the two verbs cannot 
have the same meaning in the same line. 272  Third, some inscriptions record the 
dedication of slaves by their mistresses, who are assisted in the consecration by some 
friends273: there is no reason to believe that friends had any interest in giving their 
consent to the consecration (and thus alienation) of someone else’s property, therefore 
their function is more likely to be that of witnesses to the act.274 
                                                          
272  See, for instance, IG VII 3371 (Chaironeia, 2nd century B.C.), which describes the 
consecration of two slaves as sacred to Serapis by their mistress with the presence (‘παρόντος 
αὐτῇ’) and assistance (‘συνευαρεστοῦντος’) of her son. Cf. also IG VII 3326, 3396. If, as I showed 
in chapter 2, the verb συνευαρεστεῖν seems to imply the idea of giving consent to an act or to a 
contract, it is likely that the verb πάρειμι, in the Chaironeian inscriptions, simply alludes to 
assisting to an act. 
273 See, for instance, IG VII 3357 and IG VII 3365 (both from the 2nd century B.C. Chaironeia). 
274 It is also possible to suggest that the verb πάρειμι does not in any case imply the idea of 
legal representation. If this latter idea seems to be suggested by the content of those inscriptions 
98 
 
The inscription finally specifies that the dedication has been performed in the 
συνέδριον and ‘according to the law’: both these features (the involvement of the council 
and the respect of the provisions of the law) are then essential for the validity of the 
dedication.275 
This kind of formula is typical and about half of the inscriptions from Chaironeia 
recording dedications of slaves follow this scheme. The remaining half of the inscriptions, 
after describing the dedication of a slave with the same formula, require consecrated 
slaves to παραμένειν with their former masters. This is the case, for example, of the 
following inscription (IG VII 3314): 
 
Ἀρχεδάμω ἀρχῶ, μεινὸς Ὁμολωΐω πεντεκαιδεκάτη, Μηλὶς 
Φιλήμονος ἀνατίθητι τὼς ϝιδίως δούλως Σώτιμον κὴ Σωτη[ρί]- 
χαν ἱαρὼς τεῖ Σεράπι παραμείναντας αὐτῆ [ἀ]νεγκλείτως ἇς κ[α] 
ζώει, τὰν ἀνάθεσιν ποιουμένα διὰ τῶ συνεδ[ρίω] κατὰ τὸν νόμον. 
 
During the archonship of Archedamos, in the fifteenth day of the month of Homoloios, Melis 
daughter of Philomenos dedicates her own slaves Sotimos and Sotericha as sacred to Serapis, and 
they shall remain with her blamelessly for the rest of her life, having she performed the dedication 
at the council according to the law. 
 
                                                          
which mention women carrying out consecrations with the presence of their husbands (such as 
IG VII 3322, or IG VII 3359), other possible scenarios definitively exclude this possibility. The 
Chaironeian inscriptions show the following cases: women consecrating slaves without being 
assisted by anyone (IG VII 3314); women being assisted by their children (IG VII 3326, 3353, 3371, 
3396); women consecrating their slaves together with their husbands, both assisted by their 
children (IG VII 3325); and finally, men consecrating their slaves with the assistance of their sons, 
such as IG VII 3312 above analysed. 
275 Scholars generally agree that, from the 2nd century B.C., the term συνέδριον replaced the 
term βουλή in the πόλεις of Central Greece and of the Peloponnese (see Meyer [2009]: 79-80, with 
a discussion on the function of the συνέδριον within the context of these inscriptions). Yet, the 
term συνέδριον had not always been used to designate the council, as it has been pointed out by 
Hamon (2005): 131 (‘étymologiquement, un synedrion est un congrès ou un “consistoire”: le mot 
est plus neutre que “boulè”. Il s’appliquait le plus souvent, à l’époque classique et à la haute 
époque hellénistique, à des conseils de type fédéral’). That in the context here analysed the 
συνέδριον has to be identified with the βουλή is also made clear by the content of some 
inscriptions which, after describing dedications with the usual formulas, specify that the act had 
been perform in front of the βουλή: for example, IG VII 3349 (Chaironeia, early 2nd century B.C.), 
after recording the consecration of a male slave by his master, states that the latter ‘τὰν ἀνάθεσιν 
ποϊόμενος διὰ τᾶς βωλᾶς’ (l. 4). 
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The formula of this inscription is similar to the one analysed above: there is always 
the mention of the slave’s master/mistress as the dedicator, one or more slaves as the 
dedicated objects, and their qualification after dedication as ἱεροί. It is further specified 
that the dedication took place at the συνέδριον and according to the law. But this last 
inscription mentions something more: it expressly requires consecrated slaves to remain 
with their former mistress for the rest of her life. This clause clearly recalls the παραμονή 
duty which is attested in Delphic manumissions through ‘sale’, even though the 
inscriptions from Chaironeia do not mention any kind of penalty for those consecrated 
slaves who did not perform their παραμονή duties. 
In order to understand fully the different features and the contents of the Chaironeian 
dedications, it is important to consider some further elements emerging from the text of 
the inscriptions such as, first of all, the identity of the dedicator. If, as I mentioned before, 
dedications of slaves were generally performed by their ‘private’ owners, some 
inscriptions from Chaironeia (such as IG VII 3333 and IG VII 3367, both from the 2nd 
century B.C.) record that the person dedicating a slave is himself a ἱερός. 
I will consider, for instance, the content of IG VII 3333276: 
 
θεός, τύχη ἀγαθή. ἄρχοντος Ἀντίγωνος, μεινὸς 
Δαματρίου τριακάδι, Παρθένα ἱερὰ τοῦ Σερά- 
πιδος, παρόντος αὐτῇ τοῦ ἱεράρχου Ἀθανίου τοῦ Ἀριστίπ- 
που, ἀνατίθησι τὴν ἰδίαν δούλην Ἀθηναΐδα τῷ Σεράπι παρα- 
5 μείνασαν ἑαυτῇ καὶ τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς Φίλωνι Δαυλιεῖ πάντα τὸν τ[ῆς] 
ζωῆς χρόνον ἀνενκλήτως, ποιουμένη τὴν ἀνάθεσιν διὰ τοῦ συνεδρί[ου] 
κατὰ τὸν νόμον. 
 
God, good fortune. Under the archonship of Antigonos, on the thirtieth day of the month of 
Damatrios, Parthena, sacred to Serapis, being the high-priest Athanios son of Aristippos with her, 
                                                          
276 The other inscription recording the dedication of a slave by a ἱερός is IG VII 3367 (2nd 
century B.C.): ἄρχοντος Πάτρω[νος, μει]- / νὸς Ὁμολωΐου πεν[τεκαιδεκάτῃ], / Ζωΐλος ἱερὸς 
τοῦ [Σεράπι]- / δος, παρόντος α[ὐτῷ τοῦ ἱε]- / ράρχου Ἁλίππου [τοῦ — — —]- / του, ἀνατίθησι 
τ[ὸ ἴδι]- / ον δουλικὸν π[αιδά]- / ριον, ᾧ ὄνομα Η[— —, ἱερὸν] / τῷ Σεράπει, μ[ὴ προσήκοντα] 
/ μηθενὶ μηθέν, [τὴν ἀνάθεσιν] / ποιούμενος [διὰ τοῦ συνεδρίου κατὰ τὸν νόμον] (Under the 
archonship of Patronis, in the fifteenth day of the month of Homoloios, Zoilos, sacred to Serapis, being the 
high-priest Alippos son of --- with him, dedicates his own young slave, named ---, as sacred to Serapis, and 
he [the consecrated slave] shall not belong to anyone in any way, having he (Zoilos) performed the 
dedication at the synedrion according to the law). 
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dedicates her own female slave named Athenaida [as sacred] to Serapis, and she (Athenaida) shall 
remain with her (Parthena) and with her husband Philonos Daulieos blamelessly for the rest of 
life, having she (Parthena) performed the dedication at the council according to the law. 
 
The content of this inscription (which is very similar to IG VII 3367) presents some 
interesting features. First, after being dedicated to the god, the consecrated slave is 
required to παραμένειν with the ἱερά-dedicator and her husband: the fact that the ἱερά-
dedicator had a husband shows that ἱεροί could have family relationships that were 
valid and recognised, and possibly that they could marry. Second, the ἱερά dedicates a 
slave who is said to be her own (‘τὴν ἰδίαν’): this element seems to suggest that ἱεροί 
could be slave-owners and therefore that they could own property.277 Third, the fact that 
the ἱερά can make the dedication in front of the synedrion in her own rights indicates that 
ἱεροί had access to the civic institutions. Fourth, the dedication of ‘her own’ slave by a 
ἱερά seems to imply that ἱεροί had the power to dispose as they liked of their property. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that in this case, as well as in the other cases 
attesting dedications of slaves by ἱεροί, τόν ἴδιον indicates that ἱεροί were entitled to the 
right of ownership over those slaves, as is shown by the following elements. First, by the 
Hellenistic period ἴδιον is no more than a possessive adjective and its meaning is 
therefore very loose. Second, if we take a look, for example, at those inscriptions 
recording the dedication of ἀπελεύθεροι by their (former) masters, we notice that the 
freedman who is consecrated as sacred to Serapis is always labelled, in relation to his ex 
owner, as ‘τόν ἴδιον’: yet, since ἀπελεύθεροι had already been manumitted at the time 
of consecration and therefore they were already legally free individuals, it is clear that 
in these cases ‘τόν ἴδιον’ does not indicate the existence of the right of ownership. 
Moreover, the possibility that ἱεροί could ‘have’ some slaves does not necessarily imply 
that they were legally free individuals: given that, in this case, ‘τόν ἴδιον’ does not 
directly prove that ἱεροί owned (in the sense that they were entitled to the right of 
ownership over) those slaves, it is possible that the relationship between the ἱεροί and 
                                                          
277 IG VII 3331 (Chaironeia, 2nd century B.C.) records a similar episode: Pythos, sacred to 
Serapis, dedicates (in this case the verb of dedication is ἀνιερόω) as sacred to Serapis her own 
slave’s daughter, named Niko who, after dedication, will have to remain with Pythos. This 
inscription further shows that ἱεροί could dispose of their slaves and of their offspring. 
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‘their’ slaves was similar to that between the servus ordinarius and the servus vicarius in 
Roman law, which we know existed also in the Greek world, where it was attested 
already from the Homeric poems.278 
The second element that needs to be considered is the status of the consecrated person. 
If the general rule is that the objects of dedications were slaves, some inscriptions – as 
mentioned before – record the dedication of ἀπελεύθεροι as ἱεροί to Serapis by their 
former masters (for instance, IG VII 3318 and IG VII 3360, both from the 2nd century B.C.). 
As an example, I will consider the content of IG VII 3318: 
 
Πάτρωνος ἀρχῶ, μη- 
νὸς Πανάμου πεντε- 
καιδεκάτῃ, Ἀγαθοκ- 
λῆς Κάλλωνος ἀνα- 
5 τίθησι τὸν ἴδιον ἀπε- 
λεύθερον Δᾶον ἱε- 
ρὸν τῷ Σεράπει, μὴ 
προσήκοντα μηθενὶ 
μηθέν, τὴν ἀνάθε- 
10 σιν ποιούμενος δι- 
ὰ τοῦ συνεδρίου κα- 
τὰ τὸν νόμον. 
 
Under the archonship of Patronos, in the fifteenth day of the month of Panamos, Agathokles 
son of Kallo dedicates his own freedman named Daos as sacred to Serapis, and he (Daos) shall not 
belong to anyone in any way, having he (Agathokles) performed the dedication at the council 
according to the law. 
 
                                                          
278 The institution of the servus vicarius, or servus servi, is first attested in Roman law from the 
2nd century B.C. It is important to stress that, given the lack of any legal personality upon servi, 
the relationship between the servus ordinarius and the servus vicarius was not based on ownership 
but, rather, on possession: the latter was in fact included in the former’s peculium, which – as is 
well known – was legally owned by the master but de facto administered by the slave. However, 
the first evidence for the institution of the servus vicarius in Greece is provided by Hom. Od. 
14.449-452, in which Eumaeus, who is Odysseus’ slave, is said to have been granted the privilege 
to have his own slave Mesaulius whom he bought with his savings (on this point, cf. Reduzzi 
Merola [1990]: 3-7; see also Lewis [2015], who correctly includes this grant among those ‘de facto 
concessions granted by the owner to incentivize slaves and ensure their loyalty’). 
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This inscription is significant, as it shows that free persons could also be dedicated 
and thus become sacred to a god. This means, on the one hand, that it is not the act of 
dedication per se that grants freedom to slaves and, on the other hand, that dedication 
cannot simply be described as a form of manumission since, as the two inscriptions 
mentioned above279 show, dedications could concern individuals who had already been 
manumitted before. Moreover, as I pointed out before, the content of these inscriptions 
further proves that the relationship between dedicator and dedicated person is not 
necessarily based on the right of ownership, since the latter is clearly a legally free 
individual.280 
Looking at this evidence from a different angle, I suggest that the fact that 
ἀπελεύθεροι could be consecrated as ἱεροί also shows the flaws of those interpretations 
which argue that ‘sale’ and ‘consecration’ were two different but contemporary 
(religious) ways of conferring freedom upon slaves. The fact that the Delphic inscriptions 
and the Chaironeain ones are dated to the same period and the fact that where we find 
sale-inscriptions we do not usually find consecration-inscriptions and vice-versa, have 
been interpreted in the sense that these two kinds of inscriptions perform the same 
function (manumission), but with different formulas and procedures (‘sale’ and 
‘consecration’). However, the fact that ἀπελεύθεροι could be consecrated shows that the 
latter were made free with a procedure which was different from consecration, in other 
ways that we cannot infer from the texts of the inscriptions: it follows, therefore, that the 
suggested analogy between the function of the Delphic inscriptions and the Chaironeian 
ones is ultimately wrong, as their respective results seem to be completely different. 
                                                          
279  IG VII 3360 has a very similar content: [— — — — — — — — με]ιν[ὸς] / [— — 
πεντεκαιδεκ]άτη, Ἀλε- / [ξίων] Ἁγ̣νίαο Λε- / [βαδ]ε[ὺ]ς ἀνατίθει- / [τι τ]ὰν [ϝ]ιδίαν ἀπε- / 
[λε]ύθερον α[ὐ]τῶ Εὐν̣[ίκα]- / ν ἱερὰν τεῖ Σαράπι, / τὰν ἀνάθεσιν [ποιι]όμε- / νος διὰ τῶ 
σουνεδρίω / κὰτ τὸν νόμον. (— — — in the fifteenth day of the month — — —, Alexion consecrates 
his own freedwoman named Eunika as sacred to Serapis, having he performed the consecration at the 
synedrion according to the law). 
280 In this case the use of τόν ἴδιον does not refer to ownership but, rather, to the ‘connection’ 
that manumitted slaves could maintain with their ex owners even after manumission; many 
Greek sources, on the other hand, show that ἀπελεύθεροι were usually referred to with their 
name, followed by the name of their former masters in the genitive, this stressing that they were 
conceived of, even after their liberation, as the manumitted slaves ‘of’ someone (cf. Zelnick-
Abramovitz [2005]: 320; Gärtner [2008]: 454). 
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Going back to IG VII 3318, this inscription is significant also because it mentions a 
clause which is frequently attested in the Chaironeian inscriptions: once a slave or a 
freedman is consecrated to a god, the formula ‘μὴ προσήκοντα μηθενὶ μηθέν’ is often 
mentioned. Literally, it means ‘he/she shall not belong to anyone in any way’, and refers 
to the condition enjoyed by ἱεροί as an effect of dedication.281 This means that ἱεροί could 
not be the object of any individual claim or private ownership by the dedicator: the 
implication of this clause probably has to be connected with the very meaning of the 
adjective ἱερός which, in identifying things belonging to the god, conveys the ‘negative’ 
idea of inviolability and intangibility of consecrated things by humans. In other words, 
once slaves (and also freedmen) were dedicated and thus became ἱεροί, they could not 
be brought back into slavery (i.e. private ownership) through seizure by anyone. 
This clause leads to the problem of the legal protection granted to consecrated slaves 
against other people’s claims. Protection clauses are not attested in the formulas from 
Chaironeia, but the legal protection of ἱεροί against seizure and re-enslavement (usually 
expressed with the verb καταδουλίζασθαι) is mentioned in other dedication 
inscriptions from nearby πόλεις such as Koroneia.  
In this regard, I will focus on the content of IG VII 2872 (undated): 
 
Κλέωνος ἄρχον[τος, ἱερέως δὲ τοῦ Σεράπιος — — — —] 
τοῦ Ὀφελάνδρου, Ἀνί[κητος — — — καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ] 
Διονυσία Εὐμήλου ἀνατιθ̣έασι [τὸν ἴδιον δοῦλον] 
Δ̣ιονύσιον ἱερὸν τῷ Σεράπι καὶ τῇ <Ε>[ἴσι καὶ τῷ Ἀνούβι] 
5 ἱερόν. παραμεινά[τω] δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕως [ἂν ζῶσιν, ἐφ’ ᾧ] 
[τε] εἶναι ἐλεύθερ[ο]ν μὴ προσήκον[τα μηδενὶ μηδέν]. 
ἐὰν δέ τις ἐφάπτηται ε[ἰ]ς δουλήα[ν, ἀποτεισάτω] 
πρόστιμον δραχμὰς χιλίας ἱερὰς τ<ῶι> [Σεράπι· συλάτω δὲ] 
αὐτὸν ὁ ἱερεὺς κα[ὶ τῶν] ἄλλων ὁ <π>[αρατυγχάνων]. 
10 μάρτυρες· [— — — — —μ]άχου, Δα[— — — — — — — —] 
[— — — —, — — — — —αν]δρος Ξ[— — — — — — — — —] 
 
                                                          
281 As for the distribution of this clause within Chaironeian inscriptions, cf. Darmezin (1999): 
224 (‘sur les vingt-trois occurrences de cette formule, seize se trouvent dans des actes sans 
paramone, mais sept dans des actes avec paramone. Si, dans trois des actes avec paramone, la formule 
ne s’applique manifestement qu’à la période de paramone’). 
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Under the archonship of Kleon, being — — — — son of Ophelandros priest of Serapis, 
Aniketos — — — and his wife Dionysia, daughter of Eumelos, dedicate [their own slave] named 
Dionysios as sacred to Serapis and as sacred to [Isis and to Anoubi]. (Dionysios) shall remain 
with them for the rest of their lives, so that he is free not belonging to anyone in anyway. If 
someone seizes him to slavery, he (the seizer) will have to pay as a penalty a thousand drachmae 
as sacred to Serapis. The priest and anyone else shall counter-seize him. Witnesses: — — — — . 
 
Line four of the inscription has been differently restored by Darmezin who, after 
dating the inscription to the 2nd century B.C., replaces the words ‘τῇ <Ε>[ἴσι καὶ τῷ 
Ἀνούβι] ἱερόν’ with ‘καὶ τὴν [ἀνάθεσιν ποιοῦσιν εἰς τὸ] ἱερόν’, thus giving a 
completely different meaning to ἱερόν in line 5, which would then identify the temple 
(and not the condition of the slave, after consecration, as sacred to Isis and Anoubi).282 
The possibility for anyone to counter-seize the consecrated slave in the event of his 
seizure clearly recalls the act of συλᾶν which is widely attested in the Delphic 
inscriptions, and which constitutes the main means of protecting manumitted slaves 
from any attempt of reductio in servitutem. What is more, it has to be noted that the person 
who seizes the consecrated slave is liable towards the god Serapis, to whom he is 
required to pay a monetary fine of one thousand drachmae. This means that any attempt 
to seize a slave after he has been consecrated to a god is conceived of as a direct 
interference towards something – or someone – which is considered to be in an exclusive 
relation (based on ownership) with the god. This consideration, on the other hand, is not 
contradicted by the fact that the inscription qualifies the ἱερός as a free individual 
(‘ἐλεύθερ[ο]ν’): as I will show in the chapter, some sources do qualify ἱεροί as free; this 
                                                          
282 Cf. Darmezin, Affranchissements 86,121: Κλέωνος ἄρχον[τος, ἱερέως δὲ τοῦ Σεράπιος — 
— — —] / τοῦ Ὀφελάνδρου, Ἀνί[κητος — — — καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ] / Διονυσία Εὐμήλου 
ἀνατιθέασι [τὸν ἴδιον δοῦλον ᾧ ὄνομα] / Διονύσιον ἱερὸν τῷ Σεράπι καὶ τὴν [ἀνάθεσιν 
ποιοῦσιν εἰς τὸ] / ἱερόν· παραμεινά[τω] δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕως [ἂν ζῶσιν, ἐφ’ ᾧ] / [τε] εἶναι ἐλεύθερ[ο]ν 
μὴ προσήκον[τα μηδενὶ μηδέν]·/ ἐὰν δέ τις ἐφάπτηται ἐς δουλήα[ν Διονύσιον, ἀποτεισάτω] / 
πρόστιμον δραχμὰς χιλίας ἱερὰς τ[ῷ Σεράπι· συλάτω δὲ] / αὐτὸν ὁ ἱαρεὺς κα[ὶ τῶν] ἄλλων ὁ 
[βουλόμενος]· / μάρτυρες· [— — — — —μ]άχου, Δα[— — — — — —] / [— — — — — — — — 
— — —]δρος Ξ[— — — — —] (Under the archonship of Kleon, being — — — — son of Ophelandros 
priest of Serapis, Aniketos — — — and his wife Dionysia, daughter of Eumelos, consecrate [their own 
slave] named Dionysios as sacred to Serapis and they perform the consecration in the temple. (Dionysios) 
shall remain with them for the rest of their lives, so that he is free not belonging to anyone in anyway. If 
someone seizes him to slavery, he will have to pay as a penalty a thousand drachmae as sacred to Serapis. 
The priest and anyone else shall counter-seize him. Witnesses: — — — — —). 
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qualification, however, does not seem to refer to their legal condition but, rather, to their 
de facto situation. In fact, as the sources show in many ways, the absence of an actual 
owner who could concretely exercise the powers and rights descending from ownership 
made the de facto condition of ἱεροί much more similar to that of free individuals than to 
that of slaves, despite the fact that, from a legal perspective, they were property of the 
god. 
That the consecrated slave is in a particular relation with the god to the point of being 
‘untouchable’ by humans is even more evident in Darmezin, Affranchissements 100,135 
(Koroneia, middle 2nd century B.C.) which, although somewhat fragmentary, shows 
some important features: 
 
θεός· τύχη ἀγαθή· Εὐδάμω ἄρχοντος, μ[ηνὸς — πεντεκαιδεκά]- 
τῃ, Δάμων Ξενοφίλου Λαρυμνεὺς οἰκῶ<ν> ἐν Κο[ρωνείᾳ ἀνατίθη]- 
σι τὰ ἴδια σώμα[τα Ἐ]λ̣ευθερίδα [— — — — — — — — —] 
καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον κ[αὶ Πα]τ̣ρόκλεα κ̣α̣[ὶ — —]τ̣[— — — —] 
5 [κ]αὶ ΛΑΒΟΥΣ πάντω[ν — — — — — — — —, παραμεί]- 
ν̣αντ[ας] ἀνεγκλή[̣τως Δάμωνι — — — — — — — — —] 
ΩΝ· μὴ ἐξέστω [δὲ κατ]αδου[λ]ώσ[ασθαι ταῦτα τὰ σώ]- 
ματα μηθενί· [εἰ δέ μή, συλείτω ἡ ἱέρεια τοῦ Χά]- 
ροπος τοῦ Ἡρακλ[έ]ος καὶ [Βοιωτῶν ὁ βουλόμ]- 
10 [ε]νος ἀπροστί[μη]τ[ος· ὁ δὲ καταδουλούμενος ἔνοχος ἔσ]- 
τω τῆι ἱερ<ο>συλί[αι καὶ] ἀποτ[ι]σ[άτω — — — — δραχμ]- 
ὰ̣ς τρισχιλίας [ἀργυρί]ου [ἀττικοῦ ἱερὰς τοῦ Ἡρακλέ]- 
ος τοῦ Χάροπος [— — — — — — — — — — — — — —] 
τ̣ὰ προειρημέ[να — —]ΝΟΣΔΕ[— — — — — — κατα]- 
15 βολὴν μέχρι ἀ[ποτί]σωσι δισ[χιλίας — — — — — —] 
α̣ὐ̣τὸν [—]ΕΛΑ[—]ΟΝ[— — — — — — — — ἑ]κάστω ἐνι- 
αυτῶ κατ’ ἀώνιο̣[ν χρόνον — — — — — — — — — —] 
[— — —]ΔΟ[—]ΝΙΑΝΔΕΚΑ[— — — — — — — — — —] 
[— —]ΩΙ ἄκυρος ἔστω [— — — — — — — — — τοῦ Ἡρ]- 
20 ακλέους τοῦ Χά[ρ]οπος [— — — — — — — — — — —] 
ἱερὰ α[ὐ]τοῦ [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] 
[— —] εἰσενέγκη [— — — — — — — — — — — — κατ]- 
[αβο]λ̣ήν, ἀποτισάτω ὁ μὴ Ε[— — — — — — — — —] 
[—] τ̣οῖς εἰσενέγκασι ὑπὸ [— — — — — — — — — —] 
25 τῶν πόλεων πανδημεὶ [— — — — — — — — — — —] 
 
God, good fortune. Under the archonship of Eudamos, in the fifteenth day of the month of —, 
Damon Larumneus son of Xenophilos, living he in Koroneia, dedicates his own slaves Eleutherida 
106 
 
— and Alexandros and Patroklea and — and —, and they shall remain with Damon blamelessly 
—. It will not be possible for anybody to seize these slaves into slavery. If it happens, the priestess 
of Herakles Charops and anybody shall counter-seize them without being liable to any penalty; 
the seizer will be liable for theft of sacred things and he should pay three thousand drachmae of 
Attic silver as sacred to Herakles Charops … 
 
The text of the inscription is very fragmentary, and a translation of the second part of 
the text (from line 13) is almost impossible. 283  Yet, the first half of the inscription, 
although partly lost, provides some useful information about the legal protection 
granted to consecrated slaves. 
The inscription does not state that slaves are dedicated as ἱεροί, but given the 
fragmentary condition of the inscription, this part might have been lost, as it seems to be 
suggested, on the one hand, by the fact that also the name of the god to whom these 
slaves are dedicated is missing and, on the other hand, by the fact that on the whole the 
vocabulary and the formulas used in the inscription, which are very similar to the 
Chaironeian ones, suggest the performance of a ‘standard’ dedication of slaves to a 
certain god as sacred to him. After having been dedicated, these slaves are required to 
παραμένειν with their former master. It is also interesting to stress that, after registering 
the act of consecration, the inscription further states that nobody shall seize them back 
to slavery, i.e. to private ownership (‘μὴ ἐξέστω [δὲ κατ]αδου[λ]ώσ[ασθαι ταῦτα τὰ 
σώ]ματα μηθενί’): given that specific legal protection is provided against re-
enslavement, on the one hand, and that the formulas of the inscription suggest a 
standard case of dedication of slaves as ἱεροί, on the other hand, it is likely that their 
qualification as σώματα reflects a metaphorical use of the vocabulary of slavery. More 
specifically, the implication seems to be that their qualification as σώματα refers to their 
re-enslavement (in other words, they are described as such because σώματα, that is 
privately owned slaves, is what they would be if they were made the object of an act of 
κατ]αδου[λ]ώσ[ασθαι), rather than being a label assigned to them before such an act 
                                                          
283 For possible restorations of the content of this second part of the inscription, cf. Darmezin 
(1999): 101 (‘les lignes 14-15 donnent, semble-t-il, des précisions sur le paiement de l’amende. Puis 
il s’agit peut-être des devoirs des affranchise, avec à la ligne 19, l’annulation de l’affranchissement 
si ces devoirs ne sont pas respectés. A la fin, il est de nouveau question de versement d’argent’). 
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would actually occur. The inscription also specifies the consequences descending from 
the re-enslavement of the consecrated slaves: on the one hand, the priestess of Herakles 
Charops, together with anyone who wishes among the Beotians, is entitled to counter-
seize the consecrated slaves without being liable to any penalty; on the other hand, the 
seizer is liable for ἱεροσυλία and he is subject to a money penalty of three thousand 
drachmae to Herakles Charops. 284  The fact that the seizer of a ἱερός is liable for 
ἱεροσυλία is significant, since it implies that any appropriation of consecrated slaves is 
seen as a theft of sacred property285 or, more precisely, of something which is considered 
as an integral part of the god himself.286 At the same time, being the seizer liable for 
ἱεροσυλία and not for theft further proves that consecrated slaves could no longer be 
considered as privately owned. 
That the seizure of a consecrated slave may constitute a misappropriation of things 
belonging to a god as sacred, is further proved by the following inscription from 
Koroneia (Darmezin, Affranchissements 91,126; late 3rd century B.C.): 
 
[— — — — — — — —] 
[—]ΩΝ[— — — — —] 
1 μειθενί· οὐ[δὲ κατα]- 
δουλίξετη [Σω]- 
                                                          
284  The liability of the καταδουλιζόμενος to ἱεροσυλία is also attested in Darmezin, 
Affranchissements 96,131, ll. 23-25: ὁ δὲ καταδο- / [υλι]ζόμενος ἔνοχος ἔσ- / τ]ω τῇ ἱερ[οσο]υλίῃ 
(Koroneia, late 3rd century B.C.). This inscription records the dedication to Herakles Karops of a 
female slave named Ermaia, by her masters, as sacred and free (ll-4-10: Δάμων Ἀπολ[λ]- / 
[ο]δώρω κὴ Μνασὶς Ἀπ[ο]- / λλ]οδώρω ἀντίθεν- / [τι] τὰν ϝιδίαν θεράπ- / [ην]αν Ἑρμαέαν τῷ 
Χάρ- / [οπι] τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ εἱερὰ- / [ν εἶμ]εν κὴ ἐλευθέραν). 
285 Cohen (1983): 95, who also points out the other possible meanings of ἱεροσυλία (‘although 
the words hierosulia, hierosulein, or hierosuloi are occasionally used in Athenian sources to refer to 
sacrilegious behaviour, or as a derogatory epithet for persons who are not accused of any theft of 
sacred property … nonetheless the vast majority of the sources emphasize the element of 
misappropriation’).  
286 Cf. Pelloso (2008b): 58 n. 90, who, following Bianchetti (1983): 61, points out that ἱεροσυλία 
has to be conceived of as an ‘offesa oggettivamente integrata dalla sottrazione di beni non 
semplicemente consacrati alla divinità (nel qual caso si avrebbe avuto mera κλοπή di ἱερά 
χρήματα), ma tali da costituire parte integrante della divinità stessa con la conseguenza che i 
soggetti attivi dell’offesa, “menomandone il simulacro depredano gli dèi di una parte di sé con 
un atto che valica i limiti del furto per connotarsi come vero e proprio sacrilegio”’. On the 
relationship between ἱεροσυλία and ἀσέβεια (more specifically, on ἱεροσυλία as a particular 
form of ἀσέβεια), see Todd (1993): 307. 
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τειρίδα οὐθ[ίς· εἰ] 
δέ τίς κα κα[ταδου]- 
5 λίδδειτη, κ[ουρία] 
ἔστω ἅ τε ἱ[ά]ρ[εια τῶ] 
Χάροπος τῶ [Ἡρακλε]- 
ῖος σουλῶσα [κὴ ἄλ]- 
λος ὁ βειλόμε[νος] 
10 Κορωνείων κ[ὴ Βοιω]- 
τῶν ὡς ἱαρᾶς [ἰώσας] 
Σωτειρίδος κ[ὴ ἐλε]- 
[υ]θέρας· ὁ δὲ κα[ταδ]- 
[ο]υλιδδόμενος [ἔνο]- 
15 χος ἔστω τῇ [ἱερο]- 
φορίῃ· ϝίστορε[ς Ἀλε]- 
ξίω<ν> Φιλώταο, Π[ουθί]- 
νας Φίλωνος, Φ[ίλων] 
Πουθίναο, Νί[κων Φι]- 
20 λώταο. 
 
[— — — — — — — —]not to anyone. Nobody shall reduce Soteris into slavery; if someone 
does seize her into slavery, the priestess of Herakles Charops has the power to counter-seize her, 
and anyone among the people from Koroneia and Beotia (can counter-seize her), being Soteris 
sacred and free; the seizer shall be liable for carrying away sacred things. Witnesses: … 
 
The inscription is very fragmentary and what we have is only the second part of it. 
Notwithstanding this, given the formulas used in the inscription it is likely that it deals 
with the consecration to Herakles Charops of a female slave (Soteris), and the existing 
part of the inscription specifies the legal protection that she is granted after having been 
consecrated to the god. Two elements in particular are worth specific attention. First, the 
inscription states that if anyone seizes Soteris to slavery, the priestess of Herakles 
Charops and anyone among the people from Koroneia and Boeotia are entitled to 
counter-seize her, being she ἱερά and free (‘ὡς ἱαρᾶς [ἰώσας Σωτειρίδος κ[ὴ 
ἐλευ]θέρας’). Her legal condition after consecration is thus expressly described in terms 
of her being a ἱερά; however – as I noted above for Darmezin, Affranchissements 100,135 
– the fact that she is described as ‘free’ does not necessarily refer to her legal condition 
but, rather, to her de facto situation, a very peculiar one descending from being a slave of 
the god. Second, the inscription also states that those who seize the consecrated slave 
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into slavery are liable for carrying away sacred things (ἱεραφορία): thus, on the one hand, 
as an effect of the dedication the consecrated female-slave is defined as both ἱερά and 
ἐλευθέρα; on the other hand, her condition as property of the god (sacred) is further 
confirmed by the explicit qualification of her seizure in terms of ἱεραφορία. 
Scholars have also been discussing the meaning of the adjective ἀνέφαπτος in the 
context of dedication-inscriptions. The adjective is used only in few inscriptions from 
Central Greece287 and only in one from Koroneia, which is worth mentioning – although 
through brief remarks – because of the information it might provide about the legal 
condition of ἱεροί. The inscription is classified as Darmezin, Affranchissements 93,128 
(late 3rd century B.C.): 
 
θιός· τιούχαν [ἀγα]- 
θάν· Ποτάμ[ωνο]- 
ς ἄρχοντος, με[ινὸς] 
Θιουΐω πέμπτ[ῃ φθιν]- 
5 ιούντος, Ἀσκλα[πίω]- 
ν Στρότωνος ἀ[ντί]- 
θειτι τὸν ϝίδι[ον ϝ]- 
εικέταν Σωτ[ειρίδ]- 
αν ἱαρὸν εἶμεν [κὴ ἐλ]- 
10 εύθερον ἀπὸ τ[ᾶσδε] 
τᾶς ἁμέρας ἀ[νέπ]- 
αφον ἰόντα· εἰ δ[έ τίς] 
κα ἐφάπτειτ[η, κουρ]- 
ία ἔστω ἅ τε ἱά[ρεια] 
15 σουλῶσα κὴ τῶ[ν ἄλ]- 
λων ὁ βειλόμεν[ος] 
[ἀ]νουπόδικος ἰών· [εἰ δέ] 
τίς κα ἐφάπτειτ[η εἲ] 
καταδουλίδδε[ιτη, ἀ]- 
20 ποτείσι Σωτειρίδ[ᾳ ἀρ]- 
γυρίω ἀττικῶ δρ[αχμὰ]- 
ς χιλίας· ϝίστ[ορες] 
Εὔβωλος Φιλοξ[ένω], 
Πουθόδωρος Στ[ρότω]- 
25 νος, Ἕρμων Μν[άσω]- 
νος, Ἀγαθοκλ[ῆς Ἐ]- 
                                                          
287 Darmezin (1999): 225, who maintains that only fifteen inscriptions from Boeotia mention 
the ἀνέφαπτος clause. 
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μπέδωνος. 
 
God, good fortune. Under the archonship of Potamon, on the fifth day of the month of Thiouios, 
Asclapion son of Stroton dedicates his own home-born slave named Soterida (so that he is) sacred 
and free from this day, being he untouchable; if someone seizes him, the priestess has the power to 
counter-seize him and so does anyone else, being he (anyone else) not liable to action; if someone 
reduces him into slavery, he shall pay a thousand silver drachmae to Soterida. Witnesses: Eubolos, 
son of Philoxenos; Pouthodoros, son of Stroton; Hermon, son of Mnason; Agathokles, son of 
Empedon. 
 
The meaning of the adjective ἀνέφαπτος in this context has often puzzled scholars. 
Some of them think that ‘la rareté d’emploi de ce terme amène évidemment à penser 
qu’il introduit un droit particulier dont bénéficient certains affranchis et pas d’autres’, 
and therefore that ‘le mot ἀνέφαπτος signifiait certainement quelque chose de 
particulier, mais on sait pas exactement quoi’. 288  As I pointed out in chapter 2, the 
adjective ἀνέφαπτος could be used within the context both of maritime loans (in which 
case it identifies the condition of the objects given as a security by the borrower, which 
had to be non-claimable by anyone) and of sale (in which case it identifies the warranty 
against eviction): in both cases, the adjective implies that anything which is described as 
ἀνέφαπτος has to be free from anyone else’s claim of a superior title over the good 
itself.289 Given this meaning of ἀνέφαπτος, I believe that once it is used within the 
context of dedication inscriptions, the adjective has to be read in the light of the 
fundamental feature of τά ἱερά, namely, their being untouchable and not claimable by 
humans, since they are the property of a god. In other words, I do not think that 
ἀνέφαπτος identifies a specific category of particularly privileged consecrated slaves, 
nor that in these inscriptions it has an unclear meaning290 but, rather, that it directly 
refers to the typical condition of ἱεροί, that is their not being claimable or seizable by 
anyone. 
                                                          
288 Darmezin (1999): 225-226. 
289  On the meanings of ἱερός and ἀνέφαπτος, both conveying the idea of something 
‘untouchable’, cf. Bömer (1960): 123; Rädle (1969): 41. 
290 Darmezin (1999): 226. 
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To sum up, several elements in the inscriptions directly point to the fact that the legal 
condition of ἱεροί is one of slavery, which means – in other words – that they belong to 
the god. First, the technical meaning of the verb ἀνατίθημι describes dedications as gifts 
to the gods, through which a person renounces to his/her own property and transfers it 
to the god: as an effect of dedication, dedicated slaves underwent a transfer of ownership 
and thus became the property of the gods. Second, the adjective ἱερός conveys a twofold 
connotation, as it implies, on the one hand, the (positive) idea of belonging to the gods 
and, on the other hand, the (negative) idea of intangibility by humans. Third, in 
providing legal protection to consecrated slaves, some inscriptions clearly imply that the 
nature of ἱεροί is that of sacred property: on the one hand, any attempt to seize a ἱερός 
back to slavery takes to a liability of the seizer towards the god, to whom he owes a 
money penalty; on the other hand, the seizure of a ἱερός constitutes ἱεροσυλία. One 
further (and indeed fundamental) element supporting the idea that dedication does not 
per se lead to manumission is the fact that some inscriptions attest the dedication of 
ἀπελεύθεροι as ἱεροί, this implying that in all these cases consecrated persons had 
already been manumitted before the dedication, and therefore their freedom was not the 
result of consecration itself but, rather, of a previous manumission, which is not recorded. 
Other elements, on the other hand, are less straightforward in indicating that ἱεροί 
legally belonged to the god: although they are not themselves inconsistent with slavery, 
once they are taken individually they may be seen as pertaining to free individuals as 
well. It is on these elements that scholars have always based their understandings of the 
legal condition of ἱεροί as one of freedom, but – as I showed before – such an 
interpretation presents some flaws (first of all, it contradicts the implications of the 
vocabulary of the ancient sources). 
First of all, about one half of the Chaironeian inscriptions mentions the so-called 
παραμονή-clause, which compels consecrated slaves to ‘remain with’ their former 
masters. As I showed in chapter 2, παραμονή is attested in around one fourth of the 
manumission-inscriptions from Delphi, where it always refers to the condition of those 
manumitted slaves who are legally free, yet under legal obligation towards their former 
masters. If we read the inscriptions from Chaironeia in light of the evidence from Delphi, 
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we may conclude that ἱεροί who owed παραμονή-services to their dedicators were 
legally free. This assumption, however, can be challenged from several angles. On the 
one hand, it is not possible to infer from the text of the inscriptions who the real parties 
of the παραμονή-agreement are: it could also be an agreement between the god (as the 
consecrated slave’s new owner) and the dedicator (as the beneficiary of the consecrated 
slave’s services, without having the right of ownership over his person). On the other 
hand, the nature of παραμονή is that of an additional stipulation which creates an 
obligation to remain. A joint reading of the evidence from Delphi and from Chaironeia 
seems to suggest that an obligation of παραμένειν could be stipulated with regard to a 
freedman or a ἱερός: it follows, therefore, that the chief point about παραμονή is that 
this stipulation pertains to individuals who are no longer the property of their former 
masters (i.e., the usual beneficiaries of the παραμονή services), whether the former are 
free or enjoy a very peculiar condition descending from their being the property of the 
god. Finally, it might be stressed that an interpretation of the παραμονή-clause in the 
Chaironeian inscriptions as referring to a legal condition of freedom (as most scholars 
argue) is not supported in the inscriptions by the explicit mention of the penalties which 
could be imposed upon those consecrated slaves who did not fulfil their παραμονή 
duties: the Delphic inscriptions, by contrast, expressly provide specific penalties in all 
those cases in which manumitted slaves did not παραμένειν with their former owners, 
and (as I showed in the second part of chapter 2) such provisions are indeed of crucial 
importance for interpreting the legal condition of freedmen under παραμονή obligation 
in terms of freedom. 
Other elements which have traditionally been considered as an indication that the 
legal condition of ἱεροί was one of freedom are: first, the fact that ἱεροί were recognised 
family ties and that they could marry; second, the fact that they could ‘have’ slaves; third, 
the fact that they could dispose as they liked of their property (i.e. of the slaves they 
‘had’). As I showed before, however, none of these elements is itself inconsistent with 
the existence of divine ownership over consecrated slaves. Finally, the ‘μὴ προσήκοντα 
μηθενὶ μηθέν’ clause is particularly significant, as it forbids anyone from seizing 
consecrated slaves back to slavery and thus to bring them back into private ownership 
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(the purpose of this clause is the same one of the clause expressly prohibiting anyone to 
καταδουλίζασθαι consecrated slaves). If this clause, at first sight, seems to be meant to 
protect the consecrated slave’s legal freedom, I think that its ultimate function is to 
reinforce and confirm the chief feature of τά ἱερά, namely, their being untouchable and 
unavailable to men, since their condition as belonging to the gods implied absolute 
prohibition of reduction into private ownership. As I showed before, on the other hand, 
the fact that some inscriptions refer to ἱεροί as ἐλεύθεροι does not necessarily imply that 
they were legally free: this qualification points rather to their de facto situation which, 
given the absence of the actual owner exercising his powers over his property, could 
appear as closer to that of free individuals. 
It has to be noted, however, that the main reason behind the difficulty in reaching a 
proper understanding of the legal condition of ἱεροί is the nature of the inscriptions from 
Chaironeia: their highly formulaic content is strictly limited to the record of dedications 
of slaves (the formula ‘ἀνατίθημι δοῦλον ἱερόν’ simply refers to the act of giving a slave 
as a gift to the god), without providing specific information about their legal condition 
after consecration. The overall impression we get from the content of these inscriptions 
is that the effects of dedication-consecration and the condition descending upon τά ἱερά 
were well known to the Greeks of the time, so that there was no need to inscribe on stone 
any further information specifying the relationship between consecrated slaves and the 
god or the temple. 
The idea that ἱεροί were considered to be property of the god, however, is further 
suggested by other Greek sources which deal with this institution, namely, the Ion by 
Euripides and the Geography by Strabo. In the following paragraphs, I will analyse some 
passages from these sources, and will show that in both cases the condition of 
consecrated slaves is always described with the vocabulary of slavery, and never with 
the vocabulary of freedom. 
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4. Consecration and temple-slavery in the Greek literary sources: the evidence from 
Euripides and Strabo. 
Probably performed in around 413 B.C.291, the Ion is a rich source of information on 
the life condition of temple-slaves and their relationship with the temple and the god to 
whom they had been dedicated. As is well known, Ion was born from Kreousa, an 
Athenian woman who had been raped by Apollo: after bearing Ion, she abandoned him 
in a cave to die, but Apollo asked Hermes to rescue Ion and to take him to his temple in 
Delphi, where he was found by the priestess and raised hereafter. The events 
represented in the tragedy take place when, many years after, Kreousa and her husband 
Xothus travel from Athens to Delphi to consult the oracle about their childlessness292: the 
reading of the facts represented in the play provides some interesting information about 
the condition of Ion as a temple-slave, which is worth analysing in detail. 
First, Ion is described as a slave of the god throughout the play, as is clear both from 
the way Ion introduces himself to Kreousa and from the vocabulary used in the tragedy 
to characterise his relationship with the temple. On the one hand, when Kreousa asks 
him who he is (l. 308), Ion replies that he is called ‘slave of the god’ (l. 309: ‘τοῦ θεοῦ 
καλοῦμαι δοῦλος εἰμί τ᾽, ὦ γύναι’). It is also important to remember that, after Ion has 
defined himself as Apollo’s slave, Kreousa immediately asks him if this condition is the 
result of a consecration to the god or, rather, of a sale of Ion to the temple (line 310: 
‘ἀνάθημα πόλεως, ἤ τινος πραθεὶς ὕπο;’). This line is significant, because it suggests 
that whether a person (either free or slave) was sold (as for slaves) or consecrated (as for 
both free individuals or for slaves) to a god, the result was always the same: the 
consecrated person, as well as a privately owned slaves sold to the temple, was 
considered to be a slave of the god. This implies, in other words, that as an effect of 
dedication/consecration, consecrated persons (ἱεροί) were considered to become temple-
slaves or, more precisely, the property of the god (the final result being the same, in 
                                                          
291 Lee (1997): 40. 
292 For a reading of the Ion in the light of the problems connected to autochthony and the 
Periclean citizenship reform of 451/450, cf. Leão (2012): 135-153; Lape (2010): 95-136. 
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terms of transfer of ownership, as that of a sale).293 This is further proved by Ion’s reply 
to Kreousa’s question, which is significant in stressing that Ion is not known by his name, 
because the only thing he knows and that, at the same time, he is known for, is that he 
belongs to Apollo (l. 311: ‘οὐκ οἶδα πλὴν ἕν: Λοξίου κεκλήμεθα’). 
The vocabulary used by Euripides in referring to Ion’s overall tasks within the temple 
is one of slavery, as several passages from the tragedy clearly show. For example, lines 
181-183 describe Ion’s services in favour of Apollo and the temple with both the verb 
δουλεύειν and θεραπεύειν (‘οἷς δ᾽ ἔγκειμαι μόχθοις, / Φοίβῳ δουλεύσω, κοὐ λήξω / 
τοὺς βόσκοντας θεραπεύων’). Although the ancient sources sometimes use the verb 
θεραπεύειν in reference to services performed by legally free individuals294, the fact that 
in this context the verb is used together and simultaneously with δουλεύειν points to 
the fact that Ion’s services towards the temple are seen as typical of slavery. Moreover, 
the same verb δουλεύειν is used by Ion himself at line 327 to describe his relationship 
with the god Apollo (‘τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ κοσμούμεθ᾽, ᾧ δουλεύομεν’); again, after listing 
some of his tasks within the temple (ll. 102-108), Ion refers to them, as a whole, with the 
verb θεραπεύειν (l. 111: ‘τοὺς θρέψαντας / Φοίβου ναοὺς θεραπεύω’).295 
                                                          
293 The reason why people decided whether to consecrate or to sell one of their slaves to the 
temple clearly depended on the individual goal pursued with dedication or with sale. It is in fact 
clear that, even if the final effect of the two acts seems to be the same one (the dismissal of any 
private and individual ownership over the consecrated/sold slave), their legal nature and the 
purposes were completely different. By selling their slaves to the temple, masters dismissed their 
property rights in exchange for money: the nature of this act was not that of a gift to the god (sale 
results in a transfer of ownership in exchange for money), and its final purpose was thus not to 
acquire divine favour in return. On the contrary, by dedicating their slaves to the gods, private 
owners also dismissed their ownership on them, but what they carried out was an actual gift to 
the god which did not involve any money in return, since the do-ut-des relationship thus 
established by dedication simply consisted in the expectation of divine favour in return. 
294 Most notably, in the wills of the philosophers (cf. D.L. 5.54-55, 72) and in a passage from 
Plato’s Laws (Plat. Leges 914e-915c), the verb θεραπεύειν or the noun θεραπεία are also used for 
indicating the services performed by ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή obligation: see chapter 4). 
295 The vocabulary of slavery is also used in line 10 of the hypothesis, where Ion’s function 
within the temple is described with the verb δουλεύειν (ὁ δέ ἀγνοῶν ἐδούλευσε τῶι πατρί). 
Although the hypothesis is a later addition by the commentators, it further shows that Ion’s duties 
are strongly related with slavery. Lee (1997): 159, specifies, as for the hypothesis, that ‘all the 
information, except for the – inappropriate … – description of Ion as a temple-keeper, is drawn 
from Hermes’ monologue. Hypoteses of this kind probably belonged to a lost collection of “Tales 
from Euripides” compiled in 1st or 2nd cent. AD but attributed to Dicaearchus of Messene, a pupil 
of Aristotle’. 
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The second point that needs to be stressed is that several passages from the tragedy 
refer to Ion’s condition as ‘sacred property’, i.e. as a property of the god. Line 520 is a 
clear example in this regard: in believing (wrongly) that Ion is his son (the scene is 
described in lines 517-530), Xothus tries to embrace him, but Ion stops him and warns 
Xothus that, by doing so, he will cause Apollo’s anger. This is significant, because Ion’s 
rejection of physical contact is a clear indication of Xothus’ transgression of religious 
bounds296, thus confirming the ‘negative’ connotation of τά ἱερά, namely, their being 
untouchable by humans.297 In other words, this passage confirms that τά ἱερά, which 
belong to the god, represent a kind of dividing line between human and divine sphere, 
beyond which human beings are considered to invade a space which belongs to the gods 
only.298 Line 523 is also significant: in replying to Ion’s rejection of physical contact, 
Xothus maintains that his action cannot be described with the verb ‘ῥυσιάζω’ (l. 523: 
‘ἅψομαι: κοὐ ῥυσιάζω, τἀμὰ δ᾽ εὑρίσκω φίλα’). This verb means ‘treat as a ῥύσιον, 
seize, distrain upon’, whereas ῥύσιον indicates ‘surety, pledge’ and thus ‘property held 
or seized as a pledge or compensation’.299 This shows that, by saying so, Xothus clearly 
refers (although in a ‘negative’ way) to Ion’s condition as a res, that is, as a property of 
the god.300 
Euripides’ play is a useful source of information for the understanding of the 
condition of ἱεροί also because it lists the tasks that Ion has to perform in the temple as 
‘Apollo’s slave’, especially in the first part of the tragedy. Two aspects of Ion’s services 
in the temple need to be considered. On the one hand, as noted above, Ion often refers 
to his overall duties within the temple by using the vocabulary of slavery, i.e. the verbs 
                                                          
296 Lee (1997): 218. 
297 Burkert (1987): 269-270. 
298 Burkert (1985); Rouse (1902). This feature seems to mark a distinction between the legal 
condition of τά ἱερά and that of res sacrae: according to the most recent interpretations, the idea 
that ‘sacro … per separazione sarebbe proibito al contatto umano’ cannot be accepted (recently, 
on this point, Pelloso [2013]: 60). 
299  Liddle, Scott (1996) s.v. ‘ῥυσιάζω’. Lee (1997): 218, stresses that ῥυσιάζω conveys the 
meaning of ‘seizing another’s property’, thus indicating that Xothus ‘denies that he distrains 
upon the goods of another’. 
300 Lee (1997): 218, maintains that Xothus’ ‘use of the verb ῥυσιάζω of Ion can only remind the 
boy that he is, in fact, property, i.e. a slave’. 
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δουλεύω and θεραπεύω (which in this case – as noted above – can possibly be 
considered to refer to slavery). Yet, the play also specifies the single duties that Ion has 
to perform for the temple and, at the same time, it provides useful details for the 
understanding of the condition of temple-slaves. The duties which are mentioned in the 
tragedy consist of: guarding the gold of Apollo (l. 54); cleaning the entrance of the temple 
with branches of bay tied with sacred bands (ll. 102-104); dampening the ground with 
sprinkled water (ll. 105-106); shooing away the birds messing the ἀναθήματα and the 
entrance of the temple (ll. 106-109, 154-181). But the tragedy also provides other general 
information about Ion’s life as a temple-slave. For example, after asking Ion if he is the 
slave of Apollo as an effect of a dedication or of a sale to the temple, Kreousa also asks 
him whether he lives in the temple or in a house: this suggests that temple-slaves could 
also live outside the temple, although Ion replies that he spends all of his life, day and 
night, within Apollo’s temple (ll. 314-315). Furthermore, we learn that his sustenance 
comes from food and contributions provided both by the altars and by those foreigners 
who visit the temple (ll. 322-323). 
On the other hand, Ion describes his overall condition as Apollo’s slave as a good one, 
as ll. 633-645 clearly show. Ion is in fact trying to persuade Xothus not to go back to 
Athens with him, and he lists all the ἀγαθά that he enjoyed while serving Apollo’s 
temple; his conclusion is that his life in the temple as a slave is much better than the one 
he would enjoy in Athens as a free man. Although this statement is probably due to the 
plot of the story, it is notwithstanding likely that these lines can be read in the sense that 
the life of temple-slaves was commonly perceived as a particularly good one, and 
certainly better than the average standards of life enjoyed by privately owned slaves. To 
conclude, the analysis of the passages above mentioned shows that the vocabulary used 
by Euripides to describe Ion’s condition expressly refers to slavery and ownership. 
Very little information about the institution of slaves-consecration in Greece, by 
contrast, is provided in the Geography by Strabo, who mentions in several passages the 
presence of many ἱερόδουλοι in different geographical contexts (not only Greece, but 
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also, and mainly, Asia Minor).301 The only significant passage which directly refers to 
consecrated slaves in Greece comes from Book 8 of the Geography, in which Strabo deals 
with Corinth ‘the wealthy’ which he visited himself. When he talks about its temple, he 
states: 
 
Strab. 8.6.20: τό τε τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν οὕτω πλούσιον ὑπῆρξεν ὥστε πλείους ἢ 
χιλίας ἱεροδούλους ἐκέκτητο ἑταίρας, ἃς ἀνετίθεσαν τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες. 
 
The temple of Aphrodite was so rich that it owned more than a thousand temple slaves, 
courtesans, whom both men and women had dedicated to the goddess. 
 
The passage shows, one the one hand, that the temple of Aphrodite in Corinth could 
rely on a large number of slaves; the verb which describes the power of the temple over 
its ἱερόδουλοι, however, is ἔχω, which is quite generic in its meaning and does not 
necessarily imply that the relationship between the temple and its ἱερόδουλοι is based 
on ownership.302 On the other hand, the passage informs us that the condition of the 
ἱερόδουλοι of the temple in Corinth was the result of a dedication-consecration to the 
                                                          
301 For example, Strab. 11.4.7 refers to Albania and, in particular, to the numerous ἱερόδουλοι 
who lived in the temple of Selene. The first part of the passage deals primarily with the priest of 
the temple of Selene and with his role within the temple: he is in fact said to manage both the 
‘sacred lands’ and the ἱερόδουλοι. The second part of the passage refers to a specific attachment 
of the ἱερόδουλοι to the temple: Strabo maintains that if any of the temple-slaves ran away and 
was later caught, the priest would have arrested and bound him for one year, after which he 
would have been sacrificed to the god. Again, Strab. 12.2.3 refers to the temple of Ma in 
Cappadocia (south-east of Turkey). Three main elements emerge from this passage: first, the 
importance of the temple of Ma and the high consideration in which the priest was held also with 
respect to the king (to the point that the inhabitants of this territory, although formally subject to 
the king, were in many regards considered to be subject to the priest); second, the large number 
of ἱερόδουλοι who are said to live in the temple (more than six thousand, as Strabo himself could 
verify during his permanence); third, the priest is said to be master (κύριoς) both of the temple 
and of the ἱερόδουλοι. This last element thus seems to suggest that the relationship between the 
priest and the ἱερόδουλοι is based on ownership. Finally, Strab. 12.3.34 (which refers, once again, 
to Comana) suggests that temple slaves, as sacred property, could not be sold. 
302 Harrison (1968): 201, observes that the verb ἔχειν, together with κρατεῖν, always implies ‘a 
factual, concrete, non-juristic connotation; they are not used, for example, to describe the owner 
who is not the occupier or the occupier who is not the owner, nor in combination to describe who 
is both’. 
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god by private individuals: once again (as is suggested by Eur. Ion 309-310), it is clear 
that an act of dedication-consecration could lead to a condition of ‘temple-slavery’. 
An analysis of the literary evidence provided by Euripides and Strabo seems to 
confirm the interpretation which emerges from the text of the dedication-inscriptions 
from Chaironeia: on the one hand, Euripides clearly describes the condition of Ion as 
that of a slave of the god, and the terms referring to the institution of slavery recur 
frequently throughout the whole play; on the other hand, the evidence from Strabo 
seems to suggest that the same practice was attested in Corinth, where the temple of 
Aprhrodites had a large number of temple-slaves whose specific condition was the result 
of an act of dedication to the goddess. 
Although scanty, the Greek epigraphic and literary evidence is therefore consistent 
in suggesting that when temple-slavery (a condition which results from a previous 
consecration to the gods) is concerned, there is a contrast between the vocabulary 
relating to ἱεροί, which deals with slavery, and the de facto life conditions of ἱεροί, which 
could possibly appear to be closer to, or be better described in terms of, freedom. This, 
on the other hand, might also explain why in the inscriptions from Chaironeia ἱεροί 
could also be labelled as ἐλεύθεροι. 
 
5. The relationship between ἱεροί and ἱερόδουλοι in modern interpretations. 
The extreme peculiarity of the condition enjoyed by consecrated slaves is mirrored in 
the interpretations offered by scholars of Greek slavery, which often show ambiguities 
and contradictions. Their remarks on temple-slavery are usually very brief; yet, they 
seem to be constantly concerned, on the one hand, with the relationship between 
ἱερόδουλοι and ἱεροί303 and, on the other hand, with the identification of the specific 
legal condition enjoyed by ἱεροί. 
The traditional interpretations about the relationship between the so-called temple-
slaves and consecrated persons can be basically divided into two main groups. On the 
one hand, some scholars believe that ἱερόδουλοι and ἱεροί did not represent two 
                                                          
303 For a general overview on scholarship about this aspects, see Debord (1972): 135-150. 
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different categories, since ἱερόδουλοι have to be included among ἱεροί. This is suggested, 
for example, by Garlan who, in opening his discussion on sacred slaves (which he 
significantly includes within the section ‘Between Liberty and Slavery’)304, maintains that 
‘sometimes they were referred to by the explicit term hierodouloi, but they were generally 
included in the very disparate category of hieroi’.305 Some other scholars believe that 
ἱερόδουλοι cannot be properly included or identified with the category of ἱεροί. Bömer, 
for example, argues that the term ἱερόδουλος is later than ἱερός – developing only from 
the 2nd century B.C. onwards – and that, when used in referring to the institution of 
temple-slavery, is only typical of Near-Estern societies and Egypt; whereas the 
institution of temple-slavery as a result of manumission is only attested in Greece. Bömer, 
however, acknowledges the possibility that the Greeks knew the institution of temple-
slavery as well, although the lack of specific evidence does not allow any safe conclusion 
in this regard.306 
As for the problem of the legal condition of the ἱεροί, scholars have advanced very 
different interpretations that can be grouped into three main areas. Some of them believe 
that ἱεροί were legally free individuals whose relationship with the temple should be 
                                                          
304 Garlan (1988): 86. 
305  Garlan (1988): 112. See also Lambrinoudakis, Balty (2005): 333: ‘slaves and freemen 
consecrated to a deity were called ἱερόδουλοι “sacred slaves” or δοῦλοι’. The slaves given to a 
deity often became part of the sanctuary’s staff; otherwise they were part of the sanctuary’s 
property, but not part of the cult personnel. The differentiation of these two categories is not 
always clear’. 
306 Bömer (1960): 156-186. The same view is shared by Calderone (1972): 394: ‘per quanto 
riguarda lo stato giuridico in relazione all’istituto della manumissione, rapporto con il tempio e 
denominazione della categoria ampiamente documentata, e variamente designata, dei “servi 
sacri”, è emersa la necessità di distinguere tra veri e propri δοῦλοι consacrati alla divinità, legati 
al tempio e addetti al suo servizio (ἱερόδουλοι, ma anche semplicemente ἱεροί), e “servi” fittizi 
di una divinità (designati prevalentemente come ἱεροί) per effetto di manumissione sacrale (con 
fittizia “consacrazione”-vendita al dio e libertàdi fatto del manumisso) … siffatta “consacrazione” 
al dio come prassi manumissoria sarebbe peculiare della Grecia propria; mentre solo per l’Oriente 
ellenistico, asianico-egizio, sarebbe lecito parlare di veri e propri “servi”, “servi sacri (hieroduli)”. 
Questo significa che quando s’incontra in un testo epigrafico o letterario la qualifica ἱερός, essa 
deve intendersi in maniera diversa a seconda che appartenga ad ambito greco o ad ambito greco-
orientale; e lo stesso vale, ma in senso inverso, per ἱερόδουλος; tenendo presente, peraltro, la 
possibilità di uso improprio dei termini, per estensione reciproca. Andrebbe così risolta l’antica 
polemica sulla equivalenza o meno tra ἱερός e ἱερόδουλος, che dunque sarebbe da ritenersi tale 
solo entro certi limiti e con certe precauzioni’. 
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described in terms of serfdom. This view is best expressed by Biscardi, who maintains 
that ‘la forma più antica di manumissione in uso nel mondo greco sembra sia stata la 
“ierodulia”, ovverosia la consacrazione dello schiavo alla divinità come offerta votiva 
(ἀνάθημα), in conseguenza della quale lo schiavo acquistava lo stato di uomo libero, ma 
restava vincolato alla divinità da un rapporto molto stretto, che lo obbligava a vivere nel 
tempio e a lavorare al servizio di questo’.307 Another group of scholars believes that, as 
an effect of consecration and their subsequent qualification as ἱεροί, dedicated 
individuals (both free and slaves) became slaves of the temple and that, for this reason, 
they legally belonged to the god to whom they had been dedicated. This view is clearly 
implied, for example, by Burkert, who defines ἱερός as ‘that which belongs to a god or 
sanctuary in an irrevocable way … even as a temple-slave’;308 and by Sokolowski, who 
maintains not only that, as an effect of consecration to the divinity, anything which is 
ἱερός ‘belongs to the god and is protected by him’309, but also that ‘the dedication binds 
                                                          
307 Biscardi (1982): 93. The same view is shared by Westermann (1948a): 57 (‘literally translated 
hierodouloi means “sacred slaves”. But these were not slaves, by the explicit terms of the law 
establishing the dedication … the hierodules of Asia Minor were bondage dependents of the 
gods, the degree and nature of their subservience probably differing in details from place to 
place’), 59 (‘from numerous towns of Central Greece we have inscriptions recording grants of 
liberty by consecrations … in which the slaves concerned became free by the very act of their 
dedication. Since they were consecrates of the god, liberation from their enslavement followed 
from the fact that the Greek gods were not slave owners’); and implicitly by Rouse (1902): 335, 
who speaks in terms of dedication of human beings to the gods for the purpose of service (or 
sacrifice); Bussi (2001): 13 who, in excluding both λαοί and ἱερόδουλοι from the concept of 
‘chattel-slavery’, defines the condition of ἱερόδουλοι as ‘una condizione di semi-dipendenza dai 
contorni a noi oscuri’; Thompson (2011): 200-202, who significantly includes the ‘sacred slaves’, 
together with the ‘rural peasants’, within the wider category of ‘non-slave dependence’ (about 
which she specifies that ‘drawing the line is never easy and … the boundary between dependence 
and slavery is often hard to define. Both are characterised by varying degrees of un-freedom’), 
and defines temple-slavery as ‘a form of religious dependence that both preceded and outlived 
the Hellenistic world’; Bömer (1960): 123; Rädle (1969): 41. The idea that ἱεροί, at least in the 
inscriptions from Chaironeia, were free individuals is also shared by Darmezin (1999): 242 (‘on 
n’était donc pas seulement ἀπελεύθερος, mais aussi ἱερός, ce qui marquait peut-être un degré 
supplémentaire ver la liberté ou plutôt l’appartenance à une catégorie, mieux placée dans la 
hiérarchie sociale que les affranchise “simples”. En tous cas, cela indiquait une protection 
supplémentaire, susceptible d’être mieux respectée qu’une autre’). 
308 Burkert (1985): 269. 
309 Sokolowski (1954): 175. 
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the refugee and his family forever to the god’. 310  Between these two opposite 
interpretations, there is the opinion of those scholars who believe that the condition of 
ἱεροί included a wide range of different legal statuses: those labelled as ἱεροί could be 
either slaves of the temple, freedmen, and free people who dedicated themselves to a 
god. This view is clearly expressed by Garlan who, after including sacred slaves, 
together with rural-dependents, within the very generic condition labelled as ‘between 
liberty and slavery’, writes what follows: ‘This word (hieroi) applied to many kinds of 
living and material possessions that were “sacred” because they were or had been 
consecrated to a deity and thus in some way or at some level belonged to it. Hence, 
where people were concerned, it indicated a whole range of extremely varied and subtly 
differentiated forms of exploitation, service and protection that combined in various 
ways, at various places and times, with the secular modalities of statutory classification. 
Thus, the hieroi might be free men or fairly high rank, discharging some religious 
function; or freedmen more or less encumbered with obligations to the priests who had 
had a hand in their manumission; or, finally, veritable chattel slaves’.311 
This overview shows that the relationship between ἱεροί and ἱερόδουλοι and, most 
importantly, the condition of consecrated slaves in relation to the god, are still highly 
disputed among modern scholars. As I mentioned before, this is due partly to the status 
of the extant evidence, and partly to a general misinterpretation of the features 
characterising the condition of slaves after their consecration; once these elements are 
thoroughly considered, however, it is possible to suggest that the ancient sources unveil 
                                                          
310 Sokolowski (1954): 177, even though he further specifies that ‘the dedication did not imply 
a physical attachment to the god, but rather a moral one’. Similarly, see Koschaker (1931): 46; 
Klaffenbach (1957): 86. See also Lambrinoudakis, Balty (2005): 333-334, which, after maintaining 
that ‘the slaves given to a deity often became part of the sanctuary’s staff; otherwise they were 
part of the sanctuary’s property, but not part of the cult personnel’ and that ‘the differentiation 
between these two categories is not always clear’, concludes in the sense that ‘sacred slaves were 
the property of god himself, and so they could not be sold’. 
311 Garlan (1988): 112. The same idea can be found in the Hornblower, Spawforth (1996) s.v. 
‘hierodouloi’: ‘the term hierodoulos is variously used to describe slaves who are technically the 
property of a god and live on land owned by temples, slaves who are attached to the service of a 
god through a gift or civic decree, and slaves who were manumitted through a fictitious sale to a 
god’. 
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important information for a proper understanding of the legal condition enjoyed by 
ἱεροί. 
 
6. Final considerations. 
The overall aim of this chapter was to provide a legal definition of the condition 
enjoyed by ἱεροί and to determine, consequently, whether the dedication inscriptions 
from Chaironeia record acts of manumission. 
It is worth bearing in mind that, legally speaking, manumission implies the extinction 
of the masters’ right of ownership over their slaves; therefore, in order to assume that 
the content of the inscriptions from Chaironeia refers to manumission, it is necessary to 
speculate that, as an effect of consecration, slaves are no longer considered to be the 
object of any kind of ownership, either ‘human’ or ‘divine’. This means, in other words, 
that the dedication inscriptions above analysed can be considered as recording actual 
manumissions only if, as an effect of these acts, no transfer of ownership takes place, 
neither within the ‘human sphere’ (i.e., from one private owner to another, as is typical 
– for example – of sale), nor from ‘human sphere’ into ‘divine sphere’ (i.e., when an 
individual ceases to be the object of his master’s ownership and becomes the object of 
divine ownership). 
In the first part of this chapter, I suggested that the commonly held view according to 
which this corpus of inscriptions represents a specific form of ‘sacral’ manumission, 
namely, the so-called ‘manumission through consecration’ of slaves to the gods, needs 
to be thoroughly reconsidered. On the one hand, I showed that the consecrations as are 
represented in the Chaironeian inscriptions are not fictitious (as many scholars, on the 
contrary, maintain), i.e. they are not means devised ad hoc to grant freedom to privately 
owned slaves. Their specific and constant formulas, together with their technical 
contents, clearly show that they deal with actual dedications of slaves in the form of a 
gift to the god. On the other hand, I showed that identifying a consecration with a 
manumission (an identification which is implied by the very definition of these 
inscriptions as representing ‘manumissions through consecration of a slave to the god’) 
is, to a large extent problematic, and does not take into consideration the content of those 
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inscriptions which record the consecration of ἀπελεύθεροι, that is, of individuals who 
had obtained their freedom before being consecrated to a god. 
The nature of dedication is clear: dedications are unilateral acts of the κύριος, which 
ultimately result in a gift characterised by an underlying do-ut-des relationship between 
the dedicator and the god, with the expectancy of divine favour in return. The key-point 
for the understanding of the substantial effect of dedications (extinction of the right of 
ownership as opposed to transfer of ownership) is therefore the exact definition of the 
legal condition enjoyed by those individuals who are labelled as ἱεροί: yet, this purpose 
is made highly problematic by the nature of the extant evidence, in primis the epigraphic 
material, which – at first sight – seems to disclose quite a complex scenario. 
In the first part of this chapter, I have singled out the individual clauses and the 
elements mentioned in the inscriptions which scholars have traditionally relied on in 
order to suggest that the legal condition of ἱεροί was one of freedom. The main points 
which constitute the background of this interpretation are the following: the μὴ 
προσήκοντα μηθενὶ μηθέν clause; the fact that family ties among ἱεροί are legally 
recognised; the possibility for ἱεροί to ‘have’ slaves; their possible obligation to 
παραμένειν with their former masters (even though the sources do not provide clear 
information about the parties of the agreement, which could have also been concluded 
between the god/temple as the owner of the ἱεροί and their dedicator).  
On the other hand, the vocabulary constantly used in the inscriptions to describe the 
consecration of slaves to the temple is typically one of slavery, and is clear in suggesting 
that ἱεροί were slaves of the god to whom they had been consecrated. In the inscriptions 
from Chaironeia, the use of the verb ἀνατίθημι and of the adjective ἱερός indicate that 
ἱεροί belong to the gods. The comparison with Roman law further reinforces this point: 
according to the most common opinion, res sacrae belong to the gods and, for this reason, 
no one could alienate them or dispose of them in any way, being this condition the result 
of the twofold act of dedicatio-consecratio. The literary sources dealing with the institution 
of ‘temple slavery’, such as the Ion by Euripides, also point to the existence of divine 
ownership over consecrated slaves. As noted above, Ion’s servile condition is stressed 
throughout the whole play: not only he introduces himself as the slave of the god (l. 310) 
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and as Apollo’s property (l. 311), but also those verbs referring to the tasks that he has 
to perform within the temple (most notably δουλεύειν) are typical for slavery. Other 
elements mentioned in the inscriptions are unequivocal in suggesting that ἱεροί were 
conceived of as slaves of the gods, such as, on the one hand, the direct responsibility 
towards the god of anyone who attempted to bring ἱεροί back into private ownership 
and, on the other hand, the express qualification of such an attempt either in terms of 
ἱεροσυλία or of ἱεραφορία. 
Given the interpretative problems which have traditionally prevented a correct 
understanding of the legal condition enjoyed by ἱεροί, it is important to highlight some 
firm conclusions. It is clear, first of all, that ἱεροί were not the object of private ownership. 
In other words, once consecrated to the gods, they were no longer considered to be under 
the ownership of their former masters: no further connection bound the former to the 
latter (with the exception of those cases in which dedicated slaves, after consecration, 
were required to παραμένειν with their former owners, but this relationship is clearly 
not based on the right of ownership). Once excluded that ‘private’ ownership existed on 
slaves after their consecration, two possibilities remain open: ἱεροί can be interpreted 
either as free individuals or as slaves of the god. 
As noted above, traditional scholarship holds that these consecration inscriptions 
record manumissions and therefore that ἱεροί were legally free. This view, however, 
overshadows the specific and technical implications of ἀνατίθημι and ἱερός, and the 
difficulties inherent in the traditional view have been overcome by scholars in different 
ways: while some of them maintain that these consecrations were only fictitious (in the 
sense that ‘the slave, instead of truly entering into the god’s possession, was actually set 
free’)312, some others suggest that they are characterised by a twofold passage by which 
slaves were first manumitted and then consecrated to the gods (which means that they 
were already legally free at the time of consecration). 313  Both these interpretations, 
                                                          
312 Kamen (2012): 178.  
313 See, most recently, Grenet (2014): 396, who maintains that ‘at least in Chaironeia, there were 
probably two distinct steps in the procedure of manumission, i.e. the manumission proper and 
the consecration, since two slave-dedications concern freedmen (ἀπελεύθερος)’. The same view 
is shared by Rädle (1969): 58-62. 
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however, do not consider the content of the inscriptions and the precise meaning of their 
vocabulary. 
Against the first interpretation (these inscriptions record fictitious consecrations), 
nothing in the sources suggests that dedications were fictitious: if we take a look at the 
content of the typical dedications which have been found throughout the Greek world, 
we notice that the combination of the verb ἀνατίθημι and the adjective ἱερός is one of 
the most common formulas used for registering dedications of private property in 
general. The content of the inscriptions, in other words, is technical and straightforward 
in showing that a real dedication of a slave has actually taken place.314 
The second interpretation (these inscriptions attest a twofold passage), on the other 
hand, is untenable for two reasons: first, the consecrated individual is usually labelled 
as a δοῦλος, and this means that at the time of consecration he is (still) a slave; second, 
                                                          
314 The problem with this interpretation is not only that it does not find any support from the 
text of the inscriptions, but also that there is no ‘logical’ reason to believe that masters manumitted 
their slaves by carrying out a fictitious consecration. In the case of the Delphic manumissions 
through ‘sale’, the common opinion by which these inscriptions were characterised by the use of 
a fictitious sale for the purpose of liberating slaves could be justified by the need to grant slaves 
the possibility to ‘buy’ their own freedom from their masters. In the case of the inscriptions from 
Chaironeia, there is no reason to believe that Greeks recurred to fictiones iuris for liberating their 
slaves by consecrating them to the gods or, better, that the consecrations they record unveil acts 
of manumissions: the rationale behind this supposed mechanism is clearly not the need of 
granting slaves the possibility to pay for their freedom or, in more general terms, to enter into 
legally binding agreements with their masters (the act they carry out is in fact a unilateral one; on 
the other hand, the inscriptions do not mention the payment of money together with the 
consecration of slaves: see Darmezin [1999]: 233). Kamen further maintains that the fictive nature 
of these consecrations is proved by the μὴ προσήκοντα μηθενὶ μηθέν clause; yet, as I pointed 
out before, this clause should be best interpreted as implying the prohibition to reduce 
consecrated slaves into private ownership and that this is not inconsistent with the existence of 
divine ownership over those individuals who are labelled as ἱεροί. That dedication-inscriptions 
from Chaironeia record manumissions is taken for granted by modern scholarship and this idea 
has never been challenged in any work. Some scholars expressly justify this opinion with the 
fictitious nature of Chaironeian dedications, whereas other scholars simply state that 
consecrations led to manumission without further specifying their conclusions (the idea that 
dedications were just fictitious is thus implicit in their reconstructions). On the idea that 
consecrations from Chaironeia represent manumissions see, for example, Koschaker (1934): 69; 
Westermann (1948b): 9-10, (1955): 46 (his idea is the logical corollary of his fundamental premise 
– which is yet not justified, i.e. that ‘the gods of the city-state Greeks … had no slaves’ which 
means, in other words, that Greek gods were not entitled to the right of ownership); Sokolowski 
(1954): 176; Bömer (1960): 10-11; Calderini (1965): 96; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 86, 92; Kamen 
(2012): 177-180; Caneva, Delli Pizzi (2015): 170-172. 
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those few inscriptions attesting the consecration of ἀπελεύθεροι do not mention their 
previous manumission, and therefore we cannot assume that manumission and 
dedication are necessarily connected within one single act that goes through two 
different stages. 
The content of the extant sources suggests the exact opposite: a closer look at the 
epigraphic and literary sources shows that ἱεροί were considered to be the slaves of the 
god and that the relationship between the former and the latter is based on ownership. 
Each time the ancient sources refer to consecrated slaves, they are characterised by the 
constant and exclusive use of the vocabulary of slavery, and never of the vocabulary of 
freedom: this element cannot be ignored or underestimated when examining the 
implications of dedication inscriptions, which directly point to the ‘transformation’ of a 
δοῦλος into a ἱερός as an effect of consecration, and the concept of ἱερός, in turn, clearly 
designates a specific status which was well known to the Greeks of the time. The same 
consideration, on the other hand, is clearly suggested by the qualification of any attempt 
to seize ἱεροί in terms of ἱεροσυλία or ἱεραφορία, i.e. as the theft of something which 
belongs in an irrevocable way to the gods. 
To sum up, the ancient sources make it clear that the relationship between ἱεροί and 
the gods to whom they had been dedicated was based on (divine) ownership: such a 
relationship, however, is clearly characterised by the fact that the owner is not an actual 
individual, but an abstract (and non-existent) entity – the gods. 
For this reason, I suggest that those features which are mentioned in the inscriptions 
and that, at first sight, seem to imply that ἱεροί are free, could possibly reflect a very 
peculiar condition which, legally speaking, was based on divine ownership, but de facto 
was modelled in a way which mirrors the absence of an actual owner who could exercise 
the rights and powers descending from the right of ownership: this seems to suggest, on 
the other hand, that the condition of ἱεροί was conceived of as a somehow privileged 
one among the relationships based on ownership, especially if compared to the average 
conditions of privately owned slaves. As I argued in the first part of the chapter, on the 
other hand, none of the clauses which are mentioned in the inscriptions and which could 
be interpreted, at first sight, as referring to a legal condition of freedom, are themselves 
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inconsistent with the existence of divine ownership over ἱεροί, and therefore cannot be 
taken as an unequivocal indication of the legal condition of ἱεροί as one of freedom. This 
is true not only for the παραμονή clause or for the possibility, granted to ἱεροί, to ‘have’ 
slaves: the recognition of family ties among slaves, as well as the possibility for them to 
have and manage some goods, are attested elsewhere in the Greek world and, in all these 
cases, they certainly do not exclude the existence of the right of (divine) ownership over 
them.315 The ‘μὴ προσήκοντα μηθενὶ μηθέν’ clause, on the other hand, can possibly 
reflect the prohibition to bring ἱεροί (back) to the condition of privately owned slaves, 
given their inclusion among the sacred properties and therefore their inalienability and 
intangibility by humans. Finally, the possible qualification of ἱεροί as ἐλεύθεροι (as is 
attested in a few sources) may well be explained as reflecting a metaphorical use of the 
language of freedom or, more specifically, as referring to the de facto situation of ἱεροί, 
rather than to their de iure condition. 
If it is hard to understand such a peculiar condition in the light of modern categories, 
the Greeks seemed to be completely comfortable with the features characterising the 
condition of someone who, as a ἱερός, belongs to the gods, as well as with the 
consequences descending upon individuals who are consecrated to the gods: it is no 
coincidence that the inscriptions simply record the dedication of slaves without further 
specifying the single elements characterising the ἱερός condition. 
To conclude, I think that the common idea that the dedication-inscriptions from 
Central Greece record manumissions needs to be reconsidered. The analysis of their 
formulas cannot be simplistically reduced to brief considerations (often lacking any kind 
of argumentation) within the context of more general discussions on the different ‘modes’ 
of manumission. In other words, the strong connection they show with the divine sphere 
and the possible interference with divine ownership cannot be underestimated to the 
point of suggesting the hasty conclusion that these (fictitious or not) consecrations 
constitute a specific form of ‘sacral’ manumission. 
                                                          
315 This was the case, for example, of Gortynian slaves. For a criticism of the traditional view 
who saw these slaves as particularly privileged ones, and for the argument that these features of 
Gortynian slavery simply meant to reinforce their masters’ control and property rights, cf. Lewis 
(2013): 390-416. 
129 
 
The contents and implications of this group of inscriptions are far more complex and 
problematic than is usually thought. A careful analysis of their formulas (also in light of 
the literary evidence mentioning consecrated slaves) strongly suggests that they do not 
describe manumissions, but they are what they are, that is, actual consecrations of slaves 
in the form of a gift to the god, their ultimate result being the transfers of ownership over 
slaves from humans to gods. This transfer of ownership, on the other hand, resulted in 
a highly peculiar status: while, from a legal point of view, ἱεροί were slaves of the god, 
the absence of an actual human owner exercising his rights meant that their de facto 
condition resembled in several ways that of free individuals – and this is possibly the 
reason why the language of freedom can be sometimes used (metaphorically) in 
referring to ἱεροί. 
  
130 
 
 
  
131 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The Athenian evidence for manumission and παραμονή 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
A fundamental problem for the study of the liberation of slaves in Athens is the nature 
of the extant sources on manumission and ἀπελεύθεροι: while Athens provides the bulk 
of the evidence for the study of Greek laws and institutions, the Athenian sources on 
manumission are surprisingly scanty, if compared to the evidence from other Greek 
πόλεις. The only information we have for manumission in Athens is provided by a few 
forensic speeches, which refer to the liberation of slaves only incidentally within the 
context of wider discussions on the particular cases brought to trial, and by a few literary 
sources which primarily deal with the condition of freedmen after manumission. In 
approaching Athenian manumission we cannot rely, in other words, on a 
comprehensive corpus of sources such as the Delphic manumission inscriptions (which, 
as noted in chapter 2, number to more than one thousand); yet, a reading of these sources 
in the light of the evidence provided by other πόλεις unveils interesting information for 
the understanding of the legal nature of manumission in the Greek legal experience as 
informed by common principles.316 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it will explore the Athenian 
evidence for manumission in exchange for money: these sources sometimes refer to 
liberations of slaves carried out in different πόλεις (such as Corinth or Eleusis), and in 
all these cases the legal nature of manumission clearly shares the same fundamental 
                                                          
316 This further confirms ‘la sotterranea esistenza di una radicata κοινή di pensiero … ossia di 
una comune matrice di reale “Einheit” che accoglie – tanto da un punto di vista sincronico, quanto 
da un punto di vista diacronico – le plurime atomizzate esperienze giuridiche del mondo greco’. 
On the other hand, this ‘induce a discorrere non tanto di un unico “diritto greco” o di più “diritti 
greci”, bensì, in una logica che vuole comporre a unità ontologica la pluralità contingente del 
frammentario dato positivo, di un “diritto dei Greci”’ (Pelloso [2012]: 5-7). This view, in other 
words, acknowledges a unity of Greek law from a ‘substantial’ point of view (at least at the level 
of ‘common principles’), as opposed to those interpretations which suggest the idea of a ‘“unità” 
eminentemente (se non solamente) processuale’. For a discussion on this debate, cf. Pelloso (2012): 
5 n. 11. 
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features. This further proves that the act of manumission in the Greek world relied on 
common principles which, notwithstanding possible local adaptations and peculiarities, 
allow us to talk about Greek manumission as a ‘uniform’ phenomenon. On the other 
hand, this chapter will analyse the evidence for παραμονή in Athens and will show, on 
the one hand, that the legal nature of παραμονή is that of a post-manumission obligation 
imposed on freedmen as free individuals (as is also attested in the manumission 
inscriptions from Delphi) and, on the other hand, that as an effect of manumission 
ἀπελεύθεροι became legally free, independently or not of the imposition of παραμονή 
obligations on them. Shedding light on the nature and implications of παραμονή is 
fundamental: the possible subjection of ἀπελεύθεροι to παραμονή duties is believed to 
represent the predominant feature of Greek manumission, but its nature and, most of all, 
its implications, are still misunderstood, as is shown by recent scholarly approaches 
holding that the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή obligations was one 
of slavery or, rather, half-way between slavery and freedom.317 
Before analysing in detail the Athenian sources on manumission, I will briefly 
examine the development of the scholarly debate about the so-called φιάλαι 
ἐξελευθερικαί. This is necessary for a complete understanding of manumission in 
Athens, since the φιάλαι have traditionally been considered to be the only and most 
relevant Athenian epigraphic evidence for manumission. Yet, if the connection between 
these sources and the reality of ἀπελεύθεροι has always been taken for granted by 
scholars of Greek manumission, recent studies have conclusively shown that this group 
of inscriptions does not refer to manumission. 
Once ascertained that the evidence from the φιάλαι cannot be taken into 
consideration for understanding Athenian manumission, the first part of this chapter 
will analyse, first of all, the evidence from two forensic speeches, Against Neaera and 
Against Athenogenes, as they provide the most relevant information for the 
understanding of manumission and the condition of manumitted slaves in Classical 
                                                          
317  Both these views have been analysed and criticised in chapter 2. The most recent 
interpretation of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή as slaves has been offered by Sosin (2015), 
whereas that of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή as semi-slaves or half-free has been suggested by 
Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 244. 
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Athens. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the pseudo-Demosthenic speech 
refers to a manumission performed in Corinth, but with important consequences on the 
condition of an ἀπελευθέρα who decides to reside in Athens; whereas the speech by 
Hypereides directly refers to an attempted manumission which, if performed, would 
have taken place in Athens. I will then compare the results of the analysis of these 
speeches with other two sources, one by Herodotus which refers to a 6th century B.C. 
manumission of a female slave by her Greek master in Egypt, and one by Athenaeus 
who, in the Deipnosophistae, mentions the manumission of the female-slave named Phila 
by her mater Hyperides in Eleusis. By comparing the evidence from Classical Athens 
with other sources on manumission from different periods and πόλεις, this chapter will 
ultimately show that the legal nature of manumission in exchange for money shared the 
same features throughout the Greek world, from Classical Athens, Corinth and Eleusis, 
to Hellenistic Delphi.  
My analysis of these sources will rely on a close reading of the specific vocabulary 
used by the orators: on the one hand, this will allow me to challenge the traditional 
scholarly opinion which describes these acts as πράσεις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ and/or as fictive 
sales, and to argue, by contrast, that sale and manumission are always understood in the 
Greek sources as two separate transactions; on the other hand, it will allow me to show 
that manumission in exchange for money, in Athens as well as in other πόλεις, has the 
nature of a bilateral legal transaction between the slaves’ master and a third party (other 
than the slave), whose function was to pay the money for manumission, given the slaves’ 
lack of legal personality. 
The second part of this chapter will shed light on the nature and implications of 
παραμονή in Athens through the analysis of passages from Harpocration, Athenaeus, 
Diogenes Laertius, and also from Plato’s Laws. These sources constitute the only literary 
evidence for the existence of post-manumission obligations in Athens and their analysis 
shows that Athenian παραμονή was informed by the same principles which 
characterised παραμονή in Delphi. All these sources are in fact consistent in showing, 
on the one hand, that the nature of παραμονή was that of an obligation imposed on 
some freedmen in favour of their manumittors and, on the other hand, that the 
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possibility of its imposition on some ἀπελεύθεροι implies the existence, in the Greek 
world, of two categories of freedmen, both enjoying a legal condition of freedom but 
differing in their de facto condition, which ultimately results in the possibility or not for 
them to live apart from their manumittors’ household and to constitute their own. 
 
2. The evidence from the φιάλαι ἐξελευθερικαί. 
Before discussing in detail the Athenian evidence for manumission, it is important to 
highlight the outcomes of the most recent studies on the nature of the so-called φιάλαι 
ἐξελευθερικαί. If, thanks to these contributions, it is now clear that this group of 
inscriptions does not deal with manumissions and ἀπελεύθεροι, it is nonetheless 
important to mention the development in the interpretation of these sources, which have 
for a long time informed all the works on Greek manumission as representing the only 
epigraphic evidence for the liberation of slaves in Athens. 
With the expression φιάλαι ἐξελευθερικαί scholars refer to a corpus of thirty-three 
inscriptions, dated to the late 4th century B.C. and recording the dedication of bowls 
(φιάλαι), each weighing one hundred drachmas. The idea that these inscriptions 
represent evidence for manumission has been suggested by traditional scholarship and 
has never been challenged until very recently; yet, because of the fragmentary nature of 
all these inscriptions (some of them contain only a few lines), this interpretation has 
relied merely on the restoration of some key-terms, which recent works have shown to 
be questionable.318 
The general attitude of scholars to consider these inscriptions as evidence for 
manumission has been concretely expressed in different ways. Some suggested that the 
φιάλαι deal with the actual or fictitious prosecutions of slaves with a δίκη ἀποστασίου, 
which would always result in the acquittal of the defendants and, ultimately, in the 
slaves’ manumission. 319  This idea, however, presents a fundamental problem: 
                                                          
318 Harris (forthcoming). 
319 Calderini (1965): 431; Lewis (1959): 237, (1968): 368-380; Todd (1993): 191-192, all believed 
that, in these cases, trials were only fictitious. On the other hand, Harrison (1968): 183, and 
Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 285, suggest that they refer to actual prosecutions (in the case of 
Zelnick-Abramovitz, more specifically, to δίκαι ἔμμηνοι). 
135 
 
Harpocration writes that the δίκη ἀποστασίου is an action brought before the Polemarch 
by manumittors against manumitted slaves in three cases: first, when ἀπελεύθεροι ran 
away from their manumittors (which is likely to imply the existence of παραμονή duties 
on them); second, when they registered a different person, other than their manumittor, 
as their προστάτης; third, if they failed to do what the laws prescribed.320 Therefore, the 
possibility of bringing a δίκη ἀποστασίου implies that the defendant is an ἀπελεύθερος, 
i.e. a person who had been manumitted before the prosecution: this makes it clear that 
manumission was the necessary prerequisite for a δίκη ἀποστασίου, and therefore 
cannot (logically and legally) be conceived of as its result. Other scholars maintain that 
the φιάλαι refer to the liberation of ἀπελεύθεροι from their παραμονή duties (an 
institution analogous to the ἀπόλυσις mentioned in the Delphic inscriptions recording 
manumissions through ‘sale’) as a result of their acquittal in δίκαι ἀποστασίου. This 
theory holds that the actual prosecution implied a previous agreement between 
manumittor and manumitted slave by which the former fictitiously accused the latter of 
not having fulfilled the παραμονή obligations.321 One final group of scholars, on the 
other hand, believes that these inscriptions record manumissions ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, i.e. 
before the court.322 Finally, a recent contribution by Velissaropoulos-Karakostas suggests 
that the φιάλαι constitute ‘une mesure visant à render légitimes des affranchissements 
qui n’ont pas fait l’objet d’une decision du peuple’. In other words, basing her 
interpretation on the assumption that, in the last third of the 4th century B.C., a decree by 
the Assembly was necessary for ‘private’ manumissions to be valid and recognised by 
the community as a whole as well as for granting publicity to the act323, she ultimately 
                                                          
320 Cf. Harp., s.v. ἀποστασίου: δίκη τίς ἐστι κατὰ τῶν ἀπελευθεροθέντων δεδομένη τοῖς 
ἀπελευθερώσασιν, ἐὰν ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ’αὐτῶν ἢ ἕτερον ἐπιγράφωνται προστάτην, καὶ ἃ 
κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι μὴ ποιῶσιν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἁλόντας δεῖ δούλους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ νικήσαντας 
τελέως ἤδη ἐλευθέρους. 
321 Tod (1901/1902); Westermann (1946): 95. 
322 Kränzlein (1975): 264. 
323 Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (forthcoming), reads the φιάλαι in the light of the evidence 
provided by Aeschin. 3.44, in which the orator refers to a law prohibiting declarations of private 
manumissions in the theatre, and argues that ‘A l’époque d’Eschine, pour être opposable à tous, 
l’affranchissement doit être décrété par la cité. Nul ne peut alors mettre en doute le statut de la 
personne libérée par décret du peuple et l’affranchi peut, dans ce cas, vivre sans la menace d’une 
éventuelle ἀφαίρεσις εἰς δουλείαν, c’est-à-dire du danger de retomber en l’état de servitude’. 
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argues that the procedure from which the dedication of these silver bowls originated 
was necessary in all those cases in which slaves were ‘privately’ manumitted by their 
masters without the consent of the Athenian Assembly as expressed in a ψήφισμα. As 
these manumitted slaves would have been in danger of being reduced back into slavery, 
this procedure would have ultimately aimed to ascertain the newly freed person’s legal 
condition of freedom and therefore protect them from any attempt of re-enslavement.324 
As I mentioned before, the interpretation of the φιάλαι ἐξελευθερικαί in the light of 
manumission has always been taken for granted in studies on Greek manumission. Yet, 
in a 2010 work on this corpus of inscriptions, Meyer first questioned the traditional 
approach and suggested a new interpretation of these sources which, according to her 
reconstruction, do not have anything to do with manumission but, rather, with metics. 
Her interpretation relies on four main objections to the traditional scholarly approach. 
First, manumission in Athens is not a solemn act, but an informal one: therefore there 
was no need to recur to fictitious δίκαι ἀποστασίου for liberating slaves, since 
manumissions could be performed in different informal ways. Second, the traditional 
view holds that φιάλαι record the results of δίκαι ἀποστασίου concluded within one 
day, and she objects that there are too many of them for suggesting that they are actual 
prosecutions or even just administrative procedures aimed at manumitting slaves. Third, 
the value of one hundred drachmas, which is usually interpreted as a tax for 
manumission, is too high and does not find any parallel elsewhere in the Greek sources. 
Fourth, she points out that many plaintiffs in the φιάλαι are metics, who needed to have 
                                                          
For a detailed criticism of Velissaropoulos-Karakostas’ attempt to base her entire interpretation 
on the φιάλαι on the reading of Aeschin. 3.44, see Scafuro (forthcoming); for the (extra-ordinary) 
circumstances in which a πόλις could possibly be allowed to interfere with individual owners’ 
right of ownership by forcedly manumitting privately-owned slaves, see infra, chapter 5. For a 
detailed discussion on the practice of declaring manumissions at the theatre in Athens, cf. 
Mactoux (2008). 
324 Scafuro (forthcoming) moves three main objections to Velissaropoulos-Karakostas’ view on 
the nature of the φιάλαι: first, the weakness of an interpretation which relies solely on Aeschin. 
3.44; second, the lack of any evidence referring to such a ‘hybrid procedure – unless this is simply 
a different way of describing the dikē aphaireseos’; third, the chronological and logical impossibility 
to connect such a procedure with the δοκιμασία, which was reserved to those foreigners who 
were granted Athenian citizenship (and to which Velissaropoulos-Karakostas expressly likens 
the procedure from which the dedication of the φιάλαι arose). 
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an Athenian citizen as their προστάτης: therefore only their προστάται, according to 
Meyer, would have been entitled to bring δίκαι ἀποστασίου against manumitted slaves. 
On the basis of these points and developing an idea already put forward in 1880 by 
Koumanudis but always ignored by traditional scholarship, she suggests a different 
restoration of the heading of the inscriptions by which they would not refer to δίκαι 
ἀποστασίου but, rather, to γραφαί ἀπροστασίου.325 The γραφή ἀπροστασίου was a 
public action brought by Athenian citizens before the Polemarch against those metics 
who did not register an Athenian citizen as their προστάτης, or did not pay the 
μετοίκιον, i.e. a tax which was specifically imposed on metics who resided in Athens. 
Given that these inscriptions cannot be considered to be dealing with manumitted slaves, 
according to Meyer the φιάλαι have to be interpreted as a 4th century B.C. inventory of 
votive bowls dedicated to Zeus Eleutherios one century earlier by those metics who were 
acquitted in γραφαί ἀπροστασίου. She further argues that this conclusion is suggested 
by the expression ‘ἐκ τῶν φιαλῶν τῶν ἐξελευθερικῶν’ itself, which is attested in some 
of these inscriptions (e.g. IG II² 1469) and which has been taken as an indication of the 
connection of these sources with manumission: according to Meyer, this expression 
rather refers to the Athenian cult of Zeus Eleutherios, which was particularly celebrated 
in the Piraeus, where many metics resided.326 Meyer’s ultimate suggestion is that the 
dedication of the φιάλαι constituted a sanction for those citizens who brought a γραφή 
ἀπροστασίου against metics and then lost the trial: of the one thousand drachmas they 
had to pay as a fine to the πόλις for not obtaining one fifth of the votes, one hundred 
had to be paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs for the silver bowls, which were then offered to 
Zeus Eleutherios by metics.327 According to Meyer’s interpretation, this mechanism was 
ultimately meant to prevent vexatious prosecutions by citizens against metics. 
Meyer’s work has represented the first step towards a proper understanding of the 
φιάλαι ἐξελευθερικαί as not referring to manumission; her approach, however, has 
recently been challenged by Harris, who has provided a different interpretation of these 
                                                          
325 Meyer (2010): 43. 
326 Meyer (2010): 59-69. 
327 Meyer (2010): 59. 
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sources and further proved that they do not deal with manumission. After agreeing with 
Meyer’s interpretation of these inscriptions as not referring to manumissions and 
ἀπελεύθεροι, Harris challenges her view on the basis of four main points which rely 
primarily on legal data. First, Meyer suggests that these bowls are dedicated by acquitted 
defendants, whereas it would be more likely that unsuccessful litigants dedicate them, 
since they would have had to pay a fee or penalty. Second, the inscriptions show that 
many defendants are citizens, but citizens could not be prosecuted with a γραφή 
ἀπροστασίου given that this public action could be brought against metics only. Third, 
some accusers are metics, but metics could not be προστάται and therefore they could 
not act as prosecutors in a γραφή ἀπροστασίου. The fourth point made by Harris 
convincingly relies on the principle by which Athenian inscriptions, especially the public 
ones, ‘generally fall into certain categories’, each of which ‘has a particular form of 
heading, has a certain structure and use standard formulas’.328 He therefore argues that 
inscriptions, when fragmentary, should always be restored with terms and formulas that 
can be found in the same group of inscriptions they belong to. Harris observes that 
traditional restorations of these texts on which influential interpretations have been 
founded (such as ἐξελευθερικαί, δίκη ἀποστασίου, γραφή ἀπροστασίου, or the verb 
πολεμαρχέω) introduce words and expressions that are not found in the relevant 
sources. He notes, for example, that the restoration of the verb πολεμαρχέω introduces 
the verb in a sense in which it is never used in other inscriptions of the same kind, since 
the extant evidence from Greece indicates that the verb is only used by Polemarchs who, 
at the end of their service, dedicate votives as thanks for carrying out their office 
succesfully. On the grounds of these objections, and by applying this principle, Harris 
convincingly argues that this evidence simply refers to bowls dedicated by defendants, 
among which several metics were included, in gratitude for being acquitted in trials329: 
they do not constitute, in other words, either evidence for manumission in Athens, or 
dedications by acquitted metics in γραφαί ἀπροστασίου. 
                                                          
328 Harris (forthcoming). 
329 Harris (forthcoming). 
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Whether φιάλαι refer to acquitted metics in γραφαί ἀπροστασίου or, more generally, 
to dedications by acquitted defendants in trials, most recent scholarship has nonetheless 
clearly shown that what has long been considered to be the only Athenian epigraphic 
evidence for manumission, does not actually refer to manumitted slaves or, more 
generally, to the liberation of slaves. Once this body of evidence is excluded from the 
relevant sources for Athenian manumission, the problem of manumission in Athens and 
of the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι can only rely on the evidence provided by literary 
sources and, in particular, by some forensic speeches from the Classical age. 
 
3. Manumission and πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ. 
As I showed before, the inscriptions from Delphi constitute an important source of 
information on the legal nature of manumission in exchange for money. Scholars agree 
that payment in return for manumission was common throughout the Greek world, and 
the fact that sometimes payment was not mentioned in the sources does not necessarily 
mean that no payment was actually made but, rather, that both payment and the amount 
of money required for manumission had been determined between masters and slaves 
prior to manumission. 330  The ratio of payment in return for manumission has been 
explained in two different ways: some scholars suggest that, by liberating a slave, 
masters gave up an important piece of property, and therefore payment in return for 
manumission was primarily aimed at recovering the value of the slave. Other scholars 
hold that, through payment, masters hoped to recover at least part of the money they 
had spent in purchasing the slave they were about to liberate.331 This second point is 
expressly suggested by [Dem.] 59.30, which I will analyse in further detail later in the 
chapter. What is important to stress now, however, is that Apollodorus says that when 
Timanoridas and Eukrates decided to liberate Neaera, they asked her to pay twenty 
minae instead of the thirty minae they had spent when they bought her from Nikaretes, 
as in this way they hoped they could recover at least part of the money they spent for 
purchasing Neaera. 
                                                          
330 Calderini (1965): 211; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 209, 212. 
331 Calderini (1965): 210; Gschnitzer (1988): 195; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 213. 
140 
 
The practice of paying money in return for freedom is also attested in some Athenian 
sources from the Classical age; yet, the evidence for manumission in Athens is scanty 
and can only be found in a few forensic speeches. According to traditional classifications, 
these manumissions are labelled as ‘secular’, as opposed to the so-called ‘sacral’ 
manumissions from Hellenistic Central Greece: as I mentioned before, while the latter 
are defined as such because of the involvement of the gods in the manumission 
procedure, the former are characterised by the absence of the religious element and the 
involvement of the ‘civic’ sphere only.332 These speeches provide valuable information 
on several aspects of manumission in exchange for money: the analysis of their text and 
vocabulary is helpful for the understanding of the relationship between manumission 
and sale, the role of the third party intervening in the manumission procedure, the 
nature of payment, as well as the legal condition of manumitted slaves. A correct 
analysis of these aspects is fundamental for our understanding of Greek manumission; 
yet, they have not been properly assessed by traditional scholarship, which defines these 
procedures as representing a specific mode of manumission, the so-called πρᾶσις ἐπί 
ἐλευθερίᾳ, which literarily means ‘sale for the purpose of freedom’. 
The first theorization of πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ as a specific mode of manumission – 
or, better, the identification of any manumission in exchange for money with a πρᾶσις 
ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ – has been suggested by Foucart333 and has been later developed by 
Calderini in his comprehensive study on manumission in Greece. Calderini defines 
πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ as ‘la vendita di uno schiavo fatta a condizione che il compratore 
s’impegni di manometterlo’334, i.e. as a conditional sale, even though he believes that 
πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ does not constitute a specific mode of manumission but, rather, a 
                                                          
332 To what extent the ‘secular’ element is involved in these manumissions as opposed to the 
religious one is a matter of some disagreement among scholars. Calderini (1965): 125, for instance, 
maintains that ‘per atti di manomissione più propriamente civili intendo quelli che richiedono 
l’intervento delle magistrature cittadine, restando l’autorità del dio bandita affatto o soltanto 
ricordata secondariamente’; whereas Kamen (2014): 289, on the other hand, suggests that, in all 
those cases in which payment was required, the main difference between ‘secular’ and ‘sacral’ 
manumissions is that in the former category ‘the “buyer” was not divine but human’. 
333 Foucart (1867): 14-23. 
334 Calderini (1965): 218. 
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particular kind of manumission through sale.335 Similarly, Zelnick-Abramovitz identifies 
πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ as a conditional sale, and concludes that ‘whether intended to 
release the property or to keep it, the transaction gave the purchaser the right of 
ownership until he recouped his investment’.336 The problem with this definition is that, 
from a legal point of view, it defines manumission as a sale under condition 
subsequent337: it follows, in other words, that in all these cases manumission would 
determine a transfer of ownership over the manumitted slave, and this condition is 
going to last until the purchaser liberates the slave. This view, however, does not seem 
to consider that sale and manumission have opposite legal effects: while sale implies a 
transfer of ownership, manumission determines the extinction of the right of ownership 
over a slave and the acquisition, by the latter, of a legal condition of freedom. This makes 
it clear that a definition of manumission in terms of a sale (which ultimately results in 
an identification of the former transaction with the latter) cannot be accepted. 
A more recent interpretation holds that πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ consists of a fictive sale 
which does not result in a transfer of ownership but, rather, in the slaves’ liberation. This 
idea has been expressed, most recently, by Kamen, who defines ‘fictive sale’ as one in 
which ‘a third party nominally “purchased” a slave from his or her master, but in doing 
so actually paid for the slave’s freedom, whether with his own money or with the slave’s. 
The sale was fictive in that the third party did not actually exercise the right of ownership 
over the slave, as he would in a genuine purchase, but instead paid money for the slave 
to become free’.338 Moreover, when referring to the so-called ‘secular’ manumissions, she 
maintains that ‘what I am calling secular fictive sale employs … a verb of payment like 
κατατίθημι or καταβάλλω (“to pay down”) … when paired with a phrase indicating 
that the aim is a given slave’s freedom (ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ or εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, “for the 
                                                          
335 Calderini (1965): 220. 
336 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 218. 
337 ‘Condition subsequent’ is a technical legal expression which designates one of the two 
possible kinds of conditions that can be attached to a contract or, more generally, to legal 
transactions. The condition is ‘a provision that does not form part of a contractual obligation but 
operates either to suspend the contract until a specified event has happened (a condition 
precedent) or to bring it to an end in certain specified circumstances (a condition subsequent)’ 
(Law [2015] s.v. condition). 
338 Kamen (2014): 281-282. 
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purpose of freedom”) it becomes clear that we are dealing not with a genuine purchase 
but a fictive one. That is, the freedom language reveals that this purchase, like Apollo’s 
“purchase” of slaves at Delphi, is simply a fiction allowing the slave to be released from 
the ownership of his previous master’.339 
In chapter 2, I argued that the vocabulary of the inscriptions, although intermingled 
with that of sale, shows that slaves provided the money they needed in order to pay for 
their freedom and therefore no sale was taking place, neither fictitious nor symbolic: this 
conclusion is suggested not only by the meaning and implication of the verb πιστεύω in 
designating the relationship between the slaves and the god, but also – and above all – 
by the fact that the ‘purchase money’ was provided by the slaves themselves. 
As I shall show in this chapter, a definition of manumission in exchange for money 
as a πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ does not work even for the Athenian sources which are 
believed to represent this ‘form’ of manumission, among which Against Neaera and 
Against Athenogenes are usually included. Nothing in the vocabulary used in these 
sources suggests any confusion or identification between sale and manumission, which, 
on the contrary, are kept clearly distinguished: the verbs used to describe manumission 
simply refer to the payment of money for the purpose of liberating a slave, without 
pointing in any way to the conclusion of a sale, even just a fictitious one. Thus, there is 
no reason to believe that these manumissions were carried out through a fictitious sale, 
nor that in these cases sale was conceived of as a means through which slaves were 
granted freedom. Ultimately, the analysis of the Athenian sources on manumission not 
only shows that the concept of πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ is a modern invention, but it also 
reinforces the idea that the Greek legal systems did not need to rely on an institution 
analogous to the Roman fictio iuris, since they did not need to recur to a fictive sale in 
order to circumvent a legal problem, in this case, the slaves’ lack of legal personality.340 
                                                          
339 Kamen (2014): 290. For a similar definition of πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ, see also Rädle (1969): 
64-65; Klees (1998): 311-314; Glazebrook (2014): 55-56. 
340 In this sense, I find that Sosin’s overall conclusion (that πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ is a modern 
invention) is very persuasive, although I believe that his whole understanding of παραμονή and 
the legal condition of ἀπελεύθεροι compelled to this duty is undermined by fundamental 
misinterpretations: cf. Sosin (2015), about which see infra, in this chapter. 
143 
 
In the following paragraphs I will show that these considerations result from the 
analysis of the Athenian sources dealing with manumission in exchange for money. This 
will allow me to show that the commonly accepted definition of these manumissions as 
πράσεις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ is not supported by the ancient sources which, on the contrary, 
confirm what the evidence from the Delphic manumission inscriptions tells us about the 
nature of manumission in exchange for money (i.e., that of a bilateral legal transaction 
between the master and a third party) and the role of the third party within the 
manumission procedure (which was limited to conveying the money to slaves’ masters, 
given the slaves’ lack of legal personality), thus pointing to the unity, throughout the 
Greek sources, of the legal nature of manumission. 
 
4. The evidence from the pseudo-Demosthenic speech Against Neaera. 
One of the best known episodes of manumission in Athens is that of Neaera, which 
is described in the first paragraphs of the pseudo-Demosthenic speech performed in 
Athens between 343 and 340 B.C.341 The plaintiff is formally Theomnestus, although he 
soon invites Apollodorus to continue with the prosecution as his συνήγορος, thus 
becoming the actual plaintiff. The text of the speech informs us that Apollodorus brings 
a γραφή ξενίας against Neaera342: Apollodorus stresses that the woman is a ξένη who 
lives unlawfully with an Athenian citizen, Stephanus, as his wife, thus breaking the law 
– reproduced in paragraph 16 – which prohibited marriages between Athenian citizens 
and foreigners.343 Yet Neaera’s behaviour is represented as even more unacceptable, 
                                                          
341 Kapparis (1999): 28. 
342 Contra, cf. Kapparis (1999): 198-206, (2005): 78, who (unconvincingly) argues that the law 
cited in [Dem.] 59.16 ‘clearly is not the law on graphe xenias’, since ‘this law and the one quoted in 
section 52 of the same speech are extracts from legislation introduced in the 380’s in order to curb 
immigration violations by means of pretence of marriage to a citizen’. 
343 The authenticity of the laws and decrees of the speech (as well as of many documents in the 
Demosthenic corpus as a whole), has recently been challenged by Canevaro (2013). After 
remarking that the speech ‘contains 21 documents: 13 witness statements, 3 laws, 1 decree, 1 oath, 
2 diallagai and 1 proklesis’, he focuses specifically on the laws and decrees in the speech. About the 
law concerning the marriage between Athenian citizens and foreigners and procreation of 
offspring, Canevaro concludes, after a stychometric analysis and a thorough analysis of the text, 
that ‘the document presents provisions not found in Apollodorus’ summary. These features, 
however, are unverifiable, and they could be either authentic provisions belonging to this law, or 
created by a forger on the basis of information found in the orators and elsewhere. Our sources 
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since Stephanus introduced Neaera’s sons into the phratry and the deme344, and he also 
gave Neaera’s daughter, Phano, in marriage to two Athenian citizens subsequently, 
Phrastor first and then Theogenes, who was serving as King Archon.345 
Apart from being ‘a fascinating glimpse into the Athenian demi-monde’ and 
providing ‘valuable evidence about citizenship, sexuality, religious life, law’ 346 , the 
speech also mentions important information both on the act through which slaves were 
granted freedom and on the legal condition of manumitted slaves. It is important to keep 
in mind, however, the geographical context in which the events take place: Neaera was 
working as an ἑταίρα for Nikaretes in Corinth and in the same πόλις she was first 
bought by Timanoridas and Eukrates and then released; after her manumission she 
moved to Athens where she lived with Stephanus. The speech is therefore an interesting 
source of information both on the nature of manumission in exchange for money as it 
was performed in Corinth in the Classical period (or, better, as a manumission 
performed in Corinth was understood in an Athenian law court), and on the legal 
condition of an ἀπελευθέρα who, after being released, decided to reside in Athens. 
The procedure leading to Neaera’s manumission is analytically described by 
Apollodorus in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the speech: a closer look at these texts, together 
with some previous passages dealing with Neaera’s purchase by Nikaretes first, and by 
Timanoridas and Eukrates later, will shed light on the legal nature of manumission in 
exchange for money; at the same time, it will also clarify the role of payment within the 
context of slaves’ liberation and the relationship between sale and manumission. 
This last point, more specifically, is made clear at the beginning of the speech. 
Paragraphs 19 and 20 describe Neaera’s youth as Nikaretes’ slave: Nikaretes was an 
ἀπελευθέρα who bought Neaera, together with other six young girls, in order to make 
a profit by using her as a ἑταίρα. Neaera’s condition as Nikaretes’ property is made clear 
                                                          
do not allow us a conclusive verdict. The document might be a skilful forgery, a genuine statute 
found by a later editor and inserted in the speech, or a reconstruction based on trustworthy 
sources now lost to use’ (Canevaro [2013]: 187). See also Harris (2001b): 441; generally speaking, 
Harris challenges the authenticity of most documents of the speech (Harris [1994]: 21-23). 
344 [Dem.] 59.13. 
345 Cf. [Dem.] 59.50-53, 72-73. 
346 Harris (2001b): 439. 
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both by the use of the verb ἀποδίδωμι, which refers to Nikaretes’ purchase of Neaera, 
and by the latter’s description, on the one hand, as a body (σῶμα) and, on the other hand, 
by the use of the verb ἔχειν in designating Nikaretes’ ownership on Neaera. After 
describing in detail Neaera’s services as Nikaretes’ property, paragraph 29 focuses on 
Neaera’s purchase by two young Corinthian men, Timanoridas and Eucrates: 
 
[Dem.] 59.29: μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν αὐτῆς γίγνονται ἐρασταὶ δύο, Τιμανορίδας τε ὁ 
Κορίνθιος καὶ Εὐκράτης ὁ Λευκάδιος, οἳ ἐπειδήπερ πολυτελὴς ἦν ἡ Νικαρέτη τοῖς 
ἐπιτάγμασιν, ἀξιοῦσα τὰ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναλώματα ἅπαντα τῇ οἰκίᾳ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν 
λαμβάνειν, κατατιθέασιν αὐτῆς τιμὴν τριάκοντα μνᾶς τοῦ σώματος τῇ Νικαρέτῃ, 
καὶ ὠνοῦνται αὐτὴν παρ᾽ αὐτῆς νόμῳ πόλεως καθάπαξ αὑτῶν δούλην εἶναι. καὶ 
εἶχον καὶ ἐχρῶντο ὅσον ἐβούλοντο αὐτῇ χρόνον. 
 
After this she acquired two lovers, Timanoridas the Corinthian and Eukrates the Leucadian, 
who, because Nikarete was costly in her demands, expecting them to pay for all the daily household 
expenses, paid her thirty minae as a price for Neaira's person, and bought her outright from her 
according to the law of the city, to be their own slave. And they kept and used her for as long as 
they desired. 
 
The verbs used by Demosthenes are significant: the expression ‘κατατιθέασιν … 
τιμὴν τριάκοντα μνᾶς’ refers to the payment of thirty minae, and the expression ‘καὶ 
ὠνοῦνται αὐτὴν παρ᾽ αὐτῆς’ specifies that payment was made in the context of a sale. 
Therefore, the contract concluded by Nikaretes and the two men determines a transfer 
of ownership over Neaera, who becomes Timanoridas’ and Eukrates’ slave; this is also 
made clear by the expression ‘αὑτῶν δούλην εἶναι’ and by the verb ἔχειν, which 
describe – once again – the relationship between Neaera and her two new masters as 
based on the right of ownership. As an effect of the sale thus concluded and regulated 
by the laws of Corinth, Neaera becomes common property of the two young men.347 
The following three paragraphs focus on Neaera’s liberation by her masters and 
describe in detail the procedure through which she is manumitted. Apollodorus tells 
that when both Timanoridas and Eukrates were about to marry, they decided to liberate 
Neaera on the condition that she would no longer work in Corinth as an ἑταίρα. 
                                                          
347 For the joint-ownership of slaves as one of the most common forms of shared ownership 
over things in Athens, cf. Biscardi (1999). 
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Moreover, in order to recover part of the money they spent in buying her from Nikaretes 
(thirty minae), they asked Neaera for the payment of twenty minae in return for her 
liberation.348 The procedure through which Neaera collects the money she was asked for 
and the payment is made is described in paragraphs 30 to 32: 
 
[Dem.] 59.30-32: μέλλοντες δὲ γαμεῖν, προαγορεύουσιν αὐτῇ, ὅτι οὐ βούλονται 
αὐτὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἑταίραν γεγενημένην ὁρᾶν ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἐργαζομένην οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ 
πορνοβοσκῷ οὖσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδέως ἂν αὑτοῖς εἴη ἔλαττόν τε τἀργύριον κομίσασθαι 
παρ᾽ αὐτῆς ἢ κατέθεσαν, καὶ αὐτὴν ταύτην ὁρᾶν τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσαν. ἀφιέναι οὖν 
αὐτῇ ἔφασαν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν χιλίας δραχμάς, πεντακοσίας ἑκάτερος: τὰς δ᾽ εἴκοσι 
μνᾶς ἐκέλευον αὐτὴν ἐξευροῦσαν αὑτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι. ἀκούσασα δ᾽ αὕτη τοὺς λόγους 
τούτους τοῦ τε Εὐκράτους καὶ Τιμανορίδου, μεταπέμπεται εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον ἄλλους 
τε τῶν ἐραστῶν τῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῇ καὶ Φρυνίωνα τὸν Παιανιέα, Δήμωνος μὲν 
ὄντα υἱόν, Δημοχάρους δὲ ἀδελφόν, ἀσελγῶς δὲ καὶ πολυτελῶς διάγοντα τὸν βίον, 
ὡς ὑμῶν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι μνημονεύουσιν. [31] ἀφικομένου δ᾽ ὡς αὐτὴν τοῦ 
Φρυνίωνος, λέγει πρὸς αὐτὸν τοὺς λόγους οὓς εἶπον πρὸς αὐτὴν ὅ τε Εὐκράτης καὶ 
Τιμανορίδας, καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐραστῶν 
ἐδασμολόγησεν ἔρανον εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν συλλέγουσα, καὶ εἴ τι ἄρα αὐτὴ 
περιεποιήσατο, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ προσθέντα τὸ ἐπίλοιπον, οὗ προσέδει εἰς τὰς εἴκοσι 
μνᾶς, καταθεῖναι αὑτῆς τῷ τε Εὐκράτει καὶ τῷ Τιμανορίδᾳ ὥστε ἐλευθέραν εἶναι. 
[32] ἅσμενος δ᾽ ἀκούσας ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους τούτους αὐτῆς, καὶ λαβὼν τἀργύριον 
ὃ παρὰ τῶν ἐραστῶν τῶν ἄλλων εἰσηνέχθη αὐτῇ, καὶ προσθεὶς τὸ ἐπίλοιπον αὐτός, 
κατατίθησιν αὐτῆς τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς τῷ Εὐκράτει καὶ τῷ Τιμανορίδᾳ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ 
καὶ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐν Κορίνθῳ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι. 
 
When, however, they were about to marry, they gave her notice that they did not want to see 
her, who had been their own mistress, plying her trade in Corinth or living under the control of 
a brothel-keeper; but that they would be glad to recover from her less than they had paid down, 
and to see her reaping some advantage for herself. They offered, therefore, to remit one thousand 
drachmae toward the price of her freedom, five hundred drachmae apiece; and they bade her, when 
she found the means, to pay them the twenty minae. When she heard this proposal from Eucrates 
and Timanoridas, she summoned to Corinth among others who had been her lovers Phrynion of 
Paeania, the son of Demon and the brother of Demochares, a man who was living a licentious and 
extravagant life, as the older ones among you remember. [31] When Phrynion came to her, she 
told him the proposal which Eucrates and Timanoridas had made to her, and gave him the money 
which she had collected from her other lovers as a contribution toward the price of her freedom, 
and added whatever she had gained for herself, and she begged him to advance the balance needed 
to make up the twenty minae, and to pay it to Eucrates and Timanoridas to secure her freedom. 
[32] He listened gladly to these words of hers, and taking the money which had been paid in to 
                                                          
348 [Dem.] 59.30: ἀφιέναι οὖν αὐτῇ ἔφασαν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν χιλίας δραχμάς, πεντακοσίας 
ἑκάτερος: τὰς δ᾽ εἴκοσι μνᾶς ἐκέλευον αὐτὴν ἐξευροῦσαν αὑτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι. 
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her by her other lovers added the balance himself and paid the twenty minae as the price of her 
freedom to Eucrates and Timanoridas on the condition that she should not ply her trade in Corinth. 
 
The speech informs us that Neaera did not have the entire sum of money she was 
asked to pay in return for manumission, and for this reason she needed the help of some 
of her former lovers in order to obtain the remaining part: Neaera eventually collected 
the entire sum of twenty minae thanks to the money provided partly by an ἔρανος349 
and partly by Phrinion, who added τό ἐπίλοιπον. 
If we read Neaera’s case in the light of what is attested in the Delphic manumission 
inscriptions, we notice that while in the Delphic manumissions through ‘sale’ there is no 
express indication of the actual provenance of the ‘purchase money’, which is just said 
to be entrusted by the slaves to the god (because of their lack of the capacity to transact), 
in the pseudo-Demosthenic speech we face a case in which the slave does not have the 
entire sum she is required, but only part of it. It is therefore fundamental to identify 
correctly who the text describes as the author of the actual payment to Timanoridas and 
Eukrates, i.e. the counterparty in the manumission transaction. The key point is that 
although the two masters’ request of payment in return for manumission was addressed 
directly to Neaera, it is not her, but Phrinion who gives the money to her former masters, 
and this is due to Neaera’s lack of the capacity to make a valid payment for the purpose 
of manumission, as she is a slave. 
One further aspect which I think is important to stress about this passage is the 
vocabulary used by Apollodorus to describe Neaera’s release from slavery. While in the 
                                                          
349 The Greek term ἔρανος refers to a loan which is generally believed to be interests-free and 
often used by slaves in order to collect the money they needed to pay for their freedom. ἔρανοι 
had to be paid back and, in the case of manumitted slaves, failure to return the loan could imply 
their reversion into slavery: Westermann (1955): 25; Kapparis (1999): 231; Kamen (2014): 295. In 
the specific case of [Dem.] 59, the fact that Apollodorus does not mention the restitution of the 
loan by Neaera does not necessarily imply that ‘the money she collected was not an ἔρανος but 
an εἰσφορά’, or that ‘Neaira collected the fee for her liberation nominally as an ἔρανος with the 
tacit understanding from all sides that it would never be repaid’ (Kapparis [1999]: 231); it is more 
likely that Apollodorus does not mention anything more about Neaera’s loan simply because it 
was not in his interest (Kamen [2014]: 295, convincingly argues that ‘it was of no use to him, 
rhetorically, to paint his opponent as a reliable borrower’). On the meaning and implication of 
ἔρανος in Greece, see, most recently, Faraguna (2012b). 
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Delphic inscriptions the liberation of slaves, at first sight, seems to intermingle with sale, 
in the sense that the vocabulary of manumission is typically that of a πρᾶσις ὠνή, the 
pseudo-Demosthenic speech shows a sharp contrast between sale and manumission, as 
is made clear by the different verbs used in indicating the two different transactions. 
As I mentioned before, the vocabulary of sale is expressly used in paragraph 29, 
which deals with Neaera’s purchase by Timanoridas and Eukrates, and directly points 
to transfer of ownership as an effect of sale: by paying thirty minae to Nikaretes 
(κατατιθέασιν αὐτῆς τιμὴν τριάκοντα μνᾶς), Timanoridas and Eukrates purchased 
Neaera (ὠνοῦνται αὐτὴν) who thus became their slave (καθάπαξ αὑτῶν δούλην εἶναι). 
Paragraphs 31 and 32, on the other hand, deal with Neaera’s manumission and in this 
context the verb of liberation does not have anything to do with sale: the expression 
‘κατατίθημι μνᾶς ἐπ᾽ἐλευθερίᾳ’ simply means ‘put down money’, ‘pay’, ‘deposit’, in 
this case for Neaera’s liberation, and does not suggest, not even indirectly, that payment 
has been made on the basis of sale and that a transfer of ownership over the slave has 
taken place. On the contrary, payment has been made with the express purpose of 
obtaining Neaera’s release from slavery, and her liberation is the direct and immediate 
effect of Phrinion’s payment of the money to Timanoridas and Eukrates. 
The overall conclusion we get from the analysis of the passages above mentioned is 
that, when masters liberate their slaves in exchange for money, manumission has the 
nature of a bilateral legal transaction between the master and a third party, other than 
the slave. If we read the evidence from the speech in the light of the Delphic 
manumission inscriptions, it is also possible to suggest that whether a slave had the 
entire amount of the money he or she was asked for (as in the Delphic inscriptions) or 
just part of it (as for the Against Neaera), the result was always the same: another party 
had to intervene in the manumission procedure and give the money to the slave’s master 
in order to carry out a valid manumission, given the slaves’ lack of the capacity to enter 
into legally binding agreements and to negotiate with their masters. 
The evidence from Against Neaera also provides useful information about the legal 
condition of manumitted slaves. Once Phrinion gives the twenty minae to Timanoridas 
and Eukrates, Neaera is no longer considered to be their slave: as I pointed out before, 
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after the payment by Phrinion, Neaera becomes immediately free, and all the rights of 
her former owners over her come to an end. It is interesting to note that after her 
liberation Neaera does not keep any connection with her former masters, but with 
Phrinion only. 
Paragraph 33 tells us that, after the payment had been made, Phrinion brought 
Neaera back to Athens with him: during this period, Phrinion made Neaera live in his 
household and he used to take her everywhere with him. Phrinion’s entitlement to this 
behaviour towards Neaera seems to descend from a specific power or authority he has 
over her, as indicated by the use of the term ἐξουσία (Apollodorus says: ‘φιλοτιμίαν 
τὴν ἐξουσίαν πρὸς τοὺς ὁρῶντας ποιούμενος’). 
Paragraph 37 is also interesting: according to Apollodorus’ account, Neaera was 
unhappy about her life with Phrinion and therefore she decided to escape from Athens 
after stealing some goods from Phrinion’s house, and to move to Megara (she could not 
go back to Corinth because Timanoridas and Eukrates manumitted her on the express 
condition that she would no longer be working in Corinth as an ἑταίρα: cf. [Dem.] 59.32). 
Once in Megara, she maintained herself by working as an ἑταίρα and after a few years 
she met Stephanus, an Athenian citizen who, after moving to Megara, started to live with 
her. After a while, Neaera decided to move back to Athens with Stephanus and, fearing 
Phrinion’s reaction to her return, she nominated Stephanus as her προστάτης 
(‘προΐσταται Στέφανον τουτονὶ αὑτῆς’).350  According to the laws of Athens, those 
ἀπελεύθεροι who decided to reside in Athens had to register an Athenian citizen as 
their προστάτης, whose role – according to the general view – was that of representing 
the ἀπελεύθεροι especially in courts, given their (partial) lack of procedural capacity.351 
Neaera’s decision to nominate Stephanus as her προστάτης is thus necessary not only 
because of her return to Athens and her condition as a resident alien, but also because 
she was already envisaging Phrinion’s reaction to her return: on the one hand, she stole 
                                                          
350 [Dem.] 59.37. 
351 Harrison (1968): 184, 190; Biscardi (1982): 88. This view, however, presents some problems: 
Harris (forthcoming) has recently shown that the φιάλαι inscriptions attest ἀπελεύθεροι and 
metics as actors in court cases, which therefore means that both these categories could take part 
in (at least some) legal procedures. 
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some of his properties before abandoning his household; on the other hand, by escaping 
to Megara, she did not respect Phrinion’s ἐξουσία over her. And in fact, as soon as 
Neaera moves back to Athens, Phrinion’s reaction is immediate and is described in 
paragraph 40: 
 
[Dem.] 59.40: πυθόμενος δὲ ὁ Φρυνίων ἐπιδημοῦσαν αὐτὴν καὶ οὖσαν παρὰ τούτῳ, 
παραλαβὼν νεανίσκους μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν τοῦ Στεφάνου 
ἦγεν αὐτήν. ἀφαιρουμένου δὲ τοῦ Στεφάνου κατὰ τὸν νόμον εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, 
κατηγγύησεν αὐτὴν πρὸς τῷ πολεμάρχῳ. 
 
Phrynion, however, learned that the woman was in Athens and was living with Stephanus, 
and taking some young men with him he came to the house of Stephanus and attempted to carry 
her off. When Stephanus took her away from him, as the law allowed, declaring her to be a free 
woman, Phrynion required her to post bonds with the Polemarch. 
 
This paragraph refers to the procedure which was started whenever the free condition 
of a person was challenged by a citizen who claimed, on the contrary, that that person 
was a slave: the ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν of the claimant, followed by the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς 
ἐλευθερίαν by the ‘adstertor libertatis’, are typical acts of Athenian litigation concerning 
the legal condition of individuals, and they constitute necessary requirements for 
bringing a δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως before the Polemarch. The text of the speech shows that 
Phrinion is the author of an ἀγωγή on Neaera: the ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν implied the 
physical seizure of the alleged slave by the person who maintained to be its master. This 
act was considered to be a form of institutionalised ‘self-help’352, and any attempt to 
hamper the ἀγωγή constituted violence (βία).353  
                                                          
352 Cf. Pelloso (2009/2010): 131 n. 30, who points out that ‘l’ἄγειν …, in astratto (e sul piano 
sostanziale), è sì configurabile come esercizio di un asserito potere dominicale (talché impedire 
violentemente un ἄγειν εἰς δουλείαν configura un illecito …), solo allorché … non si configuri 
l’opposizione formale di terzi (che accampino diritti asseritamente confliggenti con quello dell’ 
ἀγῶν); ma detto ἄγειν è anche, in concreto (e sul piano del diritto processuale), il presupposto 
necessario, in una con la successiva (seppur eventuale) ἀφαίρεσις, per l’esperimento della δίκη 
ἀφαιρέσεως. Una volta assodato ciò, va da sé che si risolve tale impossessamento in una forma 
di “self-help” consentito (anzi, comandato) dall’ordinamento, inserito coerentemente in un 
sistema che “non proteggeva il possesso in sé”, ma solo quello “giusto”, autorizzando “il ricorso 
a mezzi di autodifesa” e perseguendo “la violenza nelle private controversie”’. 
353 Cf. Plato Leg. 11.914 e; Lys. 23.11. 
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Phrinion’s ἀγωγή is followed by Stephanus’ ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, which 
consisted in ‘the symbolic act of taking the alleged slave away into liberty’.354 The nature 
of this act is different from that of the ἀγωγή: the Athenian ἀφαίρεσις was a formal act 
consisting in the order, by the adsertor to the ἀγῶν, to release the ἀπαχθείς355, and if the 
claimant did not do so and insisted in the seizure of the alleged slave, his behaviour 
would be, once again, a form of βία which could be prosecuted by the adsertor with a 
δίκη βιαίων.356 When the ἀγωγή was followed by the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, the 
only remedy for the claimant who insisted in affirming his right of ownership over the 
slave was to bring a δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως before the Polemarch: after the ἀφαίρεσις and 
until the δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως had taken place, the claimant was deprived of his possession 
over the ἀπαχθείς, who was thus granted the possession of his own self.357 Because, as 
an effect of the ἀφαίρεσις, the claimant no longer held possession over the alleged slave, 
the ἀφαιρούμενος had to provide some guarantors: their function was to assure the 
claimant that he would recover his property in the event that, as a result of the δίκη 
ἀφαιρέσεως, the latter’s right of ownership over the ἀπαχθείς was confirmed.358 The 
nature of the δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως was that of a criminal action in duplum.359 This means 
that, through this action, the plaintiff (the ἀγῶν) aimed to obtain a condemnation in 
                                                          
354 Harrison (1968): 178. 
355 On the non-violent nature of the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, as opposed to the ἀγωγή εἰς 
δουλείαν, see Paoli (1976): 435-459 (who focuses, more specifically, on the relationship between 
the two ‘analogous’ acts of the ἐξαγωγή and the ἐξαίρεσις); Pelloso (2009/2010): 97, 128 n. 30. 
356 See Christ (1998): 530. The relationship between δίκη βιαίων and δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως is made 
clear by Paoli (1976): 442, 456. Both actions are penal and aim to a condemnation in duplum; yet, 
given that ‘l’ἐξαίρεσις poneva in essere uno stato di fatto provvisorio, considerato come legittimo 
e perciò difeso dalla δίκη βιαίων’, this implying that ‘la δίκη βιαίων assicurava l’indisturbato 
perdurare di quello stato di fatto’, the δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως aimed to ‘provocare una sentenza 
giudiziale che, risolvendo la controversia, dichiarasse implicitamente legittimo solo uno stato di 
fatto che fosse conforme al diritto giudizialmente riconosciuto. È legittima qualsiasi azione tenda 
a raggiungere lo stato di fatto che la legge considera provvisoriamente (per … ἐξαίρεσις) o 
definitivamente (per sentenza in seguito a … δίκη ἐξαιρέσεως) legittimo; è violenza qualsiasi 
azione impedisca il costituirsi o il perdurare di quello stato di fatto’, thus balancing the right to 
self-help with the prohibition of violence. See also Biscardi (1982): 215. 
357 Paoli (1976): 453. 
358 Paoli (1976): 452. 
359 Paoli (1976): 454, who stresses that the main feature of the δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως is that ‘l’attore 
tende a ottenere da un lato la riparazione del danno provocato dall’adsertor e la riaffermazione 
giudiziale del diritto da quello violato, dall’altro lato la condanna in duplum del convenuto’. 
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duplum of the defendant (the ἀφαιρούμενος): if convicted, the latter had to pay a penalty, 
the amount of which corresponded to double the value of the slave, and a half of this 
sum had to be paid to the πόλις as a fine.360 Given the nature of the δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως, it 
follows that the legal condition of the ἀπαχθείς is determined only indirectly and 
incidentally: by condemning the plaintiff or the defendant to the payment of the fine, the 
decision indirectly states that the legal condition of the ἀπαχθείς is one of freedom (in 
the first case) or of slavery (in the second case). 
A closer look at the text of the speech shows that all these stages are mentioned: 
Phrinion’s ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν on Neaera is followed by the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν 
by Stephanus, who thus acts as Neaera’s adsertor libertatis; it is also mentioned that, after 
Stephanus’ ἀφαίρεσις, Neaera had to provide three guarantors before the Polemarch. 
As I showed before, the sequence ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν-ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν is 
mirrored in the inscriptions from Delphi recording the so-called ‘manumissions through 
sale’: in the Delphic inscriptions the ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν is described as an act consisting 
in the ἅπτεσθαι/ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐπί καταδουλισμῷ, whereas the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς 
ἐλευθερίαν takes the form of a συλᾶν, which implied the physical counter-seizure of 
the alleged slave by the adsertor libertatis. The fact that these remedies were often 
mentioned in the Delphic inscriptions, together with Apollodorus’ account of the ἀγωγή 
carried out by Phrinion on Neaera, show that ‘legitimately freed slaves were often 
enslaved or re-enslaved’361, and that their condition after manumission could often be 
threatened by individuals claiming titles or rights over them. Therefore, the evidence 
from the speech should not be read in the sense that Phrinion’s ἀγωγή implies that he 
held property rights over Neaera: it rather suggests that ‘Phrinion lacked a legal claim 
to Neaira and simply hoped he could take advantage of her precarious status’.362 This is 
                                                          
360 Maffi (1995): 21-22. 
361 Kamen (2014): 296. 
362 Kamen (2014): 296. Similarly, see Kapparis (1999): 249-250, who stresses that the opposite 
solution would have been also against the intentions of Neaera’s manumittors (‘any term or 
condition giving legal rights to Phrynion would be entirely against the intentions of her former 
masters. They had decided not to sell her again but to set her free and encouraged her to collect 
only part of the money they had paid for her … it is unlikely that they would have agreed to a 
conditional liberation granting further rights to Phrynion’). 
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also true, on the other hand, if we consider that, as an effect of Solon’s reforms, slavery 
for debt was definitely abolished and therefore no debtor in Athens could be reduced 
into slavery.363 Neaera, after all, had borrowed money from Phrinion in order to pay for 
her manumission, and she owed him this money and yet failed to pay it back, as she 
escaped to Megara. Neaera’s failure to fulfil her obligation(s) towards Phrinion, 
therefore, could not have led to the former’s reduction into slavery by the latter (because 
of the Solonian reform), and for this reason the ἀγωγή by Phrinion was illegal. 
Phrinion, however, does not bring a δίκη ἀφαιρέσεως against Stephanus, since some 
friends of both parties convince them to recur to the decision of three private arbitrators, 
as is described in paragraph 46 of the speech: 
 
[Dem.] 59.46: συνελθόντες δ᾽ οὗτοι ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων καὶ αὐτῆς 
τῆς ἀνθρώπου τὰ πεπραγμένα, γνώμην ἀπεφήναντο, καὶ οὗτοι ἐνέμειναν αὐτῇ, τὴν 
μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἐλευθέραν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν, ἃ δ᾽ ἐξῆλθεν ἔχουσα 
Νέαιρα παρὰ Φρυνίωνος χωρὶς ἱματίων καὶ χρυσίων καὶ θεραπαινῶν, ἃ αὐτῇ τῇ 
ἀνθρώπῳ ἠγοράσθη, ἀποδοῦναι Φρυνίωνι πάντα: συνεῖναι δ᾽ ἑκατέρῳ ἡμέραν παρ᾽ 
ἡμέραν: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀλλήλους πείθωσι, ταῦτα κύρια εἶναι. 
 
They met in the temple and after hearing the facts from both parties and the woman herself 
they announced their decision, which the parties accepted, that the woman was to be free and her 
own mistress, but that Neaera should give back to Phrinion all that she took with her from 
Phrinion's house, except for clothing and jewellery and maidservants, which had been bought for 
the woman herself; she was to live with each of them day for day; but any other arrangement 
arrived at by mutual agreement should be binding. 
 
This is passage is also key for the understanding of Neaera’s condition after her 
liberation: the arbitrators decided that she had to be considered ‘ἄνθρωπον ἐλευθέραν 
εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν’ ([Dem.] 59.46). This expression clearly recalls the 
formula used in some manumission inscriptions from Delphi in which the manumitted 
slave is said to be ‘ἐλευθέρα … κυριεύουσα αὐτοσαυτᾶς’364: this formula aims to protect 
the legal condition of freedom enjoyed by ἀπελεύθεροι after manumission and stresses 
                                                          
363 Cf. Harris (2002), for a clear discussion on the legal distinction between enslavement for 
debt and debt-bondage; Harris further proves that Solon only abolished enslavement for debt, 
whereas debt-bondage continued to be practiced in Classical Athens long after Solon. 
364 Cf., for instance, FD III 2:224, 3:3, or 3:13 (all from the 2nd century B.C. Delphi). 
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that, from a legal point of view, manumitted slaves are masters of themselves, and no 
other form of private ownership exists on them after their manumission. 
Yet, while the content of the arbitrators’ decision confirms that Neaera, legally 
speaking, is a free woman (thus implying that no right of ownership over her existed, 
neither by Phrynion nor by Stephanus), it also states that she has to live with each of 
them every other day, and this constitutes a considerable limitation of the freedom that 
Neaera de facto enjoys.365  The rationale behind the decision taken by the arbitrators 
clearly lies in Neaera’s debt with Phrinion. Since she borrowed money from him and 
thus became his debtor366, she was in a position by which she had obligations towards 
Phrinion, which likely consisted in living with him (it is less clear from the text the reason 
why it was also decided that she had to live one day with Stephanus: such a decision 
might reflect what her real will was, rather than the existence of an actual obligation 
towards him). In this regard, it may be possible to suggest that the existence, in the case 
of Neaera, of an obligation following her debt with Phrinion, resembles the institution 
of debt-bondage (which can be defined as the condition of a debtor who, as a legally free 
individual, ‘remains under the control of the creditor only until his debt is paid off’)367, 
rather than παραμονή strictu sensu, and, at the same time, further proves – although 
from a different angle – that in practice παραμονή involved obligations over a free 
person, in the same way as debt-bondage did. 
To sum up, the analysis of paragraphs 33 to 46 of the speech suggests that Neaera’s 
condition after her manumission was characterised by the following elements: 
Phrinion’s behaviour towards her reflects his power or authority (ἐξουσία) over Neaera; 
                                                          
365 The arbitrators’ decision further states, on the one hand, that the parties could come to a 
different arrangement on this point, which had to be considered equally valid and binding and, 
on the other hand, that Neaera would have to return all the goods that she had taken from 
Phrinion’s house except for those that he had bought personally for her: cf. [Dem.] 59.45 
(…συνεῖναι δ’ἑκατέρῳ ἡμέραν παρ’ἡμέραν· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀλλήλους πείθωσι, ταῦτα 
κύρια εἶναι…). On the function of private arbitrations and their nature (‘an agreement between 
two litigants, who both consent to accept the decision of an independent third party as decisive, 
forgoing their right to appeal to a jury’), cf. Todd (1993): 123-125; more recently, see Harris (2006): 
157. 
366 Cf. Faraguna (2012b): 140. 
367 Harris (2002): 417. 
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Neaera’s return to Athens is possible only after she nominates Stephanus as her 
προστάτης; an ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν is carried out by Phrinion, which was followed by 
the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν by Stephanus; the dispute is settled by recurring to three 
arbitrators, whose decision makes a very clear distinction between Neaera’s legal 
condition (ἀυτήν ἀυτῆς κυρίαν) and her de facto situation as a freedwoman (obligation 
to ‘live with’ Phrinion and with Stephanus in alternate days – συνεῖναι –). 
To conclude, the analysis of the speech provides important information with regard 
to both the legal nature of the act through which Neaera was granted freedom (in 
Corinth) and her condition after manumission (in Athens). As for the first point, the 
speech makes it clear that, whenever payment was required by masters in return for the 
liberation of slaves, manumission has the nature of a bilateral legal transaction between 
the slaves’ master and a third party, whose role in the manumission procedure was 
limited to paying the money to the slaves’ κύριοι. Moreover, these passages point to the 
inadequacy of defining this kind of manumission as a πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ: not only 
the vocabulary is completely different from that of sale and simply suggests that 
payment is made by a third party in return for liberation, but also indicates that no 
transfer of ownership takes place, not even a conditional or fictitious one. The speech 
makes it clear that Neaera’s liberation is immediate and descends automatically from 
the payment made by Phrinion to Timanoridas and Eukrates. As for the second point, 
the speech suggests that, after her liberation, Neaera became an ἀπελευθέρα and her 
condition as such was de iure one of freedom, but de facto this freedom was limited in 
several ways. This contrast between de iure and de facto levels clearly recalls the condition 
of manumitted slaves as recorded in the Delphic inscriptions: in this latter case, the 
institution of παραμονή requires to make a distinction between the de facto condition of 
ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή duty and their de iure condition, which was clearly one 
of freedom. Similarly, the case of Neaera – although strictly speaking may not be 
described as a case of παραμονή – is characterised by a ‘contrast’ between her legal 
condition, which is clearly one of freedom, and her de facto situation, which is one of 
debt-bondage; both cases (παραμονή and debt-bondage), however, involved very 
similar obligations. Moreover, a closer look at the text of the speech shows that many 
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elements are similar to some of the clauses often mentioned in the Delphic inscriptions. 
For instance, the features of the ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, through which Neaera’s 
freedom was legally protected, are very similar to the συλᾶν mentioned in the Delphic 
manumissions through ‘sale’ as a response to an act of ἀγωγή εἰς δουλείαν; Neaera’s de 
facto freedom seems to be undermined by severe limitations of movement (as the 
arbitrators’ decision compelling her to συνεῖναι with Stephanus and Phrinion clearly 
shows), which are very similar to those that characterised the condition of the 
ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή of the Delphic manumissions, who were obliged to ‘stay 
with’ their former masters for years, or also for the rest of the latter’s lives. 
 
5. Manumission and sale in Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes. 
The contrast between sale and manumission and their respective effects is even more 
evident in the Against Athenogenes, a forensic speech by Hypereides dated between 330 
and 324 B.C. 368  Although scholars traditionally maintain that the attempted 
manumission of a young slave boy as described in this speech constitutes, together with 
Against Neaera, a typical example of πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ as a specific form of 
manumission, the vocabulary used in the speech makes a clear distinction between sale 
and manumission, and thus reinforces the idea of the inadequacy of such definition. 
The speech was written for Epikrates, who brings a δίκη βλάβης for damages against 
Athenogenes.369 The terms of the litigation can be synthetized as follows: ‘the lawsuit 
arose from a contract of sale whereby Epicrates purchased three slaves – a man named 
Midas and his two sons, in one of whom Epicrates had an erotic interest – and the 
perfumery they managed from Athenogenes for 40 mn. In doing so he explicitly agreed 
to assume all debts that Midas had incurred in running the perfumery. Epicrates asserts 
that Athenogenes misrepresented the amount of debt in negotiating and drawing up the 
                                                          
368 Whitehead (2000): 266. The initial part of the speech is lost: according to commentators, this 
‘amounted to two or three columns; something between four and nine chapters’ (see Whitehead 
[2000]: 279, who, in his commentary on the speech, maintains that the lost prologue ‘will have 
served three purposes: expressing the speakers’ embarrassment at being obliged to resort to law; 
giving a summary explanation … of how this unwanted and unwelcome necessity had arisen; 
and then beginning to narrate the plaintiff’s initial encounters with the crafty Athenogenes’). 
369 On the δίκη βλάβης, see Wolff (1943): 316-324; Villers (1989): 63. 
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contract and accordingly seeks to void the contract on grounds of fraud. In his defence, 
Athenogenes will rely on a general law of contract that provides that “whatever one man 
agrees with another is binding”’.370 
The contrast between sale and manumission characterises the very beginning of the 
speech. Epikrates had fallen in love with one of the three slaves who ran Athenogenes’ 
μυροπώλιον and wants to liberate him: for this reason, he suggests that he would pay 
forty minae to Athenogenes in order to manumit the young slave. Yet, Athenogenes, 
with the help of an ex ἑταίρα named Antigona, persuades Epikrates to pay the sum of 
forty minae not for the slave’s liberation, but for purchasing the entire μυροπώλιον 
together with the three slaves (the one Epikrates loves, his brother and his father 
Midas).371  It is clear, then, that although manumission was the initial intention that 
moved Epikrates to negotiate with Athenogenes, what the two parties actually 
concluded was a sale. The reason why Athenogenes insists in asking Epikrates for the 
payment of forty minae on the basis of a sale rather than on manumission lies, ultimately, 
on the opposite legal effects descending from the two transactions. The main point of the 
speech is in fact to determine whether the person who had to be considered liable for the 
debts incurred by the slaves in running the μυροπώλιον had to be identified with the 
owner at the time of the transactions (i.e. Athenogenes) or, rather, with the new owner 
of the slaves and of the μυροπώλιον (i.e. Epikrates).372 
As Epikrates suggests in paragraph 7, if Athenogenes had accepted Epikrates’ 
original intention (manumission), the litigation would not have started: as an effect of 
manumission, no transfer of ownership would have taken place and therefore no 
                                                          
370 Phillips (2009): 92. 
371 Maffi (2007): 212, stresses that the object of the sale were (only) the three slaves, whereas 
the acquisition of ownership over the μυροπώλιον, together with its credits and debts, would 
have automatically descended upon Epikrates from the purchase of the slaves who ran it. For this 
reason, he suggests that Epikrates would have been taking over all the debts of the perfumery, 
even though he had not expressly accepted them within the ὁμολογία. Talamanca, on the other 
hand, maintains that the object of the contract was the perfumery, whereas the acquisition of 
ownership over the slaves would have been an automatic effect descending upon Epikrates from 
the purchase of the μυροπώλιον, given that the three slaves were ‘una sorta di accessorio di tale 
oggetto e, in quanto “funzionali” all'esercizio dell’azienda, erano naturalmente ricompresi 
nell’alienazione della stessa’ (Talamanca [2007]: 224-225). 
372 Maffi (2007): 211-212. 
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problem about Epikrates’ possible responsibility for the debts would have emerged.373 
Since, on the contrary, the two parties decided to conclude a πρᾶσις ὠνή, the transaction 
determined a transfer of ownership over the slaves and the μυροπώλιον, and this led to 
the problem of the possible transfer of the liability for debts from the former owner to 
the new one. 
The different nature of the two acts is made clear in paragraphs 5 and 6, whereas 
paragraph 7 stresses their different effects. A closer look at these passages will make the 
point clearer: 
 
Hyp. 3.5-6: … σὺ μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὸ ἀργύριον ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβαλεῖς τοῦ Μίδου 
καὶ τῶν παίδων, ἐγὼ δέ σοι ἀποδώσομαι αὐτοὺς ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν 
μηδεὶς παρενοχλῇ μηδὲ διαφθείρῃ τὸν παῖδα, ἔπειτ᾽ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐγχειρῶσι 
πονηρεύεσθαι μηδὲν διὰ τὸν φόβον. τὸ δὲ  μέγιστον, νῦν μὲν ἂν δόξειαν δι᾽ ἐμὲ 
γεγονέναι ἐλεύθεροι: ἐὰν δὲ πριάμενος σὺ ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει εἶθ᾽ ὕστερον, ὅτε ἄν σοι 
δοκῇ, ἀφῇς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, διπλασίαν ἕξουσίν σοι τὴν χάριν. 
 
'You, you see', he said, 'are going to put up the money to liberate Midas and his sons. But I 
shall sell them to you outright. That way, nobody can bother you or corrupt the boy, and they 
themselves will not try any tricks because of fear. Best of all, though, as things stand now they 
would think it was I who had brought about their liberation, whereas if you buy them outright 
and then grant them their freedom later, when it suits you, they will be grateful to you twice over'. 
 
Sale and manumission are expressly opposed as two different transactions: not only 
Hyperides uses a specific vocabulary in referring to them, but he also stresses their 
opposite legal effects. If Epikrates had succeeded in his initial intention, he would have 
                                                          
373 From the text of the speech we cannot reach safe conclusions about the problem of the 
responsibility for the debts of the μυροπώλιον, although paragraph 7 suggests that at least the 
new owner was not to be considered responsible for the debts previously incurred by the slaves: 
Epikrates expressly states that ‘εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβάλλοιμι αὐτῶν τὸ ἀργύριον, 
τοῦτο μόνον ἀπώλλυον ὃ δοίην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἔπασχον: εἰ δὲ πριαίμην ὠνῇ καὶ 
πράσει, ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ τὰ χρέα ἀναδέξεσθαι, ὡς οὐθενὸς ἄξια ὄντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ προειδέναι, 
καὶ τοὺς πληρωτὰς τῶν ἐράνων ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ λαβών: ὅπερ ἐποίησεν’ (‘if, you see, I put up the 
money to buy their freedom I would merely lose whatever I gave him and suffer no serious harm; 
if on the other hand I bought them outright and accepted responsibility for their debts, which 
without knowing the facts in advance I assumed to be negligible, his intention was ultimately to 
bring down the creditors and the loan-depositors on me, once he had entrapped me in an 
agreement. Which is just what happened’). 
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paid the sum of forty minae to Athenogenes for the liberation of the young slave he loved. 
As a direct and immediate effect of the payment, the slave would have become a free 
individual and, consequently, no right of ownership would have existed over him, 
neither by Athenogenes (his former master) nor by Epikrates.  
The vocabulary used by Hyperides in describing Epikrates’ initial intention of 
manumitting the slave conveys the same meaning of the one used in [Dem.] 59.31-32 for 
Neaera’s manumission (κατατίθημι τάς μνᾶς): the expression ‘τό ἀργύριον 
ἐπ'ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβάλλειν’ simply refers to the payment of money in return for 
manumission. No connection is therefore made, or can be inferred, between sale and 
manumission, and the evidence from Against Athenogenes further proves that the 
qualification of this act as a πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ cannot be accepted. 
Paragraph 4 also confirms this point: when Epikrates is talking about his initial 
intention, he says that Antigona – in agreement with Athenogenes for the purpose of 
cheating Epikrates – lied to him, telling him that she could hardly convince Athenogenes 
to liberate the slaves, thus urging Epikrates to give him the forty minae before he 
changed his mind: 
 
Hyp. 3.4-5: συμπεπεικυῖα αὐτὸν ἀπολῦσαί μοι τόν τε Μίδαν καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς 
ἀμφοτέρους τετταράκοντα μνῶν, καὶ ἐκέλευέ με τὴν ταχίστην πορίζειν τὸ ἀργύριον, 
πρὶν μεταδόξαι τι Ἀθηνογένει. 
 
She had, for my sake, persuaded him with difficulty to release Midas and both his sons for forty 
mnai; and she told me to produce the money without delay before Athenogenes changed his mind 
on anything.  
 
Once again, the vocabulary of manumission, as corresponding to Epikrates’ initial 
intention, is different from that of sale: the liberation of the three slaves is expressed by 
the verb ἀπολύειν, and the verb of payment (πορίζειν τὸ ἀργύριον) shows that, if this 
had been made, payment for their manumission would not have been based on a sale. 
What Epikrates and Athenogenes actually concluded was, on the contrary, a sale. 
Athenogenes persuades Epikrates to pay the forty minae not for manumission, but as 
the purchase money in a sale, as the vocabulary of the speech makes clear: Athenogenes’ 
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proposal (ἐγὼ δέ σοι ἀποδώσομαι αὐτοὺς ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει)374 is in fact followed by the 
statement that the πρᾶσις ὠνή was concluded (τὰς δὲ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς ἐγὼ 
καταβαλὼν τὴν ὠνὴν ἐποιησάμην). 375  It is therefore clear that sale determines a 
transfer of ownership over the three slaves from Athenogenes to Epikrates, who thus 
becomes their new master. 
The passages above mentioned further confirm what is suggested by the analysis of 
the Delphic manumission inscriptions and by the Against Neaera: whenever masters 
required the payment of money for liberating their slaves, the legal nature of 
manumission was that of a bilateral legal transaction between the slaves’ master and a 
third party. Moreover, an overall reading of the evidence analysed so far shows that 
manumission in exchange for money was characterised by common features throughout 
the Greek world, in different πόλεις and times. Given that, in all these cases, the 
performance of valid manumissions in exchange for money always required the 
intervention of a third party in order to carry out a valid transaction with the slaves’ 
masters, it is possible to suggest that the former’s role is the same one and is necessary 
for a purely legal reason. The evidence shows three possible scenarios. The money paid 
for manumission could be provided: entirely by the third party (as in Against 
Athenogenes); partly by the third party and partly by the slave who is to be manumitted 
(as in Against Neaera); entirely by the slaves who are to be manumitted (as in the Delphic 
manumission inscriptions). In all these cases, a third party, necessarily different from the 
slave, has to intervene in the manumission procedure in order to allow slaves to pay for 
their freedom, given their lack of legal personality. Finally, all the evidence analysed 
above shows that no right of ownership is acquired by the third party over the 
manumitted slaves, who become legally free individuals immediately after payment is 
made. 
 
 
 
                                                          
374 Hyp. 3.5. 
375 Hyp. 3.9. 
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6. The manumissions of Rhodopis and Phila. 
The same considerations on the legal nature of manumission in exchange for money 
can be made for what is believed to represent ‘the earliest reference to a purchase for the 
purpose of freedom’376, namely, the episode referring to the liberation of the female slave 
Rhodopis as is described by Herodotus in the second Book of the Histories. It is important 
to point out that the episode of Rhodopis’ manumission is set in a geographical and 
chronological context which is different from those of the sources analysed so far, but 
what Herodotus tells about the act through which she was granted freedom is 
nonetheless significant and further confirms what the evidence from Against Neaera and 
Against Athenogenes suggests about manumission. 
Rhodopis was a slave of Thracian origins who belonged to Iadmon of Samos; she was 
then brought to Egypt by her master, where she was later released by a citizen from 
Mytilene, named Kharaxos, who had fallen in love with her: 
 
Hdt. 2.135.1: Ῥοδῶπις δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπίκετο Ἐάνθεω τοῦ Σαμίου κομίσαντος, 
ἀπικομένη δὲ κατ᾽ ἐργασίην ἐλύθη χρημάτων μεγάλων ὑπὸ ἀνδρὸς Μυτιληναίου 
Χαράξου τοῦ Σκαμανδρωνύμου παιδός, ἀδελφεοῦ δὲ Σαπφοῦς τῆς μουσοποιοῦ … 
Hdt. 2.135.6: Χάραξος δὲ ὡς λυσάμενος Ῥοδῶπιν ἀπενόστησε ἐς Μυτιλήνην. 
 
Rhodopis came to Egypt to work, brought by Xanthes of Samos, but upon her arrival was freed 
for a lot of money by Kharaxus of Mytilene, son of Scamandronymus and brother of Sappho the 
poetess … Kharaxus, after giving Rhodopis her freedom, returned to Mytilene. 
 
In this passage, the verb of manumission is λύειν (which conveys the same meaning 
of the composite form ἀπολύειν used by Epikrates in Hyp. 3.4): although Herodotus 
stresses that Kharaxos paid a large sum of money for Rhodopis’ liberation, there is no 
reason to believe that the episode describes a case of πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ or, in other 
words, that Kharaxos purchased Rhodopis, thus becoming her master, for the purpose 
of liberating her later in time or also immediately after the purchase.377 The text suggests 
the opposite, because it makes clear that, as an effect of the payment by Kharaxos to her 
                                                          
376 Glazebrook (2014): 56. 
377 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 209; Kamen (2014): 300; Glazebrook (2014): 56. 
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master, Rhodopis becomes immediately free. In this case, Rhodopis’ condition is one of 
freedom both de iure and de facto: while she remains in Egypt, where the tradition says 
she became rich and well-known, Kharoxos goes back to Mytilene and therefore no 
connection between him and Rhodopis exists after the latter’s manumission. Heredotus, 
in other words, makes no mention of a παραμονή duty or other obligations as 
characterising Rhodopis’ condition after her manumission. This evidence further proves 
that these sources do not justify any confusion between sale and manumission (as is 
implied by those scholars who describe these episodes as πράσεις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ), and 
that manumission was conceived of as a bilateral legal transaction by which the third 
party did not acquire any right of ownership over the manumitted slave. 
One final episode which does not refer to a manumission performed in Athens, but 
confirms the distinciton between sale and manumission, is mentioned by Athenaeus in 
the thirteenth Book of the Deipnosophistae, in which he mentions, although very briefly, 
the manumission of a female slave named Phila by her master, Hypereides, who had 
purchased her for a large sum of money: 
 
Ath. 13.58: Ὑπερείδης δ᾽ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκ τῆς πατρῴας οἰκίας τὸν υἱὸν ἀποβαλὼν 
Γλαύκιππον Μυρρίνην τὴν πολυτελεστάτην ἑταίραν ἀνέλαβε, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐν 
ἄστει εἶχεν, ἐν Πειραιεῖ δὲ Ἀρισταγόραν, Φίλαν δ᾽ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, ἣν πολλῶν 
ὠνησάμενος χρημάτων εἶχεν ἐλευθερώσας, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ οἰκουρὸν αὐτὴν 
ἐποιήσατο, ὡς Ἰδομενεὺς ἱστορεῖ. 
 
But Hyperides the orator, having driven his son Glaucippus out of his house, received into it 
that most extravagant courtesan Myrrhina, and kept her in the city; and he also kept Aristagora 
in the Piraeus, and Phila at Eleusis, whom he bought for a very large sum, and then liberated; 
and after that he made her his housekeeper, as Idomeneus relates. 
 
After narrating that Hypereides used to spend a lot of money in buying expensive 
ἑταῖραι, Athenaeus mentions the episode of the liberation of one of them, named Phila, 
who was Hypereides’ slave in Eleusis: it is therefore likely that the passage from 
Athenaeus refers to a manumission performed in the 4th century B.C. at Eleusis. 
Once again, the Greek text is characterised by a clear-cut distinction between the 
vocabulary of sale and the vocabulary of manumission: sale is referred to with the verb 
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ὠνέομαι, whereas manumission is described with the verb ἐλευθερόω, which means ‘to 
set free’. The passage informs us that Hypereides had first bought Phila for a large sum 
of money, thus becoming her master (he then decided to keep her as his ἑταίρα: the same 
use of a female slave as an ἑταίρα was also made by Timanoridas and Eukrates with 
regard to Neaera, after they purchased her from Nikaretes) and then, later in time, he 
manumitted her. From the text we cannot infer whether Hypereides liberated Phila for 
free (ἐπὶ δωρεᾷ) or in exchange for money (as in the case of Neaera or Rhodopis); what 
is important to stress is that the vocabulary of sale is different from that of manumission, 
that sale and manumission have opposite legal effects and, ultimately, that this episode 
cannot be described, as some scholars have suggested, as a πρᾶσις ἐπί ἐλευθερίᾳ378, 
since in this specific case payment for freedom is not even mentioned.379 
                                                          
378 Calderini (1965): 219; see also Kamen (2014): 300, who translates the passage as ‘… and in 
Eleusis he kept Phila, whom he freed having purchased her for a very large sum of money’ and 
concludes that ‘Phila … was likely “sold” for the purpose of freedom’. Kapparis (1999): 210, on 
the other hand, correctly maintains that ‘Phila … was liberated by her master Hyperides after he 
had bought her from Nikarete. Courtesans sometimes were first bought as slaves and shortly if 
not immediately afterwards liberated’. Kapparis’ comment makes it clear that sale and 
manumission are kept distinguished and that manumission is carried out only after having 
purchased a slave; Kamen’s suggestion, on the other hand, implies that sale and manumission 
were intermingled within one single transaction and that, as an automatic effect of the purchase 
(sale), Phila was manumitted. 
379  I am not convinced that Plut. Vit. Dec. 849d-e (ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια 
καταφερής, ὡς ἐκβαλεῖν μὲν τὸν υἱὸν εἰσαγαγεῖν δὲ Μυρρίνην τὴν πολυτελεστάτην ἑταίραν, 
ἐν Πειραιεῖ δ᾽ ἔχειν Ἀρισταγόραν, ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις κτήμασι Φίλαν τὴν Θηβαίαν, 
εἴκοσι μνῶν λυτρωσάμενος) refers to the same episode, i.e. to Phila’s manumission (as it seems 
to be suggested by Calderini [1965]: 219; Kamen [2014]: 300), since it more likely refers to the 
moment in which Hyperides acquires ownership over Phila, who would thus become his slave. 
The passage is however problematic. On the one hand, it mentions that Hyperides had ransomed 
Phila for twenty minae (εἴκοσι μνῶν λυτρωσάμενος). Legally speaking, ransom does not imply 
that the ransomer acquires ownership over the ransomed individual: after the payment of the 
ransom, the ransomed became legally free, even though ransom could (but not necessarily did) 
imply the latter’s obligation of paying back the ransom, this constituting the result of a contractual 
obligation between the ransomer and the ransomed (contra, see, most recently, Sosin 
[forthcoming]). While performing these further obligations, the ransomed was legally free. After 
all, the main purpose of ransom – and, at the same time, the reason why ransom is legally and 
terminologically distinguished from sale – is that of liberating a person from a previous reduction 
into slavery (as typically happened for war captives); if ransom implies a transfer of ownership 
(which is what would ultimately happen, if the ransomed became the ransomer’s property), its 
purpose, structure and nature would not differ from those of sale, and therefore there would be 
no reason to distinguish between sale and ransom. The condition of the ransomed who, after 
being liberated, was compelled to perform further services towards the ransomer in order to pay 
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7. Παραμονή and post-manumission obligations in the Athenian evidence. 
As I pointed out in the first part of this chapter, the analysis of the Athenian sources 
shows that after manumission ἀπελεύθεροι became legally free, in the sense that they 
were no longer considered to be their former masters’ property. Sometimes the evidence 
also shows that those ἀπελεύθεροι who chose to reside in Athens had specific duties 
towards the πόλις. All of these duties reflect the fact that in Athens ἀπελεύθεροι were 
considered to be free non-citizen residents, and therefore excluded from those political 
rights and privileges which were strictly reserved to adult male citizens.380 
The duties of ἀπελεύθεροι in Athens were similar to those of metics and for this 
reason it has commonly been held that freedmen were included among the metic 
population.381 Yet, a closer look at the Athenian sources shows that the duties owed to 
the πόλις by the two groups were not identical, and their different features suggest to 
consider them as two separate groups of non-citizen residents.382  
First, ἀπελεύθεροι had to pay a residence-tax, known as μετοίκιον, which consisted 
in twelve drachmas a year for men and six drachmas a year for women. The μετοίκιον 
had to be paid by metics also, both males and females.383 Some sources, however, suggest 
that ἀπελεύθεροι were perhaps imposed another tax, the τριώβολον, which is 
mentioned only by Harpocration, and therefore the subjection of ἀπελεύθεροι to the 
τριώβολον is still somehow controversial.384 The fact that both metics and ἀπελεύθεροι 
had to pay a direct, regular and personal tax for residing in Athens has been interpreted 
as having not only a financial impact but also symbolic implications, since direct and 
personal taxation represents ‘the symbol of subjection to a tyrant, and a burden never 
                                                          
back the ransom is similar to that of those ἀπελεύθεροι who, after manumission, where bound 
to their former masters by the παραμονή duty, being, during this period, legally free. 
380 Youni (2008): 166. 
381 For instance, Calderini (1965): 307; Biscardi (1982): 95; Todd (1993): 190; Martini (2005): 46; 
Youni (2008): 166. 
382 Dimopoulou (2008): 35; Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 97. See also Kamen (2011). 
383 Todd (1997): 114-115, who interprets the imposition of the μετοίκιον on both male and 
female metics as representative of the fact that ‘the gap between male and female … is in fact 
specific to citizens, and is part of the construction of male citizen gender. Among metics, the 
division between male and female is less clear-cut, and among slaves, it is very blurred indeed’. 
384 Harp., s.v. μετοίκιον. Some other authors, on the other hand, maintain that also metics had 
to pay the τριώβολον: cf. Pollux 3.55; Hesychius s.v. μετοίκιον. 
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imposed on Athenian citizens. It was a powerful indication of the metics’ subordinate 
position’. 385  The ultimate significance of this financial duty is thus to create a gap 
between citizens and non citizens, given that citizens were not subject to regular taxation, 
but to non-regular contributions only.386 
Second, ἀπελεύθεροι in Athens had to nominate their former master as their 
προστάτης. This is another element that makes the condition of ἀπελεύθεροι in Athens 
very close to that of metics, since the latter had to register an Athenian citizen as their 
ἐπιστάτης. The role of the προστάτης of freedmen and its relation with the ἐπιστάτης 
of the metics is still controversial, since the extant sources do not allow safe conclusions 
on this point as well as on the specific roles of the two figures. It is generally agreed, 
however, that the προστάτης of ἀπελεύθεροι had the main function of representing 
freedmen in court, given their lack of procedural capacity; whereas the role of the 
ἐπιστάτης for metics would be mainly a symbolic one and his functions no more than 
nominal.387 There was however a fundamental difference between ἀπελεύθεροι and 
metics as for their respective προστάται: while metics could choose any Athenian citizen 
as their ἐπιστάτης, ἀπελεύθεροι had to nominate their manumittors as their προστάται; 
if they had chosen a different person, a specific private action, known as δίκη 
ἀποστασίου, could be brought against them by their manumittors.388 
This leads to the third fundamental feature of the condition of freedmen in Athens: 
although both ἀπελεύθεροι and metics were under the jurisdiction of the archon 
Polemarch, different actions could be brought against them in specific circumstances. 
Metics could be prosecuted by any Athenian citizen with a γραφή ἀπροστασίου before 
the Polemarch if they did not pay the μετοίκιον or failed to register an Athenian citizen 
                                                          
385 Todd (1993): 198. Similarly, Martini (2005): 42. 
386 This point has been best expressed by Todd (1993): 184: ‘financial obligations were laid on 
richer citizens only. In Greek political theory, to impose direct regular taxation was characteristic 
of a tyrant; and although there was a significant range of citizen taxes, these were all either 
indirect (like harbour dues) or irregular (like the eisphora, a capital tax imposed on the rich at 
times of financial shortage)’. 
387 As pointed out before, however, the evidence from the so-called φιάλαι ἐξελευθερικαί 
shows that ἀπελεύθεροι (as well as metics) could act as actors in court cases without being 
represented by anyone (see Harris [forthcoming]). 
388 Harp., s.v. ἀποστασίου: see infra. 
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as their ἐπιστάτης.389  Άπελεύθεροι, on the other hand, could be sued with a δίκη 
ἀποστασίου, a private action which manumittors could bring against manumitted 
slaves in three specific cases: first, if ἀπελεύθεροι went away from them; second, if 
ἀπελεύθεροι chose another person as their προστάτης; third, if they failed to do what 
the laws prescribe.390 Harpocration finally specifies that acquitted ἀπελεύθεροι in a δίκη 
ἀποστασίου became ‘fully’ free, whereas those who lost the trial would have reverted 
into slavery. 
One further element which characterises the condition of ἀπελεύθεροι is that if they 
did not have any legitimate heir/descendent, all their goods would have been inherited 
by their former masters, given that they could not dispose of their property as they 
liked.391 
Harpocration’s definition of δίκη ἀποστασίου and, more specifically, his 
identification of the cases in which manumittors cold bring a δίκη ἀποστασίου against 
manumitted slaves, suggests the possible existence in Athens of obligations imposed on 
freedmen after their manumission. The evidence for the existence in Athens of an 
institution similar to the παραμονή of the Delphic manumission inscriptions is scanty392; 
yet, a reading of the Athenian sources in the light of the information provided by the 
Delphic inscriptions seems to show that παραμονή existed in Athens, that the 
imposition or not of παραμονή duties suggests the existence of two categories of 
manumitted slaves (both enjoying the same legal condition of freedom), and that its legal 
nature is that of an obligation owed by ἀπελεύθεροι to their former masters. 
A closer look at the passage from Harpocration will make the point clearer: 
 
Harp., s.v. ἈΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΟΥ: δίκη τίς ἐστι κατὰ τῶν ἀπελευθερωθέντων δεδομένη 
τοῖς ἀπελευθερώσασιν, ἐὰν ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ̓ αὐτῶν ἢ ἕτερον ἐπιγράφωνται 
προστάτην, καὶ ἃ κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι μὴ ποιῶσιν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἁλόντας δεῖ δούλους 
εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ νικήσαντας τελέως ἤδη ἐλευθέρους. 
 
                                                          
389 Harp., s.v. ἀπροστασίου. 
390 Harp., s.v. ἀποστασίου. 
391 Is. 4.9. 
392 Youni (2008): 168; Dimopoulou (2008): 31. 
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This is a kind of a private law-suit, which manumittors could bring against manumitted slaves 
if they left them, or registered another ‘prostates’ and did not do what the laws require. Those who 
are convicted become slaves, those who are acquitted become completely free. (Tr. Zelnick-
Abramovitz) 
 
According to Harpocration, the first case in which manumittors could bring a δίκη 
ἀποστασίου against manumitted slaves was when ἀπελεύθεροι ‘went away from them’ 
(ἐὰν ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ̓ αὐτῶν). The fact that a specific action could be brought before 
the Polemarch if manumitted slaves left their manumittors (the verb used by 
Harpocration is ἀφεστήξω) implies that, after manumission, ἀπελεύθεροι could be 
required to ‘remain with’ their former masters: this obligation clearly recalls the 
παραμονή duty of the Delphic inscriptions. 
Harpocration is not the only evidence for the existence of παραμονή obligations in 
Athens, since other sources refer, although sometimes only through brief remarks, to the 
imposition of post-manumission obligations upon freedmen. 
As I mentioned before, [Dem.] 59.46 seems to suggest the possible imposition of a 
similar duty on Neaera after her manumission in Corinth and her return to Athens as an 
ἀπελευθέρα. The arbitrators’ decision states, on the one hand, that Neaera is legally free 
in the sense that she does not belong to anyone (she is, in other words, ‘her own mistress’: 
ἄνθρωπον ἐλευθέραν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν); on the other hand, the 
arbitrators decided that she should not enjoy freedom of movement and action, given 
that she had to ‘live with’ Stephanus and Phrinion on alternate days. The verb describing 
Neaera’s duty to live with Phrynion and Stephanus in alternate days is συνεῖναι, which 
suggests that she had to ‘stay with’ the two men in their households: the content of this 
obligation is thus very similar to that of the Delphic παραμονή. 
Another important source of information comes from Diogenes Laertius: recent 
studies have pointed out that the wills of Aristotle, Theophrastus and Lyco, as reported 
by Diogenes, not only are authentic and reliable third and fourth century B.C. documents, 
but also provide valuable information on the existence of παραμονή obligations in 
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Athens. 393  After a detailed analysis of the documents, these works have disclosed 
fundamental information both on the nature of παραμονή and on the condition of 
manumitted slaves under παραμονή obligations.394 For this reason, I will only refer to 
the case of Theophrastus’ will as a case-study, since it provides valuable information for 
the understanding of the different possible scenarios that could characterise the 
condition of ἀπελεύθεροι after manumission. 
 
D.L. 5.54-55: ὅπως δὲ συνείρηται, μετὰ τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβάντα, τὰ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν 
καὶ τὸ μνημεῖον καὶ τὸν κῆπον καὶ τὸν περίπατον θεραπευόμενα συνεπιμελεῖσθαι 
καὶ Πομπύλον τούτων ἐποικοῦντα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενον 
ἣν καὶ πρότερον: τῆς δὲ λυσιτελείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἔχοντας ταῦτα. 
Πομπύλῳ δὲ καὶ Θρέπτῃ πάλαι ἐλευθέροις οὖσι καὶ ἡμῖν πολλὴν χρείαν 
παρεσχημένοις … τῶν δὲ παίδων Μόλωνα μὲν καὶ Τίμωνα καὶ Παρμένοντα ἤδη 
ἐλευθέρους ἀφίημι: Μανῆν δὲ καὶ Καλλίαν παραμείναντας ἔτη τέτταρα ἐν τῷ κήπῳ 
καὶ συνεργασαμένους καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους γενομένους ἀφίημι ἐλευθέρους. 
 
And according to previous agreement let the charge of attending, after my decease, to the 
temple and the monument and the garden and the walk be shared by Pompylus in person, living 
close by as he does, and exercising the same supervision over all other matters as before; and those 
who hold the property shall watch over his interests. Pompylus and Threpta have long been 
emancipated and have done me much service … And of my slaves I at once emancipate Molon 
and Timon and Parmeno; to Manes and Callias I give their freedom on condition that they stay 
four years in the garden and work there together and that their conduct is free from blame. 
 
This passage from Theophrastus’ will shows three different situations. On the one 
hand, it mentions some ἀπελεύθεροι (i.e., freedmen who had already been manumitted 
at the time of the will: their names are Pampylus and Threpta) who during Theophrastus’ 
life had to perform specific services as post-manumission obligation. According to the 
provision of the will, these ἀπελεύθεροι shall continue to perform the same services 
even after the philosopher’s death. These duties consist in taking care of the garden and 
                                                          
393 The point has been recently made by Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 104-110, who show that the 
evidence from Diogenes Laertius is fundamental for a proper understanding of Athenian 
παραμονή, and oppose those scholarly opinions which either denied the reliability of the 
documents (Cohen [1998]: 114 n. 47; Meyer [2010]: 27 n. 69), or believed that they do not reflect 
Athenian practice, but foreign customs (Gernet [1955]: 171-172). 
394 Cf. Canevaro, Lewis (2014). 
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the temple: even though they are not referred to as παραμονή but, rather, as θεραπεία, 
they imply that these freedmen have to live nearby their former master’s household in 
order to perform these specific services. On the other hand, the will mentions some 
slaves who are set free in the will with the further obligation of παραμένειν for seven 
years in the garden working together (their names are Manes and Callias): this obligation 
suggests that these newly freed slaves will be in a condition similar to that of those slaves 
who had already been manumitted before, given that their obligation to remain and 
work in the garden keeps them somehow connected to their former master’s household 
and limits their freedom of movement and action. One final group of slaves, by contrast, 
are set free but do not appear to be bound to any post-manumission duty towards their 
manumittor (Molon, Timon and Parmeion): this means, in other words, that they are no 
longer attached to the latter’s household, but can constitute their own. 
Theophrastus’ will therefore provides an excellent example for the understanding of 
the possible conditions of ἀπελεύθεροι after manumission. More specifically, the cases 
of Manes and Callias, on the one hand, and of Molon, Timon and Parmeion, on the other 
hand, show that manumitted slaves could be required or not to perform further services 
towards their former masters, but as an effect of manumission were nonetheless legally 
free. Those who were required to παραμένειν were still attached to their manumittors’ 
household and thus did not have freedom of movement and action; by contrast, those 
who were set free with no further obligations towards their former masters were no 
longer attached to the latter’s household and could constitute one of their own. The same 
considerations are also suggested by the analysis of Aristotle’s (D.L 5.15) and Lyco’s (D.L 
5.69-74) wills. The fact that after manumission these ἀπελεύθεροι enjoyed freedom of 
movement and action recalls the clause, attested in the majority of the Delphic 
manumission inscriptions, by which manumitted slaves ‘are free to do whatever they 
want and to go wherever they want’ (for example, SGDI II 1697); whereas the fact that 
some others were required to ‘remain with’ their previous owners reflects the content of 
those Delphic inscriptions which obliged manumitted slaves to παραμένειν with their 
manumittors and to ‘do whatever they are ordered to do’ (for instance, SGDI II 1703). 
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There are two fundamental points which is important to keep in mind when 
considering the condition of manumitted slaves in Greece. The first one is that whether 
after manumission freedmen are required or not to perform further services towards 
their former masters, they are nonetheless legally free individuals. The difference 
between freedmen under παραμονή obligation and those ἀπελεύθεροι who are not 
bound by any obligation is that the former category enjoys a legal condition of freedom 
but not a de facto one, given that they are attached to their manumittors’ households, 
whereas those ἀπελεύθεροι who are not under παραμονή are free both de iure and de 
facto, since they are no longer connected to their former masters’ households. The second 
point is that the overall condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή is a temporary one: 
whether their obligation to ‘remain with’ is meant to last for specific years or for the rest 
of their manumittors’ lives, at the end of this period they acquire also freedom of 
movement and action, which means that they can constitute their own household. 
Ancient sources often refer to the acquisition of de facto freedom by mentioning that, 
at the end of the παραμονή period, ἀπελεύθεροι will be ‘completely free’. A typical 
example of this expression is offered by Harpocration’s definition of δίκη ἀποστασίου: 
Harpocration says that those ἀπελεύθεροι who are acquitted in a δίκη ἀποστασίου are 
‘completely free’ (τοὺς δὲ νικήσαντας τελέως ἤδη ἐλευθέρους), whereas those who 
lose the trial revert into slavery (τοὺς μὲν ἁλόντας δεῖ δούλους εἶναι). As I mentioned 
before, one of the cases in which manumittors could bring a δίκη ἀποστασίου against 
manumitted slaves was when the latter abandoned the household of the former: if 
acquitted, therefore, ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή would be ‘fully free’, i.e. they 
would no longer be bound to their manumittors’ household and would have acquired 
freedom of movement and action. While remarking the temporary length of this duty, 
this statement by Harpocration clearly points to the existence of two different categories 
of manumitted slaves, all labelled as ἀπελεύθεροι but with a clear differentiation as for 
their de facto condition. This means, on the other hand, that ‘ἀπελεύθεροι can be subject 
to δίκη ἀποστασίου if they have obligations (chiefly that of remaining in the household 
of the manumittor), but they clearly cannot once they are τελέως ἐλευθέρους, because 
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in that case they no longer have such obligations. Yet in both cases these individuals 
must be unequivocally identified as freedmen, ἀπελεύθεροι’.395 
Similar considerations as for the condition of manumitted slaves under παραμονή 
obligations are also confirmed in a passage from Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae, which does 
not directly refer to the existence of post-manumission obligations, but rather focuses on 
the condition of ἀπελεύθεροι (and slaves) within their former masters’ households: 
 
Ath., Deipn. 6.267 b-c: διαφέρειν δέ ψησι Χρύσιππος δοῦλον οἰκέτου, γράφων ἐν 
δευτέρῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀπελευθέρους μὲν δούλους ἔτι εἶναι, οἰκέτας δὲ 
τοὺς μὴ τῆς κτήσεως ἀφειμένους. ‘ὁ γὰρ οἰκέτης (φησί) δοῦλος ἐν κτήσει 
κατατεταγμένος’. 
 
Chrysippus, writing On Concord, says in the second book that a slave differs from a domestic 
in that freedmen are still slaves, whereas those who have not been released from ownership are 
domestics. ‘For,’ says he, ‘the domestic is a slave appointed thereto by ownership’. 
 
This passage is significant as it makes a distinction between the condition of 
ἀπελεύθεροι and that of οἰκέται (whom, in the context of this passage, have to be 
identified with slaves) with regard to the right of ownership.396 According to Athenaeus, 
the difference between οἰκέται and ἀπελεύθεροι is that while the former are δοῦλοι 
subject to their masters’ κτῆσις, the latter are still (ἔτι) δοῦλοι, but are not subject to the 
κτῆσις of anyone. Two main points can be inferred from the passage. First, Athenaeus 
further confirms that the relationship between manumitted slaves and their former 
masters is not based on the right of ownership (κτῆσις): it follows that the latter cannot 
dispose of the former, since the rights and duties descending from ownership are no 
longer existing.397 After all, the point made by Athenaeus is that the existence or not of 
the right of ownership is the distinguishing mark of ἀπελεύθεροι vis-à-vis slaves, and 
therefore it further suggests that freedmen (under παραμονή) cannot be conceived of as 
                                                          
395 Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 100. 
396 On the relationship between δοῦλος and οἰκέτης in this passage and, more specifically, for 
the use of οἰκέτης as referring to slavery in its legal sense (i.e. a relationship based on the right of 
ownership) and of δοῦλος in its metaphorical sense of a relationship based on domination, rather 
than ownership, see Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 101. See also Martini (1995): 15-16. 
397 Martini (1995): 15-16. 
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the property of someone. Second, Athenaeus seems to imply that (some) manumitted 
slaves kept a very strong connection with their former masters which made them ‘look 
like’ slaves whereas, in legal terms, they were not. The point can be interpreted in the 
sense that ‘despite not being owned, freedmen can still be δοῦλοι in a philosophical 
sense, insofar as they lay under the domination of their ex-master to whom they owed 
obligations’.398 Athenaeus, in other words, seems to confirm, on the one hand, that post-
manumission obligations could be imposed on (some) freedmen in Athens; on the other 
hand, his statement further reinforces the idea of a contrast between the de facto condition 
of manumitted slaves under παραμονή (which could be very similar to that of slaves, 
given the strong attachment they often kept with their former masters’ household) and 
their legal condition as free individuals (in the sense that they were not subject to their 
manumittors’ right of ownership). 
One further source which could possibly refer to the existence of post-manumission 
obligations in Athens is a passage from Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, where Socrates says 
that, once freed, manumitted slaves will be happy to work (ἐργάζειν) and παραμένειν 
with their former masters (Xen. Oecon. 3.4: ‘ἔνθα δὲ λελυμένους καὶ ἐθελόντας τε (τοὺς 
οἰκέτας) ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ παραμένειν’). The verb used by Socrates in referring to the 
services that manumitted slaves have to perform towards manumittors is παραμένειν, 
which directly points to the existence in Athens of an institution similar to the Delphic 
παραμονή.399 
                                                          
398 Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 102. A similar idea has been suggested by Martini (1995): 16-17, 
even though he is wrong in maintaining that the condition resulting from the imposition of 
παραμονή duties upon slaves is a half-slavery one: ‘dal punto di vista greco, la posizione 
giuridica degli ἀπελεύθεροι in Atene fosse … quella abbastanza ambigua e difficile a 
comprendere per noi abituati alla summa divisio gaiana degli homines in liberi e servi, di soggetti 
utilizzabili ancora come schiavi ma dei quali, in quanto sottratti alla κτῆσις, non si sarebbe 
verosimilmente più potuto disporre nel senso, ad esempio, di cederli ad altri’, and later concludes 
that ‘sulla base del testo … di Ateneo … a me è parso addirittura di poter ipotizzare … che anche 
ad Atene esistesse … qualcosa di simile alla c.d. paramoné, ossia una condizione di quasi-schiavitù, 
caratterizzata dall’obbligo per il soggetto liberato di dover ancora rimanere per un certo tempo 
accanto all’ex padrone o altra persona designata da costui’ (Martini [2005]: 46-47). 
399  Westermann (1955): 25; Martini (1995): 13-14. Another possible piece of evidence for 
παραμονή in Athens is perhaps a passage from the eleventh book of Plato’s Laws, where the 
philosopher describes the duty of freedmen to provide θεραπεία towards their manumittors 
(Plat. Leg. 11.914e-915c). 
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Finally, one more passage which can be perhaps understood as reflecting the 
existence of παραμονή in Athens comes from the eleventh book of Plato’s Laws: it has 
to be stressed, however, that in this passage Plato refers to the treatment of slaves and 
freedmen in the imaginary πόλις of Magnesia, and the possibility of using the Laws as a 
source of information for Athenian laws and customs has sometimes been questioned 
by scholars. 400  The common view, however, acknowledges that Plato’s theorization 
generally reflects Athenian practices, although some elements are probably the result of 
variations made by Plato for the purpose of adaptation to his constitutional model.401 
The reading of this passage seems to suggest that the practice of imposing post-
manumission obligations upon freedmen was well known at the time, and probably 
reflected Athenian practice: 
 
Plat. Leg. 11.915a-b: ἀγέτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀπελεύθερον, ἐάν τις μὴ θεραπεύῃ τοὺς 
ἀπελευθερώσαντας ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς: θεραπεία δὲ φοιτᾶν τρὶς τοῦ μηνὸς τὸν 
ἀπελευθερωθέντα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀπελευθερώσαντος ἑστίαν, ἐπαγγελλόμενον ὅτι 
χρὴ δρᾶν τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἅμα δυνατῶν, καὶ περὶ γάμου ποιεῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν συνδοκῇ 
τῷ γενομένῳ δεσπότῃ. πλουτεῖν δὲ τοῦ ἀπελευθερώσαντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μᾶλλον: τὸ 
δὲ πλέον γιγνέσθω τοῦ δεσπότου. 
 
Freedmen too may be arrested if they fail to perform their services to their manumittors, or 
perform them inadequately. The services are these: three times a month a freedman must proceed 
to the home of his manumittor and offer to do anything lawful and practicable; and as regards 
marrying, he must do whatever his former master thinks right. He must not grow more wealthy 
than his manumittor; if he does, the excess must become the property of the master. 
 
The services that manumitted slaves have to perform in the imaginary πόλις of 
Magnesia are labelled as θεραπεία, a term that we find also in Athens for post-
manumission obligations (for example, D.L. 5.54-55). Even though the specific 
articulations of θεραπεία as listed by Plato might not be reflecting real practice, they 
                                                          
400 On the inadequacy of considering Plato’s theorisation on παραμονή as reflecting Athenian 
practices, see, typically, Martini (1995): 16. 
401  Morrow (1939): 97-109; Biscardi (1982): 32-33; Saunders (1991): 2-3; Youni (2008): 168; 
Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 102. More optimistically, Westermann (1955): 220-221, believes that 
Plato’s Laws reflects Athenian practice, whereas Meyer (2010): 27 – with specific regard to Plato’s 
theorization of post-manumission obligations – argues that it should be rather interpreted as an 
invention by Plato. 
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generally seem to point to the existence of post-manumission services which kept 
manumitted slaves somehow connected to their manumittors’ household. 
One final point which is worth stressing is the possible existence in Athens of a corpus 
of laws regulating the condition of ἀπελεύθεροι: this element further suggests that 
ἀπελεύθεροι constituted a specific category of people, different from metics, to whom 
specific laws were addressed. 
The existence in Athens of these laws is suggested once again by Harpocration’s 
definition of δίκη ἀποστασίου: one of the cases in which manumittors could bring a δίκη 
ἀποστασίου against manumitted slaves was when the latter did not do what the laws 
prescribe (‘καὶ ἃ κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι μὴ ποιῶσιν’). The text does not mention what 
these laws specifically regulate, but the passage clearly points to the fact that in Athens 
there was perhaps a group of laws specifically aimed at regulating the condition of those 
freedmen who resided in Athens.402 The laws mentioned by Harpocration are likely to 
be the so-called ἐξελευθερικοί καὶ ἀπελευθερικοί νόμοι referred to by Pollux in citing 
Demosthenes (Pollux 3.83: ‘καὶ Δημοσθένης φησιν ἐξελευθερικοὺς νόμους καὶ 
ἀπελευθερικοὺς νόμους’). The existence of laws regulating the condition of 
manumitted slaves seems to be attested only in a few other πόλεις403; an interesting case, 
however, is offered by the inscriptions from 1st century B.C. Calymna, which are believed 
to represent the only evidence in the Greek world for the so-called παραμονή ex lege. 
This group of inscriptions has been analysed by Segré first and then by Babacos404, and 
seems to constitute an unicum in the general context of the evidence for manumission in 
Greece. If the bulk of the evidence for παραμονή (mainly from Delphi and Athens) 
                                                          
402 Gernet (1955): 171. 
403 The πόλις which is usually believed to attest the existence of laws on manumitted slaves is 
Chaeronea: the formulas of the inscriptions (which are about 125) constantly mention the fact that 
the act of dedication-consecration has been carried out ‘according to the laws’ (cf. chapter 3). Since 
the inscriptions from Chaeronea have traditionally been interpreted as referring to a specific form 
of ‘sacral’ manumission (that is, through consecrations of slaves to the god), this clause has been 
taken as reflecting the existence in Chaeronea of specific laws regulating manumission and the 
condition of manumitted slaves. Yet, as I mentioned above, I believe that the identification of 
these inscriptions with manumissions is highly problematic and that they rather refer to actual 
dedications of slaves to the god: therefore, I think that these laws were more likely regulating the 
act of dedication-consecration itself. 
404 Segré (1944/1945); Babacos (1964). 
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shows that post-manumission obligations were the object of private agreements between 
manumittors and manumitted slaves and therefore did not constitute a constant feature 
of the condition of freedmen as such, the παραμονή resulting from the Calymnian 
inscriptions is interpreted as a feature descending upon all manumitted slaves and 
regulated by the ‘laws on ἀπελεύθεροι’, rather than being a matter of private agreement 
between manumittors and manumitted slaves.405 A common expression which can be 
found in the inscriptions is in fact ‘κατά τούς ἀπελευθεροτικούς νόμους’, which seems 
to point to the existence of a group of laws specifically aimed at regulating the 
relationship between manumittors and manumitted slaves after manumission and, more 
specifically, the services that the latter owed to the former. Moreover, those inscriptions 
in which this clause was not attested still stated that freedmen had to remain with their 
manumittors and raise children for them.406 According to Segré and Babacos, the analysis 
of the inscriptions from Calymna shows that the specific duties imposed on manumitted 
slaves by local laws basically consisted in the duty to ‘remain with’ former masters and 
their family, on the one hand, and to raise children for the manumittors, on the other 
hand; together with these, the duty of registering a citizens as a προστάτης is constantly 
mentioned.407 The obligation to raise children for manumittors is attested elsewhere in 
the Greek world and also in some inscriptions from Delphi. SGDI II 1719 (Delphi, 2nd 
century B.C.) provides a typical example: after describing the manumission through ‘sale’ 
to Apollo of a female slave named Niko according to the usual formula, the inscription 
attests to Niko’s obligation to παραμένειν with her manumittor and to raise two 
παιδάρια for him.408 Alternatively, some other inscriptions state that freedwomen had 
to hand over to the manumittor their children born during their παραμονή409; in both 
                                                          
405 Samuel (1964): 292. 
406 Segré (1944/1945): 175. 
407 Segré (1944/1945); Babacos (1964). 
408  Cf. SGDI II 1719 (ll. 8-10): παραμεινάτω δὲ Νικὼ παρὰ Μνασίξενον, ἄχρι κα ζώῃ 
Μνασίξενος, καὶ ἐκθρεψάτω παιδάρια δύο ἀδόλως καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ποιοῦσα τὸ ποτιτασσόμενον 
πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνεγκλήτως. 
409 See, for instance, FD III 2:129, ll. 10-11 (Delphi, 1st century B.C.). For a detailed discussion 
on the condition of children born to freedwomen under παραμονή in Delphi and examples of 
evidence, cf. Tucker (1974): 233, who distinguishes inscriptions stating that these children had to 
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cases, however, scholars agree that this obligation was meant to recover the loss suffered 
by masters as an effect of manumission.410 What is important to stress is that, according 
to Segré and Babacos, the παραμονή of the inscriptions from Calymna is not the object 
of an agreement between manumittors and manumitted slaves (i.e., a possible feature of 
the condition of some manumitted slaves), but is a duty directly imposed on manumitted 
slaves by the laws (i.e., a constant feature characterising the condition of all manumitted 
slaves). Notwithstanding this local peculiarity, however, the conclusions about the legal 
condition of freedom enjoyed also by those freedmen under παραμονή obligation do 
not change411, and the evidence from Calymna further proves that ἀπελεύθεροι under 
παραμονή obligation were legally free as well as those ἀπελεύθεροι who were no 
longer bound to their former owners by post-manumission services. 
 
8 Conclusions. 
Even though Athens does not provide a comprehensive and organic corpus of 
evidence for manumission, a close look at the extant sources dealing with the liberation 
of slaves reinforces the conclusions both on the nature of manumission and on the legal 
condition of manumitted slaves (especially those under παραμονή obligation) as 
attested in the Delphic manumission inscriptions. 
First, the Athenian evidence for manumission shows, on the one hand, that slaves 
were often liberated in exchange for money and, on the other, that in all these cases 
manumission was conceived of as a bilateral legal transaction between the slaves’ master 
and a third party. The intervention of a third person in the manumission procedure 
seems to be the rule whenever payment was required in return for manumission, and 
simply consisted in the third person handing over the money to the slaves’ masters in 
order to carry out a valid manumission. Slaves had no legal personality and even if they 
had part of the money (as for Against Neaera) or even all of it (as for the Delphic 
inscriptions), payment by them would have not had any legal validity. 
                                                          
be considered free, and other cases in which the offspring of an ἀπελευθέρα had to be handed 
over to her manumittors. 
410 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 228-229; Dimopoulou (2008): 41; Tucker (1974): 233. 
411 Samuel (1965): 292; see also Waldstein (1986): 97-98. 
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Second, some other sources shed light on the condition of manumitted slaves in 
Athens who, as free non-citizen residents, owed specific duties towards the πόλις, 
mainly those to register an Athenian citizen as their προστάτης and to pay a residence 
tax (the μετοίκιον, perhaps together with the τριώβολον). Yet, freedmen in Athens did 
not only have duties towards the πόλις, but could also be obliged to perform some post-
manumission services towards their manumittors which share the same features of the 
Delphic παραμονή. 
The Delphic inscriptions constantly refer to these duties with the verb παραμένειν, 
which thus seems to be used in a technical sense, whereas in Athens different terms (such 
as θεραπεία) or verbs (together with παραμένειν, also θεραπεύειν and συνεῖναι can 
be found) are used to designate the same phenomenon. The existence of post-
manumission obligations compelling freedmen to ‘remain with’ their former masters is 
suggested by several ancient authors such as Harpocration, Athenaeus, Diogenes 
Laertius, and by some passages from the pseudo-Demosthenic speech Against Neaera: 
the general principles lying behind these sources as well as the inscriptions from Delphi 
are the same ones, and refer both to the nature of παραμονή and to the condition of 
manumitted slaves (especially those under παραμονή obligation). 
As for the first point, a joint reading of the inscriptions from Delphi and the literary 
evidence from Classical and early-Hellenistic Athens shows that the legal nature of 
παραμονή is that of an obligation compelling freedmen to perform specified or 
unspecified services towards their manumittors for a specific period of time, and the 
object of a binding agreement between manumittors and manumitted slaves as – the 
latter as well as, of course, the former – legally free persons (with the possible exception 
of Calymna, which seems to constitute the only evidence for παραμονή descending ex 
lege upon manumitted slaves). In other words, the agreement between manumittors and 
manumitted slaves determines the imposition of a unilateral obligation upon freedmen. 
At the same time, the extant sources occasionally mention the remedies that are available 
if freedmen do not perform their obligation. These remedies are mostly attested in 
Delphi, and they consist either in physical punishment (such as in SGDI II 1703), which 
does not in itself threaten the condition of freedmen as legally free individuals, or in the 
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invalidity of manumission and the subsequent reversion into slavery (for example, in 
SGDI II 1702; but also Harp. s.v. ἀποστασίου). 
As for the second point, the institution of παραμονή shows that there could be two 
categories of manumitted slaves. Many of them, once manumitted, could ‘go wherever 
they want and do whatever they want’, and were in primis allowed to constitute their 
own household, thus being entitled to interrupt any connection with the ex owners. 
Some others, after their liberation, were bound by παραμονή duties to their 
manumittors’ households and obliged to perform services for a specific period of time, 
after which they were usually said to become ‘fully free’, which means free from post-
manumission services and therefore free to constitute a separate household. In Athens, 
this last category of manumitted slaves was sometimes referred to as χωρίς οἰκοῦντες 
(literally: ‘dwellers apart’), whom Demosthenes mentions in a passage of his First 
Philippic as subject to the naval draft.412 
Both of them, however – and this is the central point – were legally free (in the sense 
that they did not belong to anyone) and became free immediately after, and as an effect 
of, manumission: this fundamental feature allows ancient sources to refer to them 
comprehensively as one single category of persons known as ἀπελεύθεροι, no matter if 
they were bound to παραμονή duties or not. Παραμονή, in other words, characterised 
their de facto freedom only, with no consequences on their legal condition as free 
individuals. 
The Athenian sources ultimately confirm the evidence from Delphi and, while 
referring to aspects of manumission in different πόλεις (such as Corinth and Eleusis), 
point to the existence of common principles lying behind the legal nature of 
manumission and the legal condition of manumitted slaves across different geographical 
and chronological contexts of the Greek world. 
  
                                                          
412 Dem. 4.36-37. For an interpretation of χωρίς οἰκοῦντες as representing ‘those freedmen 
who were not bound by any such obligations [post-manumission obligations], and who dwelt 
apart from their former owners’, see Canevaro, Lewis (2014): 93. 
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CHAPTER 5 
‘Public’ manumissions in Classical Greece 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapters, I showed that, from a legal point of view, slaves were the 
property of their masters. From the perspective of Greek slave-owners, this implies that 
‘in Ancient Greece … a master could exercise almost unlimited power over his slaves’413: 
this is what the ancient sources show – they show that masters did exercise over their 
slaves all the rights and powers descending from the right of ownership. Of the ten 
‘incidents of ownership’ identified in 1961 by Honoré414, the right to capital and the 
absence of term are particularly relevant for a discussion on manumission. As previously 
mentioned, the right to capital implies that owners can dispose of their property as they 
like. The best expression of the masters’ power of disposition is the right to alienate a 
property, for example, through sale or gift. In the first case, masters acquire money in 
return for alienation, whereas in the second case their property is transferred 
gratuitously: both cases, however, ultimately determine the extinction of the masters’ 
right of ownership over their property, as their right is transferred to a new owner. 
‘Absence of term’, on the other hand, means that masters can enjoy their property 
without limitations in time (that is, for a virtually unlimited period). This means, from 
the point of view of a slave, that ‘his subjection to his master or masters has no limit; he 
is a slave for life. There is no prospect of release from his status unless the master agrees 
to emancipate the slave. But nothing compels his master to free him’.415 
These ‘incidents’ of ownership are relevant for a discussion on manumission, which 
is itself an act through which masters exercise their right to dispose of their property by 
extinguishing their right of ownership. Unlike the acts of alienation, however, in which 
ownership is only extinguished for the assignor as it is transferred to a new owner, 
                                                          
413 Harris (2012): 346. 
414 Honoré (1961). 
415 Harris (2002): 417. 
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manumission implies the ‘complete’ extinction of the right of ownership, as a slave is 
transformed into a free person – who, as such, can no longer belong to anyone. 
The ancient Greek sources analysed in the previous chapters confirm that the power 
to extinguish ownership through manumission pertains exclusively to slave-owners: 
from the very first attestations of manumission down to the Hellenistic period, the act 
through which masters granted freedom to their slaves only depended on the master’s 
will, and no interference was generally allowed in their decision. 
On the other hand, we know that ‘the governments of the Greek city-states gave 
owners the right of security, that is, immunity from expropriations’416; this was true also 
for a slave-owner, who therefore ‘should be able to look forward to remaining owner 
indefinitely if he so chooses’.417 At the same time, however, ‘a general right to security … 
is consistent with the existence of a power to expropriate or divest in the state or public 
authorities … When expropriation takes place, adequate compensation should be paid; 
but a general power to expropriate subject to paying compensation would be fatal to the 
institution of ownership as we know it’.418 
Given these premises, this chapter will look at the features and implications of Greek 
manumission from a different angle, by focusing on those sources attesting cases in 
which privately-owned slaves were not granted freedom by their masters but, rather, by 
the πόλις itself, without (or perhaps even against) their masters’ consent. In this sense, 
the chapter will suggest that manumission of privately-owned slaves performed by the 
πόλις regardless of the owners’ consent ultimately results in the ‘forced’ extinction of 
the latter’s right of ownership: in other words, a form of expropriation which, as such, 
was strictly limited to specific cases and purposes.419 Interference by the state in the 
extinction of the owners’ right of ownership was virtually regarded as an illegitimate 
intrusion within the private sphere and was therefore believed to be inconsistent with 
                                                          
416 Harris (2015b): 119. 
417 Honoré (1961): 119. 
418 Honoré (1961): 119. 
419 Honoré (1961): 120, points out that ‘the state’s … power of expropriation is usually limited 
to certain classes of thing and certain limited purposes. A general power to expropriate any 
property for any purpose would be inconsistent with the institution of ownership’. 
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the right of ownership itself.420 This idea was certainly valid also for manumission; some 
sources, however, inform us that, during specific emergency-circumstances that 
occurred between the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., some πόλεις did deprive masters of their 
property by ‘forcedly’ liberating their slaves without providing the former with a 
compensation. As I will show, however, the extant evidence makes it clear that such 
cases were rare and, as such, reflect an extra-ordinary situation in which public interests 
were considered to prevail upon the rights and interests of individual slave-owners. 
This aspect of manumission in Greece, however, is often ignored or discussed 
through no more than brief remarks by modern scholarship. Moreover, whenever 
‘public’ manumissions of slaves are mentioned in modern studies, no discussion is made 
of the several legal problems arising from this form of intervention by the state: most 
notably, the possibility for the πόλις to interfere with private ownership over slaves was 
itself problematic, as some sources inform us that in at least one occasion (that is, in the 
case of Hyperides’ proposal to set all slaves of Attica free after the battle of Chaeronea) 
the proposal was met with a public charge of being in contrast with the νόμοι of the state 
(παράνομον). An analysis of the sources which make direct reference to this form of 
manumission, together with the consideration of the problems arising from ‘public’ 
forms of slaves’ liberation, is necessary not only in order to better outline the nature and 
implications of Greek manumission in all its nuances, but also to understand the 
conditions and the limits imposed on such an intervention by the πόλις in liberating 
either individual slaves or a large number of them. 
The evidence for this form of manumission, however, is extremely scanty; moreover, 
it mostly deals with episodes which took place in the Classical period, yet our knowledge 
of these events often depends on accounts made by later authors. This aspect has led 
                                                          
420 Cf. Jones (1956): 198, who stresses that ‘Expropriation without compensation, although an 
ever-present danger in the troubled conditions of Greek politics, was regarded as essentially 
inconsistent with the nature of the institution of property. On taking office the eponymous archon 
proclaimed his intention to ensure that men’s possessions should remain unmolested during his 
term office [Arist. Ath. 35.2], and in peace treaties a clause would sometimes be inserted 
forbidding confiscation of property and redistribution of land [(Dem.) 27.15]’. More recently, see 
also Harris (2015b): 119, for an accurate list of examples showing that the principle by which 
Greek πόλεις ensured protection of the owners’ right against expropriation was widespread 
throughout the Greek world. 
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some scholars to question the historical authenticity and reliability of this evidence, 
holding that the extant information should not be considered as direct and reliable 
evidence for this form of manumission. Yet, a joint analysis of the evidence dealing with 
different πόλεις of the Classical age (such as Athens, Rhodes, Chios and Sparta) will 
show that interference by the state in the manumission of slaves did happen occasionally 
but was extremely rare, as it was only allowed in specific circumstances. 
The first part of the chapter will analyse the evidence from some forensic speeches by 
Lysias, as they suggest that in Classical Athens manumission by the πόλις could be 
conceived of as a reward for those slaves who had brought a denunciation (μήνυσις) 
against their masters for committing specific crimes (such as ἱεροσυλία or ἀσέβεια). In 
both cases, ‘public’ manumission appears to be closely connected to information, passed 
by slaves against their masters, concerning specific religious offences which were 
considered to be matters of concern for the community as a whole; on the other hand, 
these episodes constitute the only cases we know in which the πόλις manumitted 
individual slaves. 
The second part of the chapter will analyse the evidence attesting the grant of freedom 
to slaves before or after a battle: in the first case, manumission by the state is generally 
performed for the purpose of reinforcing the army, as it was a common belief at the time 
that slaves could not fight alongside with free people; in the second case, manumission 
had – once again – the nature of a reward offered by the πόλις to those slaves who had 
helped in the army.421 In both cases, however, the surviving evidence makes it clear that 
‘public’ manumission was due to extra-ordinary situations, and sources referring to 
Athens and Rhodes expressly state that such a measure was taken through the 
enactment of a ψήφισμα ad hoc. 
                                                          
421 One important exception to this general trend is the case of Hyperides’ proposal to the 
Assembly to set slaves free soon after the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea. This ‘public’ 
manumission, as I will explain in further detail, was never performed; yet, even if strictly 
speaking it can be included among those mass-manumissions of slaves performed by the state 
after a battle, it was not meant to constitute a reward for the slaves but, rather, a precautionary 
measure taken by the city in preparation for the further developments of the war against Philip. 
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The third part of this chapter will focus on the evidence dealing with Classical Sparta, 
not only because this πόλις is generally excluded from modern discussions on 
manumission, but also because it provides an interesting case-study. As is now 
acknowledged by many scholars, the helots were privately owned slaves. Yet, whenever 
manumission is mentioned in the ancient sources referring to Classical Sparta, it is 
always described as an act which is carried out by the πόλις only, whilst no reference is 
made to manumissions performed by individual Spartiatai; moreover, a passage from 
Ephorus holds that in Classical Sparta individual slave-owners were prohibited from 
manumitting their helots.422 Once this evidence is considered, this section will argue, on 
the one hand, that this peculiarity was possibly due to the fact that Sparta intended to 
hold strict control over the manumission of the helots because of specific economic and 
social reasons and, on the other hand, that, as well as in other πόλεις from the Classical 
age, ‘public’ manumission of the helots is described in the ancient sources as an extra-
ordinary act which was only performed in emergency-situations. 
Through the analysis of the ancient sources and a discussion of the fundamental 
problems they present, the final purpose of this chapter is to show that this form of 
manumission does not itself exclude the recognition of the masters’ almost unlimited 
powers over their slaves, but rather confirms it, although in ‘negative’ terms. The ancient 
sources make it clear that slave-owners have been occasionally deprived of the right to 
extinguish their ownership through manumission, but only in those extreme and 
exceptional circumstances in which the predominance of public interests over individual 
rights was perceived as vital for the survival and safety of the community as a whole.  
 
2. Freedom as a reward for denunciation: the cases of Lys. 5 and Lys. 7. 
The ancient sources show that the πόλις could liberate privately-owned slaves in two 
cases: first, if the latter brought a denunciation against their masters for committing 
specific crimes; second, before (when further manpower was needed) or after (in the 
form of a reward) a battle (with the important exception, in this latter case, of Hyperides’ 
                                                          
422 Cf. Ephorus FGrHist70 F117. 
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proposal after the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea: see infra). The evidence we possess for 
the first case comes from Classical Athens and is provided by two forensic speeches by 
Lysias, both dealing with religious matters: a close look at their text will help us to shed 
light on the specific circumstances in which manumission by the state was allowed in 
Classical Athens. 
The first, For Callias, was performed between the 5th and the 4th century B.C. (the 
precise date is unknown). Much of the general issue brought to trial is unknown, as there 
are only six surviving paragraphs from the speech, whilst the rest is lost. For instance, 
we do not know who the accuser and the defendant’s συνήγορος are, as their names are 
not mentioned: we only know very little information about the defendant, a metic whose 
name (Callias) was extremely common in Classical Athens, and therefore a more specific 
identification of his character is almost impossible.423 The speech was written for one of 
the defendant’s friends, who thus intervened as Callias’ συνήγορος. We also know that 
his discourse had perhaps been preceded by other speeches delivered by different 
συνήγοροι in defence of Callias, as the mention of ‘other speakers’ in paragraph 1 of the 
speech may suggest (‘τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰρημένα’).424 Yet, the understanding of the 
circumstances which brought to the prosecution of Callias is problematic, as the speech 
– as I mentioned before – is incomplete. The only indication we have about the crime 
allegedly committed by Callias comes from the manuscript title of the speech (‘ὑπὲρ 
Καλλίου ἱεροσυλίας ἀπολογία’), according to which Callias was prosecuted for 
committing theft of sacred property (ἱεροσυλία). Although ἱεροσυλία is not mentioned 
                                                          
423 Cf. Todd (2007): 386: ‘Kallias is an extremely common name at Athens, which appears 262 
times in LGPN Attica. The only clue to identification is a negative one: since the defendant is a 
metic, he cannot be identified with any of the 249 of these who are certain or probable Athenian 
citizens’. 
424 Cf. Todd (2007): 385, according to whom the idea that ‘the main defence of Kallias has 
already been delivered, and that our speaker is one of several sunēgoroi … is not totally secure, 
because the speaker could in theory be delivering the substantive defence and referring to 
arguments presented by putative co-defendants’. Yet, he further notices that ‘on balance, 
however, it seems highly probable, because of the scale of the speech, which at 292 words is by 
far the shortest in the corpus’, in comparison with the standard length of the speeches by Lysias. 
He notices in fact that if ‘the speeches of Lysias tend not to be particularly long – 1.250-2.500 
words is typical’, the shorter ones (which usually count less than 800 words) ‘are either written 
for preliminary proceedings … or else proclaim themselves to be supporting speeches’ (Todd 
[2007]: 386). 
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anywhere else in the text, scholars agree that the title assigned to the speech was based 
on the content of the remaining paragraphs which are now lost, and therefore generally 
agree that ἱεροσυλία is the actual charge brought against Callias.425 Moreover, although 
we do not know the details of the case brought to trial as well as the specific terms of the 
accusation, it is likely that Callias was prosecuted with a γραφή ἱεροσυλίας, i.e. a 
popular action for theft of sacred property.426 
Notwithstanding the incompleteness of the speech, paragraphs 3 to 5 provide 
interesting information about the possibility of an intervention by the πόλις in order to 
reward with freedom those slaves who would inform against their masters in specific 
circumstances: 
 
Lys. 5.3-5: ὑμᾶς δὲ ἄξιον μὴ τοὺς μὲν τῶν θεραπόντων λόγους πιστοὺς νομίζειν, 
τοὺς δὲ τούτων ἀπίστους … οὗτοι δὲ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότες καὶ 
πολλῶν κακῶν πεπειραμένοι, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτιοι γεγενημένοι περὶ 
ἐλευθερίας νυνὶ ποιοῦνται τοὺς λόγους. καὶ οὐ θαυμάζω: ἴσασι γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν  
ψευδόμενοι ἐλεγχθῶσιν, οὐδὲν μεῖζον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πείσονται, ἐὰν δὲ 
ἐξαπατήσωσι, τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἔσονται ἀπηλλαγμένοι … ἄξιον δέ μοι δοκεῖ 
εἶναι οὐ τούτων ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἀλλὰ κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει: 
οὐ γὰρ τούτοις μόνοις εἰσὶ θεράποντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, οἳ πρὸς τὴν 
τούτων τύχην ἀποβλέποντες οὐκέτι σκέψονται ὅ τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν εἰργασμένοι τοὺς 
δεσπότας ἐλεύθεροι γένοιντο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τι ψεῦδος περὶ αὐτῶν μηνύσαντες … 
 
You, however, ought not to credit the statements of mere slaves and discredit those of the 
accused … these men, having spent their lives in committing serious offences and incurring a 
variety of troubles, make their speeches to-day with an air of having performed a great service, 
merely in the hope of freedom. And I am not surprised; for they know that, if they are convicted 
of lying, they will suffer nothing worse than their actual lot; while if they succeed in deceiving 
you, they will be rid of their present troubles … The trial, in my opinion, ought to be regarded 
                                                          
425 Cf. Todd (2007): 386-387: after stressing that the titles of forensic speeches as are preserved 
in manuscripts are not always reliable, he maintains that there is no reason to doubt that 
ἱεροσυλία, in this specific case, was the alleged crime for which Callias had been brought to trial, 
given that ‘what survives of the speech gives no reason to doubt the title, and a copyist is perhaps 
more likely to have subsumed hierosulia under the more familiar and broader charge of asebeia – 
impiety – than vice versa’. 
426 In this sense, Todd (1993): 307 n. 19. Todd [2007]: 387, further mentions that, according to 
the interpretations suggested by some scholars, Callias was perhaps employed as a treasurer of 
the Parthenon, as it seems to be implied by the mention of ‘τῷ δημοσίῳ’ in paragraph 4; he 
observes, however, that this view ‘is weakened by the lack of any positive evidence for the 
employment of metics (as opposed to citizen officials or public slaves) in such a post’. 
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not as the personal affair of the accused, but as the common concern of everybody in the city; for 
these are not the only people who own slaves; they are owned by everyone else, and looking at the 
fate of the accused will no longer ask themselves by what great service to their masters they might 
gain their freedom, but by what lying information about them … 
 
This passage is significant as it highlights the possibility for slaves to obtain freedom 
as a reward by the πόλις. More specifically, the following points can be inferred from 
the analysis of Lys. 5.3-5. First, slaves could bring a denunciation against their masters: 
the technical term for this form of denunciation (as is used not only in Lys. 5, but also in 
other sources: see infra) is μήνυσις. Second, as an effect of μηνύσεις by slaves, a 
procedure could start, which ultimately resulted in the prosecution of the slaves’ masters. 
In the specific case represented in Lys. 5, the μήνυσις brought by Callias’ slaves took to 
the prosecution of the former with a γραφή ἱεροσυλίας. It follows therefore that in this 
case slaves’ statements could have a legal and procedural relevance, given that as an 
effect of their denunciations, a prosecution could later be started of the person against 
whom their denunciation was brought.427 Third, the speech suggests that slaves could 
μηνύειν against their masters if the masters’ alleged crimes involved ἱεροσυλία, which 
was considered to be a particularly serious religious offence.428 Fourth, we learn that if 
slaves brought a μήνυσις against their masters, their legal condition could change as an 
effect of a reward by the πόλις: paragraph 4 of the speech suggests that if, at the end of 
the γραφή ἱεροσυλίας, their master was convicted, slaves would be rewarded with 
freedom and would therefore become free persons. 
The content of this passage clearly mirrors masters’ concerns about this specific form 
of manumission. On the one hand, ‘public’ manumission of privately owned slaves was 
                                                          
427 Denunciation by slaves, which could eventually take to the prosecution of their masters, 
has in fact to be kept distinguished from the statements they could render in litigations as 
witnesses. In this last case, slaves could only witness in trials if tortured. Torture (βάσανος) was 
included by Aristotle among the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις (that is, not based on the τέχνη ῥητορική: cf. 
Aristot. Rh. 1.15), and was therefore considered to be a form of evidence which could be provided 
by slaves in trials, except in homicide cases and in δίκαι ἐμπορικαί, in which they could be 
witnesses without being subject to βάσανος: cf. Harrison (1968): 170; Biscardi (1982): 267.  
428 Cf. Osborne (2000) for the idea that μηνύσεις by slaves concerned specific religious offences, 
rather than more generic matters concerning the community as a whole. Todd (2007): 389, further 
suggests that this kind of cases were of primary concern for the πόλις, as it was a common belief 
that ‘the gods may otherwise take it out on the whole community’. 
187 
 
certainly seen as an interference by the state in the individuals’ right of ownership, which 
was perhaps felt even more unbearable because it directly originated from information 
passed by slaves against their own masters. On the other hand, this form of manumission 
could also be seen as particularly dangerous by slave-owners, as is clear from the 
speaker’s words: he expressly envisages the possibility that slaves could make an 
inappropriate use of μήνυσις by producing false accusations against their owners in the 
hope of being rewarded with freedom by the state.429 
To conclude, Lys. 5.3-5 clearly indicates, on the one hand, that manumission of 
privately-owned slaves by the πόλις was allowed in Classical Athens; on the other hand, 
regardless of the speaker’s words (which point to the risks descending from a large-scale 
use of this kind of reward for slaves), such a possibility seems to have been strictly 
controlled by the πόλις, and limited to specific circumstances involving a serious 
religious offence. 
Similar evidence for ‘public’ manumissions following a μήνυσις by slaves is provided 
by Lysias’ seventh speech. The events for which the accusation is brought against the 
unknown defendant must be placed around 397-6 B.C., and the accusation was brought 
before the Areopagus a couple of years later.430 Although there is no mention of the 
specific action which was brought to trial, most scholars agree that Nikomachus, the 
accuser, brought a γραφή ἀσεβείας against Lyasias’ client for having committed a 
particular form of ἀσέβεια. The sequence of events is described in paragraph 2 of the 
speech: the defendant had been first prosecuted for removing a sacred olive-tree (μορία) 
from his land; then, because the accuser could not provide enough evidence showing 
that he was guilty, he was further prosecuted before the Areopagus with the accusation 
of having removed the stump of a sacred olive-tree, or – more specifically – the precinct 
                                                          
429 For this point, see Gärtner (2008): 458: ‘le plaideur du discours V stigmatise cette possibilité 
d'accéder à un nouveau statut, soulignant la perversité d'un système dans lequel les serviteurs 
auraient tout à gagner … le plaideur appelle les citoyens à se souvenir qu'ils sont eux aussi des 
δεσπόται, des maîtres qui ont tout à craindre des esclaves’. For a general discussion on the ‘fear 
of slaves’ which emerges from the reading of certain legal documents, cf. Arnaoutoglou (2007). 
430 Carey (1989): 114. 
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enclosing such a stump (σηκός).431 In Athens, olive-trees – both sacred and non-sacred – 
were in fact the object of specific regulations by the πόλις. 432  Dem. 43.71 refers to 
privately owned olive-trees (or, more precisely, to non-sacred ones), and specifies that 
land-owners could not remove more than two olive-trees each year. Sacred olive-trees 
(μορίαι), on the other hand, were of primary concern for the πόλις as they were 
considered to be sacred to Athena: the πόλις of Athens had the right to use the olives 
they produced, and – at least in earlier times – it was from these sacred olive-trees that 
the oil was produced to reward the victors in the Panathenaic festivals.433 
Even though no direct reference to ἀσέβεια is made in the text of the speech, scholars 
agree, on the one hand, that the case represented in Lys. 7 concerns ἀσέβεια, as cutting 
down a σηκός was clearly regarded as a serious religious offence in 4th century B.C. 
Athens and, on the other hand, that Lysias’ client was prosecuted with a γραφή 
ἀσεβείας before the Areopagus.434  
The speech provides interesting information about the possibility for the πόλις to 
liberate privately owned slaves. More specifically, paragraph 16 directly refers, once 
again, to manumission as a reward for those slaves who had brought a denunciation 
against their masters: 
 
Lys. 7.16: πῶς δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἦ ἀθλιώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων, εἰ τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ 
θεράποντας μηκέτι δούλους ἔμελλον ἕξειν ἀλλὰ δεσπότας τὸν λοιπὸν βίον, 
τοιοῦτον ἔργον συνειδότας; ὥστε εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα εἰς ἐμὲ ἐξημάρτανον, οὐκ ἂν οἷόν 
                                                          
431 Scholars agree that the word σηκός originally designates the fence which distinguishes a 
sacred olive-tree (μορία) from a non-sacred one. By extension, the term came to identify the 
stump of a μορία, which remained sacred: Todd (2007): 486; see also Carey (1989): 115. 
432 Harris (2015b): 119-120. 
433 Carey (1989): 114; Todd (2007): 482-485. See also Burkert (1985): 141, who, after remarking 
that the olive-tree is sacred to Athena, stresses that the olive-tree on the Athenian Acropolis 
‘seemed to embody the continuity of the city’. For the regulation of olive-trees, see also [Arist.] 
Ath.Pol. 60.1-2 with the commentary by Rhodes (1981): 673, who thus specifies: ‘olives which were 
designated sacred, supposed to be offshoots of the tree planted by Athena on the Acropolis, were 
to be found throughout Attica; whoever acquired the land on which the tree grew acquired with 
it the obligation attached to the tree, and dead stumps had to be preserved in case they might 
revive as the stump on the Acropolis was said to have revived in 480’. 
434 In this sense, cf. most recently Filonik (2013): 60-61. See also Todd (2007): 476; Carey (1989): 
114-115. 
189 
 
τε ἦν δίκην με παρ᾽ αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν: εὖ γὰρ ἂν ᾔδη ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις ἦν καὶ ἐμὲ 
τιμωρήσασθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς μηνύσασιν ἐλευθέροις γενέσθαι. 
 
And surely I must have been the most wretched of human creatures if my own slaves were to 
be no longer my slaves, but my masters for the rest of my life, since they would be privy to that 
act of mine; so that, however great might be their offences against me, I should have been unable 
to get them punished. For I should have been fully aware that it was in their power at once to be 
avenged on me and to win their own freedom by informing against me. 
 
As in Lys. 5.3-5, the possibility for slaves to gain freedom as a reward by the πόλις is 
seen from the point of view of a slave-owner, and the information provided by the two 
speeches is very similar: Lys. 7.16 further confirms that manumission by the πόλις as a 
reward for slaves was possible in Classical Athens. In this case, more specifically, 
μήνυσις by slaves brought to the prosecution of their master with a γραφή ἀσεβείας, 
and therefore appears connected, once again, to the denunciation of a crime which was 
considered to be a serious religious offence. Although this passage (as well as Lys. 5.3-5) 
does not provide specific information about this form of manumission, nor about the act 
through which slaves were granted freedom by the πόλις, it is nonetheless possible to 
make the same consideration that we drew from Lys. 5.3-5: freedom as a ‘public’ reward 
seems to be admitted only in limited circumstances, given that μήνυσις by slaves deals, 
in both cases, with specific religious offences. It has to be noted, however, that the 
evidence we possess is extremely scanty and the only information we have for this 
practice is provided by two speeches. Because both cases refer to serious religious 
matters, it is a reasonable suggestion that these cases may be indicative of a wider rule 
by which slaves were only allowed to bring denunciations against their masters 
whenever specific religious offences were involved. We also need to consider, however, 
that because slaves had no procedural capacity 435 , they could not bring charges. 
Therefore, by its very nature, μήνυσις (that is, a denunciation leading to a later 
prosecution of the accused individual) must have been limited to matters which could 
be prosecuted through a popular action, that is, to those cases in which ὁ βουλόμενος 
was entitled to pick up the denunciation and start the prosecution. Because public 
                                                          
435 With the notorious exception of the δίκαι ἐμπορικαί. 
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charges concerning religious matters are not widely-mentioned in the ancient sources, 
the fact that both mentions of μήνυσις in the extant evidence deal with such matters 
suggests the existence of a connection between μήνυσις by slaves and religious offences 
and, at the same time, a limitation to denunciations by slaves to those matters only. 
The fact that the evidence for this practice is extremely scanty, and that freedom as a 
reward was only allowed in specific occasions, ultimately proves that, in Classical 
Athens, only exceptional cases could justify an exception to the principle that only slave-
owners are entitled to extinguish their rights of ownership over their slaves. Whenever 
these exceptional circumstances are involved, the interest of the community as a whole 
is clearly considered to prevail on individual rights: this justifies the interference by the 
πόλις which, in normal circumstances, would not be admitted. The analysis of the other 
case in which ‘public’ manumissions of slaves could be performed by the πόλις, i.e. in 
emergency-situations due to warfare, will further confirm this conclusion. 
 
3. Mass-manumissions during wartime: the evidence from Classical Athens. 
The circumstances and public needs which allowed ‘public’ liberations of slaves 
during wartime explain why, in these cases, the evidence mentions mass-manumissions 
of slaves carried out as an effect of the decision taken by the πόλις (whereas the two 
forensic speeches by Lysias analysed before refer to ‘public’ liberations of individual 
slaves). 
Unlike the sources concerning freedom as a possible reward for μήνυσις, which only 
refer to Classical Athens, the extant evidence informs us that this form of manumission 
has been practiced by different πόλεις during the Classical period. These sources, more 
specifically, describe two possible scenarios, as slaves could be liberated either before or 
after a specific battle. In the first case (which happened, for instance, for the battle of 
Marathon or soon after the Athenian defeat in Chaeronea), it is likely that manumission 
prior to a battle was due to the general exclusion of slaves from military service. As 
pointed out by Garlan, slaves were in fact usually excluded from direct participation in 
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war and were not allowed to join in battles436: war was generally conceived of as a matter 
reserved to free people, as it was commonly believed that divine favour would not 
descend upon an army which was formed (also) of slaves.437 This may possibly explain 
why, when in extreme need of manpower, the state would occasionally recur to mass-
manumissions of slaves in order to fill the numbers of the army with new (free) members. 
In the second case (which happened, for instance, with regard to the battle of the 
Arginusae), sources mentioning the liberation of slaves immediately after a battle clearly 
point to the fact that their manumission was conceived of as a reward for helping in the 
army. In this regard, Garlan has pointed out a different trend in the Greek world 
depending on whether slaves were employed in battlefields or in naval-battles: in the 
first case, they were usually liberated before the battle started, whereas in the second 
case they tended to be freed after the battle had come to an end. This distinction is due, 
according to Garlan, both to efficiency purposes and ideological reasons: ‘raisons 
d'efficacité’ required that ‘le service sur terre, impliquant un engagement personnel, 
exigeait davantage d’esprit d’initiative, et par là même, d’ardeur combattive, que le 
service sur mer où comptait davantage la discipline collective’; whereas, from an 
ideological point of view, ‘pour que l’esclave fût apte à servir dans l’armée de terre, il 
convenait au préalable d’élever son statut, car l’écart idéologique entre son statut et la 
fonction qu’on lui demandait de remplir était trop grand – ce qui n’était pas le cas pour 
l’esclave rameur, dont la fonction était moins honorable’.438 
Although the evidence for this form of manumission is scanty, it is important to look 
at these sources in detail, as they provide significant information about the 
                                                          
436 Garlan (1985): 93. During wartime slaves’ function was normally limited to ‘secondary’ 
roles: they could be used in battlefields for carrying arms and equipment for the army (Garlan 
[1985]: 78), or serve in fleets as ‘personal’ slaves for ‘l’élite de l’équipage’, which ‘ne pouvait, en 
temps de guerre encore moins qu’en temps de paix, être privée de serviteurs personnels’ (Garlan 
[1972]: 35). According to Garlan (1972): 35, 41, however, the latter possibility was more commonly 
practiced in other πόλεις than it was in Athens (‘l’utilisation d'esclaves comme rameurs ait été 
plus fréquente ou, si l’on préfère, moins exceptionnelle, dans le reste du monde grec qu’à 
Athènes’). 
437 Calderini (1965): 167. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 7.5.78-79, who stresses the importance of not sharing 
with slaves the knowledge and exercise of war (πολεμικῆς δ᾽ἐπιστήμης καὶ μελέτης), as they 
are direct gifts of the gods. 
438 Garlan (1972): 48. 
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circumstances in which mass-manumissions of slaves could be performed by the πόλις: 
most of them refer to ‘public’ manumissions which took place in Classical Athens, 
whereas other sources suggest that a similar practice also took place in Classical Rhodes 
and (perhaps) in Chios. 
I will start the analysis by looking at the manumission of those slaves who had helped 
the Athenians during the naval battle of the Arginusae in 406 B.C.: this episode concerns 
a mass-manumission of slaves after the battle had come to an end, when ‘a grateful 
Athenian state rewarded those slaves who had rowed in the victorious fleet with 
citizenship’.439 In this specific case, the decision taken by the πόλις to reward slaves with 
freedom (and perhaps to grant them – as well as metics – citizenship rights) was taken 
because of their extreme need of manning ships for the campaign during the 
Peloponnesian war. Evidence for the presence of slaves among the rowers during the 
Arginusae battle is provided by Xenophon in the Hellenika, where he mentions a decree 
passed by the Athenians in which it was decided that whoever was of military age, both 
slaves and free, should be employed to man the one-hundred and ten ships which had 
been prepared for the battle.440 
The main source of information for the Athenian grant of freedom and citizenship 
rights to those slaves who joined the battle is a passage from Aristophanes’ Ranae, which 
was performed at the Lenaea festivals of 405-406 B.C., just a few months after the victory 
of the Athenian fleet at the Arginusae. The significant information is provided in a 
passage from the παράβασις, in which the chorus addresses the Athenian audience as 
follows: 
 
Aristoph. Ran. 694-695: καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρόν ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ναυμαχήσαντας μίαν / καὶ 
Πλαταιᾶς εὐθὺς εἶναι κἀντὶ δούλων δεσπότας. 
 
                                                          
439 Worthington (1989): 359. 
440  Xen. Hell. 1.6.24: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ γεγενημένα καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν, 
ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα, εἰσβιβάζοντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὄντας 
ἅπαντας καὶ δούλους καὶ ἐλευθέρους: καὶ πληρώσαντες τὰς δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐν τριάκοντα 
ἡμέραις ἀπῆραν. (‘When the Athenians heard of what had happened and of the blockade, they voted to 
go to the rescue with one hundred and ten ships, putting aboard all who were of military age, whether slave 
or free; and within thirty days they manned the one hundred and ten ships and set forth’). 
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Because it is disgraceful that those who fought just once at sea should suddenly be Plataeans 
and masters instead of slaves. 
 
In this passage, Aristophanes suggests that those slaves who had joined the Athenians 
in the battle of the Arginusae were rewarded with the same citizenship rights which had 
been recognised to the Plataeans almost twenty years before, in 427 B.C. One further 
reference to the episode is made in a scholium to this passage, which mentions a 
statement by Hellanicus concerning the grants of freedom and of the same status 
attributed to the Plataeans to those slaves who had fought with the Athenians in the 
battle of the Arginusae: 
 
Hellanicus Scholium at Ranae (Hell. 323a F25): τοὺς συνναυμαχήσαντας δούλους 
Ἑλλάνικός φησιν ἐλευθερωθῆναι καὶ ἐγγραφέντας ὡς Πλαταιεῖς 
συμπολιτεύσασθαι αὐτοῖς. 
 
Hellanicus says that the slaves fighting with the Greeks were freed and made fellow citizens, 
enrolled like Plataians. (tr. Kamen) 
 
Lines 693-694 of Ranae constitute the only straightforward evidence for slaves’ 
liberation in return for their help during the battle441, and suggest that those slaves who 
had been employed in the fleet during the Arginusae campaign were rewarded with a 
specific grant, namely, the same status which had been assigned to the Plataeans. In 
order better to understand the nature of this grant, we need to understand first what the 
features were characterising the status of Plataeans. References to the grant of citizenship 
                                                          
441  Other two passages from Ranae, however, are generally believed to refer to the same 
episode leading to a mass-manumission of slaves, but their actual reference to manumission is 
much controversial. These passages are Ar. Ran. 33-34 (οἴμοι κακοδαίμων: τί γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ 
ἐναυμάχουν; / ἦ τἄν σε κωκύειν ἂν ἐκέλευον μακρά: 'Unhappy wretch! Why didn't I join the navy? 
/ Then I'd tell you to whistle a different tune!') and 190-191 (δοῦλον οὐκ ἄγω, / εἰ μὴ νεναυμάχηκε 
τὴν περὶ τῶν κρεῶν: 'I will not take the Slave, / unless he fought at sea, to save his hide') and their 
respective scholia. That these passages do refer to the mass-manumission of slaves performed 
after the Arginusae battle has been held, for example, by: Calderini (1965): 166 n. 2; Hunt (2001): 
359-361; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 70 n. 12; Kamen (2005): 17; Tamiolaki (2008): 54-55. Contra, 
see Worthington (1989): 359-361, who reads these lines as reflecting the humoristic purpose of 
Aristophanes’ play, and therefore challenges the reference of Ar. Ran. 33-34 and 190-191 to the 
manumission of slaves after the Arginusae battle. 
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to Plataeans are found in several sources442, although the details of this award can only 
be found in [Dem.] 59.104-106. In [Dem.] 59.104, the speaker, Apollodorus, asks the clerk 
to read the text of the decree granting citizenship to the Plataeans, whilst the following 
two paragraphs contain Apollodorus’ account of the same grant. The two passages, 
however, are not completely consistent and discrepancies exist between the text of the 
document reproduced in paragraph 104 of the speech and Apollodorus’ account. Recent 
work has shown that the decree reproduced in [Dem.] 59.104 is a forgery, and therefore 
more reliable information about the details of this grant should be found in Apollodorus’ 
paraphrase of the decree.443 According to Apollodorus, in order to be granted citizenship 
rights, the Plataeans had to undergo the following procedure: first, they had to be subject 
to a δοκιμασία444 in order to verify their actual condition as Plataeans (and consequently 
to make sure that non-Plataeans would not gain Athenian citizenship); second, the 
names of those who had passed the δοκιμασία had to be inscribed on a stele to be placed 
in the Acropolis in order to make this grant public and therefore accessible to their 
descendants. Apollodorus finally states that those Plataeans who were granted 
citizenship rights were nonetheless excluded from archonships and priesthoods: 
citizenship rights granted to Plataeans were thus not exactly the same ones which were 
strictly reserved to πολῖται, given that ‘new citizens are excluded from all priesthoods 
and archonships, the actual religious authorities in Athens, “in order to make sure that 
the sacrifices on behalf of the city are performed according to piety”’.445 The implications 
of such a grant to the citizens of Plataea can be properly understood if we consider the 
                                                          
442 Cf. Thuc. 3.55.3, 63.2; Isoc. 12.94, 14.51-52; Lys. 23; Diod. 14.46.6. 
443 For a detailed discussion of the inauthenticity of the document preserved in [Dem.] 59.104, 
cf. Canevaro (2010). 
444 As pointed out by Robertson (2000): 149, ‘in Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, the 
full status of the citizen was not ascribed at birth … instead, a male of Athenian parents inched 
towards citizen status in a series of loosely connected rites that incorporated him into increasingly 
larger social units’. δοκιμασία was in fact one of the steps that young Athenians (usually around 
the age of eighteen) needed to undergo in order to be admitted within the corpus of Athenian 
citizens. According to the generally accepted view, it consisted of the verification, by the 
demesmen, both of their birth as citizens and of their physical maturity (Biscardi [1982]: 80). For 
a discussion about the nature and implications of δοκιμασία as a means through which new 
members could be included in the citizen community, cf. Rhodes (1981):499-502; Robertson (2000). 
445 Canevaro (2010): 362. 
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main features of naturalisation in Classical Athens. Naturalisation can be defined as the 
grant of citizenship to the citizens of another πόλις. This institution has been thoroughly 
analysed by Osborne, who focuses on the evidence from Classical Athens. According to 
Osborne, naturalisation has the nature of a gift (or, to better say, ‘the gift par excellence of 
the polis’)446 which, according to the specific laws on the point, could only be granted in 
return for benefactions made by foreigners to the πόλις. He further suggests that ‘the 
introduction of a formal, legal process for granting citizenship in Athens probably 
belongs in 451/0’, and that, from the Classical age up to the 2nd century B.C., ‘citizenship 
could only be granted to a foreigner … by a decree of the Athenian Assembly’.447 
As for the reward granted to slaves as is mentioned in Aristoph. Ran. 694-695, it 
follows that likening their condition to that of Plataeans implies that, in order to enjoy 
citizenship rights, they had been set free before the naturalisation grant.448 Osborne has 
argued that granting slaves the same status of the Plataeans presupposes in fact a 
twofold passage: he maintains that slaves were first manumitted and therefore acquired 
the condition of free individuals (as they would have become freedmen), and then were 
granted citizenship rights, given that the latter presupposes the former, even though, in 
practical terms, the two stages could have been carried out simultaneously within one 
single act.449 
However, the use of Aristophanes’ Ranae and of its scholia as source-material for the 
argument that slaves were rewarded with citizenship rights has been challenged by 
some scholars. More specifically, while it is commonly acknowledged that, after the 
battle of the Arginusae, slaves were rewarded with freedom450, the fact that they were 
                                                          
446 Osborne (1981): 5. 
447 Osborne (1981): 6; by the 2nd century B.C., ‘the practice of decreeing honours to foreigners 
died out, and naturalization itself … was transformed into an automatic right for duly qualified 
candidates’. 
448 One minority position among scholars argues that granting slaves the status of Plataeans 
did not imply that they would start enjoying certain citizenship rights but, rather, that slaves 
would have been allowed to live and reside in the Skione with other Plataeans, but this view is 
not based on the reading of these sources (see Osborne [1983]: 36). 
449 Osborne (1983): 35 n. 63, maintains that ‘in strict terms there will have been two stages in 
the process, namely 1) the advance to freedman status, and 2) the acquisition of the citizenship’. 
450  See, for instance: Calderini (1965): 166; Osborne (1983): 33-37; Ostwald (1986): 433; 
Cartledge (1993): 133-134; Hunt (2001) 359-380; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 70. Garlan (1988): 165, 
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further granted citizenship rights is much more controversial. The objections are based, 
on the one hand, on the consideration that ancient historians such as Diodorus or 
Xenophon do not mention a similar grant to slaves451; and, on the other hand, on the fact 
that other ancient sources only mention the ‘naturalization’ of those metics and 
foreigners who had joined the battle, whereas no mention is made of a similar grant to 
slaves. Diodorus, for example, only refers to the fact that the Athenians conferred 
Athenian citizenship to those metics and foreigners who decided to fight in the battle, 
but does not state that a similar award was granted to slaves.452 
Most scholars, however, agree that there is no reason to doubt about the historical 
reliability of the information provided by Aristophanes. On the one hand, Ranae was 
performed soon after the battle of the Arginusae, and therefore the audience was familiar 
with the events referred to by Aristophanes, given that many people ‘had either fought 
at Arginusae or had relatives who had’.453 On the other hand, the passage immediately 
following lines 694-695 clearly refers to the fact that the measure has actually been taken 
by the Athenians454: given the historical context in which the play was performed, most 
                                                          
on the other hand, maintains that after the battle, ‘the Athenians went back on their promises 
made to fighting slaves’, and therefore no grants (either citizenship rights or even freedom) 
would have been accorded to these slaves, but he does not justify his assumption. 
451 See, for instance, Worthington (1989): 359-360: after pointing out that the only reference to 
this grant is provided by Aristophanes, he argues, on the one hand, that this passage from Ranae 
cannot be considered as a reliable evidence for ‘public’ manumissions of slaves and, on the other 
hand, that what is attested in Aristoph. Ran. 694-695 is no more than ‘a remark … which may in 
itself be deliberately distorted for satirical effect’. 
452  Diod. 13.97.1: τούτων δὲ πραττομένων Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐλαττώμασι 
περιπίπτοντες, ἐποιήσαντο πολίτας τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων τοὺς βουλομένους 
συναγωνίσασθαι: ταχὺ δὲ πολλοῦ πλήθους πολιτογραφηθέντος, οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέγραφον 
τοὺς εὐθέτους εἰς τὴν στρατείαν (‘While these events were taking place, the Athenians, who had 
suffered a continued series of reverses, conferred citizenship upon the metics and any other aliens who were 
willing to fight with them; and when a great multitude was quickly enrolled among the citizens, the 
generals kept mustering for the campaign all who were in fit condition’). 
453 Hunt (2001): 360-361. 
454 Aristoph. Ran. 695-696: κοὐδὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ ἔχοιμ᾽ ἂν μὴ οὐ καλῶς φάσκειν ἔχειν, / ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐπαινῶ: μόνα γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῦν ἔχοντ᾽ ἐδράσατε (‘No, even this I could not say was not well and good, 
/ in fact, I praise it. It is the only sensible thing you did’). 
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scholars argue that it seems unlikely that Aristophanes would refer to something which 
never took place.455 
To sum up, it seems quite clear that Aristophanes, by mentioning the grant to slaves 
of the same status that the Athenians had assigned to the Plataeans, undoubtedly refers 
to a mass-manumission performed by the πόλις as a reward for slaves. Although the 
passage does not specify the means through which this reward was granted by the state, 
it is likely that such a measure required the enactment of a ψήφισμα ad hoc by the πόλις, 
as is expressly mentioned in other sources that I will consider in the following part of 
the chapter.  
One more episode dealing with ‘public’ manumissions during wartime is provided 
by Pausanias in the seventh book of his Description of Greece: 
 
Paus. 7.15.7: Ἀχαιοῖς δὲ αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦ στρατεύματος παρῄει Δίαιος: 
καὶ δούλους τε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν ἠφίει, τὸ Μιλτιάδου καὶ Ἀθηναίων βούλευμα τὸ πρὸ 
τοῦ ἔργου τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μιμούμενος, καὶ Ἀχαιῶν συνέλεγε καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἀπὸ 
τῶν πόλεων τοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ: ἐγένετο δέ, ἀναμεμιγμένων ὁμοῦ καὶ οἰκετῶν, τὸ 
ἀθροισθὲν ἐς ἑξακοσίους μὲν μάλιστα ἀριθμὸν ἱππεῖς, τὸ δὲ ὁπλιτεῦον 
τετρακισχίλιοί τε καὶ μύριοι. 
 
Diaeus once more came forward to command the Achaean army. He proceeded to set free slaves, 
following the example of Miltiades and the Athenians before the battle of Marathon, and enlisted 
from the cities of the Achaeans and Arcadians those who were of military age. The muster, 
including the slaves, amounted roughly to six hundred cavalry and fourteen thousand foot. 
 
In this passage, Pausanias makes a brief reference to the liberation of slaves carried 
out by Miltiades prior to the battle of Marathon. More specifically, this passage deals 
with two episodes concerning manumissions of slaves performed by the state: the 
specific object of Pausanias’ account is the liberation of many slaves carried out in 279 
                                                          
455 Osborne (1983): 37, for example, argues that ‘the unusualness of the mass enfranchisement 
prior to Arginusai is obvious. The manning of the ships with slaves in such substantial numbers 
was in itself as uncommon as the granting of citizenship to slaves (or to other groups) en masse. 
But desperate circumstances breed desperate solutions … and the crucial consideration in this 
case is surely this: the men who were embarked upon the ships to fight in the Arginusai campaign 
were being called upon to do what was the duty (and the privilege) of citizens – it is thus not 
surprising that the reward for participation was the citizenship’. 
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B.C. by Diaios (καὶ δούλους τε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν ἠφίει). He then proceeds to a comparison 
with a similar act performed by Miltiades in 490 B.C., which is presented as the episode 
that inspired Diaios to perform a similar mass-manumission of slaves before the battle: 
according to Pausanias’ account, therefore, prior to the battle of Marathon, slaves were 
set free in accordance with a specific βούλευμα by Miltiades and the Athenians. 
Although this passage is vague, many scholars do not doubt the historical reliability of 
the events narrated by Pausanias, which would therefore constitute ‘the earliest-known 
case of wartime manumission by the Athenians’.456 Calderini, for example, expressly 
mentions the episode attested in Paus. 7.15.7 as one of the few cases of ‘public’ 
manumissions in the Greek world before a battle.457 
On the other hand, it has to be noted that this passage (which constitutes a much later 
source, as Pausanias lived in the 2nd century A.D.) is the only one which mentions this 
episode.458 Moreover, Pausanias seems elsewhere to contradict himself. In the first book, 
he tells that, after the battle of Marathon, the Athenians built two graves: one for the 
citizens who died during the battle of Marathon, and one for the Plataeans and the slaves 
who lost their life in the same battlefield. Because Pausanias refers to them twice as 
δοῦλοι, within the same sentence (Paus. 1.32.3: ‘καὶ ἕτερος Πλαταιεῦσι Βοιωτῶν καὶ 
δούλοις: ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τότε πρῶτον’), one may argue that the reliability 
of Paus. 7.15.7 as direct evidence for the mass-manumission of slaves who had fought in 
                                                          
456 Kamen (2005): 15. Cf. Notopoulos (1941); Finley (1980): 99; Garlan (1988): 171; Hunt (1998): 
27. 
457  Calderini (1965): 167-168. Calderini further supports his view about the historicity of 
Pausanias’ account by stressing ‘l’urgenza del momento, che richiedeva subito un aiuto; … 
l’accenno esplicito di Pausania ad un βούλευμα del popolo e di Milziade, e il fatto che lo scrittore 
lo cita a modo di confronto, il che voleva dire che era comunemente noto e accettato come vero’, 
all take to the conclusion that ‘non mi pare possibile non accogliere le parole di Pausania’. Cf. also 
Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 70 n. 11, who also mentions the passage from Paus. 7.15.7 as referring 
to a manumission performed by the πόλις. 
458 One of the main objections to the use of Paus. 7.15.7 as source-material for the mass-
manumission of slaves before the battle of Marathon is that ‘Herodotus, who treats the battle at 
length, makes no mention of the slaves at Marathon’ (Kamen [2005]: 16). Such a silence, however, 
has been explained by Hunt (1998): 42, in terms of Herodotus’ intention to emphasize ‘freedom 
and … its connection with military prowess’, as the Athenians were particularly proud of having 
defeated the Persians. Mentioning the presence of slaves in the army would have therefore 
clashed with this ideology. 
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Marathon is somewhat compromised. It is also true, however, that – as I have shown in 
the previous chapters – manumitted slaves sometimes could be referred to in the ancient 
sources as δοῦλοι or, more generally, with a vocabulary typical of slavery, and such a 
practice clearly reflected a metaphorical use of the vocabulary of slavery (referring also 
to their legal condition prior to manumission). If we keep this in mind, we may be able 
to suggest that in this specific passage Pausanias (perhaps following his sources) was 
using the term ‘slaves’ as shorthand for ‘the slaves who had been manumitted before the 
battle’. Moreover, if we consider that ‘sarebbe stato uno strano onore fatto ai Plateesi 
morti per la salvezza di Atene, di seppellirli cogli schiavi degli Ateniesi; mentre sarebbe 
spiegabilissimo pensare che fossero stati posti accanto ai liberti Ateniesi’ 459 , we can 
conclude that Paus. 7.15.7 is likely to refer to a case of mass-manumission of slaves before 
the battle. 
More information for the understanding of ‘public’ manumission have been 
preserved with regard to the events which followed the Athenian defeat in the battle of 
Chaeronea in 338 B.C., as their historical authenticity cannot be doubted. As evidence 
for the attempted mass-manumission of slaves which Athens was about to perform in 
the period immediately following the battle, scholars usually refer to the following 
passage from Dio Chrysostom’s fifteenth oration (which constitutes, however, a much 
later source): 
 
D. Chr. 15.21: ὅπως Ἀθηναίων ψηφισαμένων μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην τοὺς 
συμπολεμήσοντας οἰκέτας ἐλευθὲρους εἶναι, εἰ προύβη ὁ πόλεμος, ἀλλὰ μὴ 
διελύσατο θᾶττον ὁ Φίλιππος πρὸς αὐτοὺς, πολλοὶ ἄν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν οἰκετῶν ἢ 
μικροῦ πάντες ἐλεὺθεροι ἦσαν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου ἕκαστος ἀφεθείς. 
 
In the same way that, when the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea passed a vote to the 
effect that those slaves who would help them in the war should receive their freedom, if the war 
had continued and Philip had not made peace with them too soon, many of the slaves at Athens, 
or rather, practically all of them, would have been free without having been emancipated one at a 
time by their respective masters. 
 
                                                          
459 Calderini (1965): 168, following Croiset (1898): 67-72. 
200 
 
This passage informs us, on the one hand, that the Athenians passed a decree 
specifically aimed at granting freedom to those slaves who would help the πόλις during 
the war against Philip. On the other hand, it specifies that such a decree never became 
effective and therefore these slaves were never liberated, as the exceptional 
circumstances which justified the enactment of the decree (namely, the necessity to 
continue the war against Philip) came to an end (because of the peace with Philip). 
This passage, however, does not constitute the only extant evidence for the mass-
manumission of slaves that Athens was about to perform after the battle of Chaeronea: 
the same episode is attested in other sources, which show a much more complex scenario. 
We know from this evidence that the proposal of the decree had been accused of being 
παράνομον: at first sight, the legal possibility for the state to manumit privately-owned 
slaves seems therefore problematic, as in contrast with the νόμοι of the πόλις. 
The author of the proposal of the decree to the Assembly was Hyperides, who was 
later prosecuted by Aristogeiton with a γραφή παράνομον.460 It is important to point 
out from the very outset, however, two key issues. First, the γραφή παράνομον against 
Hyperides resulted in the latter’s acquittal. Second, the fragmentary status of the extant 
evidence does not allow us to know the specific reason(s) why this proposal was accused 
of contradicting the existing laws. In other words, the idea that Hyperides’ proposal was 
considered to be παράνομον because it suggested to liberate privately owned slaves, 
although possible, is not directly proved by the sources – this is only one of many 
                                                          
460 The γραφή παράνομον was ‘a public action against measures that violate the law’, and its 
use is mostly attested in the 4th century B.C. In this period (which directly interests this discussion) 
this popular action could only be used against those ψηφίσματα (decrees) which were considered 
to be in contrast with the νόμοι: the γραφή παράνομον thus played ‘a rule akin to that of a 
modern charge of unconstitutionality, repealing decrees that were not in accordance with a 
hierarchically higher set of rules, the nomoi’ (Canevaro [2015]). At the end of the 5th century B.C., 
a clear distinction was first outlined between ψηφίσματα and νόμοι, whereas before then the two 
terms were used interchangeably to describe binding rules in general. For a thorough discussion 
about the changes occurred at the end of the 5th century B.C. in the legislative procedure (which 
saw, from a legal point of view, the introduction of a more clear-cut distinction between νόμοι 
and ψηφίσματα, and a partially new function of the γραφή παράνομον – due also to the 
introduction of the γραφή νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι against those νόμοι which were 
considered to be inconsistent with other νόμοι), cf., most recently, Canevaro (2015). 
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possible hypotheses about the reasons why this decree could have been accused of being 
illegal. I shall discuss this point in more detail. 
We know of Hyperides’ proposal and of his later prosecution with a γραφή 
παράνομον, in the first place, thanks to the surviving fragments of a forensic speech 
which Hyperides wrote for his own defence against Aristogeiton’s accusations. As we 
learn from other sources (such as Lyc. 1.36-37 and [Plut.] Moralia 849a, which I shall 
discuss later in this chapter), the measures suggested by Hyperides in the decree were 
aimed at increasing the number of men who would be able to fight in the Athenian army 
and included, among others: restoration of civic rights to ἄτιμοι and exiles; grant of 
Athenian citizenship to metics; manumission of slaves. 461  As I mentioned before, 
however, the evidence concerning the decree by Hyperides is extremely scanty and 
fragmentary, as the speech he wrote against Aristogeiton only survives in a few 
fragments. The most significant one for our purposes is fragment 27, which is however 
only preserved in the Latin translation of Hyperides’ text462: 
 
Hyp. Fr. 27: Quid a me saepius his verbis de meo officio requiris? Scripsisti, ut servis libertas 
daretur? Scripsi; ne liberi servitutem experirentur. Scripsisti, ut exules restituerentur? Scripsi; 
ut ne quis exilio afficeretur. Leges igitur, quae prohibebant haec, nonne legebas? Non poteram; 
propterea quod literis earum arma Macedonum opposita officiebant. 
 
Why do you keep asking me in these words about my duty? “Did you propose in the decree to 
grant freedom to slaves?” I did, to prevent free men from experiencing servitude. “Did you 
propose to restore exiles?” I did, to prevent anyone else from suffering exile. “Now then, did you 
not read the laws that prohibited this?" I couldn't, because Macedonian arms stood in the way 
and obstructed their words. (tr. Cooper) 
 
Of the several measures proposed by Hyperides, this fragment mentions the 
restoration of exiles and the grant of freedom to all slaves of Attica (who numbered, 
according to Fr. 29, more than one hundred and fifty thousand). According to Hyperides’ 
report of Aristogeiton’s accusation, these two measures have been accused of being, as 
                                                          
461 Cooper (2001): 138, who also mentions, among the measures proposed by Hyperides, the 
evacuation of all women and children to the Piraeus and arming the Council of 500. See also 
Harris (2001a): 171 n. 29. 
462 Cooper (2001): 139 n. 6. 
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a whole, illegal. The terms of the accusation, however, are only preserved in a 
translation, and it is likely that the expression ‘Leges igitur, quae prohibebant haec, nonne 
legebas?’ constitutes a Latin elaboration of the Greek adjective παράνομον. 
This passage does not directly prove that the provision which aimed at granting 
freedom to slaves was itself illegal (which would imply, in other words, that at the time 
in Athens there was a specific νόμος which prohibited public manumissions of slaves 
by the state in emergency situations): this could be possible in theory, but does not 
automatically descend from the text of Fr. 29. It seems to me to be safer to assume that 
the decree as a whole, and not just the measure concerning the grant of freedom to slaves, 
was charged with the accusation of being παράνομον: the proposal of any decree could 
in fact be accused of being παράνομον for several reasons, regarding both substantive 
and procedural issues. Further evidence makes this point clearer. 
Other sources mention the fact that Hyperides proposed, among other measures, the 
grant of freedom to slaves.463 For example, we learn from Against Leocrates that ‘Lycurgus 
uses the procedure of eisangelia to indict Leocrates and charges him with treason 
(prodosia), as soon as Leocrates returns to Athens, for sailing to Rhodes during the critical 
period for Athens following its defeat in Chaeronea’. 464  In mentioning the decree 
proposed by Hyperides to the Assembly soon after the battle of Chaeronea, Lycurgus 
reminds the judges that, among the measures suggested by the orator, the ψήφισμα 
passed by the Assembly also proposed to set slaves free: 
 
Lyc. 1.41: πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δεινῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν γιγνομένων, καὶ πάντων τῶν 
πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἠτυχηκότων, μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ἤλγησε καὶ ἐδάκρυσεν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς 
πόλεως συμφοραῖς, ἡνίχ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους 
                                                          
463 Other sources, on the other hand, although mentioning Hyperides’ proposal and its illegal 
nature, do not expressly refer to the slaves’ liberation: cf. Hyp. Fr. 29; [Dem.] 26.11; Suda s.v. 
‘Aristogeiton’. 
464 For a detailed discussion on the framework of the speech, see Harris (2001a): 159-161, who 
stresses, on the one hand, that ‘the weakness of Lycurgus’ case is that the law does not state that 
citizens were obliged to contribute to the city’s defense even if they were not explicitly ordered 
to do so’ and, on the other hand, that ‘Lycurgus’ appeals to patriotism as well as his personal 
prestige almost succeeded in winning the case; Aeschines (3.252) says that Leocrates escaped 
conviction by a single vote’. For a reference to the decree proposed by Hyperides, see also Lyc. 
1.16, 36-37. 
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ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους: ὃς πρότερον2 ἐπὶ 
τῷ αὐτόχθων εἶναι καὶ ἐλεύθερος ἐσεμνύνετο. 
 
In the middle of these many disasters for the city and terrible misfortunes for all its citizens, 
anyone would have shared their pain and would have wept to see the people who prided themselves 
on their freedom and racial purity voting to grant slaves their freedom, give citizenship to 
foreigners, and restore privileges to the disenfranchised. (tr. Harris) 
 
Again, the same information about the decree proposed by Hyperides is provided in 
a passage from Plutarch’s Lives of the Ten Orators: 
 
Plut. Vit. Dec. 848f-849a: κριθεὶς δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος παρανόμων ἐπὶ τῷ 
γράψαι μετὰ Χαιρώνειαν τοὺς μετοίκους πολίτας ποιήσασθαι τοὺς δὲ δούλους 
ἐλευθέρους, ἱερὰ δὲ καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἀποθέσθαι, ἀπέφυγεν. 
αἰτιωμένων δέ τινων αὐτὸν ὡς παριδόντα πολλοὺς νόμους ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι, 
‘ἐπεσκότει’ ἔφη ‘μοι τὰ Μακεδόνων ὅπλα’ καί ‘οὐκ ἐγὼ τὸ ψήφισμα ἔγραψα ἡ δ᾽ ἐν 
Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχη’. 
 
Being once accused at the instance of Aristogiton of publishing acts contrary to the laws after 
the battle of Chaeronea,—that all foreign inhabitants of Athens should be accounted citizens, that 
slaves should be made free, that all sacred things, children, and women should be confined to the 
Piraeus,—he cleared himself of all and was acquitted. And being blamed by some, who wondered 
how he could be ignorant of the many laws that were directly repugnant to those decrees, he 
answered, that the arms of the Macedonians darkened his sight, and it was not he but the battle 
of Chaeronea that made that decree. 
 
In this passage, Plutarch seems to summarise the information provided by the other 
sources, and his evidence further confirms, on the one hand, that Hyperides did propose 
in the Assembly a decree suggesting, among other measures, to set slaves free for war 
and, on the other hand, that such a decree as a whole was accused of being illegal by 
Aristogeiton who thus started a γραφή παράνομον against Hyperides. 
If we want to sum up the information provided by the sources analysed above, we 
can isolate the following points. First, soon after the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea, 
Hyperides proposed to the Assembly a decree in which, among other measures, 
liberation by the state of privately owned slaves was mentioned as a means through 
which the πόλις aimed at increasing the Athenian army for the later stages of the war 
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against Philip. Second, the efficacy of the decree was subject to the condition that the war 
against Philip (and therefore the emergency-situation for the πόλις) would continue. 
Third, the decree was passed by the Assembly, but never became effective because the 
events which had been taken as the condition for the efficacy of the decree never 
happened. This implies that none of the provisions mentioned in the decree became 
effective, and therefore slaves were not actually manumitted by the πόλις. Fourth, 
Hyperides’ proposal was accused of being illegal: a γραφή παράνομον was in fact 
started by Aristogeiton against him, which yet resulted in Hyperides’ acquittal. 
The question therefore is: do these sources tell us unequivocally that a decree 
proposing the ‘public’ manumission of privately owned slaves was itself illegal? In other 
words, can we infer from this evidence that in Athens there was a specific νόμος which 
expressly prohibited the possibility for the πόλις to liberate slaves, even without their 
masters’ consent, in emergency situations? The extant evidence does not provide us with 
a direct answer to these questions; yet, some considerations about the application and 
function of the γραφή παράνομον might help us to suggest some possible answers. 
The first point that we need to keep in mind is that, as mentioned before, nowhere in 
these sources we find a reference to the specific reason(s) why Hyperides’ proposal was 
considered to be against the laws, as they make no more than a general allusion to the 
specific charge brought against the decree as a whole. 
Moreover, other ancient sources refer both to the proposal made by Hyperides after 
the defeat of Chaeronea and to its accusation of being παράνομον without mentioning 
the manumission of privately owned slaves by the state. For example, in [Dem.] 26.11 
the speaker refers to the decree proposed by Hyperides ‘when the very foundations of 
our state were threatened with the utmost danger’: yet, in reminding the audience that 
because of this proposal Hyperides was later prosecuted with a γραφή παράνομον, the 
speaker only refers to the proposal of restoring civic rights to the ἄτιμοι (whilst no 
mention is made to the grant of freedom to slaves).465 But we learn from Dem. 24.45 that 
                                                          
465  [Dem.] 26.11: ὅτε γὰρ Ὑπερείδης ἔγραψε, τῶν περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἀτυχημάτων τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι γενομένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐδαφῶν εἰς κίνδυνον μέγιστον 
κατακεκλειμένης, εἶναι τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους, ἵν᾽ ὁμονοοῦντες ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς 
ἐλευθερίας προθύμως ἀγωνίζωνται, ἐάν τις κίνδυνος τηλικοῦτος καταλαμβάνῃ τὴν πόλιν, 
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proposing to restore civic rights to the ἄτιμοι was not itself παράνομον (in other words, 
in Athens there was not a νόμος which prohibited the restoration of civic rights to the 
ἄτιμοι), unless a specific procedure was not followed before the proposal was actually 
presented to the Assembly. More specifically, in order for a citizen to be able to propose 
the restoration of civic rights to the ἄτιμοι, the ἄδεια (immunity) had to be voted in the 
Assembly with no less than six thousand affirmative votes given by secret ballot. Only 
once the ἄδεια was voted, then a citizen could propose in the Assembly a decree 
regarding the condition of the ἄτιμοι, and such a proposal could then be discussed; 
without a prior vote on the ἄδεια, such a proposal would have been accused of being 
παράνομον.466 
[Dem.] 26.11 therefore does not necessarily imply that Hyperides’ proposal was 
accused of being παράνομον because of its measure consisting in the restoration of civic 
rights to the ἄτιμοι: it could well be the case that such a proposal was seen as illegal 
because it did not follow, for example, the complex procedure which was necessary for 
the possibility of discussing such a decree (and this might have been the case, given the 
emergency situation that Athens was facing after the defeat at Chaeronea). In other 
words, there are many possible legal infractions that might have led to Hyperides’ 
prosecution with a γραφή παράνομον. 
If we extend this discussion to the general content of the proposal, we notice that the 
same considerations can be made for the measure consisting in the slaves’ manumission 
by the πόλις: after all, manumission and restoration of civic rights to the ἄτιμοι are often 
                                                          
τούτου τοῦ ψηφίσματος γραφὴν παρανόμων ἀπενέγκας ἠγωνίζετ᾽ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ (‘For 
after the disasters to the Greek forces at Chaeroneia, when the very foundations of our State were threatened 
with the utmost danger, when Hypereides proposed that the disfranchised citizens should be reinstated in 
order that, if any such danger should menace our State, all classes might unite wholeheartedly in the 
struggle for liberty, the defendant indicted this decree as unconstitutional and conducted his case in court’). 
466 Dem. 24.45: Νόμος: μηδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων, ὅπως χρὴ ἐπιτίμους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, μηδὲ περὶ 
τῶν ὀφειλόντων τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων περὶ ἀφέσεως τοῦ ὀφλήματος ἢ 
τάξεως, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων τὴν ἄδειαν πρῶτον μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξακισχιλίων, οἷς 
ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις. τότε δ᾽ ἐξεῖναι χρηματίζειν καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ 
δήμῳ δοκῇ (Law: ‘… nor in respect of disfranchised citizens, for restoration of their franchise, nor in 
respect of persons indebted to the Gods or to the treasury of the Athenians, for remission or composition of 
their debt, unless permission be granted by not less than six thousand citizens giving an affirmative vote 
by ballot. In that event it shall be lawful to put the question in such manner as the Council and the Assembly 
approve’). This document is genuine and reliable: cf. Canevaro (2013): 89, 127-132. 
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mentioned together in referring to Hyperides’ proposal and its later accusation of being 
illegal, but we know that at least one of its provisions (the one regarding ἄτιμοι) was not 
in itself παράνομον. Moreover, the fact that some ancient sources refer to manumission 
as one of the measures suggested by Hyperides while some other ones do not467, could 
perhaps be taken as an indication that, in all these cases, the mention of the individual 
measures suggested by Hyperides was aimed at identifying the decree which had been 
later accused of being παράνομον, rather than the specific reasons why the proposal 
was charged with this accusation. 
To sum up: many sources are consistent in showing that Hyperides did propose to 
the Assembly a decree which included mass-manumissions of slaves by the πόλις 
among its measures, and that such a decree was passed by the Assembly. Regardless of 
the later accusation of παρανομία, and given the fact that we have no clear and 
unequivocal indication about the specific charge that allegedly made this proposal 
illegal, we can suggest that, in the emergency-situation which followed the defeat at 
Chaeronea, the Athenians did recur to the extreme solution of adopting a decree which 
was meant to grant freedom to privately-owned slaves for purposes of self-defence. Of 
course, the proposal of such a decree must have met with considerable resistance in some 
quarters, if we also consider that the Athenian Assembly was made of citizens who were 
themselves slave-owners. Such a decree was nevertheless proposed and passed by the 
Assembly, because of exceptional circumstances. 
A joint-analysis of the ancient sources referring to mass-manumissions of slaves 
performed by Athens between the 4th and the 5th century B.C. further confirms that this 
form of slaves’ liberation only occurred in wartime, at times of severe distress and on 
the eve of likely ruin for the city, when further manpower was needed and therefore 
manumission appeared to be the only means through which involving slaves in the army 
(or the appropriate reward for loyal slaves). What is clear, however, is that in Classical 
Athens these circumstances were extremely rare, and only the specific emergencies that 
the πόλις was experiencing in each of them could justify measures that was certainly 
                                                          
467 Cf., for example, Suda s.v. ‘Aristogeiton’. 
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very problematic and potentially unpopular, but which aimed at prioritising public 
interests and safety over the interests and rights of individual slave-owners. 
 
4. ‘Public’ manumissions outside Athens: the evidence from Rhodes and Chios. 
Apart from the evidence dealing with Athens, some sources refer to manumissions 
performed by other πόλεις between the 5th and the 4th century B.C.: this shows that 
‘public’ manumission was not just an Athenian peculiarity but, rather, that it has been 
practiced elsewhere in the Greek world. 
The first piece of evidence that I shall consider refers to 4th century B.C. Rhodes. The 
episode is described by Diodorus in the twentieth book of his Bibliotheca Historica, and 
deals with the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 305 B.C.: 
 
Diod. 20.84.2-3: ἀριθμὸν δὲ ποιησάμενοι τῶν δυναμένων ἀγωνίζεσθαι πολιτῶν 
μὲν εὗρον περὶ ἑξακισχιλίους, τῶν δὲ παροίκων καὶ ξένων εἰς χιλίους. ἐψηφίσαντο 
δὲ καὶ τῶν δούλων τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενομένους ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀγοράσαντας 
παρὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ πολίτας εἶναι. 
 
When they made a count of those who were able to fight, they found that there were about six 
thousand citizens and as many as a thousand metics and aliens. They voted also to buy from their 
masters any slaves who proved themselves brave men in battle, and to liberate and enfranchise 
them. (tr. Geer) 
 
This passage is significant for our understanding of the nature and implications of 
manumission of privately-owned slaves by the πόλις. First, Diodorus informs us that 
the πόλις passed a ψήφισμα in which it was decided to confer freedom and citizenship 
rights onto those slaves who had proved to be brave in battle. Second, the passage 
further specifies how this mass-manumission had to be performed: according to the 
provisions of the ψήφισμα, in order for the πόλις to validly manumit privately owned 
slaves, the former had to buy the latter from their masters in the context of an ordinary 
market-transaction. The fact that the πόλις had to buy these slaves from their masters is 
suggested by the expression ‘ἀγοράσαντας παρὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν’: as Pringsheim has 
pointed out, ‘ἀγοράζω seems to be a special term for buying in the market. This is the 
meaning as early as in Pindar …, and in the orations of Aeschines and Demosthenes, in 
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comedy and in the papyri the term is used for sales in the market or at least for sales of 
movables which were mostly sold there’.468 Technically speaking, this passage implies 
that the πόλις actually purchased privately owned slaves from their masters. The 
masters, however, acquired not just mere compensation in return for an expropriation: 
the fact that the πόλις purchased privately-owned slaves in the context of an ordinary 
market-transaction means that masters received the payment of the price, which 
possibly reflected the economic value of their slaves at the time of the transaction. This 
also makes it clear that, by virtue of the sale thus concluded, the πόλις first became the 
slaves’ new owner (which also means, in other words, that these slaves ceased to be 
privately owned and became owned by the πόλις, i.e. ‘public slaves’), and then would 
manumit them, according to the provisions of the ψήφισμα. Third, Diodorus informs us 
that these slaves were not only granted freedom, but also citizenship rights by the πόλις 
(‘ἐψηφίσαντο … ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ πολίτας εἶναι’): such a reward reminds of the 
evidence from Aristoph. Ran. 694-695, which mentions the grant of the status of 
Plataeans to those slaves who had fought in the battle of the Arginusae. 
Later on, at paragraph 100 of the same book, Diodorus further confirms that, after the 
siege came to an end, the Rhodians proceeded to grant freedom and citizenship rights 
to those slaves who had proved brave in battle, according to the provisions of the decree: 
 
Diod. 20.100.1-4: οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥόδιοι πολιορκηθέντες ἐνιαύσιον χρόνον τούτῳ τῷ 
τρόπῳ κατελύσαντο τὸν πόλεμον. τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς 
γενομένους ἐτίμησαν ταῖς ἀξίαις δωρεαῖς καὶ τῶν δούλων τοὺς ἀνδραγαθήσαντας 
ἐλευθερίας καὶ πολιτείας ἠξίωσαν. 
 
In this way then the Rhodians, after they had been besieged for a year, brought the war to an 
end. Those who had proved themselves brave men in the battles they honoured with the prizes 
that were their due, and they granted freedom and citizenship to such slaves as had shown 
themselves courageous. (tr. Geer) 
 
In order to provide a complete analysis of the extant evidence for manumission by 
the πόλις, I will discuss one further source which has been generally ignored in modern 
                                                          
468 Pringsheim (1950): 100. 
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discussions on manumission, but which can possibly be interpreted as recording a 
‘public’ manumission of slaves. This inscription (‘Chios 62’)469 has been found in Chios 
and is dated between the end of the 5th and the beginning of the 4th century B.C. This 
inscription is fragmentarily preserved on a stone inscribed on three sides. It consists of 
a list of names of slaves, divided in groups, that are defined as δεκάδες in sides A and B 
of the stone (cf. A, l. 8; B, l. 11), that is, as military units. Robert first thoroughly analysed 
this inscription and suggested to interpret its content as referring to a mass-manumission 
of slaves performed by the πόλις in wartime470: his view has been later acknowledged 
by other scholars of Greek slavery, such as Garlan, Hunt and Ducat.471 Robert’s view is 
based on the following premise: after remarking that, in normal circumstances, the πόλις 
has no reason to invest time and money for inscribing the names of several slaves on a 
stone, he suggests that such a measure must have been due to extraordinary events. He 
therefore reads the content of this inscription by suggesting a comparison with other 
evidence from the same time (namely, those sources referring to mass-manumissions of 
slaves performed by the πόλεις before the battle of the Arginusae, after the defeat at 
Chaeronea, and for the siege of Rhodes). In doing so he notices, on the one hand, that 
many ancient sources mention the enrolment of slaves in the army when the πόλεις were 
in desperate need of extra man-power and, on the other hand, that some of these sources 
expressly state that those slaves who helped in the army were rewarded with freedom.472 
Given these premises, Robert concludes that the inscription is likely referring to a 
manumission performed by the πόλις of Chios. Together with these remarks based on 
the comparison with other sources mentioning similar episodes, the idea that this 
inscription refers to a mass-manumission of slaves carried out by Chios in wartime 
                                                          
469 McCabe (1986): 62. 
470 Cf. Robert (1935): 453-459. 
471 Garlan (1972): 44; Hunt (2001): 370, who reads the inscriptions in connection with the Ionian 
war, and suggests that ‘when Chios revolted from Athens during the Ionian War, the Chians set 
slaves free as a reward for naval service. At this time Chios, like Athens, was manning a navy of 
a size that stretched its manpower capacity … at Chios, as at Athens, the pressures of a bitter war 
led to atypical rewards for naval service’. The idea that this inscription refers to a mass-
manumission of slaves performed by the state for military purposes has also been suggested by 
Ducrey (1990): 26. 
472 Robert (1935): 456-459. 
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seems to be supported by the commonly-accepted restoration of lines 3-5 of the 
inscription, which would therefore directly refer to the manumission by the πόλις of 
those slaves whose names have been inscribed on the stone: ‘[—]τας γράψα̣ι ̣πο- / [— ἡ] 
πόλις ἠλεο[θέ]- / [ρωσεν —]εναι’. This hypothesis, moreover, is further strengthened 
by the consideration of the chronological context in which the stone was inscribed. Being 
dated to the beginning of the 4th century B.C., its content is perhaps due to a particularly 
harsh period for Chios and its inhabitants: ‘Depuis qu’en 411 Chios a fait defection à 
Athènes, ce ne sont que guerres et revolutions, lutes contre Athènes et contre Sparte, 
lutes entre le people et l’oligarchie, entre les villages et la ville. Il me paraît difficile de 
préciser la date exacte de notre liste d’esclaves; la dernière partie de la guerre du 
Péloponèse me paraît peut-être l’époque la plus probable’.473 All the elements above 
mentioned (1) the restoration of the first five lines of the inscription; 2)the list of slave-
names grouped as forming part of specific military units; 3) a reading of the inscription 
through a comparative approach), therefore, seem to suggest that, between the 4th and 
the 5th century B.C., the πόλις of Chios manumitted several slaves for military purposes. 
If this is true, then the evidence from Rhodes and Chios further confirms that, even 
outside Athens, ‘public’ manumission was an exceptional measure due to warfare for 
the safeguard of public interests. 
 
5. The evidence for manumission in Classical Sparta: ‘public’ manumission of the helots. 
In scholarly contributions to Greek manumission, it is unusual to find discussions 
about liberation of slaves in Sparta, to which no more than brief remarks are usually 
devoted. This is primarily due, on the one hand, to the status of the extant evidence and, 
on the other hand, to the traditional views on Sparta’s slave-system. The evidence for 
manumission in Sparta is extremely scanty, and only very few cases of slaves’ liberation 
are mentioned in no more than brief remarks. However, the main problem, which for a 
long time has prevented a satisfactory understanding of Spartan manumission, is the 
way that scholars have addressed the problem of the helots’ legal condition. 
                                                          
473 Robert (1935): 459. 
211 
 
The idea that the helots were privately-owned slaves is in fact emerged in recent 
interpretations, as the commonly held-view was that they were public slaves (that is, 
owned by the πόλις), whom the state had ‘assigned’ to individual Spartiatai or, more 
precisely, to the land the these Spartiatai controlled, to which they were bound for the 
rest of their lives.474 Other views, on the other hand, held that the legal condition of the 
helots was one of serfdom 475  or, again, an unspecified status ‘between slavery and 
freedom’.476 
The problem of the legal condition enjoyed by the helots and the development of the 
scholarly opinions about this issue have been addressed by recent contributions, which 
have shown that the helots were privately owned by Spartan citizens.477 These readings 
show that the slave-system of Classical Sparta was based on private ownership over 
slaves; such a system, however, was in many ways peculiar, as its main features were 
the result of specific social and economic features which shaped Spartan society. 
                                                          
474 Cf. Lotze (1959): 27-47; Garlan (1988): 88; de Ste Croix (1972): 89-93. This idea is mainly 
grounded on the reading of Strabo 8.5.4 and Paus. 3.20.6, who tend to describe the helots as ‘slaves 
of the community’. Ducat (1990): 19-29, however, has argued that both Strabo and Pausanias 
constitute much later sources, and that their idea of the helots as ‘public slaves’ reflected the 
changes that had occurred within Spartan society. Similarly, cf. Hodkinson (2000): 114, who 
stresses that this view ‘was indissolubly linked to the revolution’s redistribution of private 
Spartiate estates into a system of state-controlled equal klēroi, which meant a real change in status 
for the helots working the kleroi, who now likewise became public property’. 
475 Luraghi (2002): 228, argues that such a view relies on the fact that the helots were strictly 
bound to the land they had to work and could not be removed from it, but he challenges this idea 
and concludes that the helots were privately-owned slaves. For the idea that the helots were 
legally free yet attached to a specific piece of land, see, most recently, Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005): 
9 n. 16, who, after including the helots among the ‘bondsmen and other dependent groups’, 
expressly excludes them from her discussion on Greek manumission since, according to her 
interpretation, they could not be considered as ‘chattle-slaves’. 
476 See, for instance, Finley (1981): 116. This interpretation of the legal condition of the helots 
relies entirely on Pollux’ Onomasticon, who, in the 2nd century A.D., provides the following 
definition: ‘Μεταξὺ δὲ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δούλων οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων Εἵλωες καὶ Θετταλῶν 
Πενέσται καὶ Κρητῶν Κλαρῶται καὶ Μνῶται καὶ Σικυωνdων Κορυνηφόροι’ (‘between free men 
and slaves are the Lakonian helots, the Thessalian Penestai, the Cretan Klarotai and Mnoitai, the 
Mariandynian Doryphoroi, the Argive Gymnetes and the Sikyonian Korynephoroi’: Poll. 3.83). With this 
definition, Pollux includes other categories, together with the helots, within this unspecified 
category of persons who are defined as enjoying a legal condition ‘between slavery and freedom’. 
477 Most recently, Lewis (2015), (forthcoming a). See also, in this sense, Hodkinson (2000): 113-
117; Luraghi (2002): 228-233. The first interpretation of the legal condition of the helots as 
privately owned slaves, however, was that of Ducat (1990): 19-29. 
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The starting-point for the understanding of manumission in Classical Sparta is a 
passage from the Greek historian Ephorus (who lived in the 4th century B.C. and 
therefore provides contemporary evidence). According to Ephorus, the helots could not 
be sold ‘outside the borders’ of Spartan territory (‘ἔξω τῶν ὅρων’) and could not be 
manumitted by their masters:  
 
Ephorus FGrHist70 F117 = Strab. 8.5.4: τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους ὑπακοῦσαι, τοὺς δ᾽ 
Ἑλείους τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ Ἕλος （καλεῖσθαι δὲ Εἵλωτας） ποιησαμένους ἀπόστασιν 
κατὰ κράτος ἁλῶναι πολέμῳ καὶ κριθῆναι δούλους ἐπὶ τακτοῖς τισιν, ὥστε τὸν 
ἔχοντα μήτ᾽ ἐλευθεροῦν ἐξεῖναι μήτε πωλεῖν ἔξω τῶν ὅρων τούτους: τοῦτον δὲ 
λεχθῆναι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας πόλεμον. 
 
… now all obeyed except the Heleians, the occupants of Helus, who, because they revolted, 
were forcibly reduced in a war, and were condemned to slavery, with the express reservation that 
no slaveholder should be permitted either to set them free or to sell them outside the borders of the 
country; and this war was called the War against the Helots. 
 
Many scholars have relied on this passage in order to argue that the helots could not 
be private property, because the restriction on the sale of the helots and the ban on their 
manumission are (supposedly) inconsistent with the right of ownership over them.478 A 
closer look at these features, however, shows that they are not themselves inconsistent 
with ‘private’ ownership over the helots, but rather reflect the peculiarities of this slave-
system.479 Prohibition to sell the helots outside Spartan territory undoubtedly constitutes 
a significant limitation, imposed by the state, on the exercise of the right to alienate a 
property, which descends from entitlement to ownership. Yet, restriction on the exercise 
of one of the powers descending from ownership does not imply exclusion of ownership 
itself: in other words, the fact that the state decided (for specific reasons) to impose a 
‘territorial’ limitation on the alienation of the helots does not indicate that private 
ownership over them was not recognised at all. Prohibition on the manumission of the 
                                                          
478 See, for example, Cartledge (2003): 17-18. 
479 Luraghi (2002): 229, has pointed out that ‘although they might seem contradictory, at a 
closer look the two rules mentioned by Ephorus are perfectly consistent with one another’; 
moreover, as I shall show in this paragraph, they are due to social, economic and legal reasons. 
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helots, by contrast, implies that the πόλις forbids masters to exercise one of the powers 
descending from ownership, namely, the possibility to dispose of their right by 
extinguishing it. In the case of Classical Sparta, then, the question arises on how ban on 
‘private’ manumission is consistent with the existence of a slave-system based on private 
ownership over slaves. 
Prohibition to manumit the helots has often been taken as the major indicator that 
they were not privately-owned but, rather, owned by the state.480 I suggest, by contrast, 
that the state’s (exclusive) entitlement to manumission does not necessarily imply the 
state’s more general entitlement to the right of ownership over the helots, but rather 
reflects social, economic and legal reasons which aimed to protect the interests of the 
state at different levels. As many scholars have pointed out, Spartan society was 
characterised by a strong fear of slave revolts481 because of specific social factors: first, a 
big disparity in numbers between free individuals and slaves (as the number of slaves 
largely outnumbered that of the free population)482; second, a considerable absenteeism 
of masters (as free citizens were busy in the city, whereas the helots were employed in 
the fields, from which it follows that the former could hardly control the latter in their 
everyday life)483; third, the ‘ethnic solidarity’ among the helots was also a factor which 
‘provided a certain degree of unity of purpose’.484 Because of all these elements, the 
Spartans ‘rappresentavano se stessi come una fortezza assediata, cioè come un gruppo 
“circondato da nemici”’485 and therefore ‘keeping their territory and their helots under 
control was a problem to which the Spartiates devoted a lot of energy’.486 
                                                          
480 See, typically, Cartledge (2003): 17-18, (2011a): 82. 
481 Cf., for example, Cartledge (1985); Garlan (1988): 177; de Ste Croix (2002); Luraghi (2002): 
231; Paradiso (2008a): 1-26, (2008b): 66-67. 
482 Paradiso (2008a): 30; on this point, see also Lewis (forthcoming a). In this regard, see also 
Cartledge (2011a): 74, who maintains that ‘although Sparta had a smaller overall population than 
Athens, it had the highest density of slave to free, followed, not by Athens, but by the island-state 
of Chios’. 
483 Luraghi (2002): 231. For the idea that ‘agricultural labour was the distinctive feature of helot 
servitude’, see also Hodkinson (2000): 113-145. 
484 Lewis (forthcoming a). 
485 Paradiso (2008a): 30. 
486 Luraghi (2002): 231. Cartledge (2011b): 57, has suggested that the Spartans kept control over 
the helots by adopting a ‘state terror’ involving, among other measures, the famous κρυπτεία, 
which was used as ‘an agent for spreading paranoia among the helots’ (Lewis [forthcoming a]). 
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In the second place, prohibition to manumit the helots (as well as restrictions on their 
sale) is also strongly influenced by economic reasons. Recent works have pointed out 
that, compared to other πόλεις of the same time, Spartan economy relied little on foreign 
trade.487 This element also had an important impact on its slave supply: its main source 
for slavery was not trade but, rather, natural reproduction among the helots.488 This 
economic factor may further explain the ban on private manumissions489: the fact that 
slave-supply derived mainly from self-reproduction among the helots required the state 
to keep firm control over the number of slaves that the Spartan society and the economic 
system as a whole could rely on. After all, the life of the Spartan state and its citizens 
relied heavily, if not exclusively, upon slave-labour and exploitation490, and it is therefore 
likely that the state intended to keep exclusive control over the number of its slaves, 
which could have dropped if ‘private’ forms of manumission had been practiced. 
Finally, legal reasons also suggest that the prohibition for masters to liberate their 
own slaves does not automatically imply that the relationship between the two cannot 
be based on the right of ownership. More specifically, slave-owners in Sparta are granted 
the right of ownership over their slaves; yet, according to the evidence from Ephorus, 
their power to extinguish it through manumission seems to be ‘transferred’ to the state 
which, as the only legal entity entitled to the manumission of the helots, thus exercises a 
(heavy) form of interference with the masters’ right of ownership. Even if in Sparta such 
a mechanism of ‘control’ by the state is stretched to the point of absorbing entirely one 
of the rights which – strictly speaking – would pertain to individual owners only, it 
should also be considered that interference by the state in the manumission of privately-
owned slaves is also attested in other πόλεις of the same time. As I showed before, 
similar cases of interventions by the state in the manumission of privately-owned slaves 
without or even against their masters’ consent are recorded in the ancient sources as 
happening at least in Classical Athens, Rhodes and perhaps Chios: the extant evidence 
                                                          
487 Luraghi (2002): 229. 
488 Lewis (2015). 
489 As well as on restriction upon sale of the helots outside the Spartan borders, which was 
likely due to the state’s interest in keeping control over the slave work-force that it could rely on. 
490 Lewis (forthcoming a). 
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for Sparta is consistent with these sources, as it indicates that the helots were only 
liberated during wartime and in exceptional occasions. 
The first evidence that can be considered in this regard refers to the mass-
manumission of the helots performed by Sparta around 424 B.C. during the 
Peloponnesian War. Thucydides informs us that, as the state needed volunteers who 
would bring food and supply to the army that was camped in the island of Sphacteria, 
the Spartans promised rewards to those people who would do so, and freedom to the 
helots: 
 
Thuc. 4.26.5-6: αἴτιον δὲ ἦν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἐσάγειν 
σῖτόν τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀληλεμένον καὶ οἶνον καὶ τυρὸν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἷ᾽ 
ἂν ἐς πολιορκίαν ξυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τῷ 
ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι. καὶ ἐσῆγον ἄλλοι τε παρακινδυνεύοντες καὶ 
μάλιστα οἱ Εἵλωτες, ἀπαίροντες ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὁπόθεν τύχοιεν καὶ 
καταπλέοντες ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐς τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τῆς νήσου. 
 
The fact was that the Lacedaemonians had made advertisement for volunteers to carry into the 
island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices being offered, 
and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should succeed in doing so. The Helots accordingly 
were most forward to engage in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that part of Peloponnese, 
and running in by night on the seaward side of the island. 
 
This passage deals with a case in which the πόλις promises freedom to those helots 
who decided to help the Spartan army during the siege of Sphacteria: freedom seems 
therefore to be a reward that the πόλις would grant to the helots only after the 
emergency-situation had come to an end. 
In another passage, Thucydides informs us of a similar promise made by the state at 
around the same time during the Peloponnesian War. More specifically, after the 
Athenians had settled in Pylos and threatened to attack Sparta, the Spartans feared that 
the helots could take advantage of the situation by starting a revolt (‘νεωτερίσωσιν’: cf. 
Thuc. 4.80.2). For this reason, they decided to send seven hundred helots in Calcidica to 
fight with Brasidas, and they armed them as hoplites. Thucydides further mentions that 
the Spartans decided that those helots who would fight with Brasidas would have been 
rewarded with freedom: 
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Thuc. 5.34.1-2: καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἤδη ἡκόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης μετὰ 
Βρασίδου ἐξελθόντων στρατιωτῶν, οὓς ὁ Κλεαρίδας μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκόμισεν, οἱ 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐψηφίσαντο τοὺς μὲν μετὰ Βρασίδου Εἵλωτας μαχεσαμένους 
ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ αὐτοὺς μετὰ 
τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν ἐς Λέπρεον κατέστησαν, κείμενον ἐπὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ τῆς 
Ἠλείας, ὄντες ἤδη διάφοροι Ἠλείοις. 
 
The same summer the soldiers from Thrace who had gone out with Brasidas came back, having 
been brought from thence after the treaty by Clearidas; and the Lacedaemonians decreed that the 
Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free and allowed to live where they liked, and not 
long afterwards settled them with the Neodamodes at Lepreum, which is situated on the Laconian 
and Elean border; Lacedaemon being at this time at enmity with Elis. 
 
This passage from Thucydides shows that, after the army commanded by Brasidas 
returned to Sparta, the state passed a ψήφισμα which stated, on the one hand, that those 
helots who joined the battle with Brasidas would be manumitted and, on the other hand, 
that they would have been free to decide where they would live. Freedom to decide 
where to reside, on the other hand, is clearly an aspect of the legal freedom granted to 
the helots: this means, in other words, that, as free individuals, they were no longer 
bound to their masters’ household, and therefore could decide to live somewhere apart 
from it. Yet, their freedom of deciding where to live is limited to the boundaries of the 
Spartan territory, as it seems to be suggested by the following specification that they 
were settled at Lepreum with the Neodamodes. 
What is important to stress, however, is that manumission of the helots is described 
as the result of a decision taken by the πόλις which required the enactment of a ψήφισμα 
ad hoc. This aspect is perfectly in line with the evidence above analysed concerning 
Classical Athens and Rhodes, where – as we are informed by the ancient sources – a 
ψήφισμα was also enacted in those few cases in which the state decided to perform 
mass-manumissions of slaves. 
The same information is provided by Diodorus, who mentions only generically the 
grant of freedom to the helots who fought with Brasidas without referring to the 
enactment of a ψήφισμα by the state: 
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Diod. 12.76.1: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὁρῶντες ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς συνισταμένην τὴν 
Πελοπόννησον καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πολέμου, τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν 
ὡς ἦν δυνατὸν ἠσφαλίζοντο. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς μετὰ Βρασίδα κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην 
ἐστρατευμένους Εἵλωτας ὄντας χιλίους ἠλευθέρωσαν. 
 
The Lacedaemonians, seeing the Peloponnesus uniting against them and foreseeing the 
magnitude of the impending war, began exerting every possible effort to secure their position of 
leadership. And first of all the Helots who had served with Brasidas in Thrace, a thousand in all, 
were given their freedom. 
 
Such a promise, however, was never followed by the actual manumission of the helots 
after their return to Sparta. According to both Thucydides and Diodorus, after the battle 
had come to an end, the Spartans made a proclamation which invited those among the 
helots who thought to deserve freedom because of the services they rendered to the state 
in battle, to come forward in order to be manumitted. Thucydides notes that such a 
measure was only aimed, in the Spartans’ intentions, to test the helots in order to 
understand who, among them, was more likely to be ready to revolt, ‘as it was thought 
that the first to claim their freedom would be the most high spirited and the most apt to 
rebel’.491 Two thousand helots came forward to ask for freedom; yet, soon after this, they 
disappeared and were never found.492 
One final source which refers to manumission in Sparta is a passage from Plutarch’s 
Life of Cleomenes. Plutarch tells that, in order for the state to raise money for the war, 
Cleomenes liberated those helots who would pay five Attic minae to the πόλις and then 
enrolled two-thousand of them in the army for the battle: 
 
Plut. Cleom. 23.1: τοῦ δὲ Ἀντιγόνου Τεγέαν μὲν παραλαβόντος, Ὀρχομενὸν δὲ καὶ 
Μαντίνειαν διαρπάσαντος, εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν Λακωνικὴν συνεσταλμένος ὁ Κλεομένης 
τῶν μὲν εἱλώτων τοὺς πέντε μνᾶς Ἀττικὰς καταβαλόντας ἐλευθέρους ἐποίει καὶ 
τάλαντα πεντακόσια συνέλεξε, δισχιλίους δὲ προσκαθοπλίσας Μακεδονικῶς 
ἀντίταγμα τοῖς παρ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου λευκάσπισιν, ἔργον ἐπὶ νοῦν βάλλεται μέγα καὶ 
πᾶσιν ἀπροσδόκητον. 
 
                                                          
491 Thuc. 4.80.3. Similarly, cf. Diod. 12.67.5. 
492 Thuc. 4.80.4; Diod. 12.67.4. On this episode, see Paradiso (2008b): 66-68. 
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After Antigonus had taken Tegea by siege, and had surprised Orchomenus and Mantineia, 
Cleomenes, now reduced to the narrow confines of Laconia, set free those of the Helots who could 
pay down five Attic minas (thereby raising a sum of five hundred talents), armed two thousand 
of them in Macedonian fashion as an offset to the White Shields of Antigonus, and planned an 
undertaking which was great and entirely unexpected. 
 
It should be kept in mind, however, that this evidence refers to an episode which 
happened much later than the ones discussed above: Cleomenes’ initiative was taken in 
around 223-222 B.C., and therefore does not refer to manumission as it was performed 
in Classical Sparta. As Ducat notes, this case, on the one hand, ‘est unique dans l’histoire 
de Sparte’; on the other hand, it may reflect a later stage in the general perception of the 
condition of the helots (‘il serait possible que les rois réformateus aient renforcé à un tel 
point les pratiques communautaires relatives aux Hilotes que ceux-ci aient désormais 
été considérés plus comme une propriété collective que comme des biens privés’).493 The 
reading of this passage, however, seems to further confirm the fundamental features of 
manumission in Sparta as it shows the following elements. First, manumission is the 
object of a decision taken by the state (in this case, by the king Cleomenes) regardless of 
the consent of individual slave-owners. Second, such a manumission appears to be once 
again performed for military purposes.494 Third, no mention is made of a compensation 
given to slave-owners for their economic loss: on the contrary, the passage expressly 
states that the five minae paid by the helots for their freedom were connected to a 
financial need of the πόλις, and were used in order to collect money for the military 
expedition.495 
The analysis of these sources suggests that manumission in Classical Sparta was 
characterised by the following features. First, although the helots were privately-owned 
slaves, the only manumissions we know about have been carried out by the state. If we 
read this element (lack of any evidence dealing with ‘private’ manumissions of the 
                                                          
493 Ducat (1990): 25. 
494 Ducat (1990): 27. 
495 Papazoglou (1995): 373. Ducat (1990): 27, further specifies that the public manumission 
promised by Cleomenes ‘n’en conserve pas moins son caractère militaire, puisque la somme ainsi 
recueillie constitua un trésor de guerre’. 
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helots)496 in the light of the information provided by Ephorus (who, as a contemporary 
source, mentions the explicit ban, imposed by the πόλις upon slave-holders, on 
liberating their own slaves), we can perhaps draw the conclusion that in Classical Sparta 
masters had no power to extinguish their right of ownership through manumission, as 
the role of manumittor seems to be held by the πόλις only.497 Second, the extant sources 
inform us that manumission had the nature of a reward for those helots who had fought 
bravely in battle. This feature brings up three corollaries: a) manumission is not a right 
descending upon the helots from their participation in battle but, rather, an unilateral 
act of the πόλις which usually followed a battle (unlike other πόλεις, we have no sources 
mentioning manumissions performed before a battle in order to allow helots to fight as 
free individuals; moreover, we learn that after the emergency-situation had come to an 
end, the πόλις could also change its mind and revoke the promise of such a grant); b) 
manumission appears to be always connected with emergency-situations in wartime, 
and therefore war seems to be the typical background for manumission in Classical 
Sparta (to the point that most scholars describe Spartan manumission as having a 
military nature)498; c) Spartan manumission does not seem to concern individual helots, 
as it is rather described in the surviving evidence as a ‘collective’ measure, in the sense 
that it always implies a mass-liberation of high numbers of helots.499 Third, the πόλις’ 
decision to manumit privately-owned slaves was taken through the enactment of a 
ψήφισμα ad hoc (cf. Thuc. 5.34): this is also confirmed by the evidence from other πόλεις 
of the Classical age, as it was the case – for example – for Athens (as the many sources 
dealing with the events after the battle of Chaeronea show) and Rhodes (cf. Diod. 20.84.2-
3). Fourth, no mention is made of a compensation given to slave-owners in return for the 
liberation of their helots: this is also true, on the other hand, for those episodes of ‘public’ 
manumission attested with regard to other πόλεις, as Rhodes apparently provides the 
                                                          
496 Ducat (1990): 25-26. 
497 This point, on the other hand, is commonly accepted by scholars: see, for instance, Calderini 
(1965): 169 (who stresses that ‘a Sparta una legge vietava la manomissione private degli Iloti’); 
Cartledge (2003): 17; Ducat (1990): 26-27; Paradiso (2008a): 49; Lewis (2015), (forthcoming a). 
498 Cf., for example, Ducrey (1990): 26-27; Paradiso (2008a): 49. 
499  Ducat (1990): 26: ‘les seuls affranchissements que nous connaissions sont … des 
affranchissements collectifs, qui résultent de décisions prises par la cité’. 
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only example of a πόλις that offered to buy slaves from their masters in the context of 
an ordinary market-transaction. Fifth, unlike in some other πόλεις of the Classical age, 
the fact that the helots could be granted citizenship rights alongside manumission is not 
mentioned in the sources, as freedom is described as the only reward that they could 
possibly be granted for their participation in battle: this is consistent, after all, with the 
very exclusive nature of Spartiate citizenship. 
According to the most recent interpretations of the Spartan slave-system, this πόλις 
provides the most extreme example of slave society of the Ancient world, both because 
of the heavy interference by the state on masters’ power to exercise some of the 
fundamental rights descending from ownership, and because Sparta relied greatly (if 
not completely) on the helots’ work-force.500 If we look at the extant evidence referring 
to Classical Sparta, we might suggest that this πόλις also practised the most extreme 
form of interference in the individual masters’ right to manumit their own slaves: a 
slave-society based on private ownership over the helots seems to coexist with a 
prohibition on private manumission, an act which is described as being completely 
absorbed by the πόλις. 
Apart from this (fundamental) peculiarity of Spartan manumission, we can draw the 
overall conclusion that ‘public’ manumission in Classical Greece is constantly described 
in the ancient sources as an exceptional measure, which appears to be strictly performed 
in those rare cases in which emergencies due to wartime required the state to interfere 
with individual interests. In this sense, I believe that Calderini is correct in arguing that 
the scarce evidence we possess for ‘public’ manumission reflects the rare circumstances 
in which such measures were carried out in ancient Greece.501 On the other hand, his 
justification for the scarcity of collective public manumissions in the sources fails to 
highlight satisfactorily the rationale behind this form of manumission. Calderini 
maintains that this is due both to the general exclusion of slaves from participation in 
war, and to the fact that, at the end of a battle, a πόλις could hardly determine who 
among the slaves had proved brave and therefore deserved to be rewarded with 
                                                          
500 Lewis (forthcoming a). 
501 Calderini (1965): 167. 
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freedom.502 Both these remarks are certainly correct; yet, I suggest that besides these 
factors (or even before them) there was another fundamental reason which prevented 
the πόλις from regularly performing forms of ‘public’ manumission, that is, the very 
nature of the right of ownership in Ancient Greece. In fact, the sources make it clear that 
only when it was commonly acknowledged that particular and exceptional 
circumstances required public interests to prevail upon individual rights, then the πόλις 
was allowed to interfere on the right of ownership of its members by forcedly 
expropriating privately owned slaves. It was only in these exceptional cases, in other 
words, that the state’s interest could prevail upon individual ownership over slaves. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
This study has analysed the most relevant sources for Greek manumission and 
isolated the fundamental features characterising, on the one hand, the legal nature of the 
act of manumission and, on the other hand, the legal and factual dimensions of the 
condition of manumitted slaves in ancient Greece. 
The analysis of the extant evidence has been conducted through an ‘emic’ approach 
to the ancient material, with the aim of reassessing our understanding of manumission 
in light of the Greeks’ own conceptualisation of the legal principles and institutions 
surrounding the slaves’ liberation. 
This approach has shown that the Greeks clearly understood and described 
manumission as a legal act which determined the extinction of the masters’ right of 
ownership over their slaves and, as a result, a fundamental change in the legal status of 
the latter, who became legally free individuals. 
At the same time, a close look at the ancient documents shows that the Greek 
conceptualisation of manumission was shaped by a pragmatic understanding of specific 
legal concepts and definitions. 
First, the Greeks understood the legal distinction between slavery and freedom as 
opposite legal statuses built around the existence or not of a relationship based on the 
right of ownership. More specifically, the ancient documents clearly represent slavery as 
the legal condition of those individuals who are the property of their owners (who can 
therefore exercise on them all possible rights and powers descending from ownership); 
whereas freedom is the opposite legal condition of those persons who cannot be 
considered the property of anyone. 
Second, an ‘emic’ approach to the ancient sources shows that the Greeks had a clear 
and pragmatic understanding of the right of ownership, and also that they were 
perfectly aware of the rights and powers pertaining to slave-owners. 
Third, the Greeks were clearly capable of distinguishing between legal and extra-legal 
meanings of slavery and freedom. This allowed them to isolate the legal and the factual 
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implications of manumission in the life condition of manumitted slaves, especially of 
those who were required to perform post-manumission services for their manumittors. 
More specifically, while they made it clear that manumitted slaves under παραμονή 
were legally free, they acknowledged the fact that, in practical terms, their lack of 
freedom of movement and action made their de facto condition somehow slavish, and 
this explains the reason why the vocabulary of slavery is sometimes applied to 
ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή obligation. 
Most importantly, a close look at the ancient material has shown that in different 
πόλεις and in different historical periods of Greek history, manumission was informed 
by the same basic legal principles, thus pointing to a substantial unity of Greek laws and 
institutions in this regard. 
The first purpose of my research was to highlight the way in which the Greeks 
conceptualised the act of manumission. As mentioned above, manumission was 
conceived of as a legal act which determined fundamental legal implications: on the one 
hand, the cessation of masters’ right of ownership over their slaves; on the other hand, 
the transformation of slaves into legally free persons, who as such could no longer be 
considered the property of any (human or divine) owner. 
More specifically, this work has dealt primarily with manumission in exchange for 
money, as most of the extant evidence for manumission mentions the fact that Greek 
slave-owners asked their slaves for the payment of money in return for their release from 
slavery. This can be explained if we consider that slaves represented a high capital value; 
therefore the grant of freedom to slaves entailed a significant financial loss for their 
owners, who renounced for good to a piece of property. It is then likely that, by asking 
money in return for manumission, masters aimed to recover either part of the money 
they spent when they acquired their slaves (as is suggested by [Dem.] 59.30), or at least 
the economic value of the slaves at the time of manumission. This does not necessarily 
imply, however, that payment in return for manumission was a legal requirement for 
liberating slaves in Greece. Calderini, for example, has noticed that a few inscriptions 
from several πόλεις mention manumissions carried out ἐπὶ δωρεᾷ or κατὰ δωρεάν (‘for 
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the purpose of making a gift’), thus implying that in all these cases no payment was 
required in return for manumission.503 
Chapter 1 has shown that specific forms of compensations in return for release from 
slavery (consisting in the payment of a ransom) were already attested in the Iliad, thus 
showing, at the same time, that the very first attestations of Greek manumission can be 
traced back to the Homeric poems. This element marks an important continuum between 
the most ancient sources for manumission in Greece and the most recent ones, as it 
highlights that this institution was informed by the same principles in different 
geographical and chronological contexts of the Greek world. 
More specifically, a close look at the war-context of the Iliad shows that the main form 
of reduction into slavery was the defeat in battle and the subsequent reduction into war-
captivity: several elements indeed suggest that the defeated enemies were clearly 
conceived of as slaves (in the legal sense of property) of the victors. At the same time, 
the only possibility for these slave-captives to be released from their servile condition 
(which ultimately resulted in their manumission) was the hope that their victors-masters 
accepted their supplications, consisting in the promise of the payment of a ‘countless 
ransom’ (ἀπερείσι’ἄποινα) in return for their liberation (expressed with the verbs λύειν 
or ἀπολύειν). 
The information we find in the Odyssey points however in a different direction. There 
I have found only one episode which deals with manumission: Hom. Od. 212-216 
describes the liberation of Eumaeus and Philoitius as a reward by their master. More 
specifically, their manumission is implied by their entrance in Odysseus’ οἶκος as equals 
(ἑταῖροι) and kin (κασίγνητοι) of Telemachus. In this regard, a close look at the text of 
the poem has shown that the consideration of the legal data is key for distinguishing the 
grant of privileges to slaves – which does not itself imply manumission – from a real 
manumission. The first case is attested in Hom. Od. 14.61-65: as noted in chapter 1, the 
award of specific privileges to slaves (in this case, the possibility of possessing some 
goods, or to have a wife) does not necessarily imply that they are no longer slaves. Such 
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grants, after all, were also common to other slave societies, and yet in all these cases the 
legal condition of these ‘privileged’ slaves as property was never questioned. Conversely, 
the fact that two slaves are made ἑταῖροι of their masters’ son points to the creation of a 
relationship which is no longer based on hierarchy and inequality, but, rather, on 
equality and reciprocity of rights and duties. This is certainly inconsistent with a 
relationship based on ownership; and even more inconsistent with slavery is the creation, 
between master and slave, of a kinship tie (κασίγνητοι). These two elements together 
ultimately confirm that, through the terms ἑταῖροι and κασίγνητοι, Homer clearly refers 
to the entrance of two slaves in their masters’ οἶκος no longer as slaves (property) but, 
rather, in a position of equality and reciprocity with their master’s son. This implies that 
they are no longer slaves but, rather, free individuals. 
As noted above, evidence for payment in return for manumission was common 
throughout the Greek world. The main source of information comes from the epigraphic 
material from Hellenistic Delphi, but the same principles can be found also in the 
evidence from Athenian oratory. 
More specifically, the Greek conceptualisation of manumission in exchange for 
money originated from the need to circumvent a legal obstacle: slaves were not legal 
subjects and therefore they lacked the capacity both to negotiate manumission with their 
masters and to pay them for their liberation. It follows that, even if slaves had (at least 
de facto, as a sort of peculium) the money they were asked to pay in return for their 
manumission, they lacked the capacity to pay that money in a valid transaction to their 
masters in order to obtain freedom. For these reasons, another actor had to intervene in 
their manumission for conveying that money to the slaves’ masters thus concluding a 
legally valid and effective manumission. 
In the Delphic inscriptions (which are analysed in chapter 2) the role of the ‘third 
party’ is played by the god Apollo, and this is likely due to the importance held by 
Apollo’s sanctuary in Delphi. Scholars generally include this evidence among the so-
called ‘sacral’ manumissions but, as chapter 2 has shown, the intervention of the god is, 
on the one hand, a ‘local’ adaptation to the general principle by which a third party had 
to intervene in the manumission process for delivering the money to the slaves’ masters; 
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and, on the other hand, a pragmatic way to circumvent the legal obstacle of slaves’ lack 
of legal personality by involving a trustworthy institution as an intermediary in the 
transaction. 
Although these inscriptions use the vocabulary of a πρᾶσις ὠνή and seem to attest 
the sale of slaves to Apollo by their masters, chapter 2 has shown that there is no actual 
sale taking place, for the fundamental reason that the ‘purchase money’ was provided 
by the slaves themselves. More specifically, the constant use of the verb πιστεύειν in the 
formulas points to the fact that these slaves had ‘entrusted’ their money to the god, thus 
developing an expectation to the god’s own performance consisting in delivering that 
money to slaves’ masters. As an effect of the payment, manumission was concluded and 
the slaves became legally free individuals.  
Close analysis of the texts of these inscriptions unveils a sophisticated legal 
construction. Since, in Greek sale, the provenance of the money was an important factor 
in the acquisition of ownership, the god could not become the slaves’ new master, for 
the fundamental (legal) reason that the ‘purchase money’ was not provided by him, but 
by the slaves themselves, which entrusted it to the god. ‘Sale to the god’, in other words, 
is the external form given to manumission for legal reasons, in order to allow slaves to 
‘buy’ their own freedom notwithstanding their lack of legal personality. 
The same legal principles inform the nature of manumission as is attested in the 
sources referring to Classical Athens: this evidence, however, consists of sporadic 
references to slaves’ liberation mentioned in a few forensic speeches (as it has recently 
been shown that the φιάλαι ἐξελευθερικαί cannot be taken as evidence for slaves’ 
liberation in Athens). Yet, if we read this evidence in light of the information provided 
by the Delphic inscriptions, we can conclude that in both cases manumission was 
informed by the same legal principles. 
The most relevant sources for manumission in Athens are [Dem.] 59 and Hyp. 3. In 
this latter case, however, no manumission was actually performed: manumission was in 
fact the original intention which moved Epicrates to negotiate with Athenogenes for the 
liberation of the three slaves, but Athenogenes finally persuaded Epicrates to buy these 
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slaves, and therefore the information we get from Hyp. 3 refer only indirectly to 
manumission. 
Scholars have usually included this evidence among the so-called ‘secular’ 
manumissions, as opposed to the ‘sacral’ manumissions of the Delphic inscriptions. As 
noted in the introduction, however, there is no reason to suggest such a distinction. This 
study has shown that the Athenian ‘secular’ transactions were substantively analogous 
to the ‘sacral’ manumissions attested in Delphi, the difference lying in the identity of the 
third party: at Athens, a human agent; at Delphi, the god Apollo, possibly represented 
by his priests. 
This is best represented by [Dem.] 59, which provides us with important information 
both on Neaera’s manumission in Corinth and on her condition as a freedwoman in 
Athens. Neaera was asked by her joint-masters to pay twenty minae in return for her 
liberation, and she collected this money partly from her own savings, partly by recurring 
to an ἔρανος, partly by asking Phrynion to add τό ἐπίλοιπον. The fundamental point is 
that, although Neaera was directly asked by her masters to pay for manumission and 
although she had most of the money she needed for the transaction, it was not her, but 
Phrynion, who conveyed the money to Timanoridas and Eukrates, thus confirming that 
the intervention of a third party was necessary for the validity of the transaction. As in 
the Delphic inscriptions, on the other hand, the speech makes it clear that the payment 
completed the manumission and that Neaera became legally free (‘ἐλευθέραν εἶναι καὶ 
αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν’: cf. [Dem.] 59.46). Chapter 4 has also shown that such a 
conceptualisation of manumission in exchange for money was common also to other 
πόλεις of the Classical period, such as Corinth and Eleusis. 
To sum up, a close analysis of the ancient legal documents shows that the Greeks 
understood manumission in exchange for money as a bilateral legal transaction between 
the slaves’ masters and a third party, other than the slave, whose role within the 
manumission procedure was simply to hand over the money provided by the slaves to 
their masters, in order for them to be manumitted and for manumission to be legally 
valid and effective. 
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This shows that modern definitions attached by traditional scholarship to 
manumission in exchange for money – such as ‘fictitious sale’, ‘conditional sale’, or ‘sale 
for the purpose of freedom’ – are inadequate, as they not only impose modern categories 
over the ancient material, but also ultimately imply that the Greeks were not able to 
distinguish between sale and manumission and their respective legal effects. By contrast, 
the ancient Greek sources make it clear that sale and manumission were conceived of as 
two separate legal transactions with opposite legal effects (transfer of ownership as 
opposed to extinction of property rights), and that such a distinction is at the heart of 
their conceptualisation of manumission. This is also implied by the fact that the 
vocabulary used in the sources for describing manumission is different from that of sale, 
and simply suggests that the third party pays the money ‘on behalf’ of the slaves. At the 
same time, these sources unequivocally show that the slaves’ liberation ensued as an 
immediate and automatic result of payment by the third party: the ideas of ‘conditional 
freedom’ and ‘fictitious sale’ are therefore misleading, as nothing of the kind (such as 
manumission as a two-step process, or as characterised by the use of fictiones iuris) is 
attested in the ancient sources. 
The second purpose of this study was to understand the way the Greeks 
conceptualised the condition of ἀπελεύθεροι. More specifically, I have focused 
primarily on the sources which mention the imposition of παραμονή obligations upon 
manumitted slaves. The relationship that παραμονή establishes between manumittors 
and manumitted slaves is key for our understanding of Greek manumission, yet it has 
not been properly assessed by scholars. 
An ‘emic’ approach to the vocabulary and legal clauses of the ancient documents has 
shown, on the one hand, that the Greeks were clearly aware that manumission resulted 
always in a legal condition of freedom; on the other hand, that the legal dimension of 
the freedom thus joined by freedmen could be sometimes opposed to the practical 
implications of παραμονή in the everyday life of ἀπελεύθεροι (especially with regard 
to their former owners). 
The evidence from the Delphic inscriptions and from the forensic speeches of the Attic 
orators shows that some manumitted slaves could be required to παραμένειν with their 
230 
 
former masters and perform services in their favour. This, however, was not a constant 
feature descending automatically from manumission upon all manumitted slaves, as the 
Delphic inscriptions, for instance, state that most manumitted slaves after their liberation 
were free to do whatever they wanted and to go wherever they pleased, thus enjoying 
complete freedom of movement and action. 
As mentioned in chapters 2 and 4, on the other hand, the exact definition of the legal 
condition of ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή still divides scholars, who have interpreted 
it either in terms of slavery, or as halfway between slavery and freedom (whereas the 
idea that they were free individuals has traditionally received little attention). Both these 
views, however, have proved to be wrong, as they do not take into adequate 
consideration the following points: first, the specific legal nature of παραμονή as is 
described in the ancient sources; second, the fact that the Greeks often used the 
vocabulary of slavery and freedom in a metaphorical sense; third, the individual legal 
clauses expressly mentioned in the ancient sources as characterising the condition of 
ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή. 
The Delphic inscriptions and the evidence from Athens constitute our major source 
of information for παραμονή. In both cases, παραμονή is described as a post-
manumission obligation, which could be imposed upon some freedmen as the object of 
a legally binding agreement between manumittors and manumitted slaves. The fact that 
παραμονή implied an obligation of freedmen towards manumittors means that 
freedmen under παραμονή were legally free, yet still attached to their former masters’ 
households. In this sense, they had imperfect de facto freedom, as they did not enjoy 
complete freedom of movement and action.  
This takes us to the second point. Chapters 2 and 4 have shown that the fact that the 
ancient sources may refer to the condition of freedmen under παραμονή obligation with 
the vocabulary of slavery, or stress that, at the end of their παραμονή period, they 
became ‘completely free’, does not mean that they were slaves in a legal sense. Rather, it 
reflects a metaphorical use of the vocabulary of slavery, which was common in Greece 
and referred to the de facto condition of this specific category of ἀπελεύθεροι. Such 
usages, in other words, are simply aimed at illustrating that the condition of 
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ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή was a temporary one: once παραμονή was over, in 
addition to legal freedom (which they already enjoyed throughout the period of 
παραμονή), ἀπελεύθεροι also acquired de facto freedom in its other multifarious senses, 
which would allow them to live separately from their manumittor’s household and to 
enjoy freedom of movement and action. This metaphorical usage of the vocabulary of 
freedom, therefore, ultimately refers to the extinction of their post-manumission 
obligations. 
Finally, the fact that freedmen under παραμονή are legally free is further shown by 
some clauses mainly mentioned in the Delphic inscriptions and aimed at enforcing the 
performance of παραμονή duties by ἀπελεύθεροι. 
Chapter 2 has shown that – besides the prohibition to sell manumitted slaves under 
παραμονή obligation – if ἀπελεύθεροι did not παραμένειν, their manumittors could 
either sell them as slaves, or their manumission was to be considered invalid and with 
no effects. In these two cases, the result was the same, as ἀπελεύθεροι were no longer 
considered to be free persons and reverted to a legal condition of slavery. Moreover, as 
chapter 4 has shown, reversion into slavery as an effect of the non-fulfilment of post-
manumission obligations was common also in Athens, as implied by Harpocration’s 
definition of δίκη ἀποστασίου. 
Similarly, those provisions which mention physical punishment as a remedy for the 
non-fulfilment of παραμονή duties are not inconsistent with the legal condition of 
freedom enjoyed by ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή: as noted in chapter 2, for instance, 
debtors, as free individuals, could be subject to physical coercion by the creditors, as is 
attested in early Roman law for the nexi, who were nonetheless conceived of as legally 
free individuals. 
Moreover, some Delphic inscriptions also state that if a dispute arose between 
manumittors and manumitted slaves regarding the performance of παραμονή 
obligations, such a disagreement had to be settled by three private arbitrators, whose 
decision was to be valid and binding for both parties. Such a provision can hardly be 
explained if we believe that the Greeks thought of manumitted slaves under παραμονή 
as the property of their masters; by contrast, it directly points to the fact that the two 
232 
 
parties in the relationship were considered to be in a position of equality as legally free 
individuals. 
Finally, the institution of ἀπόλυσις confirms that manumitted slaves under 
παραμονή were legally free. Ἀπόλυσις is described in the Delphic inscriptions as a 
bilateral legal transaction between the beneficiary of παραμονή (as the creditor) and the 
ἀπελεύθερος held under παραμονή (as the debtor), by which the two parties agreed 
that the ἀπελεύθερος was released from his παραμονή duty before the time specifically 
established, after he had paid money to the beneficiary of the παραμονή obligations. 
This institution implies: first, that ἀπελεύθεροι under παραμονή legally owned their 
own money; second, that they could take direct binding agreements with their 
manumittors without the intervention of a third party; third, that they could validly pay 
money to their former masters with the effect of extinguishing their obligations towards 
the latter. The ἀπόλυσις therefore marks a fundamental distinction between freedmen 
under παραμονή and slaves, as the latter could neither own money nor bind themselves 
to their masters with formal agreements. 
Therefore, the overall conclusion suggested by the ancient documents is that there 
existed two categories of manumitted slaves: those who, immediately after their 
liberation, were free do to whatever they wanted and to go wherever they wanted (these 
were clearly conceptualised as free both de iure and de facto), and those who were 
required to ‘remain with’ their former masters to perform post-manumission obligations 
in their favour. The discrimen between these two categories was their de facto condition, 
that is, their capacity to live in a different household (in a legal, not a physical sense) 
from their manumittors. What these sources unequivocally show, however, is that in 
both cases they were labelled as ἀπελεύθεροι and were legally free individuals. At least 
in Athens, freedmen who were not under παραμονή obligation could also be referred 
to as χωρίς οἰκοῦντες (literally, ‘dwellers apart’: Dem. 4.36-37). 
Chapter 3 moves to considering some of the problems that arise from the modern 
distinction between ‘sacral’ and ‘secular’ manumissions and, more generally, from the 
over-imposition of modern categories to the ancient sources. 
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This chapter has analysed the inscriptions from Hellenistic Cheroneia which are 
customarily labelled as ‘manumission through consecration’ of slaves to the god: this 
qualification is due to the fact that they describe masters who dedicate (ἀνατίθημι) their 
own slaves as sacred (ἱεροί) to a god, usually Serapis. The chapter has shown the 
inadequacy of the general view, which holds that these dedications were fictitious since, 
as an effect of consecrations, the slaves became free.  
A close look at the text of these inscriptions shows that interpreting this evidence as 
referring to manumission is highly problematic: many elements point to the fact that, far 
from resulting in the extinction of any right of ownership over slaves, they rather 
determine a transfer of ownership over consecrated slaves to the god, who thus becomes 
their new owner. This is clearly suggested: by the (technical) meanings of the verb 
ἀνατίθημι and of the adjective ἱερός (which are constantly used in the formulas of these 
inscriptions); by the meaning of the μὴ προσήκοντα μηθενὶ μηθέν clause (which points 
to the prohibition on bringing consecrated slaves back into a condition of private 
ownership, as they now belong irrevocably to the god); by the fact that individuals who 
had already been manumitted could also be consecrated as ἱεροί to the god (thus 
showing that manumission and consecration were conceived of as two separate 
transactions); and, finally, by the vocabulary of the literary evidence referring to ἱεροί, 
which univocally describes consecrated slaves as the ‘slaves of the god’, and the verbs 
themselves describing their tasks in the temple are typical of slavery (such as, most 
frequently, δουλεύειν). 
This conclusion is not challenged, on the other hand, by those elements that scholars 
have usually taken as an indication that ἱεροί were free individuals, such as, for example, 
the fact that they could possess some slaves in their turn, or that they could marry: these 
features are not themselves inconsistent with the condition of consecrated slaves as 
property of the god. Moreover, the vocabulary of these inscriptions is highly formulaic, 
and the same formulas are found elsewhere in the Greek world for regular dedications 
to the gods. All these elements suggest that the Cheroneian inscriptions do not record 
‘fictitious’ consecrations, but real consecrations of slaves, who would then become the 
property of the god (ἱεροί). 
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This chapter has therefore highlighted one of the problems of the traditional 
taxonomy suggested by scholars of Greek manumission, namely, the fact that two 
completely different operations (manumission and consecration), fulfilling opposite 
functions, are made to fall into one category (‘sacral manumissions’). Moreover, an ‘emic’ 
approach to these sources shows that the Greeks clearly conceptualised the condition of 
ἱεροί as a very peculiar one: from a legal perspective, they were considered to be slaves 
of the god, even though the absence of a human owner who could concretely exercise 
the rights and powers descending from ownership made their de facto condition more 
akin to that of free individuals. This is the fundamental reason why the sources on ἱεροί 
sometimes refer to them as ‘free’ individuals, thus recurring to a metaphorical use of the 
vocabulary of freedom. 
At the same time, the fact that ἱεροί were conceived of as the property of the god is 
further confirmed, a contrario, by the consideration that there seems to be no evidence 
for consecrated slaves being released from their condition as property of the god: this 
seems to suggest that their condition as divine property was a permanent one, which 
was likely to last for the rest of their lives. 
This analysis ultimately shows that the Greeks were clearly aware of the distinction 
between manumission and consecration and their opposite legal effects. Moreover, it 
further shows that adopting an ‘emic’ legal approach to the ancient material is vital not 
only for our understanding of manumission itself, but also for fulfilling the basic 
purpose of such an investigation, namely, for the possibility of discerning, within the 
ancient documents, which ones attest manumissions and which ones attest, by contrast, 
something completely different. The widely-held idea that these inscriptions record 
manumissions relies on an inadequate approach to the ancient sources and, above all, 
on a mistaken interpretation of the fundamental legal meaning and implications of the 
vocabulary of the ancient documents. 
Finally, chapter 5 has focused on the evidence which deals with the liberation of 
privately owned slaves by the πόλις. The Greeks conceived of manumission as a typical 
expression of the masters’ power to dispose of their right of ownership by extinguishing 
it. This results clearly from the ancient sources, which show that the right to manumit 
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slaves pertained to individual slave owners only. Consistently with this, ‘public’ 
manumissions were conceptualised as a form of expropriation (the possibility of which 
is implied by the so-called right to security) which, as such, was expressly limited to 
specific cases and circumstances. 
More specifically, the ancient documents show that this kind of intervention by the 
πόλις has only been practiced when particular situations were considered to be 
threatening the community as a whole, with the consequence that common interests 
prevailed on the rights of individual slave-owners. 
The evidence for ‘public’ manumissions is extremely scanty and the information it 
provides is quite general; however, a close look at the ancient sources has shown that 
the features and the limits of this form of interference by the state are informed by the 
same principles in different πόλεις of the Classical age. 
Chapter 5 has shown that, at least in Athens, slaves could be manumitted by the πόλις 
when they informed against their masters for committing specific crimes involving 
serious religious offences that were considered to be threatening to the community as a 
whole. Lys. 5 and Lys. 7 inform us that slaves could bring a denunciation (μήνυσις) 
against their masters if the latter committed ἀσέβεια or ἱεροσυλία. This denunciation 
could lead to the prosecution of their masters with a public action brought by ὁ 
βουλόμενος and, if the latter were convicted, slaves were rewarded by the πόλις with 
freedom. 
Most of the extant evidence for slaves’ liberation by the state, however, deals with 
mass-manumissions performed by several πόλεις in the Classical period (not only 
Athens, but also – for example – Chios, Rhodes and Sparta) in exceptional wartime 
situations. In these cases, manumissions could be performed either before a battle (in 
order to reinforce the army with new free members) or after it (as a form of reward for 
slaves). 
These ancient sources inform us that, in order for the πόλις to liberate privately-
owned slaves, the enactment of a public decree ad hoc (ψήφισμα) was required. Chapter 
5 has then addressed a specific issue, namely, the legality of such decrees: we know for 
example that when Hyperides proposed to set slaves free after the Athenian defeat at 
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Chaeronea, he was prosecuted with a γραφή παράνομον. This seems to suggest that a 
ψήφισμα allowing the manumission of privately owned slaves by the state was 
considered to contradict the νόμοι of the πόλις. The information we have in this regard, 
however, is extremely scanty and fragmentary, and we do not know the specific reasons 
why the proposal was charged with this accusation. Therefore, we cannot conclude that 
– at least in Athens – there were laws prohibiting the state to interfere with individual 
slave-owners’ right of ownership by forcedly manumitting their slaves. 
Finally, chapter 5 has analysed the sources referring to Classical Sparta, which was 
characterised by a particularly unusual situation: although its slave system was based 
on private ownership of the helots, there is no evidence that they could be manumitted 
by their masters. This seems to be suggested by the nature of the extant evidence (which 
only refers to manumissions of helots being carried out by the state) and by the 
information provided by Ephorus (who expressly mentions the prohibition for 
individual Spartiatai to manumit their helots). The fact that a slave-system based on 
private ownership over slaves coexisted with the prohibition, imposed on their masters, 
to manumit their helots, was due to specific economic and social factors that shaped 
Spartan society; in Classical Sparta, however, manumission by the state was also only 
attested in emergency wartime situations. 
To conclude, this study has shown that scholarly attempts to apply modern categories 
(either legal or social) to the ancient Greek documents have failed altogether not only to 
understand the real nature of manumission in Greece, but also to grasp the sophisticated 
legal conceptualisations and arrangements witnessed by the surviving evidence. 
At the same time, it has shown that the variety of our evidence attests to the multitude 
of specific ways in which manumission could be effected by owners across the Greek 
world. Yet, at the heart of these different methods lies the same fundamental idea: that 
manumission is a legal institution determining a basic transition, one from being the 
property of another person to being the property of no-one at all. 
We can discern in the sources a profound respect for and awareness of the legal 
principles behind the Greek conceptualisation of manumission. The best expression of 
the Greeks’ pragmatic understanding of manumission as informed by the basic legal 
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definitions of slavery, freedom and ownership is perhaps the ingenious way in which 
many Greek slaveholders managed to balance the legal constraints and 
conceptualisations and their personal interests: the legal principle that manumission 
resulted in outright legal freedom was reconciled pragmatically with the further 
exploitation of their former slaves’ services by arranging παραμονή agreements with 
them as legally free individuals. 
  
238 
 
 
  
239 
 
INDEX LOCORUM 
 
 
Literary Sources 
 
Aeschines 
3.44: 135 n. 323; 136 n. 323; 136 n. 324 
 
Aristophanes 
Ran. 
33-34: 193 n. 441 
190-191: 193 n. 441 
693-694: 193 
694-695: 192-193, 195, 196, 196 n. 451, 208 
695-696: 196 n. 454 
 
Aristoteles and Pseudo-Aristoteles 
Ath. Pol. 
35.2: 181 n. 420 
60.1-2: 188 n. 433 
 
Rh. 
1.15: 186 n. 427 
 
E.N. 
1162b 16-25: 50 
1162b 25-30: 51 n. 153 
 
240 
 
Athenaeus 
Deipn. 
6.267 b-c: 171 
13.58: 162 
 
Demosthenes and Pseudo-Demosthenes 
4.36-37: 178 n. 412, 232 
24.45: 204, 205 n. 466 
26.11: 202 n. 463, 204, 204 n. 465, 205 
27.15: 181 n. 420 
36.48: 15 n. 41 
43.71: 188 
59.2: 15 n. 42 
59.13: 144 n. 344 
59.16: 143 n. 342 
59.29: 145 
59.30: 139, 146 n. 348, 224 
59.30-32: 146 
59.31-32: 159 
59.32: 149 
59.33: 149 
59.37: 149, 149 n. 350 
59.40: 150 
59.45: 154 n. 365 
59.46: 153, 167, 228 
59.50-53: 144 n. 345 
59.72-73: 144 n. 345 
59.104: 194, 194 n. 443 
241 
 
59.104-106: 194 
 
Dio Chrysostom 
15.21: 199 
 
Diodorus Siculus 
12.67.4: 217 n. 492 
12.67.5: 217 n. 491 
12.76.1: 217 
13.97.1: 196 n. 452 
14.46.6: 194 n. 442 
20.84.2-3: 207, 219 
20.100.1-4: 208 
 
Diogenes Laertius 
5.15: 169 
5.54-55: 115 n. 294, 168, 173 
5.69-74: 169 
5.72: 115 n. 294 
 
Ephorus 
FgrHist70 F117: 183 n. 422, 212 
 
Euripides 
Ion 
54: 117 
102-104: 117 
102-108: 115 
242 
 
105-106: 117 
106-109: 117 
111: 115 
154-181: 117 
181-183: 115 
308: 114 
309: 114 
309-310: 119 
310: 114, 124 
311: 115, 125 
314-315: 117 
322-323: 117 
327: 115 
517-530: 116 
520: 116 
523: 116 
633-645: 117 
 
Harpocration 
v. ἀποστασίου: 7 n. 20, 135 n. 320, 165 n. 388, 166, 166 n. 390, 178 
v. ἀπροστασίου: 166 n. 389 
v. μετοίκιον: 164 n. 384 
 
Hellanicus 
323a F25: 193 
 
Herodotus 
2.135.1: 161 
243 
 
7.104.4: 4 n. 7 
 
Hesiodus 
Op. 
707: 36 n. 118 
 
Hesychius 
v. μετοίκιον: 164 n. 384 
 
Homer 
Il. 
1.10-52: 25 
1.14-15: 26 n. 77 
1.20-21: 26 n. 78 
1.22-23: 26 n. 79 
1.34-54: 26 n. 81 
1.94: 26 n. 80 
1.114: 27 n. 84 
1.366-369: 25 n. 75 
1.376-377: 26 n. 79 
6.37-65: 24 
6.37-38: 25 n. 72 
6.38: 22 n. 55, 23 n. 59 
6.45-50: 25 n. 73 
6.46: 22 n. 55, 22 n. 57 
6.414-428: 27 n. 82 
9.336: 31 n. 95 
10.378: 22 n. 55, 22 n. 57 
244 
 
10.378-381: 24 n. 70 
11.106: 22 n. 58 
11.131: 22 n. 55, 22 n. 57 
11.131-135: 24 n. 70 
16.331: 22 n. 55, 23 n. 59 
18.28: 22 n. 56 
19.295-299: 27, 27 n. 85, 38 
19.298: 31 n. 95 
20.464: 22 n. 55, 22 n. 58 
21.36: 22 n. 55, 22 n. 58 
21.102: 22 n. 55 
22.46: 23 n. 66 
23.292: 24 n. 68 
 
Od. 
1.430-431: 29 n. 92 
4.244-245: 29 n. 90 
4.623: 31 n. 95 
4.736: 31 n. 95 
6.34: 31 n. 96 
8.585-586: 36 n. 118 
9.197-200: 26 n. 76 
11.485: 28 n. 88 
11.488-491 28 n. 88 
14.64: 32 n. 98 
14.61-65: 30, 31, 32, 225 
14.61-66: 29 
14.449-452: 33 n. 103, 101 n. 278 
245 
 
20.105-119: 29 n. 89 
21.212-216: 21, 29, 32 
21.216: 35, 36, 37, 38 
22.430-473: 29 n. 91 
24.389: 31 n. 95 
24.411: 31 n. 95 
 
Hyperides 
3.4: 161 
3.4-5: 159 
3.5: 160 n. 374 
3.5-6: 158 
3.7: 157, 158, 158 n. 373 
3.9: 49 n. 144, 160 n. 375 
Fr. 27: 201 
Fr. 29: 201, 202, 202 n. 463 
 
Isaeus 
4.9: 166 n. 391 
 
Isocrates 
12.94: 194 n. 442 
14.51-52: 194 n. 442 
 
Lycurgus 
1.16: 202 n. 464 
1.36-37: 201 
1.41: 202-203 
246 
 
 
Lysias 
5.1: 184 
5.3-5: 185, 186, 187, 189 
5.4: 185 n. 426 
7.2: 187 
7.16: 188, 189 
23: 194 n. 442 
23.11: 150 n. 353 
 
Pausanias 
1.32.3: 198 
3.20.6: 211 n. 474 
7.15.7: 197, 198 
 
Plato 
Leg. 
8.849e: 50 n. 147 
9.2.915d: 50 n. 146 
11.914e: 150 n. 353 
11.914e- 915c: 172 n. 399 
11.915a-b: 173 
11.915e: 50 n. 147 
 
Plutarch and Pseudo-Plutarch 
Cleom. 
23.1: 217 
 
247 
 
 
X Or. (= Mor.) 
848f-849a: 203 
849a: 201 
849d-e: 163 n. 379 
 
Pollux 
3.55: 164 n. 384 
3.83: 174, 211 n. 476 
 
Strabo 
8.5.4: 211 n. 474, 212 
8.6.20: 118 
11.4.7: 118 n. 301 
12.2.3: 118 n. 301 
12.3.34: 118 n. 301 
 
Suda 
v. Aristogeiton: 202 n. 463, 206 n. 467 
 
Thucydides 
3.55.3: 194 n. 442 
3.63.2: 194 n. 442 
4.26.5-6: 215 
4.80.2: 215 
4.80.3: 217 n. 491 
4.80.4: 217 n. 492 
5.34: 219 
248 
 
5.34.1-2: 216 
 
Xenophon 
Cyr. 
7.5.78-79: 191 n. 437 
 
Hell. 
1.6.24: 192 n. 440 
 
Oecon. 
3.4: 172 
 
 
Inscriptions 
 
BCH 
76 (1952) 646,17: 72 n. 214 
83 (1958) 480,13: 72 n. 214 
110 (1986) 437,3: 72 n. 214 
 
Chios 
62: 209 
 
Darmezin, Affranchissements 
86,121 (= IG VII 2872): 104 n. 282 
91,126: 95 n. 270, 107 
93,128: 109 
96,131: 107 n. 284 
249 
 
100,135: 95 n. 270, 105, 108 
 
FD III 
1:138: 48 n. 141 
1:303: 7 n. 20 
1:316: 72 n. 214 
1:566: 48 n. 141 
2:129: 175 n. 409 
2:223: 70 n. 208 
2:224: 153 n. 364 
2:225: 72 n. 214 
2:229: 48 n. 137 
2:233: 70 n. 208 
2:243: 70 n. 208 
2:247: 70 n. 208 
3:3: 48 n. 137, 153 n. 364 
3:13: 153 n. 364 
3:27: 70 n. 208 
3:32: 70 n. 208 
3:43: 72 n. 214, 75 n. 218 
3:45: 70 n. 208 
3:140: 67 n. 198 
3:174: 70 n. 208 
3:175: 71 n. 210 
3:272: 72 n. 214 
3:273: 72 n. 214, 75 n. 220 
3:278: 72 n. 214 
3:281: 72 n. 214 
250 
 
3:292: 72 n. 214 
3:296: 72 n. 214, 74 n. 217, 75 n. 222 
3:302: 72 n. 214 
3:304: 72 n. 214 
3:306: 70 n. 208 
3:319: 72 n. 214 
3:327: 72 n. 214 
3:329: 83 n. 236 
3:332: 72 n. 214 
3:333: 72 n. 214 
3:337: 71 n. 210 
3:340: 72 n. 214 
3:341: 72 n. 214 
3:346: 70 n. 208 
3:354: 72 n. 214 
3:364: 70 n. 208 
3:369: 70 n. 208, 72 n. 214 
3:374: 70 n. 208 
3:398: 72 n. 214 
3:402: 72 n. 214 
3:411: 70 n. 208 
3:418: 72 n. 214, 73, 74 
3:419: 72 n. 214, 73, 74 
3:423: 72 n. 214 
3:424: 70 n. 208 
3:428: 72 n. 214 
4:71: 70 n. 208 
4:479,B: 48 n. 141 
251 
 
4:507: 72 n. 214 
6:7: 72 n. 214 
6:18: 72 n. 214, 74 n. 217 
6:25: 72 n. 214 
6:30: 72 n. 214 
6:33: 72 n. 214, 75 n. 222 
6:40: 72 n. 214 
 
IG II2 
1469: 137 
 
IG IX 
12 3:754: 79 
1:192: 79 
1:194: 79 
 
IG VII 
2872: 103 
3312: 96, 98 n. 274 
3314: 98, 98 n. 274 
3318: 101, 103 
3322: 98 n. 274 
3325: 98 n. 274 
3326: 97 n. 272, 98 n. 274 
3331: 100 n. 277 
3333: 99 
3349: 98 n. 275 
3353: 98 n. 274 
3357: 97 n. 273 
252 
 
3359: 98 n. 274 
3360: 101, 102 n. 279 
3365: 97 n. 273 
3367: 99, 99 n. 276, 100 
3371: 97 n. 272, 98 n. 274 
3396: 97 n. 272, 98 n. 274 
 
SGDI II 
1685: 46, 58 n. 175, 63 
1686: 48 n. 142, 57 
1687: 59 n. 179 
1688: 47 n. 134 
1689: 69 n. 204, 71 
1694: 67 n. 199, 67 n. 201 
1696: 67 n. 200, 71 n. 212 
1697: 169 
1698: 48 n. 142 
1699: 48 n. 139 
1701: 58 n. 176, 60 n. 184 
1702: 67 n. 200, 69 n. 204, 178 
1703: 68 n. 202, 169, 177 
1704: 48 n. 139 
1706: 41 n. 124 
1708: 47 n. 136, 65 
1711: 48 n. 140 
1713: 60 n. 184 
1714: 67 n. 199, 68 n. 202 
1717: 47 n. 136, 74, 68 n. 202 
253 
 
1719: 175, 175 n. 408 
1721: 65, 67 n. 199, 69 
1726: 68 
1728: 47 n. 136 
1729: 60 n. 184, 67 n. 199 
1732: 48 n. 138 
1743: 47 n. 136 
1832: 71 n. 212 
1858: 71 n. 212 
1874: 71 n. 212 
1916: 67 n. 200 
1918: 75 n. 219 
1919: 72 n. 214, 75 n. 219 
1971: 60 n. 184, 71 n. 212 
2071: 83 n. 236 
2097: 84 n. 236 
2101: 42, 84 n. 236 
2140: 70 
2157: 72 n. 214 
2158: 70 n. 208 
2159: 70 n. 208 
2163: 70 n. 208 
2167: 72 n. 214 
2168: 47 n. 135 
2171: 66, 70 n. 208 
2172: 84 n. 236 
2185: 47 n. 135 
2186: 70 n. 208 
254 
 
2190: 70 n. 208 
2199: 72 n. 214 
2200: 72 n. 214, 75 n. 221 
2213: 60 n. 184 
2225: 70 n. 208 
2252: 60 n. 184 
2277: 48 n. 138 
2327: 72 n. 214 
  
255 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Andreau J. & R. Descat (2006) Esclave en Grèce et à Rome. Paris. 
 
Arnaoutoglou, I.N. (2007) ‘The Fear of Slaves in Ancient Greek Legal Texts’ in A. 
Serghidou (ed.) Fear of Slaves – Fear of Enslavement in the Ancient Mediterranean. XXIXe 
colloque du GIREA (Rethymnon, 4-7 novembre 2004). Besançon: 133-144. 
 
Babacos, A. (1964) ‘Familienrechtliche Verhältnisse auf der Insel Kalymnos im 1. 
Jahrhundert n. Chr.’ ZRG 81: 31–51. 
 
Bearzot, C. (2005) ‘Né cittadini né stranieri: “apeleutheroi” e “nothoi” in Atene’ in M.G.A. 
Bertinelli & A. Donati (eds.) Serta Antiqua et Mediaevalia. Il cittadino, lo straniero, il barbaro, 
fra integrazione ed emarginazione nell’antichità. Vol. 7. Roma: 77-92. 
 
Beasley, T.W. (1906) ‘The κύριος in Greek States Other than Athens’ The Classical Review 
20.5: 249-253. 
 
Beringer, W. (1964): ‘Der Standort des οἰκεύς in der Gesellschaft des homerischen Epos’ 
Historia 13.1: 1-20. 
 
Beringer, W. (1982) ‘“Servile Status” in the Sources for Early Greek History’ Historia 31.1: 
13-32. 
 
Bianchetti, S. (1983) ‘Osservazioni sulla “graphe hierosylias” e sulla “graphe klopes 
hieron chrematon”’ SRISF 2: 55-61. 
 
Bielman, A. (1994) Retour à la liberté. Paris. 
 
Bielman, A. (2001) Review of Darmezin (1999). Revue historique 303.3 (619): 741-744. 
 
Biscardi, A. (1982) Diritto greco antico. Milano. 
 
Biscardi, A. (1999) ‘Sul regime della comproprietà in diritto attico’ in A. Biscardi (ed.) 
Scritti di diritto greco. Milano: 23-74. 
 
Bloch, M. (1914) Die Freilassungsbedingungen der delphischen Freilassungsinschriften. 
Strassburg. 
 
Blok, J. (2014) ‘A “covenant” between gods and men. Hiera kai osia and the Greek polis’ 
in C. Rapp & H.A. Drake (eds.) The City in the Classical and Post-Classical World. Changing 
Contexts of Power and Identity. Cambridge: 14-37.  
 
256 
 
Bömer, F. (1960) Untersuchungen über die Religion der Sklaven in Griechenland und Rom, Vol. 
II: Die sogennante sakrale Freilassung in Griechenland und die (δοῦλοι) ἱεροί. Wiesbaden. 
 
Bonfante, P. (1966) Corso di diritto romano. Vol II. La proprietà. Milano. 
 
Bouvier, D. (2008) ‘Formes de “retours à la liberté” et statut de l’‘affranchi’ dans la poésie 
homérique’ in A. Gonzales (ed.) La fin du statut servile? Affranchissement, libération, 
abolition. XXXᵉ colloque du Groupe International de Recherches sur l’Esclavage dans l’Antiquité 
(GIREA). Vol. 1. Besançon: 9-16. 
 
Bravo, B. (1980) ‘Sylan. Les représailles et justice privée contre des étrangers dans les cités 
grecques’ Annali della Scuola normale superiore di Pisa 10.3: 675-987. 
 
Brock, R. (2015) ‘Law and Citizenship in the Greek Poleis’ in E.M. Harris & M. Canevaro 
(eds.) Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law. Oxford. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.013.15 
 
Burkert, W. (1985) Greek Religion. Archaic and Classical. Translated by J. Raffan. Oxford. 
 
Burkert, W. (1987) ‘Offerings in Perspective: Surrender, Distribution, Exchange’ in T. 
Linders & G. Nordquist (eds.) Gifts to the Gods. Proceedings of the Uppsala Symposium 1985. 
Uppsala: 43-50. 
 
Bussi, S. (2001) Economia e demografia della schiavitù in Asia Minore Ellenistico-romana. 
Milano. 
 
Cabanes, P. (1974) ‘Les inscriptions du théâtre de Bouthrôtos’ Actes du colloque 1972 sur 
l’esclavage. Paris: 105-209. 
 
Calderini, A. (1965) La manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia. Roma. 
 
Calderone, S. (1972) ‘Superstitio’ A.N.R.W. 1.2: 377-396. 
 
Caneva, S.G & Delli Pizzi, A. (2015) ‘Given to a Deity? Religious and Social Reappraisal 
of Human Consecrations in the Hellenistic and Roman East’ The Classical Quarterly 65.1: 
167-191. 
 
Canevaro, M. (2010) ‘The Decree Awarding Citizenship to the Plataeans ([Dem.] 59.104)’ 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 50: 337-369. 
 
Canevaro, M. (2013) The Documents in the Attic Orators: Laws and Decrees in the Public 
Speeches of the Demosthenic Corpus. Oxford. 
 
257 
 
Canevaro, M. (2015), ‘Making and Changing Laws in Ancient Athens’ in E.M. Harris & 
M. Canevaro (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law. Oxford. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.013.4 
 
Canevaro, M. & D. Lewis (2014) ‘Khoris oikountes and the obligations of freedmen in late 
classical and early Hellenistic Athens’ Incidenza dell’Antico 12: 91-121. 
 
Canfora, L. (2001) Storia della letteratura greca. Milano. 
 
Cantarella, E. (1979) Norma e sanzione in Omero. Contributo alla protostoria del diritto greco. 
Milano. 
 
Carey, C. (1989) Lysias. Selected Speeches. Cambridge. 
 
Cartledge, P. (1993) The Greeks: a Portrait of Self and Others. Oxford. 
 
Cartledge, P. (2003) ‘Raising hell? The helot mirage – a personal review’ in N. Luraghi & 
S. Alcock (eds.) Helots and their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, 
Structures. Cambridge MA & London: 12-30. 
 
Cartledge, P. (2011a) ‘The helots – a contemporary review’ in K. Bradley & P. Cartledge 
(eds.) The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Vol. I: The Ancient Mediterranean World. 
Cambridge: 74-90. 
 
Cartledge, P. (2011b) Ancient Greece: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford. 
 
Chantraine, P. (1977) Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Paris. 
 
Christ, M.R. (1998) ‘Legal Self-Help on Private Property in Classical Athens’ The 
American Journal of Philology 119.4: 521-545. 
 
Clarke, M. (1995) ‘The Wisdom of Thales and the Problem of the Word ΙΕΡΟΣ’ The 
Classical Quarterly 45.2: 296-317. 
 
Cohen, D. (1983) Theft in Athenian Law. München. 
 
Cohen, D. (1989) ‘The Prosecution of Impiety in Athenian Law’ in G. Thür (ed.) 
Symposion 1985. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Ringberg, 24-
26 Juli 1985). Wien: 99-107. 
 
Cohen, E.E. (1998) ‘The Wealthy Slaves of Athens: Legal Rights, Economic Obligations’ 
in H. Jones (ed.) Le monde antique et les droits de l’homme. Brussels: 105-129. 
 
Cooper, C.R. (2001) ‘Hyperides’ in M. Gagarin (ed.) Dinarchus, Hyperides, & Lycurgus. 
Translated by Ian Worthington, Craig Cooper, & Edward M. Harris. Austin: 59-152. 
258 
 
 
Croiset, A. (1898) ‘L’affranchissement des esclaves pour faits de guerre’ Recueil de 
mémoires concernant l’histoire et la littérature grecques, dédié à Henri Weil à l’occasion de son 
80e anniversaire. Paris: 67-72. 
 
Curtius, E. (1843) Anecdota Delphica. Berlin. 
 
Dareste, R., Haussoullier, B. & R. Reinach (1898) Recueil des inscriptions juridiques grecques: 
texte, traduction, commentaire. Paris. 
 
Darmezin, L. (1999) Les affranchissements par consécration en Béotie et dans le monde 
hellénistique. Nancy. 
 
Davies, J.K. (1971) Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C. Oxford. 
 
De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. (1972) The Origins of the Peloponnesian War. London. 
 
De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. (1972) ‘The helot threat’ in M. Whitby (ed.) Sparta. Edinburgh: 211-
216. 
 
Debord, P. (1972) ‘L’esclavage sacre: état de la question’ in Actes du colloque 1971 sur 
l'esclavage. Paris: 135-150. 
 
Dimopoulou, A. (2008) ‘Apeleutheroi: metics or foreigners?’ Dike 11: 27-50. 
 
Dimopoulou, A. (2013) ‘Ἄκυρον ἔστω: Legal Invalidity in Greek Inscriptions’ in M. 
Gagarin & A. Lanni (eds.) Symposion 2013. Papers on Greek and Hellenistic legal history 
(Cambridge MA, August 26-29, 2013). Wien: 249-276. 
 
Donlan, W. (1982) ‘Reciprocities in Homer’ The Classical World 75.3: 137-175. 
 
Donlan, W. (1985) ‘The Social Groups of Dark Age Greece’ Classical Philology 80.4: 293-
308. 
 
Donlan, W. (1998): ‘Political Reciprocity in Dark Age Greece: Odysseus and his hetairoi’ 
in C. Gill & N. Postlethwaite (eds.) Reciprocity in Ancient Greece. Oxford: 51-71. 
 
Ducat, J. (1990) Les Hilotes. BCH Suppl. 20. Athens. 
 
Ducrey, P. (1968) Le traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique. Paris. 
 
Dumezil, G. (2001) La religione romana arcaica. Miti leggende realtà della vita religiosa romana 
con un’appendice sulla religione degli Etruschi. Translated into Italian by F. Jesi. Milano. 
 
259 
 
Duncan-Jones, R.P. (1984) ‘Problems of the Delphic Manumission Payments 200-1 B.C.’ 
Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 57: 203-209. 
 
Englund, G. (1987) ‘Gifts to the Gods – a necessity for the preservation of cosmos and 
life. Theory and praxis’ in T. Linders & G. Nordquist (eds.) Gifts to the Gods. Proceedings 
of the Uppsala Symposium 1985. Uppsala: 57-66. 
 
Faraguna, M. (2012a) ‘Pistis and apistia: Aspects of the Development of Social and 
Economic Relations in Classical Greece’ Mediterraneo Antico 15: 355-374. 
 
Faraguna, M. (2012b) ‘Diritto, economia, società: riflessioni su eranos tra età omerica e 
mondo ellenistico’ in B. Legras (ed.) Transferts culturels et droits dans le monde grec et 
hellénistique. Actes du colloque international (Reims, 14-17 mai 2008). Paris: 129-153. 
 
Ferrucci, S. (2006) ‘L’“oikos” nel diritto attico. Pubblico, privato e individuale nella 
democrazia ateniese classica’ Dike 9: 183-210. 
 
Filonik, J. (2013) ‘Athenian Impiety Trials: a Reappraisal’ Dike 16: 11-96. 
 
Finley, M.I. (1954) The World of Odysseus. London. 
 
Finley, M.I. (1964) ‘Between Slavery and Freedom’ Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 6.3: 233-249. 
 
Finley, M.I. (1980) Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology. London. 
 
Finley, M.I. (1981) Economy and Society in Ancient Greece. London. 
 
Fisher, N.R.E. (1995) ‘Hybris, status and slavery’ in A. Powell (ed.), The Greek World. 
London: 44–84. 
 
Foucart, P. (1867) Mémoire sur l’affranchissement des esclaves, par forme de vente à divinité, 
d’après les inscriptions de Delphes. Paris. 
 
Fowler, W.W (1911) ‘The Original Meaning of the Word Sacer’ The Journal of Roman 
Studies 1: 57-63. 
 
Gainsford, P. (2012) ‘Sibling Terminology in Homer: Problems with ΚΑΣΙΓΝΗΤΟΣ and 
ΑΔΕΛΦΕΟΣ’ The Classical Quarterly 62.2: 441-465. 
 
Gallavotti, C. (1963) ‘Il valore di “hieros” in Omero e in miceneo’ L'Antiquité Classique 
32.2: 409-428. 
 
Garlan, Y. (1972) ‘Les esclaves grecs en temps de guerre’ Actes du Colloque d'histoire sociale. 
Paris: 29-62. 
260 
 
 
Garlan, Y. (1985) Guerra e società nel mondo antico. Translated into Italian by R. Albertini. 
Bologna. 
 
Garlan, Y. (1987) ‘War, Piracy and Slavery in the Greek World’ in M.I. Finley (ed.) 
Classical Slavery. London: 9-27. 
 
Garlan, Y. (1988) Slavery in Ancient Greece. Revised and Expanded Edition. Translated by J. 
Lloyd. Ithaca & London. 
 
Gärtner, M. (2008) ‘L’affranchissement dans le corpus lysiaque: une pratique contestée. 
Le regard d’un métèque sur l’affranchissement’ in A. Gonzales (ed.) La fin du statut servile? 
(affranchissement, libération, abolition…) 30e colloque du Groupe International de Recherches 
sur l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité (GIREA) - Besançon - 15-16-17 décembre 2005. Besançon: 453-
466. 
 
Gernet, L. (1955) Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne. Paris. 
 
Glazebrook, A. (2014) ‘The Erotics of Manumission: Prostitutes and the πρᾶσις ἐπ’ 
ἐλευθερίᾳ’ Eugesta 4: 53-80. 
 
Glotz, G. (1904) La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce. Paris. 
 
Grenet, C. (2014) ‘Manumission in Hellenistic Boeotia: New Considerations on the 
Chronology of the Inscriptions’ in Papazarkadas, N. (ed.) The Epigraphy and History of 
Boeotia. New Finds, New Perspectives. Leiden-Boston: 395-442. 
 
Grosso, G. (2001) ‘Corso di diritto romano. Le cose’ Rivista di Diritto Romano 1: 1-137. 
 
Gschnitzer, F. (1988) Storia sociale dell’antica Grecia. Translated into Italian by L. Gallo & 
M. Corsaro. Bologna. 
 
Hamon, P. (2005) ‘Le Conseil et la participation des citoyens: les mutations de la basse 
époque hellénistique’ in P. Fröhlich & C. Müller (eds.) Citoyenneté et participation à la basse 
époque hellénistique. Actes de la table ronde des 22 et 23 mai 2004, Paris, BNF organisée par le 
groupe de recherche dirigé par Philippe Gauthier de l’UMR 8585 (Centre Gustave Glotz). Paris: 
121-144. 
 
Harris, E.M. (1988) ‘When Is a Sale Not a Sale? The Riddle of Athenian Terminology for 
Real Security Revisited’ The Classical Quarterly 38.2: 351-381. 
 
Harris, E.M. (1994) ‘Law and Oratory’ in I. Worthington (ed.) Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric 
in Action. London: 130–152. 
 
261 
 
Harris, E.M. (2001a) ‘Lycurgus’ in M. Gagarin (ed.) Dinarchus, Hyperides, & Lycurgus. 
Translated by Ian Worthington, Craig Cooper, & Edward M. Harris. Austin: 153-218. 
 
Harris, E.M. (2001b) Review of Kapparis (1999). The Classical Journal 96.4: 439-441. 
 
Harris, E.M. (2002) ‘Did Solon Abolish Debt-Bondage?’ The Classical Quarterly 52.2: 415-
430. 
 
Harris, E.M. (2006) Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens. Essays on Law, Society 
and Politics. Cambridge & New York. 
 
Harris, E.M. (2012) ‘Homer, Hesiod and the “Origins” of Greek Slavery’ Revue des Etudes 
Anciennes 2: 345-366. 
 
Harris, E.M. (2015a) ‘Toward a Typology of Greek Regulations about Religious Matters: 
A Legal Approach’ Kernos 28: 5-36. 
 
Harris, E.M. (2015b) ‘The Legal Foundations of Economic Growth in Ancient Greece: the 
Role of Property Records’ in E.M. Harris, D.M. Lewis & M. Woolmer (eds.) The Ancient 
Greek Economy. Markets, Households and City-States. Cambridge: 116-146. 
 
Harris, E.M. (forthcoming) ‘The Dedication of Phialai by Metics and Citizens, Or 
Applying Ockham's Razor to the Interpretation of Some Attic Inscriptions’. 
 
Harrison, A.R.W. (1968) The Law of Athens. The Family and Property. Vol. 1. Oxford. 
 
Heinen, H. (2001) Fünfzig Jahre Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei an der Mainzer Akademie, 
1950-2000: Miscellanea zum Jubiläum. Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei. Stuttgart. 
 
Hodkinson, S. (2000) Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta. Swansea. 
 
Honoré, A.M. (1961) ‘Ownership’ in A.G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. A 
collaborative work. Oxford: 107-147. 
 
Hopkins, K. (1978) Conquerors and Slaves. Cambridge. 
 
Hornblower, S. & A., Spawforth (eds.) (1996). The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Oxford. 
 
Hunt, P. (1998) Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians. Cambridge. 
 
Hunt, P. (2001) ‘The Slaves and Generals of Arginusae’ The American Journal of Philology 
122.3: 359-380. 
 
Impallomeni, G. (1971) ‘Sulla capacità degli esseri soprannaturali in diritto romano’ Studi 
in onore di E. Volterra. Vol. 3. Milano: 23-68. 
262 
 
 
Johnstone, S. (2011) A History of Trust in Ancient Greece. Chicago. 
 
Jones, J. W. (1956) The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks. An Introduction. Oxford. 
 
Kamen, D. (2005) Conceptualizing Manumission in Ancient Greece. Diss. Berkeley. 
 
Kamen, D. (2011) ‘Reconsidering the Status of khôris oikountes’ Dike 14: 43-53. 
 
Kamen, D. (2012) ‘Manumission, Social Rebirth, and Healing Gods in Ancient Greece’ in 
S. Hodkinson & R. Geary (eds.) Slaves and Religions in Graeco-Roman Antiquity and Modern 
Brazil. Newcastle Upon Tyne: 174-194. 
 
Kamen, D. (2014) ‘Sale For the Purpose of Freedom: Slave-Prostitutes and Manumission 
in Ancient Greece’ The Classical Journal 109.3: 281-307. 
 
Kapparis, K. (1999) [D.] 59 Against Neaira. Berlin. 
 
Kapparis, K. (2005) ‘Immigration and citizenship procedures in Athenian law’ RIDA 52: 
71-113. 
 
Klaffenbach, G. (1957) Griechische Epigraphik. Göttingen. 
 
Klees, H. (1998) Sklavenleben im klassischen Griechenland. Stuttgart. 
 
Konstan, D. (1996) ‘Friendship’ The American Journal of Philology 117.1: 71-94. 
 
Konstan, D. (1997) Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge. 
 
Koschaker, P. (1931) Über einige griechische Rechtsurkunden aus den östlichen Randgebieten 
des Hellenismus. Leipzig. 
 
Kränzlein, A. (1975) ‘Die attischen Aufzeichnungen über die Einlieferung von phialai 
exeleutherikai’ in H.G. Wolff (ed.) Symposion 1971. Vorträge zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte. Wien: 255-264. 
 
Kränzlein, A. (1983) ‘Bemerkungen zu den griechischen Freilassungsinschriften’ in P. 
Dimakis (ed.) Symposion 1979 : Vortrage zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte 
(Agina, 3-7 september 1979). Wien: 239-247. 
 
Laffi, U. (2001) Studi di storia romana e di diritto. Roma. 
 
Lambrinoudakis, V. & J.C., Balty (2005) Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum (ThCRA). 
Vol. 3. Divination, Prayer, Veneration, Hikesia, Asylia, Oath, Malediction, Profanation, Magic 
Rituals. And Addendum to Vol. II: Consecration. Los Angeles. 
263 
 
 
Lape, S. (2010) Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy. Cambridge. 
 
Law, J. (2015). A Dictionary of Law. Oxford. 
 
Leão, D.F. (2012) ‘The Myth of Autochtony, Athenian Citizenship and the Right of 
“Enktesis”: a Legal Approach to Euripides’ “Ion”’, in B. Legras & G. Thür (eds.) 
Symposion 2011. Études d’histoire du droit grec et hellénistique (Paris, 7-10 septembre 2011). 
Wien: 135-153. 
 
Lee, K.H. (1997) Euripides Ion. With an Introduction, Translation and Commentary. 
Warminster. 
 
Lencman, J.A. (1966) Sklaverei im mykenischen und homerischen Griechenland. Wiesbaden. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (1959) ‘Attic manumissions’ Hesperia 28.3: 208-238. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (1968) ‘Dedications of Phialai at Athens’ Hesperia 37.4: 368-380. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (2013) ‘Slave marriages in the laws of Gortyn: a matter of rights?’ Historia 
62.4: 390-416. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (2015) ‘Slavery and Manumission’ in E.M. Harris & M. Canevaro (eds.) 
Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law. Oxford. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.013.21. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (2016) ‘Orlando Patterson, Property, and Ancient Slavery: The Definitional 
Preoblem Revisited’ in J. Bodel & W. Scheidel (eds.) On Human Bondage: After Slavery and 
Social Death. Malden MA, Oxford & Chichester: 31-54. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (forthcoming a) Greek Slave Systems and their Eastern Neighbours: A 
Comparative Study. Oxford. 
 
Lewis, D.M. (forthcoming b) ‘The Homeric Roots of Helotage’ in M. Canevaro & J. 
Burnhardt (eds.) From Homer to Solon: Continuity and Change in Archaic Greek Society. 
Leiden. 
 
Liddell, H.G. & R. Scott (1996) A Greek-English Lexicon. Revisited and augmented by H. 
Stuart Jones with the assistance of R. McKenzie. With a revised supplement. Oxford. 
 
Lintott, A. (2004) ‘Sula: Reprisal by Seizure in Greek Inter-Community Relations’ The 
Classical Quarterly 54.2: 340-353. 
 
Lloyd, G.E.R. (1990) Demystifying Mentalities. Cambridge. 
264 
 
Lotze, D. (1959) ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΥΛΩΝ. Studien zur rechtsstellung 
Unfreier Landbevolkerungen in Griechenland bis zum 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr. Berlin. 
 
Luraghi, N. (2002) ‘Helotic slavery reconsidered’ in A. Powell & S. Hodkinson (eds.) 
Sparta: Beyond the Mirage. London: 229-250. 
 
Mactoux, M.-M. (2008) ‘Regards sur la proclamation de l’affranchissement au théâtre à 
Athènes’ in A. Gonzales (ed.) La fin du statut servile? (affranchissement, libération, 
abolition…) 30e colloque du Groupe International de Recherches sur l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité 
(GIREA) - Besançon - 15-16-17 décembre 2005. Besançon: 437-451. 
 
Maffi, A. (1974) ‘Rilevanza delle “regole di scambio” omeriche per la storia e la 
metodologia del diritto’ in H.J. Wolff (ed.) Symposion 1974. Vorträge zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte» (Gargnano am Gardasee, 5-8 Juni 1974). Wien: 3-68. 
 
Maffi, A. (1979) ‘Circolazione monetaria e modelli di scambio da Esiodo ad Aristotele’, 
in Annali dell’istituto italiano di numismatica 26: 161-184. 
 
Maffi, A. (1995) ‘Processo di libertà e rivendicazione in proprietà dello schiavo a Gortina 
e ad Atene’ in G. Thür & J. Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas (eds.) Symposion 1995. Vorträge 
zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Korfu, 1-5 September 1995). Wien: 17-
25. 
 
Maffi, A. (2007) ‘Economia e diritto nell’Atene del IV secolo’ in E.M. Harris & G. Thür 
(eds.) Symposion 2007. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte 
(Durham, 2.–6. September 2007). Wien: 203-222. 
 
Martini, R. (1995) ‘Alcune considerazioni a proposito degli apeleutheroi’ in M. Moggi & 
G. Cordiano (eds) Schiavi e dipendenti nell’ambito dell’“oikos” e della “familia” (Atti del XXII 
colloquio GIREA, Pontignano (Siena), 19-20 novembre 1995). Pisa: 11-18. 
 
Martini, R. (2003) ‘“Fides” e “pistis” in materia contrattuale’ in L. Garofalo (ed.) Il ruolo 
della buona fede oggettiva nell’esperienza giuridica storica e contemporanea (Atti del convegno 
internazionale di studi in onore di A. Burdese, Padova-Venezia-Treviso, 14-16 giugno 2001). Vol. 
2. Padova: 439-449. 
 
Martini, R. (2005) Diritti greci. Bologna. 
 
McCabe, D.F. (1986) Chios inscriptions: texts and list. Princeton. 
 
Mele, A. (1968) Società e lavoro nei poemi omerici. Napoli. 
 
Meyer, E. (1910) Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtsheorie und zur wirtschaftlichen und politischen 
Geschichte des Altertums. Halle. 
 
265 
 
Meyer, E.A. (2009) ‘A New Inscription from Chaironeia and the Chronology of Slave-
Dedication’ Techmēria 9: 53-89. 
 
Meyer, E.A. (2010) Metics and the Athenian phialai-inscriptions. A study in Athenian 
epigraphy and law. Stuttgart. 
 
Miller, M. (1953) ‘Greek Kinship Terminology’ The Journal of Hellenic Studies 73: 46-52. 
 
Morani, M. (1981) ‘Lat. “sacer” e il rapporto uomo-dio nel lessico religioso latino’ Aevum 
55.1: 30-46. 
 
Morris, I. (1987) Burial and Ancient Society, Cambridge. 
 
Morrow, G.R. (1939) Plato’s Law of Slavery and Its Relation to Greek Law. Urbana. 
 
Mossé, C. (1984) La Grèce archaïque d’Homère à Eschyle. Paris. 
 
Mulliez, D. (1992) ‘Les actes d’affranchissement delphiques’ Cahiers du Centre Gustave 
Glotz 3: 31-44. 
 
N’doye, M. (2008) ‘L’affranchissement dans les poèmes homériques: de la parenté 
illusoire à l’adoption’ in A. Gonzales (ed.) La fin du statut servile? Affranchissement, 
libération, abolition. XXXᵉ colloque du Groupe International de Recherches sur l’Esclavage dans 
l’Antiquité (GIREA). Vol. 1. Besançon: 17-27. 
 
Naiden, F. (2006) Ancient Supplication. Oxford & New York. 
 
Natali, C. (1999) Etica Nicomachea. Roma-Bari. 
 
Nieto, F.J. (1982): ‘Die Freilassung von Sklaven in Homerischer Zeit’ in J. Modrzejewski 
& D. Liebs (ed.) Symposion 1977. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen 
Rechtsgeschichte (Chantilly, 1- 4 Juni 1977). Wien: 21-29. 
 
Notopoulos, J.A. (1941) ‘The Slaves at the Battle of Marathon’ The American Journal of 
Philology 62.3: 352-354. 
 
Osborne, M.J. (1981) Naturalization in Athens. Vol. 1. Brussel. 
 
Osborne, M.J. (1983) Naturalization in Athens. Volumes III and IV. Brussel. 
 
Ostwald, M. (1986) From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law. Berkeley. 
 
Paoli, U.E. (1961) ‘“Famiglia” (diritto attico)’ in Novissimo Digesto Italiano. Vol. 7. Torino: 
35-42. 
 
266 
 
Paoli, U.E. (1976) ‘La difesa del possesso in diritto attico’ in U.E. Paoli (ed.) Altri studi di 
diritto greco e romano. Milano: 435-459. 
 
Paoli, U.E. (1976) Altri studi di diritto greco e romano. Milano. 
 
Papanastassiou, G. (2011) ‘The Preverb ἀπό in Ancient Greek’ Proceedings of the 9th 
International Conference on Greek Linguistic (Chicago, 29-31 october 2009). Chicago: 97-111. 
 
Papazarkadas, N. (2011) Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens. Oxford. 
 
Papazoglou, F. (1995) ‘Sur la condition des hilotes affranchis’ Historia 44.3: 370-375. 
 
Paradiso, A. (2008a) Forme di dipendenza nel mondo greco. Ricerche sul VI libro di Ateneo. 
Bari. 
 
Paradiso, A. (2008b) ‘Politiques de l’affranchissement chez Thucydide’ in A. Gonzales 
(ed.) La fin du statut servile? (affranchissement, liberation, abolition…) 30e colloque du Groupe 
International de Recherches sur L’Esclavage dans l’Antiquité (GIREA) – Besançon – 15-16-17 
décembre 2005. Vol. 1. Besançon: 65-76. 
 
Parker, R. (2004) ‘Introduction, literary and epigraphical sources’ in V. Lambrinoudakis 
& J.C. Balty (2004) Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum (ThCRA). Vol. 1. Processions, 
Sacrifices, Libations, Fumigations, Dedications. Los Angeles: 269-280. 
 
Patterson, O. (1982) Slavery and Social Death. Cambridge MA. 
 
Patterson, C.B. (1990) ‘Those Athenian Bastards’ Classical Antiquity 9: 40-73. 
 
Pelloso, C. (2007) ‘Le origini aristoteliche del συνάλλαγμα di Aristone’ in L. Garofalo 
(ed.) La compravendita e l’interdipendenza delle obbligazioni nel diritto romano. Vol. 1. Padova: 
3-100. 
 
Pelloso, C. (2008a) ‘Influenze greche nel regime romano della “hypotheca”?’ Teoria e 
Storia del Diritto Privato 1: 1-109. 
 
Pelloso, C. (2008b) Studi sul furto nell’antichità mediterranea, Padova. 
 
Pelloso, C. (2009/2010) ‘“Astreintes” e regime probatorio nel processo gortinio: 
considerazioni in margine a IC iv 72 I, 15-35’ Dike 12/13: 91-169. 
 
Pelloso, C. (2012) Themis e Dike in Omero. Ai primordi del diritto dei greci. Alessandria. 
 
Pelloso, C. (2013) ‘Sacertà e garanzie processuali in età regia e proto-repubblicana’ in L. 
Garofalo (ed.) Sacertà e repressione criminale in Roma arcaica. Napoli: 57-144. 
 
267 
 
Phillips, D.D. (2009) ‘Hypereides 3 and the Athenian law of contracts’ Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 139.1: 89-112. 
 
Pringsheim, F. (1950) The Greek Law of Sale. Weimar. 
 
Raaflaub, K. (2004) The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece. London. 
 
Rädle, H. (1969) Untersuchungen zum griechischen Freilassungen. Diss. München. 
 
Reduzzi Merola, F. (1990) Servo Parere. Napoli. 
 
Rensch, W. (1911) ‘De manumissionum titulis apud Thessalos’ Dissertationes Philologicae 
Halensis 18: 65-131. 
 
Rhodes, P.J. (1981) A Commentary on the Aristotelian ‘Athenaion Politeia’. Oxford. 
 
Rhodes, P.J. (2015) ‘Constitutional Law in the Greek World’ in E.M. Harris & M. 
Canevaro (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law. Oxford. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.013.12 
 
Robert, L. (1935) ‘Sur des inscriptions de Chios’ BCH 59: 453-470. 
 
Robertson, B.G. (2000) ‘The Scrutiny of New Citizens at Athens’ in V. Hunter & J. 
Edmondson (eds.) Law and Social Status in Classical Athens. Oxford: 149-174. 
 
Rouse, W.H.D. (1902) Greek Votive Offerings. Cambridge. 
 
Rubinstein, L. (2010) ‘Praxis: The enforcement of penalties in the late classical and early 
Hellenistic periods’ in G. Thür (ed.) Symposion 2009. Vorträge zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Seggau, 25-30 August 2009). Wien: 193-222. 
 
Rüpke, J. (2004) La religione dei Romani. Translated into Italian by U. Gandini. Torino. 
 
Samuel, A.E. (1965) ‘The role of paramone clauses in ancient documents’ Journal of Juristic 
Papyrology 15: 221-311. 
 
Santalucia, B. (1994) Studi di diritto penale romano. Roma. 
 
Saunders, T.J. (1991) Plato’s Penal Code. Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek 
Penology. Oxford. 
 
Scafuro, A. (forthcoming) ‘Response to J. Velissaropoulos-Karakostas’ in Symposion 2015.  
 
Schaps, D.M. (1976) ‘A Disputed Slave in Boeotia’ Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und 
Epigraphik 20: 63-64. 
268 
 
 
Scheid, J. (2003) An Introduction to Roman Religion. Edinburgh. 
 
Scherillo, G. (1945) Lezioni di diritto romano: Le Cose. Parte I. Concetto di cosa, Cose extra 
patrimonium. Milano. 
 
Schönbauer, E. (1933) ‘Paramone, Antichrese, und Hypothek’ ZSS 53: 422-450. 
 
Scialoja, V. (1933) Teoria della proprietà nel diritto romano. Vol. 1. Roma. 
 
Segré, M. (1944/1945) ‘Tituli Calymnii’ Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene 22/23: 
1-34. 
 
Sirks, A.J.B. (1981) ‘Informal Manumission and the Lex Junia’ in Revue Internationale des 
Droits de l’Antiquité 28: 247-276. 
 
Sirks, A.J.B. (1983) ‘The Lex Junia and the effects of informal manumission and iteration’ 
in Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 30: 211-292. 
 
Sokolowski, F. (1954) ‘The real meaning of sacral manumission’ The Harvard Theological 
Review 47.3: 173-181. 
 
Sosin, J.D. (2015) ‘Manumission with Paramone: Conditional Freedom?’ TAPA 145: 325-
381. 
 
Sosin, J.D. (forthcoming) ‘Ransom at Athens ([Dem]. 53.11)’ Historia 66.2. 
 
Stagakis, G. (1966) ‘“Therapontes” and “Hetairoi” in the Iliad as Symbols of the Political 
Structure of the Homeric State’ Historia 15.4: 408-419. 
 
Stagakis, G. (1968) ‘Ἔτης in the Iliad’ Historia 17.4: 385-399. 
 
Stagakis, G. (1971) ‘ΕΤΑ(Ι)ΡΙΖΩ in Homer as Testimony for the Establishment of an 
“Hetairos” Relation’ Historia 20: 524-533. 
 
Talamanca, M. (1990) Istituzioni di diritto romano. Milano. 
 
Talamanca, M. (2007) ‘Risposta a Alberto Maffi’ in E. Harris & G. Thür (eds.) Symposion 
2007. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Durham, 2.–6. September 
2007). Wien: 223-228. 
 
Tamiolaki, H.-M. (2008) ‘La liberation et la citoyenneté des esclaves aux Arginuses: 
Plateéns ou Athéniens? Un vers controversé d’Aristophane (Gren. 694) et l’idéologie de 
la société athénienne’ in A. Gonzales (ed.) La fin du statut servile? (affranchissement, 
269 
 
liberation, abolition…) 30e colloque du Groupe International de Recherches sur L’Esclavage dans 
l’Antiquité (GIREA) – Besançon – 15-16-17 décembre 2005. Vol. 1. Besançon: 53-63. 
 
Ter Beek, L. (2012) ‘Divine Law and the Penalty of ‘‘sacer esto’’ in Early Rome’ in O. 
Tellegen-Couperus (ed.) Law and Religion in Roman Republic. Leiden: 11-29. 
 
Thalmann, W. (1998) The Swineherd and the Bow: Representations of Class in the Odyssey. 
Ithaca & London. 
 
Thompson, D.J. (2011) ‘Slavery in the Hellenistic World’ in K. Bradley & P. Cartledge 
(eds.) The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Vol. I: The Ancient Mediterranean World. 
Cambridge: 194-213. 
 
Tod, M.N. (1901/1902) ‘Some unpublished “Catalogi Paterarum Argentearum”’ ABSA 8: 197-
230. 
 
Todd, S.C. (1993) The Shape of Athenian Law. Oxford. 
 
Todd, S.C. (1997) ‘Status and gender in Athenian public records’ in G. Thür & J. 
Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (eds.) Symposion 1995: Vorträge zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte. (Korfu, 1.-5. September 1995). Cologne & Vienna: 113-124. 
 
Todd, S.C. (2007) A Commentary on Lysias, Speeches 1-11. Oxford. 
 
Tucker, C.W. (1974) ‘Women in the Manumission Inscriptions at Delphi’ Transactions of 
the American Philological Association 112: 225-236. 
 
Van Effenterre, H. & F. Ruzé (1994) Nomima. Recueil d’inscriptions politiques et juridiques 
de l’archaisme grec. Roma. 
 
Van Straten, F. (2000) ‘Votives and Votaries in Greek Sanctuaries’ in R. Buxton (ed.) 
Oxford Readings in Greek Religion. Oxford: 191-223. 
 
Van Wees, H. (1992) Status Warriors. War, Violence and Society in Homer and History. 
Amsterdam. 
 
Velissaropoulos-Karakostas, J. (forthcoming) ‘Encore une fois sur les φιάλαι 
ἐξελευθερικαί’ in Symposion 2015. 
 
Vernant, J.P. (1980) Myth and Society in Ancient Greece. Translated by J. Lloyd. London. 
 
Villers, R. (1989) ‘Responsabilité pénale et responsabilité civile dans les droits 
helléniques’ in M. Boulet-Sautel (ed.) La responsabilité à travers les âges. Paris: 47-73. 
 
270 
 
Vlassopoulos, K. (2011) ‘Greek slavery: from domination to property and back again’ The 
Journal of Hellenic Studies 131: 115-130. 
 
von Savigny, F.K. (1840) System des heutigen römischen Rechts. Vol. 2. Berlin. 
 
Waldstein, W. (1986) Operae libertorum. Untersuchungen zur Dienstpflicht freigelassener 
Sklaven. Stuttgart. 
 
Westermann, W.L. (1946) ‘Two Studies in Athenian Manumission’ Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies 5.1: 92-104. 
 
Westermann, W.L. (1948a) ‘The Freedmen and the Slaves of God’ Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 92.1: 55-64. 
 
Westermann, W.L. (1948b) ‘The paramone as a general service contract’ Journal of Juristic 
Papyrology 2: 9-50. 
 
Westermann, W.L. (1955) The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity. Philadelphia. 
 
Whitehead, D. (2000) Hypereides. The Forensic Speeches. Oxford. 
 
Wilson, D. (2002) Ransom, Revenge and Heroic Identity in the Iliad. Cambridge. 
 
Wissowa, G. (1971) Religion und Kultus der Römer. München. 
 
Wolff, H.J. (1943) ‘The dike blabes in Demosthenes, or.51’ American Journal of Philology 64: 
316-324. 
 
Worthington, I. (1989) ‘Aristophanes’ “Frogs” and Arginusae’ Hermes 117.3: 359-363. 
 
Youni, M.S. (2008) ‘Sur le statut juridique de l’affranchi grec dans le monde gréco-
romain’ in A. Gonzales (ed.) La fin du statut servile? (affranchissement, libération, 
abolition…) 30e colloque du Groupe International de Recherches sur l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité 
(GIREA) - Besançon - 15-16-17 décembre 2005. Besançon: 161-74. 
 
Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. (2005) Not Wholly Free. The Concept of Manumission and the Status 
of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World. Leiden & Boston. 
  
271 
 
ABSTRACT (English) 
This work analyses the most important sources for manumission in Ancient Greece from a 
legal perspective, with the aim of unearthing the legal concepts and definitions that informed 
the liberation of slaves in the ancient documents. More specifically, this study will examine 
the legal nature of manumission in exchange for money while also analysing the legal 
condition of those ἀπελεύθεροι who, after their liberation, were required to perform 
παραμονή-services towards their former masters. This analysis will focus on the origins of 
manumission in Greece (which can be traced back to the Homeric poems), on the body of 
Hellenistic inscriptions from Delphi and Chaeronea, on some forensic speeches from 
Classical Athens and, finally, on the so-called ‘public manumissions’. All these sources are 
unequivocal in showing that, on the one hand, manumission in exchange for money had the 
nature of a bilateral legal transaction between the slaves’ masters and a third party, other 
than the slaves; and on the other hand, that the legal condition of manumitted slaves is 
always understood as one of freedom, independently of the possible imposition of post-
manumission obligations upon them. This work ultimately shows not only that the Greeks’ 
conceptualisation of manumission relied on a solid understanding of key legal concepts such 
as slavery, freedom and ownership, but also that this institution was informed by common 
legal principles shared by different geographical and chronological contexts of the Greek 
world. 
 
ABSTRACT (Italiano) 
Questa tesi si propone di indagare le principali fonti sull’affrancamento in Grecia secondo 
una prospettiva giuridica, al fine precipuo di gettare luce sugli istituti che caratterizzavano 
il fenomeno manumissorio nei documenti antichi. Più precisamente, il presente lavoro si 
propone di chiarire, da un lato, la natura giuridica dell’atto di manumissione a titolo oneroso 
e, dall’altro, di definire la condizione giuridica di quegli ἀπελεύθεροι che, successivamente 
alla loro liberazione, erano tenuti all’adempimento di doveri di παραμονή nei confronti dei 
loro precedenti proprietari. Attraverso un esame incentrato sulle origini della manumissione 
greca (che possono rinvenirsi all’interno dei poemi omerici), sul corpus di iscrizioni di età 
ellenistica proveniente da Delfi e Cheronea, sulle principali orazioni giudiziarie ateniesi, 
nonché – infine – sulle c.d. ‘manumissioni pubbliche’, questa tesi dimostra come, da una 
parte, i Greci concepivano la manumissione a titolo oneroso come un negozio giuridico 
bilaterale concluso tra il proprietario degli schiavi e un soggetto terzo rispetto agli schiavi 
stessi; e, dall’altra, come le fonti antiche descrivano inequivocabilmente la condizione 
giuridica degli schiavi liberati in termini di libertà, indipendentemente dall’imposizione o 
meno, in capo agli stessi, di doveri di παραμονή. Il presente lavoro, in definitiva, dimostra 
come l’affrancamento in Grecia non solo fosse improntato a una precisa definizione giuridica 
di concetti chiave quali schiavitù, libertà e diritto dominicale, ma fosse altresì caratterizzato 
da una sostanziale unitarietà di fondo che accomunava il fenomeno manumissorio in realtà 
cronologicamente e geograficamente distanti tra loro. 
 
